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INTRODUCTION 
This is a world of contradictions, but it may well tum out to be one of paradoxes. In this world 
States have traditionally created international law, whether expressly by means of the conclusion of 
treaties, or tacitly by means of contributing to a general practice accepted as law; after having cre-
ated international law States have violated it; and in response other States have performed as law 
enforcers. In doing all these things States have not acted, predominantly, according to legal princi-
ples, but rather according to political expediency and the needs perceived to exist either within their 
national communities or within the international community. Insofar as relations within the interna-
tional community are concerned, they have tended to guard their sovereignty by opposing centraliza-
tion, whether that would relate to law-making or to law enforcement. 
With regard to both the former and the latter this has manifested itself in the requirement of consent. 
Thus States claim to be bound by international law only to the extent that they have expressed their 
consent to treaties, generally by way of ratification, or to customary international law, by way of 
contributing to a practice accepted as law or otherwise persistently objecting the formation or exis-
tence of a rule. In a similar vein they have tended to enforce international law only if that suited their 
own self-interest, which in their perception lay with ad hoc alliances. It should come as no surprise 
then that States have neither proved consistent or reliable in their action, in their choice of allies, or 
in the choice of causes worthy of their attention. 
A break in these traditional patterns occurred due to World War I, which caused devastation on 
such a scale that, in order to prevent the repetition of such events, article 11 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations declared war or the threat of war, whether immediately affecting members of the 
League or not, a matter of concern to the whole League.1 The members undertook, in articles 13 and 
15, not to go to war against any Member which complied with the arbitral award or the recommen-
dations contained in a unanimous Council of the League of Nations report. If a member breached its 
covenants not to resort to war under articles 12, 13 and 15, article 16 provided that this would ipso 
facto constitute an act of war against the other members, which undertook immediately to subject 
the law-breaking State to the severance of trade, financial and certain other relations. Significantly 
the Covenant only stipulated that the Council of the League of Nations would "recommend" what 
effective military forces the members would severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to 
protect the covenants of the League. 
Yet the efforts of the League to maintain international peace and security proved ineffective, and af-
ter World War II another attempt was made to construe an effective collective security system. In 
contrast with the League system, article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations 
[hereinafter "Charter"] did not only prohibit recourse to war, but the threat or use of force by mem-
bers against States generally (with qualifications).2 That prohibition has been complemented by the 
obligation, expressed in article 2, paragraph 3, that members shall settle their disputes in such a man-
ner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. Furthermore, under Chap-
ters VII and VIII of the Charter the Security Council is endowed with the power to determine, in an 
exclusive manner, the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act af aggres-
sion, and to decide on the measures or action to be taken to maintain or restore international peace 
2 INTRODUCTION 
and security The only exception to that monopoly is constituted by article 51 on the right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence against armed attacks Yet even that right seems to be limited by the 
phrase "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security" 
Due to the existence of the Cold War, and the consequent frequent exercise of the veto power by 
the permanent members, the Security Council has not been able to function as it had been envisaged 
One of the reactions to the Security Council's near impossibility to act has been the adoption of 
General Assembly resolution 377 (V), in which the Assembly claimed, in situations of threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, the competence to recommend measures, includ-
ing the use of armed force, in case of breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, if the Security 
Council's inaction resulted from the lack of unanimity of the permanent members Another reaction 
by governments, but also by legal scholars, has been an attempt to reinterpret the basic Charter pro-
hibitions on the use of force, and the circumstances under which a justifiable use of force in self-
defence could take place 
On the legal level a number of interrelated developments has occurred, linked in one way or an-
other to the existence of an international community 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains some provisions on jus cogens3 Its 
basic article 53 stipulates that any treaty in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international 
law is void And a peremptory norm exists if a norm is accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted In its commentary 
the International Law Commission [hereinafter "Commission"] had indicated that the law of the 
Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force constituted a conspicuous example of a per-
emptory norm4 
One year later the International Court of Justice [hereinafter "Court"] proclaimed, in the Barcelona 
Traction Case, the distinction between obligations vis-a-vis States in the field of diplomatic protec-
tion and obligations towards the international community as a whole (or obligations erga omnes)s 
As examples of obligations in the latter category it named the prohibitions of aggression and geno-
cide, and the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protec-
tion from slavery and racial discrimination 
And finally the Commission adopted in 1976, as part of its effort to elaborate a draft on the interna-
tional responsibility of States, article 19, Part One, on the distinction between international delicts 
and international crimes* Article 19, paragraph 2, provides that "An internationally wrongful act 
which results from the breach by a State of an obligation so essential for the protection of fundamen-
tal interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that commu-
nity as a whole, constitutes an international crime " In paragraph 3, subs (a) to (d), the Commission 
went on to list a number of spheres of obligations of essential importance to the community, and 
specific examples of international crimes within such spheres The spheres mentioned by the Com-
mission related to the maintenance of international peace and security, the right of self-determination, 
the protection of the human being, and the protection of the human environment As specific exam-
ples the Commission named aggression, colonial domination, slavery, genocide, and apartheid, and 
massive pollution of the atmosphere or the seas 
A little bit over three months after the actual work on this thesis began, Iraq invaded Kuwait, oc-
cupied it, and eventually annexed it Fortunately the Cold War had not only ended after the coming 
into power of Gorbachov, it even led to veritable co-operation between the superpowers Nowhere 
was this shown as clearly as with the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, regarding which the Security Council 
adopted resolution after resolution At a point in time that already five of those had been adopted 
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(including a comprehensive trade embargo and a call for maritime enforcement of that embargo), 
then president Bush of the United States, addressing a joint session of Congress, observed:7 
"Out of these troubled times a new world order can emerge, a new era, freer from the threat 
of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in 
which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in har-
mony." 
This apparent promise of a "New World Order" also gained attention from international legal schol-
ars. The question in the mind of the present writer has been whether such a new world order would 
and could be grafted upon the old legal structures, or whether it required the modification of those 
old structures, going as far, possibly, of amendments to the Charter or the Statute of the Court 
[hereinafter 'Statute'].8 From that perspective the subject of this thesis, dealing in a broad sense with 
issues of community enforcement, has offered ample opportunities for reflection. 
The starting-point of this thesis lay with the (obiter) dictum of the Court in the Barcelona Trac-
tion Case on obligations towards the international community. Regarding those the Court claimed 
that they are the concern of all States, and that in view of the importance of the rights involved all 
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection: they are obligations erga omnes9 On 
the basis of those pronouncements claims have been made that all States possess a legal interest re-
garding violations of the prohibitions of aggression and genocide, and regarding violations of the ba-
sic rights of the human person (slavery and racial discrimination). 
Questions of legal interest are generally considered to relate to the right of a State to invoke the re-
sponsibility of a State engaged on the basis of its commission of an internationally wrongful act. The 
State committing an internationally wrongful act is nowadays generally referred to as "author State". 
The State entitled to invoke the author State's responsibility has been termed "injured State" by the 
Commission. On that it has adopted, in 198S, article 5, Part Two, which provides both a definition 
and certain preconceived categories of injured States.1" Paragraph 3 of the said article states that, in 
addition, all States are injured States if an internationally wrongful act constitutes an international 
crime. In view of the text of article 5, Part Two, as well as the reports of special rapporteurs and the 
discussion within the Commission, the research on this thesis shifted, in the course of time, from ob-
ligations erga omnes towards international crimes. Over and above issues of legal interest on the part 
of States, the question arose whether the existence of obligations towards the international commu-
nity (obligations erga omnes) should not also lead to a right of a personified international commu-
nity, that is, the United Nations, to invoke the responsibility of the author State of an international 
crime (see chapter two). 
From questions of legal interest this thesis developed in the direction of the question what-States or 
the United Nations could do on the basis of their right to invoke the responsibility of the author State 
of an international crime. Which forms of reparation could be demanded? Could they resort to eco-
nomic and other measures to pressure a State into acceding to their demands? Could they resort to 
the use of armed force and implement the author State's responsibility themselves? And finally, to 
what extent would it be possible to invoke an author State's responsibility for an international crime 
before the Court. 
The point of departure for the specific chapters in this thesis has been the Commission's definition 
of the phrase "international responsibility" in the Commentary to article 1, Part One, which would 
cover:" 
"(...) every kind of new relations which may arise, in international law, from the inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State, whether such relations are limited to the offending State 
and the directly injured State or extend also to other subjects of international law, and 
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whether they are centred on the duty of the guilty State to restore the injured State in its 
rights and repair the damage caused, or whether they also give the injured State itself or other 
subjects of international law the right to impose on the offending State a sanction admitted by 
international law." 
In view of this very broad definition few restrictions to the present thesis could be imposed. How-
ever, some limits result from the title of this thesis: "Obligations Erga Omnes and International 
Crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Re-
sponsibility of States". 
First of all this thesis is devoted to questions related to the responsibility of "States". Generally 
therefore it will not discuss the responsibility of any other actor or subject of international law. Con-
sequently the responsibility under international law of individuals, corporations, non-State entities or 
international organizations, inclusive the United Nations, are excluded from the scope of this thesis. 
Secondly, only the "international" responsibility of States will be discussed. Issues regarding any kind 
of responsibility which a State might incur due to the operation of rules within its own domestic legal 
system are excluded from the scope of this thesis. 
Thirdly, this thesis will not deal in any way with another topic under consideration by the Commis-
sion, namely "Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by Interna-
tional Law".12 Only responsibility incurred on the basis of an internationally "wrongful" act will be 
considered in this thesis. 
A fourth restriction is based on the theoretical nature of the research. In the light of the broad scope 
of the issues involved, the present writer deemed it both impractical and inadvisable to engage in an 
in depth research of the State practice of the differing fields. Going into all the State practice related 
to the responsibility of States generally, and reparation and reprisals in particular, the law on human 
rights, self-determination of peoples, and the use of armed force, did not present itself as the most 
appropriate way to approach the underlying and common questions which are central to this study. 
Regarding the choice of sources it may be said that the reports of the special rapporteurs on the 
topic of State responsibility, the discussion on that topic within the Commission, the texts of draft 
articles and their commentaries adopted by the Commission, have formed the basis of discussion for 
a large number of the issues argued on in this thesis. Though these texts and documents do not pres-
ent a formal source of law in the sense of article 38 of the Statute, their influence on judicial deci-
sions and teachings of the mostly highly qualified publicists of the various nations can already be 
verified. More importantly they influence both the practice of States and their juridical opinions on 
the rules of State responsibility. The latter takes place especially through the reports of the Commis-
sion to the General Assembly, as discussed by the Sixth Committee. 
As to the formal sources of law the present thesis has taken into account a number of treaties, mostly 
multilateral ones, in the field of international peace and security and human rights. With regard to 
rules of customary international law it may be said that at times instances of State practice have been 
referred to, though such reference should be considered to be of illustrative character in relation to 
the particular legal argument made in the text. Certain general principles of law, such as ex injuria 
jus non oritur, have been quoted in particular contexts. The bulk of the judicial decisions reviewed as 
to their relevance to the topics has been the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice [hereinafter 'Permanent Court'] and the Court. Certain pertinent arbitral and claims commis-
sion awards have been taken into account though. As to the publicists, that is literature and doctrine, 
preference and precedence has been given to those authors commenting upon the topics of obliga-
tions erga omnes and international crimes. 
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With the particular topics in mind, and especially the consequences which the commission of an in-
ternational crime might entail for the maintenance of international peace and security, the practice of 
the Security Council, as laid down in its resolutions, has been reviewed as to its relevance. The 
choice for restricting the review to Security Council resolutions, to the exclusion of General Assem-
bly resolutions, has been made taking into account the fact that the members of the United Nations 
have conferred on the Security Council, under article 24, the primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security; and the fact that under article 25 members have agreed to 
accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council taken in accordance with the Charter. The ab-
sence, generally, of any power to make decisions binding on members of the United Nations was 
another reason for the exclusion of Assembly resolutions. 
From a temporal point of view research has been limited, generally, to the twentieth century. 
However, although the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court has been taken fully into account, the 
practice related to the League of Nations has been disregarded. In contrast to the continuity as re-
gards the Statutes of the Permanent Court and the present Court, as expressed also in article 92 of 
the Charter, the Charter of the United Nations has not been based upon the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. Nor can the United Nations be considered, generally, a successor in law to the League of 
Nations. Considering the divergent and innovative features of the Charter, no useful purpose would 
have been served by examining also the practice related to the League. 
The end date of the research has been set at 30 June 1995. This has given the present writer the 
chance to take into account the latest report of special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz,13 the first devoted 
exclusively to international crimes, as well as the judgment of the Court on the East Timor Case.14 
Account has been taken also of the 1001 resolutions adopted by the Security Council by that date. 
Although the thesis is focused on the topics obligations erga omnes and international crimes, the 
theoretical nature of the research, as well as the relative novelty of the topics, has dictated a broad 
range of attention being devoted to matters not directly related to those topics. Thus the theory of 
State responsibility generally, that is, regarding international delicts, is discussed within the specific 
sections or subsections before attention is turned towards either obligations erga omnes or interna-
tional crimes. The main reason for this is that up to a relatively short time ago the rules on State re-
sponsibility had been considered to be of unitary character, that is to say that there existed only one 
régime of responsibility for all internationally wrongful acts.15 Special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz pro-
posed, and acted upon that proposal, to first elaborate the régime of responsibility applicable to in-
ternational delicts, and afterwards attempt to elaborate the régime applicable to international 
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crimes. 
The Commission has claimed, in 1976, that more severe consequences would attach to crimes than 
are applicable to delicts, but it indicated that it did not need to address those questions at that stage 
of drafting.17 However, an important final, but preliminary, question must be addressed, namely 
whether there are two régimes of State responsibility, one for international delicts and one for inter-
national crimes, or whether there are more. That question has been triggered by some observations 
of the Commission in the commentary to article 19 to the effect that:18 
"(...) it would be wrong to believe that there is a single basic régime of international respon-
sibility which is applicable to all internationally wrongful acts without distinction, and that all 
that is required is to add extra consequences to it for wrongful acts constituting international 
crimes. That may be true for some particular crimes, but there is no gainsaying the possible 
existence of others with respect to which the applicability of certain specific forms of respon-
sibility would exclude the applicability of the consequences prescribed for other wrongs. The 
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idea that there is some kind of least common denominator in the régime of international re-
sponsibility must be discarded." 
These remarks were made mostly in order to rebut a stance implying that the Commission should 
restrict itself to stating a general régime of State responsibility, and that it would leave it to custom-
ary or conventional law to lay down the régime applicable to international crimes.19 But it cannot but 
be noted that it had stated earlier on in the commentary when positing the more severe consequences 
in case of international crimes.20 
"This does not, of course, mean that all these crimes are equal - in other words, that they at-
tain the same degree of seriousness and necessarily entail all the more severe consequences 
incurred, for example, by the supreme international crime, namely, a war of aggression." 
There can be no doubt that the international crime of aggression takes a prominent position in inter-
national law. While most international crimes have been regulated, to differing degrees, in conven-
tional instruments, the only conduct regarding which collective enforcement has been envisaged 
concerns also the crime of aggression. It cannot be doubted that the crime of aggression is the su-
preme crime in international law, though that position is due more to the fact that its commission 
disturbs the relations between States in the most serious way. It cannot be said, at least not a priori, 
that the commission of other international crimes causes less damage, or that their commission would 
be any less abhorrent than the crime of aggression. 
Now while there are certainly grounds to single out the Charter of the United Nations for differential 
treatment,21 that is not the same as saying that the régime applicable to cases of aggression should be 
different from the régime applicable to the other international crimes. Furthermore, one would won-
der whether it would be feasible for the Commission to embark on the codification or progressive 
development in regard to crimes in total disregard of the régime of State responsibility developed 
over the years. The Commission posited its distinction between delicts and crimes on the view that it 
existed de lege lata. Yet it would seem that one of the difficulties encountered during the elaboration 
of the régime of crimes has been the lack of any clear idea as to which aggravated consequences 
could be envisaged in case of crimes. In that light one would expect any régime applicable to crimes 
to be grafted upon the general régime of State responsibility applicable to delicts. The elaboration of 
a régime on crimes should therefore proceed on the assumptions that all those consequences which 
attach to the commission of an international delict also attach to the commission of a crime,12 that 
there are only two régimes of responsibility, and that those régimes are substantially uniform in char-
acter. 
The purpose of the research has been to investigate, from a legal perspective, whether it is possi-
ble to fruitfully elaborate a régime of responsibility applicable in case of crimes, that is, a substantially 
aggravated régime. To that end it has been attempted to identify features of the régime of responsi-
bility applicable to international delicts which could or should be modified in order to impose more 
severe consequences on the author State of an international crime. In the same vein the assumptions 
that there are only two régimes of responsibility, and that those are uniform in character, will have 
been put to the test, and they will be reverted to at the end. Furthermore, it will be, and has been, as-
sumed that the underlying purpose for imposing more severe consequences on the author State of an 
international crime lies with the perceived need, lacking in regard to delicts, to provide for the more 
effective suppression of conduct constituting crimes. 
On the basis of the foregoing observations this thesis will be subdivided into the following 
chapters. Chapter one will investigate the structures related to interests, rules, obligations and rights 
in international law and the legal interests of States. Chapter two will deal with obligations erga 
omnes, international crimes, and the legal interests of the international community and the United 
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Nations Chapter three will concern the obligation of an author State to provide reparation, and the 
corresponding right of (an) injured State(s) or the United Nations to demand such reparation, in case 
of international crimes Chapter four will examine the right of (an) injured State(s) or the United 
Nations to resort to non-military countermeasures in response to international crimes Chapter five 
will look into the right of (an) injured State(s) and the United Nations to resort to armed force in 
response to international cnmes Finally chapter six will discuss the right of (an) injured State(s) and 
the United Nations to have recourse to the International Court of Justice in relation to international 
crimes 
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CHAPTER 1 
STRUCTURES RELATED TO INTERESTS, RULES, OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS Ш 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEGAL INTERESTS OF STATES 
1.1. Introduction 
The present chapter deals with questions of legal interest generally, and culminates in an examination 
of issues related to jus cogens, obligations erga omnes and international crimes The starting point 
was constituted by the observation by the Commission that the relations resulting from the commis­
sion of an internationally wrongful act might be established between ' "( ) the offending State and 
the directly injured State or extend also to other subjects of international law, ( ) " The term 
"directly injured State" will be taken to mean a State against which an internationally wrongful act is 
directed, or a State which is in one way or another affected, in an exclusive manner, by the wrongful 
act of the author State 
It seems appropriate to start the present chapter by investigating the notion of interest, notwith­
standing that that notion does not appear to have any specific legal connotation The notion of inter­
est, when addressed by jurists, is usually supplemented by adjectives, such as in "legal interest", 
"interest of a legal nature", and "political interest". The latter two phrases are not relevant for the 
examination in this chapter, which concerns primarily the issue of legal interest After having ex­
plored, generally, the notion of interest, the distinction between interests pur sang and interests pro­
tected by international law will be reflected upon A further topic of discussion will be the way in 
which interests come to be protected by international law, that is, through the elaboration of primary 
rules of international law2 
Primary rules of international law can be said to lay down obligations or rights for those bound by 
the rule concerned In regard to obligations and rights alike the question may be raised whether there 
do not exist obligations correlative to rights and/or rights correlative to obligations This latter corre­
lation, rights correlative to obligations, leads to observations regarding the possession of a correla­
tive right as a prerequisite to demand the performance of obligations by other States Another point 
of discussion concerns the sources laying down the rules that provide for the correlative rights to 
demand the performance of obligations by other States Finally the exercise of such correlative rights 
will be linked up to the notion of legal interest 
At this point the criteria to determine whether a State can be held to possess a legal interest in the 
performance of obligations by other States must be examined Consecutively will be discussed the 
criteria of the general interest in the performance of obligations, the common interest in the perform­
ance of obligations, and the performance of obligations towards specific States Finally attention will 
be devoted to the notions of damage (material, moral and legal) and the effects resulting from an in­
ternationally wrongful act The examination of criteria provides the basis for establishing an a priori 
categorization of legal interests regarding the performance of obligations by States Apart from cer­
tain non-problematic categories the following will be discussed legal interests, prejudice and the in­
dividual interest of States, legal interests, prejudice and the collective interest of States, and legal 
interests and the posited collective interest 
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From these attention is turned towards a final category of legal interests, to be determined by ref-
erence to the content, or subject-matter, of certain rules and their recognized importance for the in-
ternational community In positive law the recognized importance of certain rules constituted the 
basis for the introduction of the concept of jus cogens in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties3 Subsequently, so it seems, the Court picked up on this development and proclaimed, in the 
Barcelona Traction Case, the existence of obligations erga omnes * The Commission in turn took 
note of these and certain other developments, and adopted, in article 19, Part One, of its draft arti-
cles on State responsibility, a distinction between international delicts and international crimes5 
It is proposed to examine, in section 2, interests and their expression in international law Section 
3 will discuss obligations, rights and their correlation in international law This is followed, in section 
4, by certain observations on the necessity of correlative rights, their sources, their exercise and the 
requirement of a legal interest Section 5 then examines the criteria to determine the existence of a 
legal interest in the performance of obligations Section 6 goes on to postulate certain categories of 
legal interests of States The concept of jus cogens will constitute the subject of section 7 In section 
8 then the Court's dictum on obligations erga omnes will be discussed Finally section 9 will examine 
the theory of international crimes 
1.2. Interests and their legal expression in international law 
12 1 A definition of interests? 
The question has to be raised what the real meaning is of the notion of "interest"7 It is clear that, 
grammatically speaking, it is mostly used in context with "have an interest in something" But of 
course this begs the question, because "interest" is supplemented by the adjective "in" Gervais 
nevertheless offers a definition of what an interest should be considered to be* 
"La notion d'«intérêt» se développe sur un plan pratique, celui de «l'existence» ou plus con-
crètement de l'utilité Un «intérêt» peut se définir comme une utilité, qui peut être matérielle 
ou morale, actuelle ou future, qui est en général égoïste mais peut aussi être altruiste Cette 
«utilité», caractéristique de l'intérêt, consiste à avoir h possibilité matérielle soit de satisfaire 
ses besoins, soit d'obtenir des avantages, soit d'éviter des inconvénients Cette notion ab-
straite de l'«intérêt» en général a un contenu indéfini, en tant qu'elle recouvre toutes les utili-
tés imaginables, «les divers intérêts concrets» correspondant chacun à une utilité particulière 
ayant un contenu determiné identifiable par sa spécificité et qui, de ce fait, pourraient être ap-
pelés intérêts «nommés» " 
It may be granted to Gervais that interests will normally be directed towards the fulfilment of needs, 
obtaining advantages, or avoiding disadvantageous effects But States have many interests, and it 
may happen that a State will choose for the prevailing of the one that is more favourable to another 
State than to its own Thus the altruistic (social or humanitarian) interest, which Gervais mentions, 
but fails to relate to his definition of "utilité", may have as strong an impetus as interests of an ego-
centric nature Furthermore, Gervais construes "utilité" as the material possibility of achieving a cer-
tain goal However, an interest does not of necessity relate to the possession of the means necessary 
for achieving that goal, but to the realization of what an interest stands for, whatever the means 
Though it is clearly possible to mention the existence of an interest, still the expression "have an 
interest in something" seems to be inadequate, because, although it states the object "something", it 
fails to make clear what the objective is with regard to that object. Thus the owner of the interest 
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has, with regard to that "something", a certain objective in mind in the sense that a certain course of 
conduct is contemplated to the exclusion of others. This objective in regard to such course of con-
duct relates either to maintaining a certain status quo, or to changing it In this respect Arato ob-
serves. 
"Die Rechtssubjekte begleiten den Verlauf der Dinge mit Werturteilen und qualifizieren den 
Eintritt oder Nichteintritt gewisser Umstände, die Fortdauer oder Veränderung der Zustände 
als erwünscht Der Wert, den der Eintritt oder Nichteintritt einer bestimmten Veränderung für 
den Betreffenden hat, ist das Interesse." 
This objective will inevitably have to be implemented by means of certain acts or omissions on the 
part of States,8 and this whether or not the status quo is to be maintained or changed The Diction-
naire published by the Union Académique Internationale refers to an interest ("intérêt") as follows:9 
"Terme désignant ce qui affecte matériellement ou moralement une personne physique ou ju-
ridique, l'avantage matériel ou moral que présente pour elle une action ou abstention, le 
maintien ou le changement d'une situation." 
It seems, however, that "interests" do not have an autonomous existence of their own From these 
observations it will be clear that an interest cannot be divorced from the actual circumstances in 
which it exists Normally if an interest is advanced regarding a certain subject-matter," without 
specifying the objective to be pursued therewith, it will retain its inherently abstract character. This 
situation does not change, not even when it relates to a certain concrete situation, for so long as it is 
not indicated to what extent such an interest is to result in the maintenance of, or change in, the 
status quo Nevertheless it is possible to hold, in the abstract, that an interest always manifests itself 
in relation to a certain desired course of conduct, the realization of which is sought to be achieved by 
States or other subjects of international law Brunnée for instance states " 
"At the same time, however, the level of'coinciding interests' provides the foundation for the 
'common interests' concepts' significance on the legal level This flows from the fact that the 
existence of (coinciding) interests generally inspires efforts to see them realized (. .) Such 
realization is, in its scope and effectiveness, dependent on the degree of agreement between 
the parties concerned This agreement, in turn, is most stable and of greatest continuity if it 
can crystallize into a rule of international law ( ) Accordingly, international law in general is 
a result of the 'common interest' of the states in dependable relations guided by certain basic 
principles " 
Most of the time an interest, a desired course of conduct, will be advanced by States or other 
subjects of international law, and allocation will thus be instantly made 12 However, it may happen 
that a State claims that an interest advanced by another State, in the sense of a desired course of 
conduct, is not in the interest of the State advancing it, or that its very existence is being denied In-
deed, for the most part a claimed interest will be considered, by the State advancing it, also to be in 
its interest To put it differently, that the realization of a certain course of conduct is, subjectively 
speaking, favourable to that State Yet it must be stressed that this aspect of the term interest is not 
inherent in the term discussed If, as observed above, an interest manifests itself in relation to a cer-
tain course of conduct, then that course of conduct need not be favourable to the State advancing it, 
and nor need it entail advantages for it u The only desire for the State advancing an interest is that a 
certain course of conduct will be realized, and only in the latter sense can one claim that any interest 
advanced inevitably possesses a subjective aspect. The importance of this argument cannot be 
stressed enough, for it happens all too often that an asserted interest, a desired course of conduct, is 
confused with the "allegedly" required condition that such course of conduct must also be in the in-
terest of the person demanding the realization ofthat course of conduct 
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12 2 The distinction between interests pur sang and interests protected by international law 
There can be no doubt that since there are so many individuals and States, there exist an enormous 
variety of interests in national communities and within the international community Yet this does not 
mean that each and every interest is protected by law Indeed, it seems to be a function of law to 
separate interests worthy of protection from those which are not to benefit from such protection 
This is of course not to say that at a certain point in time all interests worthy of protection are indeed 
protected by law For law is not so much a static process, but a dynamic one, and the development of 
the law is as such very much dependent upon the social circumstances prevailing within the com-
munity While therefore law as a social phenomenon may emerge as a result of the commonly felt 
needs within a community, nevertheless the progressing complexities of a community will necessitate 
the institutionalized development of law, with the consequent institution of law as a legal phenome-
non As a counterpart of these developments the law will tend to become more rigid, and less sensi-
tive to the changing social circumstances For it will become bound to those legal techniques 
established in the course of time for changing the law, and in the meanwhile the law as it stands will 
have to be applied M Naturally such divergences may have been foreseen, and may have been ad-
dressed by some special legal technique for settling conflicts in case of any such divergence occur-
ring 1S But, in the absence of such special legal techniques, interests will only be protected by law to 
the extent that they have found expression in that law through some legal technique. 
In international law the dichotomy between interests pur sang and interests protected by law has 
been particularly underlined by the Court in the 1966 South West Africa Cases, where it held '* 
'49 The Court must now tum to certain questions of a wider character Throughout this case 
it has been suggested, directly or indirectly, that humanitarian considerations are sufficient in 
themselves to generate legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and should pro-
ceed accordingly The Court does not think so It is a court of law, and can take account of 
moral principles only in so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form Law 
exists, it is said, to serve a social need, but precisely for that reason it can do so only through 
and within the limits of its own discipline Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be 
rendered 
50 Humanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis for rules of law, just as, 
for instance, the preambular parts of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and po-
litical basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set out Such considerations do not, 
however, in themselves amount to rules of law All States are interested - have an interest -
in such matters But the existence of an 'interest' does not of itself entail that this interest is 
specifically juridical in character 
51 ( ) The sacred trust, it is said, is a 'sacred trust of civilization' Hence all civilized nations 
have an interest in seeing that it is carried out An interest, no doubt, - but in order that this 
interest may take on a specifically legal character, the sacred trust itself must be or become 
something more than a moral or humanitarian ideal In order to generate legal rights and obli-
gations, it must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal form " 
The validity of these statements as such - irrespective of the legal consequences attached to this 
position by the Court - seems to be self-evident Once law as a legal phenomenon has emerged 
within a certain community (that is to say once the legal techniques applicable for the creation of 
legal rules and their enforcement have been determined in an exclusive manner), an institute or organ 
charged with applying the law cannot, or at least should not, venture to do what is outside its 
competence Thus if a certain interest has so far not been accorded the protection by law through the 
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applicable procedures, then such an interest cannot be granted legal protection by those charged with 
the application or enforcement of law Eventually such legal protection may come to be accorded 
through the law creating process 
Although the above mentioned quotation is concerned with humanitarian interests, the division be-
tween interests pur sang and interests protected by law may be generalized In the Barcelona Trac-
tion Case the Court held in the context of the institute of diplomatic protection l7 
"86 Hence the Belgian Government would be entitled to bring a claim if it could show that 
one of its rights had been infringed and that the acts complained of involved the breach of an 
international obligation arising out of a treaty or a general rule of law The opinion has been 
expressed that a claim can accordingly be made when investments by a State's nationals 
abroad are thus prejudicially affected, and that since such investments are part of a State's 
national economic resources, any prejudice to them directly involves the economic interests of 
the State 
87 Governments have been known to intervene in such circumstances not only when their 
interests were affected, but also when they were threatened However, it must be stressed that 
this type of action is quite different from and outside the field of diplomatic protection When 
a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals it is, as indicated in 
paragraph 33, bound to extend to them the protection of the law However, it does not 
thereby become an insurer ofthat part of another State's wealth which these interests repre-
sents Every investment of this kind carries certain risks The real question is whether a right 
has been violated, which right could only be the right of the State to have its nationals enjoy a 
certain treatment guaranteed by general international law, in the absence of any treaty appli-
cable to the particular case." 
And earlier it had observed 18 
"46 It has also been contended that the measures complained of, although taken with respect 
to Barcelona Traction and causing it direct damage, constituted an unlawful act vis-à-vis 
Belgium, because they also, though indirectly, caused damage to the Belgian shareholders in 
Barcelona Traction This again is merely a different way of presenting the distinction between 
injury in respect of a right and injury to a simple interest But, as the Court has indicated, evi-
dence that damage was suffered does not ipso facto justify a diplomatic claim Persons suffer 
damage or harm in most varied circumstances This in itself does not involve the obligation to 
make reparation Not a mere interest affected, but solely a right infringed involves responsi-
bility, so that an act directed against and infringing only the company's rights does not involve 
responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests are affected " 
The latter part of this quotation, however, appears to reflect, more properly speaking, upon the dis-
tinction between interests and rights arising under municipal law 
The review of the distinction between interests pur sang and interests protected by international 
law cannot be complete without some attention being devoted to the Lac Lanoux Award, in which 
the Tribunal observed '9 
"Il faut d'abord déterminer quels sont les «intérêts» qui doivent être saufgardés L'interpréta-
tion stricte de l'article 11 permettrait de soutenir qu'il ne sagit que des intérêts correspondant 
à un droit des riverains Cependant, diverses considérations déjà dégagées par le Tribunal 
conduisent à une interprétation plus large II faut tenir compte, quelle qu'en soit la nature, de 
tous les intérêts qui risquent d'être affectés par les travaux enterpris, même s'ils ne corre-
spondent pas à un droit, seule cette solution correspond aux termes de l'article 16, à l'esprit 
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des traités pyrénéens, aux tendances qui se manifestent en matière d'aménagements hydro-
électriques dans la pratique internationale actuelle." 
Gervais appears inclined, on the basis of this passage, to introduce a generalized differentiation to the 
effect that there would be interests ("intérêts simples"), legitimate interests ("intérêts légitimes") and 
rights ("droits"). Such legitimate interests, in contradistinction to simple interests, would enjoy a 
certain protection, even if not as complete as rights.1" And he notes that on this score the Tribunal 
claimed as regards the measure of protection to be afforded to such legitimate interests:21 
"Le Tribunal est d'avis que l'Etat d'amont a, d'après les règles de la bonne foi, l'obligation de 
prendre en considération les différents intérêts en présence, de chercher à leur donner toutes 
les satisfactions compatibles avec la poursuite de ses propres intérêts et de montrer qu'il a à 
ce sujet un souci réel de concilier les intérêts des autres riverains avec les siens propres." 
The difference, according to Gervais, between rights and legitimate interests is to be found in the fact 
that the interest protected by a right is specified ("nommé") and is accorded absolute protection, 
whereas what is concerned in the case of legitimate interests are unspecified interests that are only 
accorded the safeguard of having to be taken into consideration by another State for the purpose of 
trying, in good faith, to reconcile them with its own interests.22 
While the said distinction is not entirely without merits, especially if applied to the process of deter-
mining whether or not a certain interest is protected by international law, it seems nevertheless that it 
cannot be generalized.23 First of all because it derives from the interpretation of a provision of a 
treaty which explicitly mentions the protection of interests.24 Moreover, the Tribunal places this 
construction upon the provision in question with reference to developments taking place in practice. 
Such practice relates, amongst others, to the specific subject of liability for acts not prohibited by in-
ternational law.25 Since conduct relating to this area is not always regulated by international law, one 
can only measure the interest of one State against that of another.26 Furthermore, one may note that 
this issue is as such connected with the view one takes with regard to the role to be played by rules 
of international law that regulate the conduct of States. It was held for instance, by the Permanent 
Court, that restrictions on the independence of States cannot be presumed.27 Yet does that mean that 
in the absence of any rule restrictive of a State's freedom it can do anything it wants? The least that 
can be demanded from States is that they show some regard for the interests of other States.28 This 
flows from the sovereign equality of States (since the freedom of one State restricts the freedom of 
another),29 and from the principle of good faith. 
1.2.3. Interests and their protection by means of elaboration of primary rules of international law: 
the common interest 
After having reached the conclusion that not all interests are protected by international law one is led 
to the question: which are the legal techniques by means of which interests come to be protected by 
international law? This concerns a somewhat different aspect than the matter of sources of interna-
tional law.30 For the question of sources relates to the manner in which international law is created 
(formal technique), whereas the means of protection relate to the manner in which such protection is 
legally effected (material technique). The way in which international law primarily protects interests 
is through the elaboration of rules. As has been observed above, in subsection 1.2.1, an interest 
manifests itself in a desired course of conduct, whose realization is sought to be achieved by a State 
or another subject of international law. But it is obvious that such desired courses of conduct, sub-
jectively appreciated, need not be shared by all the States making up the international community.31 
States may of course hold parallel interests with regard to a certain subject-matter, and may even 
14 CHAPTER 1 
agree upon the course of conduct to be followed therewith 3Î Yet that does not suffice to make it the 
common interest, for, as long as these parallel interests have not been established in accordance with 
the formal sources of international law, any State may legitimately decide to withdraw from its ear-
lier held position with regard to the desired course of conduct But, once these parallel interests have 
found expression through some formal source of international law, no State can escape the legal ef-
fects resulting therefrom (unless other legal rules provide for opting out of such legal effects) From 
that moment on the course of conduct laid down in a rule of international law constitutes the com-
mon interest for those subjects obligated or favoured by the rule33 The consequence is that, though 
subjective interests are predominant in the phase of formulating and creating the rule,34 they lose 
much of their potence as soon as the rule actually comes into existence From that moment on it is 
the expressed intention, the expressed course of conduct, and, more particularly, the expressed 
common interest that prevails over existing subjective interests 3S 
At this point it has to be observed that the interests put forward by States participating in the 
creation of a certain rule need not necessarily coincide fully with the interests which eventually come 
to be protected by the rule in question Judge Altamira, in his separate opinion to the Case concern-
ing Diversion of Water from the Meuse, observed M 
"( ) there is the fact - entirely natural since we are dealing with a treaty - that the Treaty of 
May 12th, 1863, involves obligations and that these obligations must be fulfilled The fact that 
the Treaty is chiefly concerned with the adjustment of the Parties' interests and not with dif-
ferences of a really legal nature does not mean that no legal relationship is established as re-
gards the fulfilment of the agreement m regard to interests These interests may have been the 
reason for the conclusion of the Treaty, but once the Treaty has come into existence, the 
rights and obligations which it expressly or implicitly creates take precedence The interests 
remain in the background and can only be taken into account in so far as is permitted by the 
legal provisions embodied in the agreement between the Parties They can never take the 
place of these provisions or impede their execution " 
As may be recalled an interest, as it relates to a certain subject-matter, has as its objective the reali-
zation of a certain course of conduct (maintenance or change of the status quo), and only an inter-
pretation of the rule in question may show whether or not it protects the interest of a certain State 
However, for the most part, as may be deduced from the quotation, rules do not even refer to the 
interest protected, let alone to the interests of the States participating in its creation Mostly they are 
drafted in prescriptive terms, and if that is the case they approximate the grammatical meaning of the 
law's obliging character, and thus refer directly towards the status quo or at least to the objective to 
be attained in relation therewith If one takes for instance the prohibitory rule "States shall refrain, in 
their international relations, from the use force", it is clear that it may either relate to a situation in 
which States are in the habit of using force and such practice is henceforth prohibited, or to a situa-
tion in which they do not use force and, since it is desirable that they should abstain from using force 
for the future, such practice shall become prohibited In the first case the rule is intended to change 
the prevailing status quo, whereas in the second it has as objective the maintenance of the status quo 
Notwithstanding that it is the status quo to which the formulation of a rule directly refers, or at least 
to its maintenance or its change, it is nevertheless more correct, in this example, to state that a rule 
prescribes a certain course of conduct, consisting of either acts or omissions Unless the rule in 
question is permissive in character, in which case the course of conduct mentioned in the rule may be 
followed 
The protection of interests has, generally speaking, taken place by means of the elaboration of 
primary rules of international law Those may either prescribe a certain course of conduct, prohibit it, 
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or, to the contrary, permit it.37 A prescriptive rule of international law can be said to lay down an ob­
ligation to adopt particular conduct for those States subjected to the rule A prohibitive rule lays 
down an obligation of abstention regarding particular conduct for those States subjected to the rule 
And a permissive rule creates rights for the States to which the rule applies Obligations and rights 
will be discussed in the following section, but apart from these some correlations between the two 
will be addressed 
1.3. Obligations, rights and their correlation in international law 
The late judge Ago, then special rapporteur, discussing how to formulate the objective element as a 
condition for the existence of an internationally wrongful act (article 3, Part One, of the ILC-draft),M 
reflected upon the nature of rules, and what springs from them, obligations and rights, in the follow­
ing manner 3 9 
"The rule is law in the objective sense Its function is to attribute in certain conditions 
subjective legal situations - rights, faculties, powers and obligations - to those to whom it is 
addressed It is these situations which, as their global appellation indicates, constitute law in 
the subjective sense, it is in relation to these situations that the subject's conduct operates 
The subject freely exercises or refrains from exercising its subjective right, faculty or power, 
and freely fulfils or violates its obligation, but it does not 'exercise' the rule and likewise does 
not 'violate' it It is its duty which it fails to carry out and not the principle of objective law 
from which that duty flows This does not mean that the obligation whose breach is the 
constituent element of an internationally wrongful act must necessarily flow from a rule, at 
least in the proper meaning ofthat term The obligation in question may very well have been 
created and imposed upon a subject by a particular legal act, a decision of a judicial or arbitral 
tribunal, a decision of an international organization, etc " 
An example may be in order to clarify the difference between the rule, as objective law, and the 
obligation, as the concrete emanation ensuing therefrom A well-established rule of customary inter­
national law, also laid down in conventional law, provides that a State must grant immunity to per­
sons accredited as diplomatic agents ** That rule is binding on all States, and thus States are under 
the obligation to grant immunity to diplomatic agents Let us suppose that a certain national X of 
State A enters into State B, breaches a rule (or obligation maybe) of the criminal code and is appre­
hended by the police authorities of State Β. X is then brought before a judge, and at that moment 
claims to be a diplomatic agent The judge, as an organ of State B, is clearly bound under the rele­
vant rule of customary international law to grant immunity to such agents But immediately the 
question rises whether the rule applies to X Is X really a diplomatic agent? Because if he is not, 
State В will not be under any obligation to grant X the immunity that is claimed To determine 
whether or not a person is a diplomatic agent it is necessary to define what is meant by a diplomatic 
agent, the conditions to be fulfilled, and whether those have been complied with (primarily articles 1 
and 7 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). So if X is not covered by the definition of 
diplomatic agents, or if additional requirements have not been met, State В will not be under the ob­
ligation to grant immunity to X Obviously State В is bound by the rule to grant immunity to diplo­
matic agents, but in the concrete circumstances at hand no obligation will exist to adopt conduct in 
conformity with that rule 
It follows from these observations that the formulation of a rule of international law41 presupposes 
the use of generalized or abstract terms,42 and this may very well be explained on the basis of the 
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particular circumstances prevailing at the time of its creation, as well as the, most of the time con-
flicting, interests held by the subjects participating in such creation. Having indicated the relation of 
rules to obligations and rights, some elaboration of the latter is called for. 
1.3.1. Obligations 
The first and foremost manner of legal protection provided by international law to interests is that 
it is binding for those subjected to it.43 Thus it imposes upon its subjects respect for its rules. In a 
general sense the absence of law means that any State is free to do as it wills, and the primary func-
tion of law, qualitatively speaking, lies in the restrictive character it possesses once it exists.44 Thus 
law obliges, and from this, grammatically speaking, derives the term "obligation". The subjective 
nature of obligations, as opposed to the objective nature of rules,45 leads to the conclusion that it is 
not sufficient to prove that a rule exists, what it prescribes and to whom it applies, but that it is also 
necessary, having regard to the particular circumstances prevailing at the time of its application, to 
specify to what extent the rule obligates States to follow a certain course of conduct in those cir-
cumstances. An additional argument for using the term "obligation" may be mentioned in that a rule 
of international law need not be binding on every individual subject of international law. For treaties 
are considered to be binding only for those States which have expressed their consent to be bound, 
and a rule of customary international law may, at the time of its creation, be persistently opposed to 
by a certain State. If one were to mention the breach of a rule as a constituent element of an interna-
tionally wrongful act one would still have to determine whether or not that rule is binding for the 
State concerned, and whether or not it imposes some obligation on that State. The Commission, in 
phrasing article 3, Part One, therefore correctly opted for the use of the term "obligation" instead of 
"rule":46 
"There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when: 
(a) conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international 
law; and 
(b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State." 
A few words may be in order regarding the use by the Commission of the term "breach of an obli-
gation" in article 3 of the ILC-draft. Preceding observations make it clear that, although the choice 
for the term "obligation" is correct, it is not proper to speak of the breach or violation of an obliga-
tion. For what a State must do according to a certain rule is to adopt the conduct prescribed by that 
rule.47 What happens therefore in reality in case of a breach of an obligation is that the status quo is 
maintained where it should have been changed, or is changed where it should have been main-
tained.48 Article 3, Part One, of the ILC-draft therefore incorrectly mentions that certain conduct at-
tributable to a State may constitute the "breach" of an international obligation. This preference for 
the word "breach" may probably be explained by the wish to accentuate the normative character of 
law, since conduct inconsistent with an obligation results in a situation contrary to what is prescribed 
by the legal system. Thus the "breach" of an obligation stresses the fact that conduct contravening 
the law is generally disapproved of. Yet although law is not neutral with regard to such conduct, 
nevertheless it is better not to prejudge the application of the law to that conduct. Accordingly, it 
would be better to use the phrase "non-fulfilment of an international obligation", or "the adoption of 
conduct inconsistent with what is required of a State under an international obligation".49 That is 
more or less how article 16, Part One, of the ILC-draft coins it:50 
"There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in 
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation." 
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However, in order to conform to prevailing legal terminology reference will be made hereafter to 
"breach of an obligation", as well as, naturally, the phrase "internationally wrongful act". 
1.3.2. Rights 
While the first and foremost means of protecting interests lies in restricting the otherwise existing 
freedom of States to do as they will by means of rules creating obligations, rules of international law 
may, instead of being drafted in prescriptive or prohibitive terms, be coined in permissive terms. If 
such is the case the rule in question confers upon its subjects an entitlement to engage in the conduct 
specified in the rule. This construction concerns, typically, what are called "rights".51 What is permit-
ted by the rule in question and what it contemplates is, for the most part, not legal action, but physi-
cal action. Thus the rule which establishes a right legitimizes conduct that would otherwise have 
been illegal, conduct that arguably had been considered to be illegal, or conduct that had not been 
regulated before by any rule of international law.52 
Of old the juridical meaning of the word "right" has been defined as a "legally protected inter-
est".ö But one may note that Bilge observes:54 
"(...) la violation d'une obligation est, toujours, en même temps, une lésion de l'intérêt qu'elle 
protège." 
It is for this reason that it is incorrect to describe a right as a legally protected interest, for rules, 
whether permissive (laying down rights) or prescriptive and prohibitive (laying down obligations), 
always protect certain interests. But it does not make much sense to describe an obligation as a le-
gally protected interest, for the immediate reaction to such a statement would be "whose interest"? 
The basis for the confused definition of a right as a legally protected interest may be found in the 
more or less automatic allocation of a right to a certain subject of law. For the interests which are 
thus legally protected - protection offered by a permissive rule to the subjects to which it applies, 
who are consequently entitled to engage in a certain course of conduct - appear to coincide with the 
interests of particular subjects of law.55 But it is obvious that the same does not apply in case of obli-
gations. It is immediately clear that when a subject is exercising a right it is at the same time protect-
ing its interests. But when a subject conforms its conduct to what is required of it by an obligation, 
then it is still not clear (unless it is specified in the rule who is to benefit from conduct in conformity 
with an obligation, or if this results from the factual circumstances) in whose interest such conduct is 
considered to be. 
At this point some attention needs to be devoted towards the meaning of the adjective 
"subjective", which is at times attached to the notion of rights.56 Rights are of necessity to be de-
scribed as "subjective", since the course of conduct which the law authorizes a subject to engage in 
is intimately related to the subject's sphere of action. It would of course make no sense if a permis-
sive rule of international law were to confer rights on those subjects favoured by the rule, without at 
the same time making it possible for them to engage in the course of conduct to which they are enti-
tled.57 To coin it differently: the course of conduct specified in the rule must be capable of being real-
ized by the subjects to which the rule applies.58 From this point of view there is no difference 
whatsoever between permissive and prescriptive rules, between rights and obligations. Both are sub-
jective in nature, both stem from an objective rule, and both must be capable, at least potentially, of 
being realized in real life. In the following no use will be made, regarding either rights or obligations, 
of the adjective "subjective". 
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1.3.3. Obligations correlative to rights 
It has been mentioned before that a right confers upon a subject of law an entitlement to engage in a 
specified course of conduct, and it has been added that the possibility of realizing such course of ac-
tion must lie within that subject's sphere of action. Yet naturally this cannot be the only protection 
offered by law to a right-holder. It is relevant in this regard to refer to the Case concerning the Right 
of Passage, in which the Court held:59 
"The Court sees no reason why long continued practice between two States accepted by them 
as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations be-
tween the two States." 
And it went on to say on the next page:*0 
"(...), the Court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice was 
accepted as law by the parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation." 
While the formulations of this principle, that a right must be accompanied by a correlative obliga-
tion,61 differ, nevertheless the ratio for it is clear. Because in the absence of such a correlative obli-
gation on the part of some other subject of international law the right itself might become 
meaningless. For if any such other subject were not under the obligation to respect another subject's 
exercise of a right, lawfully and validly conferred by a rule of international law, then any subject 
could legitimately impede the exercise of such right without being held responsible for such impedi-
ment. If therefore a subject acts in disregard of its obligation established correlative to the right con-
ferred upon another subject by a permissive rule of international law, then it may be held responsible 
for the breach ofthat obligation. Naturally such obligation to respect the exercise of a right only ex-
ists with regard to subjects to which the permissive rule in question applies.62 It may be stressed here 
that although seemingly the restrictive character of international law lies mainly in prescriptive and 
prohibitive rules, that, as may be seen from what has been observed just now, is only partly true. 
1.3.4. Rights correlative to obligations 
On one occasion the late judge Ago, then special rapporteur, contended:63 
"The term 'right' ('droit' in the subjective sense) indicates a 'claim' which the law ('droit' in 
the objective sense), invoking the legal order, accords to a subject vis-à-vis other subjects, of 
whom he may rightfully require a specific performance or a specific conduct." 
For reasons which will become clear hereafter this definition of "right" was not discussed above in 
subsection 1.3.2. The definition does fit in with the one entertained above, because Ago's definition 
does no more than specify the course of conduct (which is to require some subject to perform an ob-
ligation) to which a subject may have an entitlement. It should nonetheless be noted that the right 
mentioned before, and what it has been considered to stand for, namely the entitlement of a subject 
to engage in a certain course of conduct, differs somewhat from the right as dealt with by special 
rapporteur Ago.64 For while, in principle, the exercise of the right spoken of, and the realization of 
the course of conduct to which that right relates, depends upon some action to be resorted to by the 
subject that holds the right, Ago defines his right in such a way that the holder of the right is entitled 
to engage in a certain course of conduct to the effect that it may require some other subject to per-
form its obligation. Thus the realization of the course of conduct which a prescriptive or prohibitive 
rule aims at (by means of laying down an obligation, to which corresponds a rule laying down the 
right to demand performance) is, in principle, dependent upon some subject other than the (subject) 
holder of the right. 
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The distinction between primary and secondary rules of international law becomes relevant at this 
junction. For the Commission, at the instigation of the then special rapporteur Ago, held:65 
"It should be noted that in international law the idea of breach of an obligation can be re-
garded as the exact equivalent of the idea of infringement of the subjective rights of others. 
(...) The correlation between legal obligation on the one hand and subjective right on the 
other admits of no exception;" 
While not disputing the existence of rights correlative to obligations,66 the conception here uttered is 
nevertheless to be criticized. The correlation that is in issue here is the one between an obligation (a 
prescribed course of conduct, consisting of either acts or omissions, to be realized by a subject of 
international law) and a right which consists of the entitlement to demand performance of that obli-
gation. The fact is that such a corresponding right will, and can, only be exercised on the occasion of 
(imminent) non-performance of the obligation concerned. Thus it seems strange to contend that the 
breach of an obligation by a subject is to be considered equivalent to the breach of a subjective right 
of another, when it is exactly on the occasion of such an (alleged) breach of obligation that such a 
right has to be exercised. As long as the obligation is performed there will be no need to resort to the 
exercise of the right to demand performance ofthat obligation.67 The correlative right already exists 
at the time of performance of the obligation, but can only be exercised upon (imminent) non-
performance ofthat obligation.68 Furthermore, even though a subject may be in possession of a cor-
relative right to demand performance of a certain obligation, that does not mean that it is necessarily 
in a position to exercise its right.69 The exercise of any correlative right to demand the performance 
of another subject's obligation is intimately connected with the law of international responsibility, 
and therefore with what has been called secondary rules of international law. 
1.4. The necessity of correlative rights, their sources, and the requirement of a legal interest 
1.4.1. The possession of a correlative right as a prerequisite for the competence to demand 
performance of other subjects' obligations 
The fact that another subject has the right to demand performance of an obligation presents a limit to 
the normally existing power of a State to determine its legal position vis-à-vis other States in accor-
dance with the principle of auto-interpretation. While usually a State will interpret its conduct as be-
ing consistent with rules of international law, that interpretation may be subjected to scrutinization by 
other States, or by the international community at large (see chapter two). Riphagen asserts:70 
"Actually, in most cases, a State will deny, on the grounds of the facts or of the interpretation 
of the applicable primary rules, that there has been on its side a non-conformity with a legal 
rule, an internationally wrongful act for which it bears responsibility. Obviously other States 
are not bound to leave the matter there. They can maintain their interpretation of fact and law 
and act accordingly." 
The notion of rights correlative to obligations is necessary to avoid the creation of a legal vac-
uum.71 The Court observed, in the South West Africa Cases of 1966, on this account:71 
"In the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the last resort be en-
forced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than the exception, (...)." 
If the Court had meant to say that, considering the consensual character of its jurisdiction under 
international law, the observance of obligations might not always be effected through the means of 
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judicial process, that conclusion would have been unassailable73 But ten pages earlier it had also 
stated 
"Another argument which requires consideration is that in so far as the Court's view leads to 
the conclusion that there is now no entity entitled to claim the due performance of the Man­
date, it must be unacceptable Without attempting in any way to pronounce on the various 
implications involved in this argument, the Court thinks the inference sought to be drawn 
from it is inadmissible If, on a correct legal reading of a given situation, certain alleged rights 
are found to be non-existent, the consequences of this must be accepted The Court cannot 
properly postulate the existence of such rights in order to avert those consequences " 
While not denying that the Court cannot postulate rights which are absent, it nevertheless should 
have pronounced on the various implications of the argument thus advanced Because the Ethiopian 
and Liberian Governments had also claimed that South West Africa was a territory under Mandate 
and that South Africa continued to have obligations thereunder.75 If the individual member States of 
the League of Nations had no legal right or interest in the performance, by South Africa, of obliga­
tions under the so-called conduct provisions of the Mandate for South West Africa,76 if the League 
of Nations could no longer exercise its right to demand performance of the obligations under such 
conduct provisions due to its disappearance, and if the United Nations could not do so because it 
could not be considered to be the successor in law to the League of Nations,77 then the only conse­
quence to be drawn therefrom is that the Mandate for South West Africa had lapsed altogether78 
The conduct provisions related to the object and purpose of the Mandate, that is, the well-being of 
the original inhabitants, and with the absence of any subject entitled to invoke the obligations under 
such provisions the inadmissible conclusion would have to be drawn that South Africa was solely 
entitled to interpret its obligations, and whether or not its conduct was in conformity with such obli­
gations If, consequent upon the Court's decision that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have any legal 
right or interest in the subject-matter of their claims, no subject left in possession of a right to claim 
observance of South Africa's obligations under the Mandate could be found, then the obligations 
concerned would have disappeared, since they would have turned potestative in character7' 
If a State can determine for itself whether an obligation exists, whether or not it has breached that 
obligation, and whether or not it is responsible and in consequence ought to provide reparation, then 
the provisions on the breach of an obligation, internationally wrongful acts and responsibility laid 
down in the ILC-draft could not find any application w The Commission held, fundamentally, in arti­
cle 1, Part One, of the ILC-draft 8 I 
"Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State " 
And it stated, equally fundamentally, in article 1, Part Two, of the draft K 
"The international responsibility of a State which, pursuant to the provisions of part 1, arises 
from an internationally wrongful act committed by that State, entails legal consequences as 
set out in the present part " 
Yet if there is no subject entitled to invoke the responsibility resulting therefrom, that is, if one can­
not identify any injured State in the sense of article 5, Part Two, of the ILC-draft,83 then the concept 
of law itself becomes futile Articles 1, Parts One and Two, both postulate the principle of responsi­
bility for wrongful acts in objective terms responsibility is incurred, and consequences entail, 
whether or not such responsibility is invoked by another subject ** However, if the discharge of re­
sponsibility could only follow upon the voluntary act of the State whose responsibility is incurred, 
and not upon demand, the objective nature of responsibility would wither away It is surely for that 
reason that the commentary to article 5, Part Two, stated ю 
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"Part 1 of the draft articles defines an internationally wrongful act solely in terms of obliga-
tions, not of rights. This was done on the assumption that to each and any obligation corre-
sponds per definitionem a right of at least one other State." 
By postulating the principle of obligations with correlative rights to demand performance of such ob-
ligations, one must assume therefore that the complementary rules laying down such rights are con-
ceived,86 at least theoretically, to cover all breaches of obligations that could occur in practice. Thus 
it is to be presumed that the law leaves no lacunae in this regard, and provides for the exercise of a 
right to demand performance of obligations in each and every possible case of breaches thereof.87 
1.4.2. The sources of the complementary rules laying down correlative rights 
As to the sources of correlative rights established by complementary rules, it is submitted that those 
lie in the general principles of law,88 combined with rules of customary international law. The Court 
observed in the Barcelona Traction Case with regard to obligations erga omnes:*9 
"Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general inter-
national law (...); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-
universal character." 
The Court appears to make a distinction between the rules laying down the obligations, and the rules 
laying down the corresponding rights. Indeed, in most cases the rules laid down in a treaty, establish-
ing obligations or rights (the latter in the sense as discussed in subsection 1.3.2, with the correspond-
ing obligation to respect such rights), do not expressly, or even impliedly, provide for correlative 
rights. And, in the absence of such provisions, it must be concluded that such rights, and especially 
the conditions for their exercise, are to be found in those rules of customary international law that 
relate to State responsibility. A similar line of argument was upheld by the Permanent Court in the 
Chorzów Factory Case, where it held:9* 
"It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable comple-
ment of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the 
convention itself." 
As it is a principle of international law that the breach of an obligation entails the obligation to repair 
that breach even in the absence of any conventional provision to that effect, so it must also be con-
sidered to be a principle of international law that there will always be a subject of international law 
which possesses the right to demand the performance of obligations. 
1.4.3. The exercise of correlative rights and the requirement of a legal interest 
Having established the necessity and principle of the existence of rights correlative to obligations, it 
now becomes necessary to determine which rules condition the exercise of such rights. It may seem 
strange that there could exist rights whose exercise is dependent upon further permissive rules. The 
latter moreover laying down criteria more stringent than seem to be inherent in the terms of the right 
itself. Yet the correlative rights concerned are but conceived in theory, and are established irrespec-
tive of either the nature of the rules which lay them down, or the actual circumstances in which the 
obligations may be breached. It may seem paradoxical, and perhaps even contradictory, to hold that 
a subject should have a right which, however, it cannot exercise. Yet such rights are of indeterminate 
character, and have to filled in by complementary rules that determine under which conditions they 
can be exercised. What counts is that, as with obligations, rights have to be exercised in relation to 
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concrete circumstances, and, in the case of correlative rights, in relation to the nature of the rules 
that gave birth to them. Determining which subject(s) may exercise the right to demand the perform-
ance of obligations depends ultimately upon the interest which, by means of allocation through legal 
rules, accrues to a certain subject (or subjects): the legal interest. 
This process, typically, determines what has been called the "legal interest" of a subject. What is 
meant by "legal interest" may be best made clear through this quote of Weil, who observes:91 
"For a state to enjoy a right implies its possession of legal standing to claim performance of 
the corresponding obligation and, in default, to bring to book the person or persons owing 
that obligation. (...) Thus, not just any state may be regarded as possessing a 'legal interest', 
i.e., a right, in the observance of any international obligation by the state or states on which it 
is incumbent;" 
The possession of a legal interest by a State therefore relates to nothing other than the correlative 
right to demand the performance of an international obligation. Obviously such correlative right, or 
legal interest is not, and cannot be, of subjective character, and whether or not it is present depends 
upon the criteria laid down, objectively, in the rules complementary to the rule that lays down the 
primary obligations. That is not to say that the actual circumstances in which (allegedly) a breach of 
obligation takes place have no role to play. The complementary rules which lay down the correlative 
right to demand performance only prima facie determine the existence of a legal interest. In actual 
circumstances the exercise of the right may be dependent upon further conditions. 
A short comment may be made here regarding the way in which to establish the existence of a le-
gal interest on the part of other States consequent upon an alleged internationally wrongful act. The 
proof of the existence of an internationally wrongful act can of course only take place in the course 
of an examination of the merits of a dispute. The alleged existence of a legal interest makes no sense 
unless it is found that such an internationally wrongful act has taken place. Yet generally the question 
of whether or not such legal interest exists is examined before the merits of a dispute is investi-
gated.92 Thus it is obvious that the existence of a legal interest can only be affirmed on the assump-
tion that certain conduct could be considered to be wrongful under international law, and that it 
could be considered attributable to a certain State. If afterwards the investigation of the merits of the 
dispute would show that either of these findings could not be made, the legal interest, that is the 
possibility to exercise a correlative right, affirmed on the basis of such assumptions, would prove to 
have never existed. These remarks make clear that one speaks only of the "legal interest" of a State 
or another subject of international law in those circumstances where a subject is actually exercising 
its right to demand the performance of (allegedly) breached obligations. 
The reason why legal interests are many times identified by reference to the subjective interests of 
the States in possession of such interest, may derive from the circumstance that States are, generally, 
free either to exercise their right to performance, or not. Being under no obligation to exercise their 
rights,93 the considerations for States in determining whether or not to exercise such rights will 
mostly turn upon an evaluation of their own individual (subjective) interests.94 But the existence of a 
legal interest can only be determined objectively, which, as such, seems to be implied in the adjective 
"legal" that is added to the term "interest". 
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1.5. The criteria to determine the existence of a legal interest 
in the performance of obligations 
1.5.1. States and the general interest in the performance of obligations 
Each and any State has an interest in the performance of other States' obligations. This is why 
Riphagen observes:95 
"Whether a particular State has an interest in the performance of its international obligations 
by another State is a matter of fact. In the long run every State has an interest in the obser-
vance of any rule of international law, including the rule of pacta sunt servanda. But this by 
no means authorizes - let alone obliges - every State to demand the performance by every 
other State of its international obligations, let alone to take countermeasures in case of non-
performance of those obligations." 
Thus for a State to act upon the breach of obligation it will have to show that it has a legal interest, 
that is, a right allocated to it by the relevant rules of international law. Or to put it more clearly, a 
right which can be exercised once it is established that the conditions set for such exercise are met in 
actual fact. 
Initially, the reason why there has never crystallized a rule recognizing the legal interest with re-
gard to no matter which obligation imposed by a rule of international law is to avoid chaos in inter-
national relations. If any State could legitimately concern itself with each and every breach of an 
obligation, and in the absence of independent verification of the existence of such breaches and con-
trol over reactions to such breaches, a multiplication of inter-State disputes could be expected, which 
would go hand in hand with instability in the international community. 
Another argument may be derived from the sovereignty of States. For what reason could a State 
concern itself with a breach of an obligation, if such breach had no effect whatsoever on its own re-
lations with the State breaching the obligation.96 In view of the juxtaposition of independent sover-
eign States,97 every State is free under international law to condone a breach of an obligation that 
concerns it: either afterwards by way of agreement or acquiescence, or beforehand by way of con-
sent (in which case there is not, according to article 29, Part One, of the ILC-draft, an internationally 
wrongful act, since there is no breach of an obligation; however, nowadays under the limits estab-
lished by jus cogens rules, laid down in article 29, paragraph 2, Part One, of the ILC-draft). 
A third argument against conferring a legal interest on States generally with regard to any breach of 
an obligation lies in the way in which rules of international law are created, that is, to a large extent, 
through the consent of States. For this reason it would seem to be impossible to grant a State a legal 
interest with regard to the breach of an obligation imposed by a rule if it were not also itself obli-
gated by the rule in question. Clearly, where a State is not bound to a rule, it cannot be considered to 
have an interest in breaches of obligations imposed under that rule.98 And it is this latter remark that 
leads us to the next subsection. 
1.5.2. States and the common interest in the performance of obligations 
under rules of international law 
As with the foregoing it would appear that according a legal interest to each and every State 
obligated by a particular rule of international law is apt to overstep the purpose for which 
international law is created, namely to regulate relations between States. For rules of customary 
international law are increasingly becoming universal in character, and with the growing 
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interdependency in international relations the number of (States bound by) multilateral treaties has 
also increased Thus, to establish as a criterion for the existence of a legal interest, the binding force 
of a rule for a State, does not enhance stability in international relations Riphagen reflected upon this 
aspect as follows" 
"In many cases of internationally wrongful acts there is no problem in legally identifying the 
injured State The States which are parties to the creation of the rule of international law ( ) 
are also parties to the primary legal relationships under that rule and, at the same time, parties 
to the breach, i e parties to the new, secondary, legal relationships, the three 'levels' coin­
cide " 
While this would seem to speak against the argument here made, it is but necessary to read the sen­
tence immediately after to see why this is not so , e o 
"This is normally the case with obligations imposed in a bilateral treaty " 
Clearly if the obligation is derived from a bilateral treaty there would be no problem identifying the 
State in possession of a legal interest But with the expansion of customary and conventional inter­
national law matters are not as simple any more. 
Although it is not possible to use the binding character of a rule for States as a positive criterion 
to determine whether they are in possession of a legal interest resulting from the breach of an obliga­
tion, nevertheless it is possible to find in such circumstance a negative criterion 1 β ι Only States that 
are subjected to, or favoured by, a certain rule of international law could potentially be in possession 
of a legal interest States that have not consented to the rule (since they did not ratify the multilateral 
treaty, or because they claimed to be a "persistent objector") do not acquire a legal interest conse­
quent upon a breach of obligation established thereunderl02 
However, there are some particular interests which have been considered worthy of protection 
One of the most prominent concerns the form of intervention laid down in article 63 of the Stat­
ute,103 which provides for the right to intervene in a case whenever the interpretation of a multilateral 
treaty is in issue between two parties before the Court104 Another concerns the right to protest 
which appears possible in all cases of breaches of obligations A fine example of this latter interest 
appears to be provided by the judgment of the Court in the Wimbledon Case 10S 
"It will suffice to observe for the purposes of this case that each of the four Applicant Powers 
has a clear interest in the execution of the provisions relating to the Kiel Canal, since they all 
possess fleets and merchant vessels flying their respective flags They are therefore, even 
though they may be unable to adduce a prejudice to any pecuniary interest, covered by the 
terms of Article 386 (. . ) " 
Of course the article referred to in the quote contains a broad criterion that provides for a cause of 
action to "any interested Power" 1β* It is further to be noted that such protection is not the result of 
the existence of a legal interest, but a means for safeguarding the integrity of the rules in question 
And such rights are provided because of the perceived effect that a breach of obligations, or a dis­
puted interpretation of a rule, may have on the obligations and rights of a State intervening or pro­
testing 1β7 
15 3 Performance of obligations towards specific States 
Could it be said then that the criterion to be employed lies with the performance of obligations to­
wards certain, or all, States subjected to the rule' For instance Riphagen mentioned in relation to in­
ternational delicts·1w 
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"Normally, international obligations ( ) are obligations towards a specific State Even if more 
than one other specific State is involved, the bilateral relationships created by a rule of inter-
national law can normally be treated separately " 
And he is followed in this view by Sachanew who holds109 
"In dieser Beziehung bilden die völkerrechtlichen Verbotsnormen keine Ausnahme Sie 
erzeugen ebenfalls konkrete Rechte und Pflichte, und zwar schon vor emer eventuellen Ver-
letzung, da auch bei Verbotsnormen konkrete Rechte-Pflichte-Beaehungen entstehen Die 
Normverletzung vollzieht sich im Rahmen dieser Rechtsverhaltnisse in Gestalt einer 
Pflichtverletzung gegenüber bestimmten Subjekten Eine Volkerrechtsverletzung außerhalb 
von Rechtsverhaltnissen ist ebensowenig möglich wie eine Anwendung von Volker-
rechtsnormen außerhalb von konkreten, korrenspondierenden Rechten und Pflichten Im 
Volkerrecht kann die Norm als solche weder verletzt noch erfüllt werden " 
It is submitted that such a conception is doubtful For either the obligation is performed by a certain 
State, in which case it is obviously being performed towards all the States obligated by the rule If 
one takes as example the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force against States, clearly a State re-
fraining from such threat or use of force performs its obligation towards all the States bound by the 
rule If it breaches its obligation, it will incur responsibility It could be asserted that such responsi-
bility is entailed objectively, and towards all the States bound by the rule It would follow that re-
sponsibility will be incurred upon the breach of an obligation irrespective of the exercise by another 
State of its right to demand performance ofthat obligation n o Generally speaking it is only after the 
occurrence of a breach of obligation (which makes it dependent upon an interpretation of the rule 
and the actual circumstances) that it becomes possible to determine the State(s) in possession of a 
legal interest entitling it (them) to demand the performance of the breached obligation ш Indeed, 
Puphagen appears to acknowledge as much when he observes i ! 2 
"Whether the interest of a State is adversely affected by the act of another State is a matter of 
fact For State responsibility -1 e new legal relationships between States - to anse, it is obvi­
ously necessary to qualify both the act and the interest, m other words, to determine the par­
ties to the breach Parties to the breach can only be those States between which the primary 
relationship exists The question therefore is a matter of interpretation of primary rules 
whose interests a given primary rule is intended to protect? But even if it is established that a 
given primary rule is - possibly also - intended to protect the interests of a given State, that 
State is not necessarily a party to the breach " 
Indeed, it has to be admitted that a legal relationship exists between the States subjected to a certain 
rule even before the breach of an obligation by one of them But such relationships do not as such 
determine which State(s) is (are) in possession of a legal interest after a breach of obligation has oc­
curred by another State And all that can be said is that a State obligated or favoured by a rule may 
acquire a legal interest pursuant to the breach of an obligation established under that rule 
1 5 4 The effects of an internationally wrongful act as criterion to determine the existence of legal 
interests of States 
Material and moral damage 
It may be asked whether the criterion to determine the legal interest of a State should he with (the 
proven or assumed existence of) damage As is well known the Commission, following its then spe­
cial rapporteur Ago, considered damage not to be a constituent element of an internationally 
wrongful act ш If one takes the word "damage" to mean material injury, there can be little doubt 
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that the Commission's exclusion of damage from article 3 is correct Not all internationally wrongful 
acts entail the occurrence of material damage to either individuals or States l w One may ask oneself 
what purpose a condition of damage could usefully serve, unless it were to determine the State(s) in 
possession of a legal interest consequent upon an internationally wrongful act The commentary to 
article 3 posed the question whether there existed a third constituent element, namely damage caused 
to the detriment of the subject whose subjective right had been impaired1I5 Apparently an extra link 
is thought to be necessary in order to consider material damage a condition, namely the impairment 
of a subjective nght Seemingly then damage is used to determine the State(s) in possession of a legal 
interest, but as such it will fail in its purpose m cases where there is, or would be, no material dam­
age 
To illustrate these thoughts through means of examples, one may refer to the detention of a dip­
lomat contrary to the rules regarding immunity Clearly the sending State does not suffer any mate­
rial damage as a result of the receiving State's breach of obligation under such rules п 6 Though the 
sending State will of course be deprived of the diplomat's services in such a case Perhaps a better 
example may then be found by reference to a situation in which the police officers of a State, m pur­
suit of suspects of a criminal offence, (un)knowingly cross the border with another State, fail to 
capture the suspects, and then return to their State In such a case no damage will have been done to 
the other State Authors have been wont to speak of moral damage in such cases 1 1 7 
The term "moral damage" is not, as has been noted by the Commission, altogether free from am­
biguity " e It appears to be used in such cases of internationally wrongful acts where there is no ma­
terial damage, although of course the typical examples are those referred to above, and those 
constituting an insult to the honour or dignity of a State U 9 The assertion that there exist moral dam­
ages derives from the conception that in the absence of material damage reparation is still possible, 
mostly in the nature of satisfaction Yet how can moral damages anse from anything other than 
breaches of moral demands Indeed satisfaction is provided by one State to another on the occasion 
of an (admitted) internationally wrongful act It is accorded, in other words, on legal grounds 
Therefore any damage, whether one wants to call it material, moral, political, or other, constitutes 
legal damage because of its reparable character under the relevant rules of State responsibility , M In­
deed, the confusion becomes complete if one considers that the reasons for using the term "damage" 
he with the reparable character of acts Yet the term implies disadvantageous consequences for the 
State suffering from an internationally wrongful act As has been pointed out, an internationally 
wrongful act need not constitute, or entail, a damage, in the ordinary meaning of the word, to an­
other State Similar arguments seem to apply to so-called legal damages, to be discussed next, which 
also are not based on prejudicial consequences for other States 
Legal damage 
The Commission observed in relation to the breach of human rights obligations ш 
"Yet it manifestly constitutes an internationally wrongful act, so that if we maintain at all 
costs that 'damage' is an element in any internationally wrongful act, we are forced to the 
conclusion that any breach of an international obligation towards another State involves some 
kind of'injury' to that other State But this is tantamount to saying that the 'damage' which is 
inherent in any internationally wrongful act is the damage which is at the same time inherent 
in any breach of an international obligation " 
One cannot but note the circular reasoning which seems to underlie this argument Is damage an 
element of an internationally wrongful act? The Commission claims it is not Because where there is 
no damage consequent upon the commission of an internationally wrongful act, it must be considered 
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inherent in such acts. The basis of such argument may be found also in a statement by Anzilotti to the 
effect that:112 
"Le dommage se trouve compris implicitement dans le caractère anti-juridique de l'acte." 
While not denying that any international wrongful act is of a nature to undermine the edifice of law 
(and especially its binding character), still by putting it this way one creates the impression that con-
sequently any State has a legal interest in the performance of other States' obligations. For any law-
abiding State will thus suffer a damage due to the anti-juridical character of non-performance of any 
international obligation, and will therefore be affected by such non-performances.123 Yet that con-
clusion is rejected on good grounds by everyone (subsection 1.5.1). 
Of course it cannot be denied that the existence of damage, causally flowing from an internationally 
wrongful act,124 may, and to a certain extent does, function as a hard and fast rule to determine 
which State is in possession of a legal interest.125 But this recognition does not entail the conse-
quence that when there is no damage there is no internationally wrongful act, or even that there 
would not be any State in possession of a legal interest.126 In case of breaches of human rights obli-
gations there is damage, but not to another State. The damage is done to the nationals of the State 
breaching such obligations, and the problem is that no other State will be touched by the said 
breaches. Ironically, if one were to consider damage to States in the factual sense to constitute the 
criterion for determining the State(s) in possession of a legal interest, this would identify the State 
breaching its human rights obligations as the State in possession of the requisite legal interest. That is 
surely an unacceptable and unreasonable result. 
The quotation at the head of this subsection leads in fact to the issue of legal damage. Yet if any 
internationally wrongful act "towards another State" involves some kind of injury to that other State, 
or that damage is inherent in any breach of an international obligation,127 then one can only conclude 
that such lines are devoid of any substance. Because the damage that is inherent in any breach of an 
obligation will have been inflicted upon all States of the international community. Only by reference 
to a further criterion, that injury is done to another State, does one escape that conclusion.128 Yet 
even this does not save the Commission from ambiguity. Because it had stated, precisely by reference 
to the breach of human rights obligations, that:129 
"(...) the breach thus committed does not normally cause any economic injury to the other 
States parties to the convention, or even a slight to their honour or dignity." 
While generally injury to another State could be said to include material and moral damage (in the 
sense explained above), breaches of human rights obligations evade the phrase itself: "injury to an-
other State". One could of course, superficially, apply the theory of diplomatic protection of nation-
als analogously and hold the damage to the other State's nationals as damage to the protector State. 
But the ratio for holding damage to citizens abroad as damage to the State has always been the bond 
of nationality between the State and its citizens. Hence the elaborate rules regarding the nationality 
of claims. However, to apply such a theory to breaches of human rights obligations does not do jus-
tice to the nature of such obligations. 
It follows that one has to resort to a more generic term than damage to determine the States enti-
tled to demand performance of another State's obligations. Injury is the word that comes to mind, 
and which is being used most of the time nowadays. Originally this word "injury" was intended to be 
understood in purely factual sense. But along the way it seems that it was identified more and more 
often with "injury to rights", which resulted on its tum in the phrase "infringement of rights". The 
present writer fails to see how rights can be infringed. Rights exist to be exercised, and clearly a 
holder of a right may be obstructed in the exercise of its right. But that as such does not indicate that 
its right is infringed, because generally the right does not become extinct, or even suspended, on the 
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breach of the obligation to respect the right in question Terminologically speaking also the more 
correct expression in this regard would be that the correlative obligation is not "to respect the right", 
but "to respect the exercise of the right" And, as has been pointed out several times already, not all 
rights are capable of being obstructed by the mere breach of an obligation by another State Thus 
where a State in the exercise of a right calls upon another State to fulfil an obligation, then the 
breach of an obligation is in fact a precondition to be fulfilled before that right can exercised 
To come back now to the issue of injury, the factual intonation of this term was expressly stressed by 
Pinto (in the discussion by the Commission of Ago's proposed draft article on consent), in reaction 
to a statement by Reuter to the effect that lM 
"( ) the title of the article 'Consent of the injured State' In reality, the State was not in­
jured, since it had given its consent " 
And to this Pinto in tum observed l 3 1 
"( ), he had no difficulty with that term, since, ( ), it was used in its factual, as opposed to 
its legal, sense to refer to a State that had been injured in fact but might not be held to have 
been injured in law " 
And Ago subsequently explained with regard to his terminology ш 
"Actually, the State was not 'injured' in the legal sense of the term The State that gave its 
consent agreed not to exercise its subjective right to require the other State to act in con­
formity with an obligation The legal nature of the act ofthat State was changed, since it was 
no longer wrongful, but the physical act remained, and could entail physical injury to the State 
subjected to it The expression 'injured State' was a practical expression used to designate the 
State which by virtue of an international obligation, would have had the right to require that 
certain conduct was not adopted with respect to it " 
And again it appears from this quote that the term "injured State" is used in a somewhat ambiguous 
manner First, in the sense that a State may be factually affected by the breach of an obligation And 
secondly, to denote the State which is in possession of the right to require another State to fulfil an 
obligation The existence of the first element can obviously only be determined after a breach of an 
obligation has taken place The second element, however, presupposes that the determination of the 
"injured State" may take place even before the breach (or threat of breach) of an obligation Ripha-
gen also appears to have been caught between these two approaches, as he states l 3 3 
'Obviously, this determination cannot be made independently of the origin and content of the 
obligation breached (the 'primary rule'), indeed, that obligation is an obligation towards an­
other State, or States, or towards the international community of States as a whole (erga om-
nes) " 
Immediately after he then refers to the correlation of obligations to rights,134 yet in a later paragraph 
he observesl35 
"In two other cases it is not so much the facts which indicate the answer to the question 
which is (or are) the injured State (or States), but rather the 'law' Indeed, modem treaty 
practice increasingly recognizes the existence - and provides for the protection - of interests 
which are not allocated to particular individual States parties " 
Only one comment on the part of Jagota could be found which solely focuses on injury and injured 
States, and he observes 1 3 6 
"The question whether that term should be defined in general terms, to provide simply that an 
injured State was a State which had suffered injury because of the breach of an international 
obligation, or whether it was necessary to elaborate the sources of the primary obligation the 
breach of which constituted injury " 
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Eventually Riphagen explicitly rejected injury, and with good cause, as sole criterion to determine 
which States should be considered injured States.137 
Effects of an internationally wrongful act upon (a) State(s) as generalized criterion to determine the 
existence of a legal interest 
The latter remarks lead to the conclusion that any criterion to determine the legal interest of a State 
depends upon the perceived, experienced, or potential, (lack of) effects of the breach of an obligation 
upon States or the international community. Two observations are in place here. First, the effects of 
any breach of an international obligation depend in turn on the scope of the rule that lays down the 
obligation, or more accurately on the course of conduct it prescribes or prohibits.138 Secondly, the 
question whether those effects are present will have to be verified in real life, that is, it has to be as-
certained which State suffers the effects of an internationally wrongful act. 
At this point the question needs to be raised what should be understood by "effects", and more 
particularly so because those must be distinguished from "damage" or even "injury". 
That this distinction is imperative, generally speaking, may be seen from the categories of rights of 
suspension or termination laid down in article 60 of the Vienna Convention, as well as the categories 
of the infringement of rights inserted in article 5, Part Two, of the ILC-draft. The first refers to the 
way in which a material breach of a multilateral treaty affects the other parties to the treaty. The sec-
ond criterion, infringement of rights,139 seems to be based on the notion of injury.140 The fact that 
these two texts refer to more concrete criteria than the general criterion here advanced, that is, the 
effects of a breach of an obligation, does not belie the correctness of such criterion. For the different 
categories laid down in those articles do not all reflect the concrete criteria that they are supposed to 
represent, as will be shown in the next section. 
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention has laid down the circumstances in which States may invoke 
the material breach of a treaty for suspending or terminating the same treaty:141 
" 1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the 
breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in 
part. 
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: 
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in 
whole or in part or to terminate it either: 
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or 
(ii) as between all the parties; 
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the op-
eration of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the default-
ing State; 
(c) any other party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for 
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the 
treaty is of such character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically 
changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obli-
gations under the treaty. 
(...) 
5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human per-
son contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibit-
ing any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties." 
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The provisions of article 60 are generally interpreted to constitute the basis for concluding that there 
exist differing categories of treaties, or at least differing categories of treaty obligations M 1 Of course 
the distinction between bilateral and multilateral treaties is not, as such, in question here Yet it is 
precisely the appearance of multilateral treaties in international relations,143 as well as the changing 
subject-matter of such treaties, which has militated in favour of the recognition of differing catego­
ries of treaties, and of different consequences in case such treaties are breached The most important 
differentiation that has taken place in this regard concerns the recognition that there exist multilateral 
treaties whose breach only affects one party to the treaty, and multilateral treaties whose breach will 
affect all parties to the treaty That distinction may be illustrated by reference to the provisions of ar­
ticle 60, paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (с) ш A further category may be mentioned in that article 60, para­
graph S, excludes suspension or termination of treaties of a humanitarian character 
The Commission m tum takes a somewhat different terminological course in article 5, Part Two 
of the ILC-draft, by refemng to the concept of injured State and the infringement of its rights 14S 
" 1 For the purposes of the present articles, 'injured State' means any State a right of which is 
infringed by the act of another State, if that act constitutes, in accordance with Part One 
of the present articles, an internationally wrongful act ofthat State 
2 In particular, 'injured State' means 
(a) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a bilateral treaty, the other party 
to the treaty, 
(b) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a judgment or other binding dis­
pute-settlement decision of an international court or tnbunal, the other State or States 
parties to the dispute and entitled to the benefit ofthat nght, 
(c) if the nght infringed by the act of a State anses from a binding decision of an interna­
tional organ other than an international court or tnbunal, the State or States which, in 
accordance with the constituent instrument of the international organization con­
cerned, are entitled to the benefit ofthat nght, 
(d) if the nght infringed by the act of a State anses from a treaty provision for a third 
State, that third State, 
(e) if the nght infringed by the act of a State anses from a multilateral treaty or from a rule 
of customary international law, any other State party to the multilateral treaty or 
bound by the relevant rule of customary international law, if it is established that 
(ι) the nght has been created or is established in its favour, 
(u) the infringement of the nght by the act of the State necessanly affects the enjoy­
ment of the nghts or performance of the obligations of the other States parties to 
the multilateral treaty or bound by the rule of customary international law, or 
(in) the nght has been created or is established for the protection of human nghts and 
fundamental freedoms, 
(f) if the nght infringed by the act of a State anses from a multilateral treaty, any other 
State party to the multilateral treaty, if it is established that the nght has been expressly 
stipulated in that treaty for the protection of the collective interests of the State parties 
thereto 
3 ( ) " 
Although the article pays lip-service to the idea of injury by refemng to "injured State", nevertheless 
it defines such a State not in relation to the factual effects of an internationally wrongful act, but in 
relation to the infringement of the nght(s) of the injured State as a consequence of the internationally 
wrongful act of another State On that account Riphagen, in his commentary on article 5, stated 146 
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"In many cases the obligation of a State is merely the counterpart or mirror-image of a right 
of another State; the obligation is not infringe that right." 
Yet as has been explained in subsection 1.4.2 the substantive goal a right aims at may be achieved in 
two ways. First, by allowing a State to engage in a course of conduct that consists of actions or 
omissions. Or secondly, by allowing a State to engage into a course of conduct that consists of re-
quiring another State to fulfil its obligations. Only in the first case can the substantive goal that a 
right aims at be achieved directly by the State holder of the right, and only in that case could one 
speak of an infringement of a right if another State breaches its obligation to respect that right.147 
Thus the correlation envisaged in paragraph 1 of article 5 between the breach of an obligation (an 
internationally wrongful act) and the infringement of a right cannot, generally, be regarded as a suf-
ficient answer to the question which criteria should be used to identify the States entitled to consider 
themselves injured by an internationally wrongful act. For in many cases a rule of international law 
will be coined in terms of obligations of States, and leave open the question which States would be in 
possession of the right to insist upon the performance of such obligations. The use of the general 
criterion of the infringement of a right renders the reasoning circular. Because if a rule speaks of an 
obligation of a State, without making reference to a (criterion to determine the existence of a) cor-
relative right, then one will have to determine which State is in possession of such right first.148 It is 
only after that that one can determine whether that right has been infringed. 
While it is submitted that the basis of rules laying down the criteria to determine the existence of a 
State's legal interest lies generally with the effect a breach of an obligation causes upon other States, 
that is not to say that such rule always adopts the consequences of a breach as criterion. For adopt-
ing such criterion would lead to the conclusion that it is only after a breach of an obligation that a le-
gal interest comes into existence.149 But that is not necessarily so. A point in question concerns the 
Court's opinion regarding the PLO Observers Mission.1* In that case the Court observed that cer-
tain decisions by United States' authorities, contested by the United Nations, could give rise to a dis-
pute between the United Nations and the United States, notwithstanding that no measures of 
execution had been taken pursuant to such decisions.151 The Court expressed the opinion that the 
United States was under an obligation to arbitrate the dispute, and this shows that the United Na-
tions had an interest, and arguably even a legal interest, regarding conduct by United States authori-
ties that only potentially could be considered a breach of obligation.151 
Since the effects upon States consequent upon a breach of obligations are to determine the legal 
interests of States, a more tangible term will be used to describe those effects: prejudice. Tradition-
ally the rules laying down the conditions under which States can be considered to be in possession of 
a legal interest have been concerned with the prejudice which a State directly or indirectly sustains as 
the result of the breach of an obligation by another State. Technically speaking this amounts to a 
facts-related and rule contents-related criterion.153 For whether or not some prejudice to a certain 
State is present will depend on the factual circumstances, and whether or not it is the result of the 
breach of an obligation by another State must be determined by an evaluation of the (allegedly 
wrongful) conduct in relation to the rule laying down the obligation that prescribes a certain course 
of conduct.154 It is further obvious that the prejudice suffered must causally result from the breach of 
the obligation.155 
It is to be noted that this criterion by referring to prejudice does not refer to the subjective inter-
ests of the State that suffers it. Whether or not there is a breach of an obligation depends on the 
content of the obligation (which is dependent on the scope of the rule) and the conduct of the State 
alleged to have breached it, and both can be objectively determined. The same goes for the prejudice 
sustained as the result of a breach, and the legal interest subsequently conferred on a State derives 
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not from the subjectively appreciated prejudice resulting from a breach, but from the rule which 
names prejudice as a condition for exercising the right to invoke the responsibility of the State that 
breached an obligation 
An a prion categorization may be expounded on this basis, which may be found in the following 
section. Those categories are based on a generalized view of certain specific primary rules of inter­
national law, which, in case obligations established thereunder are breached, produce effects peculiar 
to their own subdivision Although these categories, with two exceptions, are based upon the effects 
a breach of an obligation produces (or might produce), nevertheless differences of a quantitative and 
qualitative nature may be registered. These differences originate from the content of the rules of each 
subdivision, and, consequently, from the effects a breach of an obligation established thereunder 
(perceivably) produce 
1.6. Categories of legal interests of States 
1 6 1 Non-problematical categories of legal interests 
A preliminary remark has to be made concerning the non-problematic position of binding decisions 
of international tribunals, unilateral declarations and bilateral treaties 
Considering that judgments or awards of international tribunals are almost inevitably confined to 
those States that have initiated the proceedings,156 it comes as no surprise that only a State in whose 
favour a judgment or award has been given possesses a legal interest if the obligation resulting from 
such judgment or award is breached by another State Riphagen admits that article 94 of the Charter 
points to an interest of all Member States in the compliance with the decisions of the Court, but he 
correctly observes that this does not as such leads to the conclusion that third States are in posses­
sion of a legal interest in the execution of any decision by the Court 1S7 Indeed, as paragraph 2 of the 
said article states, the other party to the judgment, and not just any State, may have recourse to the 
Security Council (the latter may then decide upon recommendations or measures to give effect to the 
judgment) This category of legal interests pursuant to the breach by a State of obligations imposed 
by a Court or Tribunal has found its recognition in article 5, paragraph 2 (b), Part Two of the ILC-
draft 
Unilateral declarations have been considered by the Court to be able to create an obligation for 
the State making i t 1 M And as a counterpart other States could rely on such declarations, and invoke 
them to demand performance of the obligation thus constituted Although in the Nuclear Tests Case 
the Court considered the French declarations to have been made erga omnes, the more normal situa­
tion will be that a declaration is made towards (a) specified State(s)I59 In such a case determining 
the State in possession of a legal interest will also present no difficulty 
With regard to the third unproblematic category it may be noted that determining the State in pos­
session of a legal interest after a breach of an obligation contained in a bilateral treaty presents no 
difficulties Ι6Φ Only the other State to the bilateral treaty, in contradistinction to the State breaching 
an obligation thereunder, can be so held 161 The existence ofthat category is of course witnessed by 
article 60, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention This category of legal interests is in fact one of 
the more important ones, and may also be established by reference to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), Part 
Two, of the ILC-draft 
LEGAL INTERESTS OF STATES 33 
1.6.2. Legal interests, prejudice and the individual interest of States 
As Riphagen correctly holds, it is only when the breach concerns an obligation contained in a multi-
lateral treaty that determining the injured State(s) may present problems. Thus he observes:162 
"But (...) the bulk of international obligations are formulated in abstract terms, and then the 
question of identifying the injured State arises. This is particularly the case if a multilateral 
treaty is the source of the obligation breached." 
Yet that remark, and his proposed article 5 (a), Part Two, failed to appreciate the role to be played 
by obligations established under rules of customary international law, whose breach may also give 
rise to problems concerning the identification of injured States. The Commission however remedied 
this, and took due account of rules of customary international law, in framing article 5, paragraph 2 
(e).163 What follows hereafter will consequently concern only an examination of the concept of legal 
interest with regard to the breach of obligations established under rules of customary international 
law and multilateral treaties. 
That the effect of the breach of an obligation determines the legal interest of a State is most 
clearly established by reference to the criterion laid down in article 60, paragraph 2 (b), which grants 
a party "specially affected" by a material breach of a multilateral treaty the right to invoke such 
breach as a ground for suspending in whole or in part the operation of the treaty in the relations be-
tween itself and the defaulting State.164 Originally the right under article 60, paragraph 2 (b), was 
granted to any other party to the multilateral treaty.165 Yet eventually it was recognized by the 
Commission that if it could be said that only one party to the multilateral treaty was affected by the 
breach concerned, then only that party should be granted a unilateral right of suspension.166 
The first category relates to rules that lay down obligations which breach causes effects upon (a) 
particular State(s). Thus the consequences of a State breaching such obligations are strictly limited, 
and the legal interest with regard to such breaches accrues only to States which suffer those conse-
quences. And on this account one may read with Riphagen:167 
"Bilateral treaties normally give rise to bilateral legal relationships only, i.e. to reciprocal 
rights and obligations as between the two States parties to the treaty. Multilateral treaties of-
ten have the same effect; i.e. even if the content of the obligations imposed is uniform towards 
all other States parties, the legal relationships remain bilateral ones as between each pair of 
States parties, and the legal relationship between one pair is quite separate from the legal re-
lationship between another pair of States parties. This may be the case even if the uniformity 
of the content of the bilateral legal relationships is itself founded upon an interest common to 
several States parties which are in the same position, defined in the multilateral treaty itself, or 
even common to all States parties. (...) A breach of an obligation imposed by a multilateral 
treaty does not, therefore, necessarily injure each other State party to the treaty individually." 
It may well be, as Riphagen stresses,168 that the multilateral treaty itself contains criteria to determine 
the State in possession of a legal interest. Examples of such criteria are for instance the terms 
"coastal State" and "flag-State".169 Apart from this, obligations established under a rule of customary 
international law or a multilateral treaty may result, when breached, in a bilateral relationship be-
tween the author State and the State in possession of a legal interest.170 
Generally a distinction can be made in this category between breaches of obligations that cause di-
rect effects upon a certain State, and breaches of obligations that cause indirect effects upon a 
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Legal interests and direct effects upon individual States 
Breaches of obligations that cause direct effects upon a particular State generally have to do with 
rules emanating from the principle of sovereignty.'71 Thus where a State obstructs the exercise of 
rights, laid down by a permissive rule of international law, which entitle another sovereign State to 
engage in some specific course of conduct, the effect of this instantly determines the legal interest of 
the State obstructed in the exercise of its rights. Examples of such rules concern the freedom to ex-
ercise jurisdiction within its territory, and freedom of the high seas. Other rules, which are more or 
less derivative from the principle of sovereignty, and prohibitive in character, that come to mind in-
stantly, concern the prohibition of the use of force against, and of the prohibition of intervention 
within the internal affairs of, another State. Also all rules related to immunities come within this 
subdivision (diplomatic and consular immunities, jurisdictional immunities, and immunities of war-
ships). 
Legal interests and indirect effects upon individual States 
The second subdivision relates to rules concerning the protection of nationals abroad. In this respect 
the exact content of, and terms used by, the primary rule establishing such protection is irrelevant.173 
Because what matters here is that determining the legal interest depends on the rules relating to 
claims. And one may recall here the dictum of the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis Case to the 
effect that:174 
"It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, 
when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom 
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the 
case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial pro-
ceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to ensure, in the 
person of its subjects, respect for rules of international law." 
Respect for the rules of international law in this respect of course refers to the rules concerning the 
protection of aliens.175 While the existence of the right of diplomatic protection is generally admitted, 
it is typical for this category that further limitations are imposed for exercising the right in question. 
The most important are the rules concerning the nationality of claims and the exhaustion of local 
remedies.176 
1.6.3. Legal interests, prejudice and the collective interest of States 
Prejudice resulting from the commission of an internationally wrongful act need not always be, as 
exemplified in the previous subsection, restricted to certain specific States. Indeed it may happen that 
a primary rule of international law imposes obligations the breach of which will involve the infliction 
of prejudice to all States obligated or favoured by that rule, or, to the contrary, will result in no 
prejudice at all for such States. In such cases each and every State will be in possession of a legal in-
terest. Therefore one can generally distinguish two categories in which there is a collective interest in 
the performance of obligations. 
Legal interests and collective prejudice to States 
The first category to be discussed is connected to the concept of collective prejudice. The content of 
the rule of international law from which an obligation springs may concern a subject-matter in which 
all States are equally concerned. Examples may be found with the obligations prohibiting the station-
ing of nuclear weapons on the deep sea bed,177 and in space,178 as well as the prohibition of testing 
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nuclear weapons If such an obligation is breached the prejudice resulting therefrom will fall 
equally upon all States, for such prejudice concerns the growth of the threat of employment, be it 
intentionally or not, of such weapons 
This category may be established also by reference to the differing categories of treaties laid down 
in article 60 of the Vienna Convention That there may be "specially affected" parties in case of a 
breach of a multilateral treaty (article 60, paragraph 2 (a)) already leads to the inference that there 
may be cases in which the breach affects (equally) all the parties to the treaty More explicit in this 
sense is article 60, paragraph 2 (c), which grants any party to a multilateral treaty the right to sus­
pend the treaty, if that treaty is of such character that a material breach radically changes the position 
of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty I8° As ex­
amples of this category the Commission mentioned disarmament treaties Breaches of obligations 
under such treaties will affect all the parties to the treaty, and for that reason a right of unilateral sus­
pension is granted to all the parties 1β1 
In a very clear manner this category of legal interests has been laid down in article 5, paragraph 2 
(e) (ii) Admittedly the right of unilateral suspension of a multilateral treaty arises only in case of a 
material breach of that treaty, and in the exceptional circumstance that such breach "radically 
changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under 
the treaty" However article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (ii) is obviously of wider character, and it is to be re­
membered that the concern here is State responsibility in its broadest sense The measures possible 
under a future convention on State responsibility will go beyond a temporary (or even final) right of 
suspension of a multilateral treaty Also, of course, minor breaches do give rise to the responsibility 
of the author State, and may entail the right of injured States to respond thereto 
Legal interests and prejudice to extra-State interests 
One may divide the second category into obligations intended for the protection of a specified sub­
ject-matter, or obligations intended for the protection of individuals irrespective of their nationality 
In both these cases prejudice resulting from the breach of such obligations will not be detrimental to 
particular States, but to the subject-matter with which the obligation is concerned, or to individuals 
It is for this reason that the legal interest accruing to States as the result of the breach of such obli­
gations may be allocated to all of them, that is to say to all those States obligated by the rule 
Legal interests and the protection of the environment in areas outside national jurisdiction. With 
regard to the first sub-category, the obligations are related mostly to the protection of the environ­
ment To make clear why all States will be in possession of a legal interest consequent to the breach 
of an obligation intended to protect the environment one may refer to Brunnée, who states І Ю 
"The contracting states' benefit lies in the protection of environmental or other values and 
thus in an interest common to the international community " 
One may also read with Lefeber 1Ю 
"( ) no individual State has a special individual interest in the preservation of the environ­
ment of international areas or in the equitable use of their natural resources The members of 
the international community have, one and all, a common interest in the maintenance of the 
state of international areas " 
And somewhat later he claims 184 
"Having regard to their content and purpose, these obligations primarily have to be looked 
upon as instruments protecting the interests of the international community as a whole 
Hence, these obligations are ipso facto not, at least not exclusively, applicable vis-à-vis an-
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other State In as far as they are employed to protect common interests, they must be consid-
ered to be valid erga omnes " 
While it appears that he confuses the existence of a collective legal interest with the legal interest de-
riving from obligations erga omnes, to be discussed in section 8, nevertheless these quotes show an 
awareness of the fact that no State will generally be individually concerned in case of the breach of 
an obligation intended to protect the environment in areas outside national jurisdiction It must be 
noted however that he refers to the protection of the environment in international areas, and it hardly 
needs to be stressed that whenever prejudice affecting the environment is inflicted within the national 
boundaries of a State there is no need to have recourse to this category of legal interests 18S 
Legal interests and the protection of individuals irrespective of nationality. It is this category that 
causes unrest within the system set out above For it concerns the legal interest regarding obligations 
the purpose of which is to prescribe a course of conduct with respect to the nationals of the author 
State On account of this feature the generalized criterion of prejudice (effects) sheds little light on 
the issue of determining the States in possession of a legal interest in consequence of a breach of 
such obligations Because no State will be subjected to disadvantageous consequences as a result of 
the breach of human rights obligations The conclusion to be drawn from such a state of affairs is 
that, in case of the breach of such obligations, every State to which a certain rule applies will acquire 
a legal interest And an early dictum of the Court in the Genocide Opinion may serve to support this 
argumentI86 
"The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose 
( ) In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own, they 
merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high pur-
poses which are the raison d'être of the convention Consequently, in a convention of this 
type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or the mainte-
nance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties " 
And such argument is strengthened by the inclusion in the Genocide Convention of a provision pro-
viding for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with regard to disputes touching on the international 
responsibility of States parties for breaches of obligation contained in the Convention 187 This con-
clusion is not contradicted by the much quoted passage in the Barcelona Traction Case, where the 
Court observed 188 
"91 With regard more particularly to human rights, to which reference has already been made 
in paragraph 34 of this Judgment, it should be noted that these also include protection against 
denial of justice However, on the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights 
do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights ir-
respective of their nationality It is therefore still on the regional level that a solution to this 
problem has had to be sought, thus, within the Council of Europe, of which Spain is not a 
member, the problem of admissibility encountered by the claim in the present case has been 
resolved by the European Convention on Human Rights, which entitles each State which is a 
party to the Convention to lodge a complaint against any other contracting State for violation 
of the Convention, irrespective of the nationality of the victim " 
If read superficially, the Court here seems to deny Belgium a legal interest with respect to breaches 
of the human rights obligation that prohibits denial of justice For instance Smith observes 189 
"As to standing to protect the community interest in human rights protection, however, the 
Court concluded that the instruments setting forth human rights obligations erga omnes con-
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ferred standing to invoke responsibility for breach only on the state of the victim's national-
ity." 
A first comment, somewhat prematurely since the subject is discussed more fully in section 8, con-
cerns his apparent identification of human rights obligations with obligations erga omnes. Human 
rights obligations do not confer standing on each and every State of the international community, but 
only on such States that are bound to a specific rule laying down a human right. Thus only States 
that have consented to become a party to a human rights treaty will be in possession of a legal inter-
est in consequence of a breach of an obligation established thereunder. The only exception to such 
position of principle of course concerns the case in which it can be established that a certain rule 
laying down a human rights obligation has also its legal basis in customary law. Assuming such a rule 
to be universal that will mean that all States have a legal interest in calling on the observance of the 
rule in question. Now obviously the rule that prohibits denial of justice is of more limited scope in so 
far as it exists in customary international law, since the complementary rule laying down the correla-
tive right to demand observance of the rule is granted only on the basis of nationality. The reference 
in paragraph 91 of the Barcelona Traction Case to paragraph 34 therefore should not be read as re-
ferring to obligations erga omnes, and not even to the basic human rights mentioned there, but to 
human rights in general. 
The phrase "on the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on 
States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their na-
tionality" furthermore ought to be viewed with the issue of jurisdiction in mind. The Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights does not provide for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court regarding 
breaches of the obligations contained therein,190 but does that mean that no State party is entitled to 
claim the performance by another State party of its obligations under the Convention? If such were 
the case the conclusion would have to be reached that the performance of obligations under the 
Convention could not be demanded, and, as has already been argued above in subsection 1.4.1, such 
a conclusion is inadmissible. 
A category of treaties, bearing testimony of this category of legal interests, may be identified in 
that article 60, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Convention, refuses any right of suspension, let alone 
termination, whenever such suspension or termination would relate to treaty provisions concerning 
the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to 
provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons protected by such treaties.191 It is to be 
noted that this category includes all provisions intended for the protection of the human person, and 
not merely those which prohibit reprisals with regard to protected persons. 
Article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (iii), Part Two confirms this category of legal interests, in that any State 
party, or State bound by the relevant rule of customary international law, is injured in case of the 
breach of obligations created for the protection of human rights or fundamental freedoms.192 
1.6.4. Legal interests and the posited collective interest 
A penultimate category of legal interests is dominated by the will of States. It may properly be called 
the posited collective interest of States, insofar as it is within their (legislative) power to extend the 
legal interest of a State specially affected to other States not so affected. In such a case it is either the 
recognized importance of the obligation concerned, or of the régime instituted, that dictates the grant 
of a right to demand the performance of obligations to States other than those States directly af-
fected or injured as a result of a particular breach of obligation. 
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This category may be considered to lie at the basis of article 60, paragraph 2 (a) of the Vienna 
Convention. That provision authorizes States parties to a certain multilateral treaty, by unanimous 
agreement, to suspend or terminate the treaty as a reaction to a material breach ofthat treaty.1'3 That 
right may even go so far as to amount to a termination tout court of the treaty, not only in the rela-
tions between the States parties and the defaulting State, but even as between all parties. Clearly this 
indicates the interest that the States parties to any multilateral treaty have with regard to the due 
performance of obligations established by such treaties. 
Article 5, paragraph 2 (f), Part Two takes account of such a possible interest, as it stipulates that 
any State party to a multilateral treaty will be injured in case of the breach of obligations established 
for the protection of the collective interests of the States parties to the treaty. The commentary to 
article 5 illustrates that this category of legal interests comes into play only if States parties to a 
multilateral treaty have agreed to consider a breach of obligation as an infringement of their collec-
tive interest.194 Again it may be observed that the provision of article 5, paragraph 2 (f) seems wider 
than its counterpart in the Vienna Convention, since it does not speak of any unanimity to be re-
sorted to by States parties for determining the requisite measures to react to a breach. And again one 
should be reminded that the ILC-draft has a wider scope and needs to address all kinds of breaches of 
obligation, and not merely material breaches. In the commentary only one example is given, namely 
that of the common heritage of mankind in respect of the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil 
beyond national jurisdiction. Other examples come to mind, such as the interest of States in the col-
lective defence against aggression, as witnessed by the rights laid down by article 51 of the Charter, 
and the interest of States parties to the treaties establishing the European Communities in the due 
performance of obligations laid down by the treaties, e.g. as evidenced by article 170.195 
1.7. The concept of jus cogens 
Finally, a last category of legal interest is constituted by reference to the content, or subject-matter, 
of a certain rule, as well as its recognized importance for the international community: obligations 
erga omnes. However, for a proper understanding of the scope of such category, it is first necessary 
to refer to, and discuss, the emergence of a concept that triggered the institution of this category: the 
concept of jus cogens. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, headed "jus cogens", runs:196 
"A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." 
It would go too far to deal with all the problems and ambiguities that the idea of peremptory norms 
may pose.197 The present writer will therefore restrict the discussion to the following topics: the ob-
ject, purpose, and basis of the concept of jus cogens, acceptance and recognition of peremptory 
norms by the international community of States as a whole; peremptory norms and the international 
responsibility of States. 
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1.7.1. The object, purpose, and basis of the concept of jus cogens 
To go to the heart of the matter, a recurrent feature of peremptory norms is that they are referred to 
as being intended for the protection of the fundamental interests, community interests, common in-
terests, general interests of the (world) community,198 overriding or vital interests and values of the 
international community of States.199 But the problem with all these terms is that the term "interests" 
is never defined, and indeed, taking into account the discussion of "interest" in subsection 1.2.1, it 
cannot be defined. For it has been considered to stand for a certain desired course of conduct, the 
realization of which is sought to be achieved by States. It is therefore clear that the course of con-
duct to be realized has to be sought in the text of article S3 as it stands. Thus a peremptory norm is a 
"norm from which no derogation is permitted". On that score the notion of jus cogens has to be in-
terpreted in relation to the otherwise existing freedom of two or more States to replace, in so far as it 
concerns their inter se relations, any rule of international law by another rule.200 That freedom makes 
it possible for States to legalize conduct, for themselves, which would otherwise be prohibited to 
them under a pre-existing prohibitive rule of international law. If one considers the rule of article 53 
of the Vienna Convention from this perspective, it becomes clear that it establishes a distinction be-
tween primary rules of international law which may be changed by States in their inter se relations 
and primary rules of international law which cannot so be changed. If nevertheless such a change is 
attempted by States through the treaty instrument, article 53 renders the said treaty void.201 
Reference has been made to "replacing a rule of international law" and "changing a primary rule 
of international law". Article 53 however makes reference to treaties that "conflict" with a peremp-
tory norm of international law, and it is therefore useful to consider somewhat more closely what this 
stands for. It is essential to acknowledge that peremptory norms have their roots in ordinary primary 
rules of international law. Although it could be considered possible that a peremptory norm would be 
created instantly by States, the way in which the existence of peremptory norms is to be verified ap-
pears to prevent this from happening: a certain norm has to be "accepted and recognized by the in-
ternational community of States as whole". The conclusion to be drawn must be that normally the 
emergence of a peremptory norm will be preceded by the creation of a rule of customary interna-
tional law. The formation of peremptory norms thus takes place in two stages: first, the emergence 
of a rule of customary international law; and secondly, the recognition and acceptance ofthat rule as 
a peremptory norm of general international law.202 The content of the primary rule of international 
law is decisive in this context, and it is to be noted that most of the primary rules ever mentioned as 
credible candidates for promotion to the category of peremptory norms are prohibitive rules: they 
prohibit States to engage upon a certain course of conduct. It is on this account that one should in-
terpret the conflict of a treaty with a peremptory norm as meaning that the treaty concerned would 
purport either to lay down an obligation for the States concerned to engage upon a course of con-
duct prohibited by a rule of peremptory character, or a right to do so. 
The criterion that a peremptory norm must be "a norm from which no derogation is permitted", 
although sometimes claimed to be of tautological character in connection to the criterion of 
"conflict", is not quite superfluous. For it refers to a certain element of will of the international com-
munity of States as a whole, and this element will be discussed next. 
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1 7 2 Acceptance and recognition of peremptory norms by the 
international community of States as a whole 
The question needs to raised what is meant by "international community of States as a whole" A 
first observation seems to be in order in that "international community" appears to be qualified by the 
phrase "of States" Clearly predominance is given to States as subjects of international law, of old 
the main actors within the international community, in determining the peremptory character of 
norms Apparently this disqualifies other subjects of international law, at least formally, in participat-
ing in the acceptance and recognition phase of the peremptory character of norms203 
Apart from this preliminary point the question arises what has been meant by this phrase the inter-
national community of States "as a whole" It may be observed that this phrase did not appear in the 
proposed text of the Commission, and was eventually inserted by the Conference on the proposal of 
Finland, Greece and Spain The president of the "Comité de rédaction", Yasseen, after a question by 
Barros (Chile), explained the meaning of "as a whole" in the following way2M 
"( ), le Comité a entendu souligner qu'il ne s'agit pas d'exiger qu'une règle soit acceptée et 
reconnue comme impérative par l'unanimité des Etats II suffit d'une très large majorité, ce 
qui signifie que, si un Etat refuse isolément de reconnaître la nature impérative d'une règle, ou 
s'il est soutenue par un très petit nombre d'Etats, cela ne peut affecter l'acceptation et la re-
connaissance du caractère impératif de cette règle par la communauté internationale dans son 
ensemble " 
If one proceeds from the notion that a peremptory norm must be modelled on a universal rule of 
customary international law, the goal of the expression "international community of States as a 
whole" appears to be to bring forward the acceptance and recognition phase, and at the same time 
safeguard the universality of peremptory norms 
Another argument that has to be made concerns the link between the acceptance and recognition 
by the international community and the criterion of non-derogation Non-derogation has at times 
been mentioned as criterion to determine the peremptory character of norms Yet as some delegates 
at the Conference on the Law of Treaties indicated, it is not non-derogation as such which exclu-
sively determines such character1K What is determinative in this regard is the explicit acceptance 
and recognition of a norm as a peremptory, and not the mere acceptance of a rule as binding in the 
sense of article 38, paragraph 1 (b)I06 The acceptance and recognition must therefore be explicit, 
and directed towards establishing the peremptory character of a rule2β7 
Which rules ought to be considered accepted and recognized as peremptory norms? That is a dif­
ficult question, and many have been the answers In the commentary to then article 50 the Commis­
sion pointed out that 2 0 e "( ) the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in 
itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus co­
gens " However, the Commission did not list any other "conspicuous" examples of treaties void for 
conflict vñth jus cogens, but limited itself to naming some of the examples suggested Among those 
were treaties contemplating the performance of acts criminal under international law, and acts, such 
as trade in slaves, piracy or genocide, in the suppression of which every States is called to co-
operate 209 Other examples mentioned, not at that time constituting crimes under international law, 
included treaties contemplating violating human rights, the equality of States and the principle of 
self-determination 21° As the Commission apparently could not agree on more conspicuous examples, 
it provided that the exact content of the rule, that treaties are void if they conflict with a rule of jus 
cogens, would have to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tri-
bunals 2 n At this time those have not provided much guidance Some arbitral awards have examined 
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whether the rale on permanent sovereignty over natural resources could be considered a peremptory 
norm, but came to a negative conclusion.211 The Court has referred Xojus cogens at times, but has 
abstained from making any positive conclusions as to its existence.213 There is no need to attempt to 
examine exactly which rales of international law are peremptory norms, though at appropriate places 
arguments will be devoted to issues οι Jus cogens. 
1.7.3. Peremptory norms and State responsibility 
Although the Vienna Convention disclaims any intention of prejudging questions that may arise with 
regard to the international responsibility of States (article 73), nonetheless such questions, though 
not explicitly dealt with, are not wholly absent from the text of the Vienna Convention itself.214 In­
deed, especially the consequences of treaties being considered invalid or void, laid down in articles 
69 and 71 of the Vienna Convention, betray certain elements inherently connected to the law of State 
responsibility.215 Thus with regard to a treaty being considered void under article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention, article 71, paragraph 1 (a) only requires that the consequences of acts performed in reli­
ance on provisions that conflict with a peremptory norm shall be eliminated.216 This consequence, as 
well as that of article 71, paragraph 1 (b) which requires States to bring their mutual relations into 
conformity with the peremptory norm, more or less resembles what is called restitutio in integrum. 
Apart from this disguised application of the law of State responsibility certain implications flow 
from the findings in subsection 1.7.1 concerning the basis of peremptory norms. It has been found 
that peremptory norms had their basis in primary rales of international law of a prohibitive character, 
and the conclusion to be drawn is that States which conclude a treaty in conflict with a peremptory 
norm would also be subject to the rales on State responsibility. At the moment one State party, 
some, or all States parties to the treaty, execute the treaty, e.g. actually engage upon the course of 
conduct prohibited by a primary rule of international law (considered to be of peremptory character), 
their responsibility will be engaged. Another implication is that the categories of legal interest de­
scribed in section 1.6 are all applicable in the event of a breach of obligation under a peremptory 
norm. The question may be raised then whether the States in possession of a legal interest will be 
entitled to invoke article 53 and have a treaty declared void even if they are not a party to such a 
treaty. 
The question is acute because reading articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna Convention together leads 
to the conclusion that only a State which is a party to a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm 
can challenge the validity of such a treaty. Article 66 provides that any one of the parties to a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of articles 53 or 64 may submit the dispute to the Court 
if a solution has not been reached under paragraph 3 of article 65. The latter provision concerns the 
making of objections if a party, under paragraph 1 of article 65, invokes a ground for impeaching the 
validity of the treaty. Clearly the "party" which invokes a ground for impeaching the validity of the 
treaty becomes a "party to a dispute", in the sense of article 66 (a), only after an objection has been 
raised by any other "party". Both the invoking party and the objecting party therefore must be parties 
to the disputed treaty if they want to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under article 66 (a). Most 
delegates at the Conference on the Law of Treaties seemed to think that any State would be entitled 
to invoke the principle contained in article 53 (then article 50) that treaties in conflict with a peremp­
tory norm are void.217 Yet obviously such beliefs, insofar as the'application of articles 65 and 66 is 
concerned, cannot be accorded precedence in view of the ordinary meaning of the terms employed. 
However, as noted in subsection 1.7.1, the concept of jus cogens starts from the premise that per­
emptory norms will be grafted upon universal rules of customary international law. The conclusion 
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drawn from articles 65 and 66 of the Vienna Convention, that only parties to the challenged treaty 
can invoke its invalidity,21" appears to efface any effectivity the application article 53 might entail. 
And the essence of peremptory norms is that a treaty in conflict therewith should be declared void 
irrespective of the will of the individual States parties.219 The question then is whether the same con-
clusion should be reached if a State were to rely on the customary law of treaties for claiming the in-
validity of a treaty due to conflict with a peremptory norm. What should count is that a peremptory 
norm is of inherently universal scope. To deny non-parties the right to challenge the validity of a 
treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm would minimize the possibilities of applying the concept of 
jus cogens. Furthermore, if the object and purpose of the concept of jus cogens is to introduce a re-
striction to the otherwise existing freedom of States to conclude any kind of treaty, the interpreta-
tion, that only States which are parties to the disputed treaty can challenge its validity, renders the 
concept largely inoperative. For the same States to which the restriction applies, States which con-
clude a treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm, would be the only ones which could invoke its 
invalidity. The better interpretation then, under the customary law of treaties, is to consider any State 
entitled to invoke the invalidity of a treaty conflicting with a peremptory norm. That conclusion is 
bolstered also by reference to the way in which the existence of a peremptory norm is to be ascer-
tained: through the acceptance and recognition of the international community of States as a whole. 
It appears contradictory to give any State a say in the acceptance and recognition phase, but to deny 
any involvement at the stage of the concrete application of the concept oí jus cogens. 
A final question is whether the consequences attached to peremptory norms apply also to unilat-
eral acts. That question is somewhat superfluous, although it can be raised, because the basis of per-
emptory norms lies with primary rules of international law. These rules at the basis of peremptory 
norms, for the most part, are prohibitive in character, and if a State engages upon a course of con-
duct contrary to the rule concerned, then those acts will generate international responsibility. The 
right question to ask then is: considering that some rules have transformed to peremptory norms, 
should that also have consequences beyond the law of treaties, that is, in the law of State responsi-
bility. That question has been answered in the positive by the Commission, which, at the instigation 
of then special rapporteur Ago, adopted article 19 on the distinction between international delicts 
and international crimes. Before turning to that distinction, however, it is necessary to dwell on the 
idea of obligations erga omnes. This idea, in a chronological sense, preceded the proposal on inter-
national delicts and international crimes, and was used to argue in favour ofthat distinction. 
1.8. The Court's dictum on obligations erga omnes 
At a point in time where article 53 of the Vienna Convention had already adopted the idea of per-
emptory norms, the Court announced, in the Barcelona Traction Case, the following:220 
"33. When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether 
natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of law and assumes 
obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are 
neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn be-
tween the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those 
arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all 
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. 
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34 Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlaw­
ing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rales concerning 
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimina­
tion Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general 
international law (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 195J, p. 23); others are conferred by 
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character " 
This dictum, by some considered to have been made obiter, constituted the starting point of this the­
sis И | Yet at present no more need be done than to discuss some of the elements contained in this 
statement by the Court It is proposed therefore to discuss the following two subjects· paragraphs 33 
and 34 in the context of the Barcelona Traction Case; and the scope of obligations erga omnes and 
the relation to the concept of jus cogens. 
18.1 Paragraphs 33 and 34 in the context of the Barcelona Traction Case 
The Court on this occasion proclaimed "an essential distinction" between two different kinds of obli­
gations, namely obligations arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection and 
obligations towards the international community as a whole What is of paramount importance here 
is to note the consequences attached by the Court to obligations towards the international commu-
nity as a whole. First of all it states that considering their very nature they are the concern of all 
States. That does not help us very much, because, as has been reflected above (subsection 1 6 1), all 
States have a general interest in the observance of international law It is the additional sentence that 
clarifies what kind of concern is envisaged as it stipulates that "In view of the importance of the 
rights involved all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection," Now the question of 
legal interest is intimately connected to the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of another 
State, and thus demand the performance of (breached) obligations In the following paragraphs, 
which will be quoted in full considering their importance, the Court acknowledges as much when it 
holds222 
"35 Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of 
the same category It cannot be held, when one such obligation in particular is in question, 
that all States have a legal interest in its observance In order to bring a claim in respect of the 
breach of such an obligation, a State must first establish its right to do so, for the rules on the 
subject rest on two suppositions 
'The first is that the defendant State has broken an obligation towards the national State in 
respect of its nationals The second is that only the party to which an international obliga-
tion is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach.' (Reparation for Injuries Suffered m 
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 181-182 ) 
In the present case it is therefore essential to establish whether the losses allegedly suffered by 
Belgian shareholders in Barcelona Traction were the consequence of the violation of obliga-
tions of which they were the beneficiaries. In other words, has a right of Belgium been vio-
lated on account of its nationals' having suffered infringement of their rights as shareholders 
in a company not of Belgian nationality? 
36 Thus it is the existence or absence of a right, belonging to Belgium and recognized as 
such by international law, which is decisive for the problem of Belgium's capacity 
'This right is necessarily limited to intervention [by a State] on behalf of its own nationals 
because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the 
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State and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic pro-
tection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic protection that the right to take up 
a claim and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged ' 
(Panevezys-Salduùskis Railway, Judgment, ¡939, P. C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 76, ρ 16 ) 
It follows that the same question is determinant in respect of Spain's responsibility towards 
Belgium Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right " 
This last remark is not entirely correct if it meant to say that responsibility is only incurred if a State 
decides to exercise its right to demand performance of (breached) obligations223 Yet this quote 
serves to illustrate the nature of the distinction made by the Court, for Belgium could only exercise a 
right based on injury done to itself,224 or to its nationals The Court, however, correctly observed 
that it is not injury that confers the right225 
"Every investment of this kind carries certain risks The real question is whether a right has 
been violated, which right could only be the right of the State to have its nationals enjoy a 
certain treatment guaranteed by general international law, in the absence of a treaty applicable 
to the particular case " 
The complication in the Barcelona Traction Case of course was that the criterion of nationality could 
be applied to either natural persons, or legal persons. The injury, in consequence of (allegedly 
wrongful) acts by Spain, was done directly to the Barcelona Traction, a corporation established un­
der the laws of Canada, and only indirectly to the Belgian shareholders of that company Canada 
could have exercised, and for some time indeed did exercise, its right of diplomatic protection, but 
refrained from doing so any longer 
Although therefore all these observations seem to lead to the conclusion that States need not be in 
possession of a right to demand the performance of obligations erga omnes, the more correct view is 
that the Court considers that the rights may be in possession of other States than those which may 
certainly claim the performance of the correlative obligations because they have suffered from an in­
fringement of their rights (in the current legal terminology), or because they suffer the consequences 
of the internationally wrongful act (in the writer's terminology) Because if one scrutinizes the text of 
paragraph 33 more closely, one may notice that the "protection" in the sentence "In view of the im­
portance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection," 
does not refer to the protection of the obligations erga omnes, but to the protection of the rights in­
volved 1 2 6 This is brought out by the French text "Vu l'importance des droits en cause, tous les 
Etats peuvent être considérés comme ayant un intérêt juridique à ce que ces droits soient protégés " 
If we make the connection with the examples the Court mentions in paragraph 34 (the prohibitions 
of aggression, genocide, slavery and racial discrimination), then it is obvious that those "rights in-
volved" are in possession first of the victim of aggression and secondly of the peoples or individuals 
suffering from genocide, slavery or racial discrimination 
The legal interest of a State suffering from aggression is well established in international law, and the 
legal interest attributed by the Court to other States, over and above the legal interest of the victim 
State and even if they are not affected by the aggression, also Indeed the reference by the Court to 
"the corresponding rights of protection" may be read to mean the rights of States other than the 
"injured State" (and those exist only where the obligation breached is of erga omnes character), and 
in respect to the example of the prohibition of aggression may be considered to refer to the right of 
collective self-defence 
In the case of the examples of the prohibitions on genocide, slavery and racial discrimination, 
however, it is the rights of the populations and individuals concerned, generally speaking, which are 
at stake, and no other State will be affected through violations of the prohibitions227 Thus the 
LEGAL INTERESTS OF STATES 45 
observation of the Court, in paragraph 35, to the effect that Belgium would have to establish its 
right, should be read to mean, not that other States need not establish their right to engage in the 
protection of obligations erga omnes, but that they need not suffer any direct injury (to their 
rights),228 in consequence of an internationally wrongful act, in order to be in possession of a legal 
interest. 
Now paragraph 91 of the same judgment has been interpreted in the sense that on the universal 
level a State can only take up the protection of individuals suffering from the breach of human rights 
obligations if and when those are of the nationality of the protecting State.229 That conclusion cannot 
be shared by the present writer. In view of the importance of paragraph 91 it seems appropriate to 
quote it once more:230 
"With regard more particularly to human rights, to which reference has already been made in 
paragraph 34 of this Judgment, it should be noted that these also include protection against 
denial of justice. However, on the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights 
do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights ir-
respective of their nationality. It is therefore still on the regional level that a solution to this 
problem has had to be sought; thus, within the Council of Europe, of which Spain is not a 
member, the problem of admissibility encountered by the claim in the present case has been 
resolved by the European Convention on Human Rights, which entitles each State which is a 
party to the Convention to lodge a complaint against any other contracting State for violation 
of the Convention, irrespective of the nationality of the victim." 
A first remark on this score relates to the observation that while the Court in paragraph 33 and 34 
proclaims a legal interests for all States with regard to the basic rights of the human person 
(protection from slavery and racial discrimination, to which may in fact be added protection from 
genocide), in paragraph 91 the Court merely adopts the general formula of human rights.231 The 
Court refers to "instruments" on the universal level, and this may be considered a reference to the 
1966 Covenants.232 It may be suggested that such reference was somewhat inappropriate since none 
of the instruments referred to had, at that time, entered into force. Furthermore, one may point to the 
customary origin of the human rights obligations enumerated in paragraph 34, whereas the same 
cannot be said without qualification with regard to the obligation prohibiting denial of justice on 
which paragraph 91 turns. Although a rule prohibiting denial of justice does exist in customary inter-
national law, that rule has developed within the field of treatment of aliens. The corresponding rights 
of protection were only established for the State of the same nationality as the alien (allegedly) suf-
fering from maltreatment. Thus the dictum of the Court would have made sense if it had related to 
the position under customary law. Yet with regard to human rights obligations under treaties, 
whether universal or regional, and whether or not expressly providing for a right to institute proceed-
ings or initiate claims, all States parties to the treaties concerned will be in possession of a legal in-
terest consequent upon the breach of obligations under such treaties.233 Nevertheless, there is a need 
not to confuse the issues here, for the legal interest relating to (breached) human rights obligations is 
not based on any idea of obligations erga omnes. A remark which leads us to the next subsection. 
1.8.2. The scope of obligations erga omnes and the relation to the concept oí jus cogens 
A preliminary observation concerns the status of obligations erga omnes within the structure of pri-
mary and secondary rules of international law. The Court has created some confusion in speaking of 
"corresponding rights of protection". Now if obligations erga omnes were to have an independent 
status within the category of primary rules of international law, then such reference would have made 
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sense. As it is, no indication can be found that they existed in customary or conventional interna­
tional law before the Court so confirmed. If the corresponding rights of protection existed already, 
either in customary or conventional international law, what then is the innovation that the Court in­
troduced? What is important to recognize is that obligations erga omnes are most intimately con­
nected to the realm of secondary rules of international law, in that "all States can be held to have a 
legal interest" is the consequence of the characterization of an obligation as erga omnes only if and 
when such an obligation is breached. On that score Meron correctly observed:234 "Moreover, being 
erga omnes is a consequence, not the cause, of a right's fundamental character." 
On that account, to develop somewhat further the terminology involved, it may be noted that the 
expression "obligations" erga omnes is, apparently, a misnomer. The late judge Ago, commenting, 
explained: " 
"In my opinion, the expression is misleading. In reality, almost all obligations of customary 
international law are obligations erga omnes in the sense that they are towards each and all 
States." 
And as illustration of that thought he then referred to the obligation to respect the immunity of dip­
lomats which States owe to all other States. Yet if that obligation was breached, he added, a bilateral 
relationship resulted between the breaching State and the State suffering from the breach.И6 It fol­
lows that when speaking of obligations erga omnes the essential idea is not that the obligations are 
owed to all States, but that in case of the breach of such an obligation the corresponding rights of 
protection are in possession of each and every State. The Court, in the Barcelona Traction Case, ac­
knowledged this in holding that "all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection". 
And commenting Gaja held that:237 
"This entails all States being able to put forward a claim that the obligation should be re­
spected and that any act constituting an infringement should be discontinued." 
If, as has been held in the previous subsection, this means that the corresponding rights of protection 
may be in possession of all States besides the State suffering from the breach of the obligation, then 
the reference by the Court to "corresponding rights of protection" must be considered to be of su­
perfluous character. Indeed a legal interest in possession of a State has been considered to stand for a 
right of protection, that is, a right to demand the performance of (breached) obligations. Thus if a 
breach of an obligation erga omnes entails for every State a legal interest in its protection, that ipso 
jure means that they are in possession of a corresponding or correlative right of protection. The ref­
erence to corresponding rights of protection may then best be understood as evidence of the exis­
tence of obligations erga omnes, rather than that the establishment of a right should be considered to 
constitute a condition for a State's reliance on its legal interest resulting from the breach of an obli­
gation erga omnes. 
Turning now to a more dire question, on the basis of what criterion, or criteria, should ofte con­
sider that a certain obligation is oí erga omnes character? It is of course clear that the Court consid-
ers the obligations established under the rules prohibiting aggression, genocide, slavery and racial 
discrimination, to be of erga omnes character. Yet it seems that one cannot extract any criterion 
from those examples. If, for instance, the Court would have omitted the reference to aggression, one 
could have thought that the criterion sought was that of the human rights character of the obligations 
concerned. 
Annacker has claimed that the essential feature of obligations erga omnes is that they are performed 
towards a community of States and not towards one or more singular States. As such obligations 
erga omnes would be obligations towards all the parties of a multilateral treaty, towards all the" 
States bound by a regional or universal rule of customary international law, or towards the 
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international community. The distinguishing feature, in her words, is their non-bilateralizable 
structure, that is, they are performed or breached vis-à-vis all the States of the community.*38 The 
argument underlying this construction fails if one considers the example of the prohibition of 
aggression mentioned by the Court. Clearly a State which violates the prohibition breaches its 
obligations towards one or more singular States. Annacker appears to attempt to avoid that 
conclusion by pointing to the fact there are two kinds of erga omnes violations: a group which never 
violates subjective interests (human rights violations), and violations which injure at the same time 
subjective and objective interests (aggression).239 Yet she does not make clear why aggression would 
injure objective interests. Certainly the mere fact that the violation of the prohibition of aggression 
injures one or more singular States conflicts with her starting-point, namely that obligations erga 
omnes can only be fulfilled or breached towards the community of States.240 To say, as she does, that 
"the same conduct may well infringe upon the subjective interests of a certain State",241 is to reverse 
cause and effect. The commission of aggression is inherently directed towards a particular State. The 
latter State is not incidentally or marginally affected, it is the target of aggression. That all other 
States would be affected in their objective interests results only from the recognized importance of 
the prohibition of aggression, not from the fact that a violation of the prohibition necessarily amounts 
to a breach of an obligation towards all States.242 
Leaving aside for the moment the considerations laid down in paragraph 91 of the judgment, the ar-
gument that one would have to look, to decide on any criterion, to the human rights character of the 
obligations, is denied also with reference to the argument made above (subsection 1.6.3) with regard 
to the legal interest resulting from the breach of human rights obligations. Any State bound by the 
relevant rule will be in possession of such a legal interest if the obligation established thereunder is 
breached. The idea of obligations erga omnes would not add anything to that conclusion, unless of 
course the Court would consider every State in possession of a legal interest irrespective of whether 
or not the State concerned would be bound by the relevant rule. However, that result would seem to 
be manifestly absurd, or even unreasonable, to use article 32 Vienna Convention terminology. Of 
course a legal interest for all States would be considered established if the rule concerned would be a 
rule under universal customary international law (which is the case with regard to the examples of 
human rights obligations mentioned in paragraph 34). Where there is no such rule of universal cus-
tomary international law a State not obligated to adopt a specific course of conduct regarding its na-
tionals could not insist that another State should indeed adopt that course of conduct. 
The example of aggression, though intimately related to the most important human rights obligation, 
that of the right to life, is of a different category. The consequences of the violation of the prohibi-
tion of aggression are felt, most directly, by the individuals within the State suffering from the ag-
gression. As such the legal interest resulting from such violation is, technically speaking, confined to 
the State injured thereby. Extending the legal interest ofthat State to all other States therefore makes 
perfect sense.243 The other specific examples mentioned by the Court, genocide, slavery and racial 
discrimination, have all their basis in human rights obligations. One could argue that obligations erga 
omnes extend the protection of the rights concerned, of the direct victim(s) (individuals or the popu-
lation), to all other States. Yet such extension of protection is unnecessary. The victims concerned, 
peoples or individuals, do not have any standing in international law.244 For that reason the legal in-
terests resulting from a breach of obligation established for their protection must of necessity accrue 
to those States bound by the same rule. Due to the differing character of the examples given by the 
Court, however, one cannot determine any criterion on which to base the erga omnes character of an 
obligation. 
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Now the other phrases and terms mentioned in paragraph 33 also do not seem to offer any defi-
nite answer to this question. The "importance" of the rights involved may be subject to differing 
claims, and only the appellation of obligations as "erga omnes" and their being incurred 'Howards the 
international community as a whole" would seem to present some form of guide-line. At the time of 
judgment in the Barcelona Traction Case the latter phrase had only just turned up in article S3 of the 
Vienna Convention, though it spoke of the international community "of States" as a whole. Although 
the Court nowhere refers to the concept of jus cogens, nevertheless the Court's use of terms has 
been interpreted to imply a link between the two concepts.145 On the other hand it may be noted that 
Ammoun's separate opinion does refer to the concept of jus cogens, indeed links it to the notion of 
legal interest, and mentions:146 
"(...) an action brought in defence of a collective or general interest, the objective being to 
safeguard legality or the respect due to principles of an international or humane nature, trans-
lated into imperative legal norms (jus cogens)" 
Another indication that the Court had the concept of jus cogens in mind when speaking of obliga-
tions erga omnes may be found in the examples it refers to. Those were at the time most often men-
tioned as candidates for promotion to peremptory norm, or as existing peremptory norms.247 Thus 
the prohibitions concerned are, and were, regarded as being related to the fundamental interests in 
need of protection by every State, and this to the extent of prohibiting any derogation by means of 
concluding treaties. 
A major advantage in combining the concepts lies in the way in which it is to be ascertained that a 
norm is to be characterized as peremptory, and therefore constitutive of obligations owed erga om-
nes. Because, as has been seen in subsection 1.7.2, whether or not a peremptory norm exists has to 
be verified by reference to its acceptance and recognition by the international community of States as 
a whole. Although it is, of course, the subject-matter of a certain rule that makes it a candidate for 
promotion to peremptory ranks, yet whether or not it actually is a peremptory norm depends on the 
element of will inherent in the notion of "acceptance and recognition by the international community 
of States". Thus the concepts move away from the notion of subject-matter, and rely instead on the 
objective determination by the international community of States. The Commission itself, in its com-
mentary on article 19, Part One, indicated that the breach of an obligation established under a per-
emptory norm should entail erga omnes character:248 
"Similarly, it would seem contradictory if, in the case of a breach of a rule so important to the 
entire international community as to be described as a "peremptory" rule, the relationship of 
responsibility was established solely between the State which committed the breach and the 
State directly injured by it." 
1.9. The theory of international crimes 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 19, Part One, of the ILC-draft on State responsibility, lay down that:249 
"2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an interna-
tional obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes 
an international crime. 
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in force, an inter-
national crime may result, inter alia, from: 
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(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression; 
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding 
the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or 
maintenance by force of colonial domination; 
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential im-
portance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide 
and apartheid; 
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-
guarding and preservation of the human environment, such as that prohibiting massive 
pollution of the atmosphere or the seas." 
The Commission placed international crimes in contradistinction to international delicts, and it pro-
vided in article 19, paragraph 4:150 
"Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in accordance with 
paragraph 2 constitutes an international delict." 
Thus a distinction was introduced within the law of State responsibility that resembles the dichotomy 
established within the law of treaties between ordinary norms and peremptory norms.251 Again it 
would go too far, at this point, to discuss the theory of international crimes in its entirety,252 and the 
following topics are therefore singled out: the object, purpose, and basis of the theory of interna-
tional crimes; the criteria to determine the existence of an international crime; recognition of crimes 
by the international community as a whole; consequences of the distinction between international dé-
bets and international crimes; and the relationship between international crimes and obligations erga 
omnes, and their embodiment in article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two, of the ILC-draft. 
1.9.1. The object, purpose, and basis of the theory of international crimes 
Whereas article 53 of the Vienna Convention at least is clear with regard to the sanction to be ap-
plied with regard to treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm, the same cannot be said regarding 
article 19 of the ILC-draft. Indeed it is completely silent on the purpose of a distinction between in-
ternational delicts and international crimes. There can be no doubt, as article 19, paragraph 1, puts it, 
that, regardless of the subject-matter of an obligation, any breach of an obligation constitutes an in-
ternationally wrongful act. But what the difference is between an international delict and an interna-
tional crime, both internationally wrongful acts under article 19, paragraph 1, is not at all clear. 
Indeed, Part One of the ILC-draft is silent on the consequences of all internationally wrongful acts, 
and not just on those of international crimes.253 The basic purpose underlying the theory of interna-
tional crimes seems to be the attachment of additional consequences to internationally wrongful acts 
that are recognized by the international community as crimes. If that is the case the whole philosophy 
behind the theory of international crimes appears to be a shift to more law observance, and, in case 
the law is not observed, to more effective law enforcement. 
As in the case of peremptory norms it is essential to recognize that the basis of an international 
crime lies with the breach of ordinary obligations (internationally wrongful acts), and this leads to the 
conclusion that all the legal consequences normally attached to an international delict are also appli-
cable to a committed international crime.254 
In the terminology of Part Two of the ILC-draft this means that a State committing an international 
crime will be subject to the obligation to repair its internationally wrongful act by all the appropriate 
means. A State in possession of a legal interest in consequence of the internationally wrongful act 
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will correspondingly be endowed with the right to require the State committing the international 
crime to repair its internationally wrongful act. Furthermore, a State in possession of a legal interest 
may, under certain circumstances, be accorded the right to resort to countermeasures or to use 
armed force. In such a case, however, the State resorting to countermeasures or force will be subject 
to the requirements set for the exercise of the right to resort to countermeasures or to armed force 
(infra chapters four and five). 
One other aspect of these considerations must be mentioned in that the categories of legal interest, 
discussed in section 1.7, are applicable to all instances of international crimes. As a consequence it 
may happen that a certain accumulation of legal interests takes place for particular States in conse-
quence of an internationally wrongful act by another State. 
1.9.2. The criteria to determine the existence of an international crime 
The basic criterion to decide whether or not breaches of certain obligations constitute international 
crimes lies, according to the Commission, in the notion that the obligation breached must:25* "(...) by 
virtue of its content, be essential for the protection of the fundamental interests of the international 
community;" As a safeguard for the correct application of this criterion the Commission stipulated a 
complementary criterion which:256 
"(...) makes the international community as a whole responsible forjudging whether the obli-
gation is essential and, accordingly, whether its breach is of a 'criminal' nature." 
The Commission, so as to highlight these criteria, in paragraph 3 of article 19, went on to provide 
examples, but "subject to paragraph 2" and "on the basis of rules of international law in force".257 It 
continued furthermore, as a matter of drafting technique, to indicate that the examples of paragraph 
3, subs (a) to (d) must concern breaches of obligations that are of "essential importance" to a certain 
general sphere of obligations.258 
Of far more importance, however, is the Commission's inclusion in all the examples mentioned, 
again as a matter of drafting technique, that there must be a "serious" breach of obligation in order to 
conclude to the existence of an international crime, and it added in the commentary:259 
"Moreover, even the breach of an obligation of essential importance may not assume propor-
tions sufficient to warrant it being characterized as a crime. This can be done only if the seri-
ousness of the breach is established." 
In addition to this more general reference to the seriousness of the breach it qualified one example by 
adding a quantitative criterion. Thus the serious breach of obligation for safeguarding the human be-
ing, laid down in paragraph 3 (c), must take place "on a widespread scale", which in the words of the 
commentary meant that it ought to take "the form of a large-scale or systematic practice adopted in 
contempt of the rights and dignity of the human being".266 
Furthermore, some of the specific examples mentioned implicitly contain quantitative dimensions. 
The prohibition of aggression in paragraph 3 (a), for instance, may be taken to refer not just to any 
kind of use of armed force by a State, but to those uses of armed force constituting an act of aggres-
sion in the sense of article 39. It may be noted that the Commission had earlier, in relation to the cri-
terion of seriousness, referred to the fact that:261 
"The Charter itself makes a distinction between 'threats to the peace', 'breaches of the 
peace', and 'acts of aggression'." 
One would think that in pointing to the term aggression as displayed in article 39, that is at the top of 
the list of illegal uses of armed force, the Commission is thinking in terms of armed attacks in the 
sense of article 51 of the Charter rather than all the different kinds of uses of armed force put down 
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in resolution 3314 (XXIX) The maintenance or establishment of colonial domination, in para­
graph 3 (b) on self-determination, is to take place "by force", even if the commentary makes clear 
that "by force" is intended to mean no more than "against the will of the subject population"263 And 
the example of paragraph 3 (d), on the safeguarding of the human environment, stipulates that the 
serious breach of obligation must concern the prohibition of "massive" pollution. 
With regard to the criterion of seriousness it has to be noted that this applies to the general catego­
ries of obligations of essential importance, and not to the specific examples mentioned2<и Although 
admittedly the phrases "such as that prohibiting" linguistically can only refer back to the obliga­
tion,165 it may be submitted that this would not accord with the intention underlying paragraph 3 For 
instance if there is a breach "on a widespread scale" of the obligations prohibiting genocide or apart­
heid, can one still argue that there must be a "serious" breach before there is an international crime1? 
Is it possible to deny the existence of an international crime, notwithstanding that there is a breach of 
the obligation prohibiting "massive" pollution? 
It may be suggested, in this latter regard, that the drafting of paragraph 3 is deficient, and that a sec­
ond reading of article 19 could improve the text as it stands266 At present no more need be said 
about the criterion of a serious breach, though it will be discussed further at appropriate places 
However, there is one aspect, which was not discussed by the Commission in relation to the pro­
posed distinction on delicts and crimes, which deserves attention That concerns the question of 
fault It does not seem, in view of the phrasing of article 3, Part One, that the Commission consid­
ered the existence of fault, that is, negligence, (wilful) intent, or premeditation, a condition for the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act But as special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz has noted, 
questions of fault must be taken into account in matters of reparation267 Irrespective of the relevance 
of fault for deciding on specific forms of reparation, resort to countermeasures or the use of force, 
one would think that in making a distinction between delicts and "crimes" there ought to be at least 
some reference in the commentary to the element of will present with the author State of an interna­
tional crime268 
There can be no doubt that an international crime cannot be committed through negligent behaviour 
Almost all of the crimes mentioned as examples in article 19, paragraph 3, are characterized by the 
fact that they can only be committed with wilful intent or premeditation Any State committing ag­
gression, establishing or maintaining by force colonial domination, engaging in slavery, committing 
genocide, or engaging in apartheid, displays its animus to do what it is doing If it had had no such 
animus, one would expect it to act to suppress the conduct of its organs In fact, none of the 
breaches characterized as crimes in article 19, paragraph 3, subs (a) to (c), can be committed without 
the active co-operation of high placed State organs, such as top government officials and high-up 
police and military officers 
In this respect some remarks by Palmisano, on the crime of aggression, are highly relevant269 
"( ) l'élément subjectif constitué par У animus de l'Etat auteur du fait illicite, joue aussi un 
certain rôle pour déterminer la gravité «circonstancielle» de l'agression En disant cela, nous 
ne nous référons pas simplement au fait - du reste évident - qu'un acte d'agression est tou-
jours réalisé intentionellement par un Etat avec la participation de tous ses organes, mais nous 
désirons surtout souligner que l'«intention agressive» représente, du moins dans quelques cas, 
l'élément qui aggrave certains comportements étatiques internationalement illicites jusqu'au 
niveau requis par la notion de «crime» envisagé dans l'article 19 " 
In his opinion the aggressive intent of an author State in engaging upon certain acts is sufficient to 
elevate such conduct to the level of a crime He goes on to illustrate that point by reference article 3, 
subs (f) and (g) of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), neither of which, in his opinion, 
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involve, as such, a use of force by the State With regard to the first it may be said that a State, 
allowing its territory, placed at the disposal of another State, to be used for the commission of an act 
of aggression against a third State, does in fact use force against the third State The determining 
factor, it would seem, is that such a State has placed its territory at the disposal of another State 
knowing that that State would commit aggression Since the act of aggression could not have taken 
place without its co-operation, it is not too far-fetched to claim that the first State has equally used 
force against the third State. The second example, the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State, 
similarly involves an actual use of force by the State concerned The phrase "by or on behalf of a 
State" signifies the element of attribution necessary for the existence of any internationally wrongful 
act of a State (article 3 (a), Part One, of the ILC-draft) If a State knows of the existence of such 
bands and fails to put an end to their activities, it does not breach its obligation to refrain from the 
use force against another State, but breaches its obligation not to allow its territory to be used for the 
commission of injurious acts against another State271 
The other examples of crimes provided in article 19, paragraph 3, subs (b) and (c), similarly bear 
witness to the existence, of necessity, of wilful intent or premeditation on the part of the author 
State The crime of denial of self-determination cannot occur through sheer negligence, if only be­
cause the formulation of the right, that a people "freely" determines its status, must imply action im­
peding the exercise of that right2n The more specific example under sub (b), the establishment or 
maintenance by force of colonial domination more clearly brings out this aspect, since the Commis­
sion claims that "by force" in this context means "against the will of the subject population" m In the 
same vein the breaches of obligations for safeguarding the human being, under paragraph 3 (c), can 
only be committed through wilful intent or premeditation, since a crime in this respect exists only if 
the breaches occur "on a widespread scale" And the Commission added to this, in the commentary, 
that a crime required breaches on a widespread scale so that it took "the form of a large-scale or 
systematic practice"274 Obviously the existence of a large-scale practice in denial of human rights 
alone would suffice to establish the wilful intent or and premeditation on the part of the author State 
And the same can be said if it can be shown that certain practices are systematic in character It may 
be noted that the specific examples of paragraph 3 (c), slavery, genocide and apartheid, constituting 
serious breaches of obligations on a widespread scale, could hardly be committed otherwise than 
through wilful intent or premeditation The specific treaties in this context also make references to 
elements of intent The Genocide Convention, in article 2, stipulates that "( ) genocide means any 
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, ( ) " The Apartheid Convention, defines in a like manner, in article 2, the crime 
οι apartheid as I 7 S "( ) acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination 
by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing 
them( ) " 
In conclusion it may be observed that the existence of wilful intent and premeditation on the part 
of an author State not merely constitutes an aggravating circumstance generally, but ought to be 
considered inherent in, and a constituent element of, the commission of any international crime 
1 9 3 Recognition by the international community as a whole 
The process by which certain internationally wrongful acts are recognized as crimes coincides to a 
large extent with that laid down in article 53 of the Vienna Convention regarding peremptory norms 
Indeed, the Commission observed in this regard in the CommentaryI76 
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"Moreover, it is clear what is meant by this reference to the international community as a 
whole It certainly does not mean the requirement of unanimous recognition by all the mem-
bers ofthat community, which would give each State an inconceivable right of veto What it 
is intended to ensure is that a given internationally wrongful act shall be recognized as an 
'international crime', not only by some particular group of States, even if it constitutes a ma-
jority, but by all the essential components of the international community." 
Yet some additional questions remain to be answered 
A first one concerns the observation that article 53 of the Vienna Convention mentions the 
"international community of States as a whole", whereas article 19, paragraph 2, makes reference to 
the "international community as a whole". If we take as a starting point the inclusion of States and 
international organizations (and possibly other subjects of international law) within the notion of 
"international community", then it needs to be asked whether the latter have some function with re-
gard to the recognition phase of certain breaches of obligation as international crimes One may take 
a look at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organiza-
tions or between International Organizations, which in article 53 has adopted the same text as that 
contained in article 53 of the Vienna Convention It would seem strange that in this treaty where 
treaties concluded with an international organization are declared subject to the concept ofy«s co-
gens, and thus void if they conflict with a peremptory norm, still the phrase is adopted "For the pur-
poses of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole" If therefore in a treaty so es-
sential to the functioning of international organizations all standing is denied for those organizations 
in the recognition phase of the peremptory character of norms, then the conclusion seems justified 
that such standing is also denied with regard to the law of State responsibility 
Another aspect which needs to be underlined is that the way in which it has to be ascertained that 
certain internationally wrongful acts constitute international crimes merely concerns the recognition, 
in the abstract, that certain breaches of obligation will constitute international crimes Thus article 
19, paragraph 2, has nothing to do with the evaluation of whether certain conduct, in the concrete 
circumstances of the case, amounts to an international crime. That evaluation hinges upon the ques-
tion who is to determine that an international crime has taken, or is taking, place, and that conse-
quently more severe consequences will attach to the conduct in question On that issue Arangio-Ruiz 
has proposed, in article 19, Part Two, to leave the determination of the existence of an international 
crime to the Court277 Any State party to a future convention on State responsibility would be enti-
tled to unilaterally seise the Court if the General Assembly or the Security Council had previously re-
solved, by qualified majority, that the allegation was sufficiently substantiated as to justify the grave 
concern of the international community If the Court determined that a crime had been, or was being, 
committed, the injured States would be entitled to invoke the special, supplementary consequences 
as contemplated by his proposed articles 16, 17 and 18, Part Two (discussed mainly infra chapters 
three to five) 
Finally, it is necessary to account for the lack of attention paid, in the previous subsection, to the 
fourth sphere of essential obligations regarding the protection of the human environment as laid 
down in article 19, paragraph 3 (d)278 The reason for that lies with the doubts one may entertain as 
to whether it is possible to say, on the basis of the rules of international law in force, that the inter-
national community has recognized obligations for the protection of the human environment as es-
sential for the protection of the fundamental interests of the international community Or in other 
words, one may doubt whether the international community has recognized breaches of obligation 
for the protection of the environment as international crimes. Taking a good look at former special 
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rapporteur Ago's report shows a minimum of argument devoted to the protection of the environ­
ment,279 and the commentary to article 19 does not significantly improve on that score M 0 Of course 
one could argue that the protection of the environment has, in recent times, received much attention, 
and has led to a number of extremely important treaties M l However, none of those treaties provides 
any indication that the international community would consider breaches of obligation for the pro­
tection of the environment as international crimes 
Furthermore, if one considers the examples of pollution nowadays, one is confronted with the fact 
that in many cases the pollution finds its origin in many different States, and with the fact that the 
relatively recent example of Chernobyl has not in any way been treated as a crime The main reason 
for the moderate reaction of the international community in that instance may be traced back simply 
to the absence of any wilful intent, let alone premeditation, to cause pollution2Ю Of course this does 
not signify that no responsibility had been incurred in this case That one cannot conclude to the exis­
tence of a crime does not mean that there was no internationally wrongful act Also there can be little 
doubt that a State which wilfully and with premeditation pollutes the atmosphere or the seas on a 
large scale will be considered to have committed an international crime 
Certain conduct engaged in by Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait could be considered, at pres­
ent, to constitute the only example of the international crime of pollution of the atmosphere and the 
seas That concerned the spilling of oil into the Persian Gulf in order to prevent or hamper a potential 
amphibian landing by Coalition forces, and the setting on fire of Kuwaiti oil wells just before and 
during the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait28Э In paragraph 16 of resolution 687 the Security Council af­
firmed that Iraq was "( ) liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including envi­
ronmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, ( )," The Council, so as to implement 
Iraq's responsibility, has set up a compensation commission, but the latter's activities relate to dam­
age caused "as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" One cannot, conse­
quently, regard the Security Council's action with regard to the Iraqi precedent as an example of the 
implementation of responsibility for the crime of pollution2M 
Since then the Council, by way of presidential statement, has noted that M 5 
"The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure interna­
tional peace and security The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, hu­
manitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security " 
This statement certainly does not qualify as a determination of the Council under article 39 of the 
Charter Yet it shows the Council's intention to act under that provision in relation to ecological cri­
ses if the circumstances so require That might be the case if a State wilfully and with premeditation 
would pollute the atmosphere or seas so as to cause damage to a particular State or people But 
certainly it is very unlikely that a State would wilfully and with premeditation massively pollute areas 
outside national jurisdiction 
In conclusion it may be said that the international community has not, at present, recognized obli­
gations for the protection of the environment as obligations essential for the protection of its funda­
mental interests Nor has it determined their breach to constitute an international crime In view of 
the rarity of precedents, and the improbability of their recurrence, the crime of pollution will not be 
discussed separately in the following chapters 
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1.9.4. The consequences attached to international crimes 
Over and above the consequences applicable in case of international delicts, there must be other ad-
ditional consequences which are applicable only in case of international crimes. These may be divided 
into two broad categories: the imposition upon a State which has committed an international crime 
of more severe consequences than applicable in case of international débets; and the broadening of 
the category of subjects of international law entitled to invoke the responsibility of a State in case an 
internationally wrongful act constitutes an international crime. 
The former are considered in articles 14 and 15 Part Two of the ILC-draft proposed by the previous 
special rapporteur Riphagen, yet they have not been adopted by the Commission. Article 14, para-
graph 2, provided for obligations on all other States: (a) not to recognize as legal the situation cre-
ated by such crime; (b) not to render aid or assistance to the State which has committed such crime 
in maintaining the situation created by such crime; (c) and to join other States in affording mutual 
assistance in carrying out the obligations under subparagraphs (a) and (b). The present special rap-
porteur Arangio-Ruiz recently has come up with his own proposals regarding possible consequences 
of international crimes.286 Since the additional consequences of international crimes will be discussed 
mainly in chapters three to five, no more need be said of them here. 
The latter category, broadening the category of subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of a 
State if the internationally wrongful act constitutes an international crime, leads us to the next sub-
section. 
1.9.5. International crimes, article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two of the ILC-draft on State responsibility, 
and obligations erga omnes 
The Commission, at different points in its commentary on article 19, already envisaged the possibility 
that there might be subjects other than the directly injured State entitled to invoke the responsibility 
of another State which committed an international crime.287 However, since the Commission at that 
moment was committed only to the construction of Part One, it did not probe further with regard to 
the question whether there might be States other than the directly injured State entitled to invoke the 
responsibility in such cases, and if so what those States could actually do consequent upon their right 
to invoke that responsibility. Whether they could demand reparation or decide upon countermeasures 
or the use of force was left to be determined in Part Two of the draft. 
The Commission, on the basis of Riphagen's proposal, reached agreement on the erga omnes charac-
ter of international crimes, as it adopted article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two of the ILC-draft:288 
'3. In addition, 'injured State' means, if the internationally wrongful act constitutes an inter-
national crime [and in the context of the rights and obligations of States under articles 14 and 
15], all other States." 
The commentary on this article makes clear that, in principle, all other States are to be considered 
"injured State" in case of an international crime.289 But it is added that:299 
"In particular, the question arises whether all other States, individually, are entitled to respond 
to an international crime in the same manner as if their individual rights were infringed by the 
commission of the international crime." 
The answer to that question depends to a large degree upon the progressive institutionalization, as 
well as the establishment of collective procedures, and as such will be dealt with in chapter two. 
However, the Commission did make clear that individual States will be entitled to invoke some of the 
legal consequences normally at the disposal of an injured State.291 The Commission then mentioned, 
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uniquely (for it did not give other examples), the "entitlement to require the author State to stop the 
breach"29î Still, some ambiguity remains as regards the theoretical and terminological underpinnings 
of the adopted text 
Among these a first point to be raised is the fact that contrary to the definition of paragraph 1, the 
phrase "if the right infringed", featuring in all the examples laid down in paragraph 2, does not have a 
place within the text of paragraph 3 No explanation for this divergence is offered either in the rele-
vant proposals of Riphagen,293 or the commentary on article 5 Now by definition "injured State" 
means a State whose rights have been infringed, and it may be wondered whether that definition 
applies also to the case of international crimes294 If the phrase "In addition" in paragraph 3 is meant 
to indicate that the definition of paragraph 1 does not apply in case of international crimes, that 
would provide a satisfactory explanation If it does not carry that meaning, that would seem strange 
Because the legal interest accruing to States consequent upon the commission of an international 
crime depends upon their being a member of the international community, and not upon any injury 
they suffer as a result ofthat crime The Court, in the Barcelona Traction Case, equated obligations 
erga omnes to obligations towards the international community, and only from that identification re-
sulted legal interests for all States To refer to rights possessed by "injured" States and infringed in 
case of international crimes would present a misnomer, and the reference to the "infringement of 
rights" has therefore rightly been omitted from the text of article 5, paragraph 3 
Another issue in need of attention, though not directly connected to the text of article 5, para-
graph 3, is the relationship between peremptory norms, international crimes and obligations erga 
omnes Now as may be recalled, the Commission has observed, in its commentary on article 19,295 
that in case of the breach of obligations established under a peremptory norm responsibility was to be 
incurred also towards not-directly injured States That remark by the Commission appeared to pave 
the way for the recognition that any State would be entitled to demand the performance of an obli-
gation laid down by a peremptory norm Yet at the same time the Commission created some confu-
sion, as it observed 296 
"It would be simply wrong to conclude that any breach of an obligation deriving from a per-
emptory norm of international law is an international crime and that only the breach of an ob-
ligation having this origin can constitute such a crime It can be accepted that obligations 
whose breach is a crime will 'normally' be those deriving from rules of ум* cogens, though 
this conclusion cannot be absolute But above all, although it may be true that failure to fulfil 
an obligation established by a rule oí jus cogens will often constitute an international crime, it 
cannot be denied that the category of international obligations admitting of no derogation is 
much broader than the category of obligations whose breach is necessarily an international 
crime " 
Taking into account the remarks made in the commentary to article 19, two conclusions seem war-
ranted First, that all States have a legal interest in case of the breach of an obligation laid down by a 
peremptory norm And secondly, since there may exist obligations under peremptory norms whose 
breach is not an international crime, that peremptory norms are to attain an independent status within 
the ILC-draft Consistent arguing, therefore, would lead to the conclusion that one might expect to 
find a provision in article 5, Part Two, to the effect that in case of a breach of an obligation estab-
lished under a peremptory norm all States are injured297 But one searches in vain to find any There 
are of course other provisions within the ILC-draft that are concerned with peremptory norms,298 but 
those do not touch upon any question of legal interest299 Under this hypothesis it flows from the 
(absence of any provision in the) ILC-draft that the legal interest accruing to States following the 
breach of an obligation laid down by a peremptory norm must be determined by application of the 
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categories of article 5, paragraph 2 That conclusion, however is in contradiction to the text of the 
commentary on article 19, as illustrated above (subsection 1 8 2) 
No problem would have existed if the categories of peremptory norms and international crimes 
had been considered to overlap completely And it is to be noted that a number of members of the 
Commission commented upon the proposed article 18 (later article 19) in the sense of identifying the 
category of peremptory norms to that of international crimes 30° If such complete identification had 
been established, the only thing to do was to find entena by which to determine when and how the 
breach of an obligation under a peremptory norm could be considered an international enme The 
basic cntenon in this respect constitutes the "senousness" of the breach m That cntenon seems to 
have been endorsed by the Commission, since in all the examples mentioned m article 19, paragraph 
3, Part One, it inserted the phrase "a senous breach", although of course it must be admitted that af­
ter that phrase they also all add the line "of an international obligation of essential importance for" 
That additional line appears to reflect more the basic cntenon laid down in paragraph 2, for whether 
an obligation is of essential importance must surely be determined by the international community as 
a whole, and the essential importance of an obligation therefore does not appear to deserve any inde­
pendent status as cntenon The commentary, however, makes clear, and indeed it stresses this as­
pect, that the entena in order to determine whether an international enme has been committed, as 
referred to in paragraph 3, must be read in the light of the cntenon adopted in paragraph 2 only 
when the international community has recognized acts to be contrary to an obligation for the protec­
tion of the fundamental interests of that community can one consider such acts to constitute 
enmes
3M
 Nevertheless, the commentary was explicit in its conviction t h a t ж 
"( ) even the breach of an obligation of essential importance may not assume proportions 
sufficient to warrant it being charactenzed as a enme " 
In view of article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (in), however, the conclusion would have to be that conduct 
constituting a denial of self-determination and human nghts violations would imply injured State 
status for all the States bound by the conventional or customary law rule As the rules regarding self-
determination and basic human nghts are established under universal rules of customary international 
law, all States are in possession of injured State status independent of the gravity of the breaches 
Under article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (ι) an unlawful use of force will either lead to the injured State status 
for the directly injured State, or under article 5, paragraph 3, to injured State status for all the other 
States if the unlawful use of force constitutes the international enme of aggression 
1.10. Summary 
It has been found that an interest stands for a desired course of conduct, the realization of which is 
sought to be achieved by a State or another subject of international law A pnme function of law in 
general is to accord protection to interests which are worthy of protection However, not all interests 
worthy of protection are necessanly protected at any given pomt m time For those charged with the 
application and enforcement of law may grant protection only to the extent that the law has granted 
an interest protection through the applicable legal procedures It has been argued by some that a dis­
tinction has developed, in international law, between simple interests, legitimate interests and nghts, 
by which the second category, though not the first, would benefit from some protection However, 
one cannot say that such a distinction has developed m international law In international law inter­
ests come to be protected through the elaboration of pnmary rules of international law Those may 
presenbe a certain course of conduct, prohibit a particular course of conduct or to the contrary 
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permit it Prescriptive and prohibitive rules lay down obligations, whereas permissive rules provide 
for rights 
Law is binding for those subjected to it and imposes respect for its rules In the absence of law 
subjects could act as they pleased, and the quality of law consists of its restrictive character once it 
exists The law therefore obliges and from this derives, grammatically, the word "obligation" Obli-
gations may be created through the elaboration of prescriptive and prohibitive primary rules How-
ever, the law may instead safeguard the freedom of States by creating a permissive primary rule 
establishing a right, that is, an entitlement to engage m certain conduct (mostly physical action) If a 
right has been validly conferred by a permissive rule, a correlative obligation must be seen to exist 
not to impede the exercise of such a right 
At the same time there exists a correlative right to demand the performance of other subjects' ob-
ligations The basis ofthat right does not he with the idea that the breach of an obligation constitutes 
the equivalent of an infringement of a subjective right it is precisely on the occasion of a breach of 
obligation that a correlative right must be exercised The necessity of correlative rights is postulated 
on the basis that there must always be, at least theoretically and to begin with, another subject of in-
ternational law entitled to demand the performance of an obligation Because if there would not be 
any such subject, the subject under obligation could itself, and exclusively, determine whether or not 
it was performing its obligation The sources of correlative rights he with the general principles of 
law and the rules of customary international law related to the law of State responsibility The actual 
circumstances and the nature of the rules determine whether a State can exercise a correlative right, 
that is, whether a subject can be considered to possess a legal interest 
The examination of entena to determine the legal interests of States has shown that neither the 
general interest in the observance of international law, nor the common interest under rules of inter-
national law, gives nse to a legal interest Though the latter provides a negative cntenon in that 
States not bound by any particular rule are most certainly not in possession of a legal interest Con-
sidenng performance towards specific States also provides no useful cntenon to determine the legal 
interest only at the occurrence of a breach of obligation is it possible to determine which States are 
in possession of a legal interest The cntenon to determine the existence of a legal interest does not, 
however, he with the existence of matenal, moral, or legal damage For the former two would not 
explain questions of legal interests pursuant to breaches of human nghts obligations, whereas the 
latter would entail the possession of a legal interest for all States The general cntenon to determine 
the legal interests of States must be the (lack of) effects of an internationally wrongful act upon other 
States or the international community The effects of a breach of obligation generally affect particular 
or all States, and the more tangible term prejudice has been chosen to desenbe such effects upon 
States 
Apart from certain non-problematical categones of legal interests, prejudice may be suffered by 
individual States, by a collectivity of States, or the effects of a breach may not affect any particular 
State The prejudice suffered by individual States may be caused directly, for instance by way of ob-
struction of the exercise of nghts of junsdiction, or it may be caused indirectly to a State to the det-
nment of its nationals Prejudice caused to a collectivity of States may come about because a breach 
of obligation affects all States equally, as is the case for instance with the prohibitions of the station-
ing of nuclear weapons on the seabed or in space Where a breach of obligation under a rule would 
not affect any State specifically, the legal interest will accrue to all States bound by the rule Such is 
the case with obligations for the protection of the environment in areas outside national junsdiction, 
and obligations for the protection of the human nghts of individuals irrespective of nationality A pe-
nultimate category of legal interests of States is constituted by reference to the will of States, and 
LEGAL INTERESTS OF STATES 59 
may be coined the posited collective interest. In such a case States have agreed to extend the legal 
interest of States directly injured or affected to all the States bound by the rule. Examples of this 
category are collective self-defence provisions and the collective interest of members to the Euro­
pean Union in the due performance of obligations under the treaties, e.g. article 170. 
A final category of legal interests is constituted by reference to the content, or subject-matter, of a 
certain rule, and its recognized importance for the international community. Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention introduced the concept of jus cogens into positive international law, and stipulates that a 
treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm. Existing peremptory norms, and credible candi­
dates, are all based on prohibitive primary rules of international law. The object and purpose of the 
concept οι jus cogens is to provide a restriction to the otherwise existing freedom of States to con­
clude any kind of treaty derogating from such rules. The existence of peremptory norms must be es­
tablished through the acceptance and recognition by the international community of States as a 
whole. In such a case any State can challenge the validity of a treaty conflicting with a peremptory 
norm under the customary law of treaties, even if it is not a party to the disputed treaty. 
The idea of obligations erga omnes, or obligations towards the international community, conveys 
the idea that all States have a legal interest regarding breaches of such obligations. With regard to the 
example of the prohibition of aggression this means that all States other than the direct victim are in 
possession of a legal interest even if they are not affected by the violation ofthat prohibition. The ex­
amples of the prohibitions on genocide, slavery and racial discrimination similarly testify to the pos­
session of a legal interest for all States even if they are not affected by violations of those 
prohibitions. The observations of the Court in paragraph 91 of the Barcelona Traction Case further­
more cannot be taken to restrict the scope of its statements on obligations erga omnes. The criterion 
to establish whether an obligation possesses erga omnes character does not lie with the human rights 
character of the obligations, but with the fact that they are established under rules accepted and rec­
ognized by the international community of States as a whole as peremptory norms. 
International crimes are, just like peremptory norms, based on prohibitive primary rules of inter­
national law. Accordingly all the legal consequences applicable to an internationally wrongful act will 
apply also to international crimes. The criteria to determine, in the abstract, whether certain conduct 
constitutes an international crime, are: the assessment by the international community that the obli­
gation breached is essential for the protection of its fundamental interests; the seriousness of 
breaches of essential obligations; and the existence of wilful intent and premeditation on the part of a 
State committing an international crime. In view of those criteria it cannot be said that the interna­
tional community has recognized environmental obligations as essential for the protection of its fun­
damental interests, nor has it recognized, so far, that the breach of such obligations would constitute 
an international crime. 
The determination that certain conduct by a State constitutes an international crime may lead to ad­
ditional consequences for that State (to be discussed in chapters three, four and five), and to the 
broadening of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of the author State. The phrase "if the 
right infringed", featuring in all the categories of article 5, paragraph 2, Part Two, of the ILC-draft, 
has been rightfully omitted from the text of paragraph 3. The status of injured State accruing to all 
States in case of international crimes comes to them due to their membership in the international 
community, and not from any prejudice done to them individually. 
Although the commentary to article 19 hinted at an injured State status for all States in case of 
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms, article 5, Part Two, has not followed up on this. To 
the extent that obligations under peremptory norms are based on primary rules regarding the right of 
self-determination of peoples or for the protection of human rights, injured State status will accrue to 
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all States, under article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (iii), even if the obligation concerned is not breached in a 
serious manner If the obligation to refrain from the use of force, conspicuously considered to be es-
tablished under a peremptory norm, is not breached in a serious manner, this does not entail injured 
State status for all States under article 5, Part Two Consequently, the only special or supplementary 
consequence under a régime of crimes, in relation to legal interests, would be the status of injured 
State for all States if the internationally wrongful act constitutes the international crime of aggres-
sion 
An issue left in abeyance has been the role to be played by the international community regarding 
the protection of community interests If obligations erga omnes would truly constitute obligations 
towards the international community, one would expect that community to be in possession of a cor-
responding right to demand the performance of those obligations, and to be in possession of a legal 
interest if such obligations are breached (in a serious manner) An international community would not 
be able to contribute much to the protection of community interests unless it were organized Any 
discussion of the role of the international community in these matters must, for that reason, look to 
international organizations, and most notably to the United Nations 
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cle 3, Part One, 184 
4 0
 Article 29 read together with article 1 (e) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 55 AJIL 1961, 
pp 1064-1077 
4 1
 Under the heading of'règle de droit' Umon Académique Internationale, Dictionnaire, 521, mentions as a synonym 
'norme juridique' And it further quotes Roubier, 521-522, to the effect that "La règle de droit est une règle de 
conduite qui s'impose aux hommes vivant en société, et dont le respect est assuré par 1'autonte publique " 
42
 Ago, in YBILC 1970, Volume I, 223, observes "Every legal rule was necessarily formulated in abstract terms ( ) 
The purpose of using that concept was to express synthetically an indefinite number of concrete situations But it 
was only the formulation of the rule that was abstract, the rule itself had a very concrete content Nothing could be 
more concrete than the statement that a State was internationally answerable for any illicit act it committed " 
43
 And article 19, paragraph 1, Part One of the ILC-draft puts it in slightly different terms as it recollects that any 
breach of an obligation, regardless of the subject-matter of that obligation, constitutes an internationally wrongful 
act Commentary Article 19, Part One, 95 and 96-97 Article 1, Part One, constitutes the corollary to this statement 
m that it observes that every internationally wrongful act by a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State Commentary Article 1, Part One, 173-176 
44
 Birkás, Das Staatsinteresse, 57, paraphrasing Nelson (Rechtswissenschaft ohne Recht, Leipzig, 1917, 181) states 
"Das Völkerrecht sollte in dem Mass als Recht betrachtet werden, wieweit es auch gegen die Staatsinteressen gilt 
Das Völkerrecht sei nur dann auf den Interesse begründbar, wenn es auch Interessen beschrankt Ein Vokerrecht, 
das Handlungen verbietet, an denen niemand ein Interesse hat, dürfte selbst kein Gegenstand des Interesses sein " 
Footnote omitted 
45
 Ago, Second Report, 192 
46
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 184 
47
 Ago, Second Report, 192 
ω
 Ago expressed this idea as follows (YBILC 1970, Volume I, 225) "The intention was to say in the clearest possible 
way that responsibility must be attributed to a State which had not done what it ought to have done or which had 
done what it ought not to have done " Riphagen, W, Fourth report on the content, forms and degrees of interna­
tional responsibility (part 2 of the draft articles), YBILC 1983, Volume II, Part One, pp 3-24, 8, stated in similar 
terms "Every single legal rule expresses an 'ought to be' As such, it cannot escape the question what should hap­
pen in case of non-conformity with the legal rule, nor the question how what should happen in that case is to be 
realized in actual fact " 
4
' Thus Ruda, in YBILC 1970, Volume I, 183, observes "It was better, he thought, to use the words 'non-fulfilment' 
of an obligation than to speak of its violation " In the same sense Reuter, ibid, 188 Although he adds that "( ) 
every failure to comply with a rule did not constitute an illicit act ( ) " Alcivar, ibid , 216, remarks "The legal 
rule commanded, prohibited or protected and it included the establishment of obligations and rights It was there­
fore the non-fulfilment of those obligations - and possibly the exercise of rights going beyond the limits established 
in the rule - which constituted the illicit act " Contrary Tammes, ibid , 185, who holds that one may use the words 
'violation of international law', or 'violation of a rule of international law' Bilge, A, La Responsabilité Interna-
tionale des Etats et son Application en Matière d'Actes Législatifs, Imprimerie Tsitouns Frères, Istanbul, 1950, 55, 
claims "C'est une erreur assez répandu que de considérer comme donnant lieu à une responsabilité internationale 
toute violation des règles internationales Toute violation des régies de l'ordre juridique international, ( ), ne fait 
pas naître une responsabilité entraînant l'obligation de réparer Selon l'intérêt vise par la regie, la violation de 
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celle-ci peut produire une autre conséquence juridique que la responsabilité " And he then refers to article 102 of 
the Charter which provides that in case a Member of the United Nations does not register a treaty with the Secre-
tariat it cannot invoke that treaty before the United Nations From this he deduces that a distinction has to be made 
according to whether the violation of a rule entails international responsibility or not He can only come to such 
conclusions by taking a very restrictive stand on the consequences of international responsibility, since m his view 
responsibility means the obligation to repair But article 102 does impose the obligation to register treaties in para-
graph 1, and the only conclusion to be drawn from a breach ofthat is that it carnes with it its own exclusive sanc-
tion in paragraph 2 The 1945 Charter of the United Nations, 39 AJJL 1945, Supplement, pp 190-215 
и
 Text and Commentary Article 16, Part One, YBILC 1976, Volume II, Part Two, pp 78-79 
S1
 In many cases authors have the word 'nght' preceded by the adjective 'subjective' E g Bleckmann, A, The Sub­
jective Right in Public International Law, 28 GYIL 1985, pp 144-162 This author will not do so for the reasons 
indicated in the final paragraph of this subsection 
n
 The course of conduct envisaged by a nght should always be possible of being realized by the subject-holder of the 
nght Yet the result aimed at by a rule (the maintenance or change of the status quo) that lays down a nght could 
come about by the action of the holder of the nght, or by another subject which is obligated by a prescriptive rule 
See for this distinction subsection 1 3 1 of this chapter 
0
 Fntzemeyer traces this to Ihenng Fntzcmeyer, W, Die Intervention vor dem Internationalen Gerichtshof, Eme 
ínternational-verfahrensrechtliche Untersuchung auf rechtsvergleichender Grundlage, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
Baden-Baden, 1984, 114 Also Separate Opinion Ammoun, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 324-327, and 
Gervais. L'affaire du Lac Lanoux, 423 Union Académique Internationale, Dictionnaire, 226, mentions under 
'droit1 "Dans un sens subjectif, une prérogative, un intérêt, un pouvoir d'agir juridiquement protégé, reconnu par 
le droit objectif " 
ы
 Bilge, La responsabilité, 55 And Buxbaum, H, Das völkerrechtliche Delikt, Druck der Universitäts-Buchdruckerei 
von ETh Jacob, Erlangen, 1915, 7, observes "Dass durch Gewohnhcits- wie Vertragsrecht nicht nur Subjekte 
Rechte, sondern blosse Interessen geschützt werden können, hegt auf der Hand Somit ist die rechtswidrige Ver-
letzung eines völkerrechtlich geschützten Interesses völkerrechtliches Delikt " Footnote omitted One cannot but 
note that if one wants to define a nght as a legally protected interest, it is insensible at the same time to hold that 
rights and interests may both be protected by international law See also ibid, 8 
55
 Though of course it would here be more correct to speak of the common interest thus legally protected, since the 
separate parallel subjective interests are not as such legally protected 
56
 Note also the arguments by judge Ranjeva who refers to objective and subjective rights Separate Opinion Ranjeva, 
Case concerning East Timor, Judgment, 30 June 1995, under II 
57
 For instance Dissenting Opinion Armand-Ugon, Right of Passage Case, Judgment, 79, remarks "One cannot ac-
cept an obligation and then withhold the means of performing the obligation " And also (80) "It is not to be sup-
posed that the Maratha Government decided to concede certain nghts to Portugal, and at the same time to reserve 
the power to adopt special measures to defeat the purpose for which those nghts had been granted " 
я
 An application of this principle may be found in the provision of article 61 of the Vienna Convention concerning 
supervening impossibility of performance Nevertheless it may be said that this article has a very restricted scope 
since it only relates to the disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty It 
may be noted that it speaks oí supervening impossibility of performance, but when the impossibility of performance 
was built in in the treaty from the start, then a State could probably not be held responsible for the non-
performance of such an obligation See Fitzmaunce, G , Third Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1958, Vol-
ume II, pp 20-46, 26 and 39 
s
' Right of Passage Case, Judgment, 39 
66
 Right of Passage Case, Judgment, 40 Also ibid, 43 And Separate Opinion Wellington Koo, ibid, 63 "It means 
that with the nght on each side there also exists an obligation - that of India to accord passage and that of Portugal 
to respect the rules of procedure respecting the application for, and grant of, passage In other words, the nghts and 
obligations of both sides are concomitant and correlative " Also ibid , 66 For similar observations see Dissenting 
Opinion Armand-Ugon, ibid, 83, Dissenting Opinion Moreno Quintana, ibid , 89, Dissenting Opinion Fernandes, 
ibid, 138, and Dissenting Opimon Weeramantry, East Timor Case, Part D, A (i), and especially Part D, С (ι), and 
Conclusions 
" To this principle there are only few exceptions, one of which will be discussed in chapter four concerning the nght 
to resort to countermeasures 
" Whether or not other subjects not bound by the rule in question have to respect the exercise of the nght may be 
considered to be in dispute See Fitzmaunce, Fifth Report, 80-81 
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" Ago, R., Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, YBILC 1980, Volume II, Part One, pp 1-70, 18 
See also Ago, R, Sixth report on State responsibility, YBILC 1977, Volume II, Part One, pp 3-43, 22, where he 
observes "A right in the subjective meaning of the term, is essentially a faculty to require from someone else a 
particular conduct or service " 
M
 A few pages later (Eighth Report, Addendum, 20) Ago seems to mention a subjective right in the traditional sense 
of a legally protected interest, as he states "The interest protected by the subjective right vested in the foreign 
State, ( ) " With regard to self-help (which he mentions in relation to self-defence as the only form of forcible 
self-help still open to States) Ago seems to envisage the distinction here made, between right as an entitlement to 
engage in a certain course of conduct and right as an entitlement to require a certain course of conduct of some 
other subject, as he states (ibid, 56) "The term accurately reflects the fact that in international law - in any case, 
in general international law - it is the rightful holder of a particular subjective right who is at the same time given 
the faculty of taking measures for the purpose of safeguarding the right in question, to see to it that the right is re­
spected and to exercise it " And again (ibid, 56-57) "'Self-protection' or 'self-help' should be construed to mean 
what legal theory describes as, and comprises under, all the different forms taken by the system which in principle 
grants to the State, as the holder of a subjective right, the faculty of acting in order to protect and safeguard that 
right in certain circumstances " 
и
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 182, and originally Ago, Second Report, 192-193 
" Such correlation is accepted without much discussion by Smith, В , State Responsibility and the Marine Environ­
ment, The Rules of Decision, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, 9, and Hafner, G, Bemerkungen zur Funktion und 
Bestimmung der Betroffenheit im Völkerrecht anhand des Binnenstaates, 31 GYTL 1989, pp 187-229, 205 Criti-
cally examined in relation to obligations erga omnes and international cnmes by Wilhsch, J , State Responsibility 
for Technological Damage m International Law, Ducker & Humblot, Berlin, 1987, 37-42, and explicitly confirmed 
with regard to treaty obligations and rights by Simma, Das Reziprozitatselement, 51 (see also 52-54), Sachanew, 
К, State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations Identifying the 'Injured State' and its Legal Status, 35 
NILR 1988, pp 273-289, 275-276, and Sachanew, К, Norm und Rechtsverhältnis un Völkerrecht, 37 SR 1988, 
pp 495-501, 496 In Aegean Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order, ICJ Reports 1976, ρ 3, 11, the Court 
paraphrased a Greek claim in that the Greek Government "( ) invoked its right to performance by Turkey of the 
latter's obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations ( ) " 
" Compare the text of article 5, paragraph 1 (a) proposed by Fitzmaunce "A party to a treaty has a duty towards the 
other party, or parties to carry it out, irrespective of whether any direct benefits to such other party or parties will 
accrue therefrom, and correspondingly, any party to a treaty has, as the counterpart of its own obligation, the right 
to require due performance by any other party of its obligations under the treaty, irrespective of any such factor," 
Fitzmaunce, G , Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1959, Volume II, pp 37-81, 42 (see also 54) 
a
 Technically speaking a correlative nght can already be exercised in cases where the breach of an obligation is 
imminent Probably more is needed for a State to exercise a correlative nght than mere potentiality of breach, since 
any obligation can be breached If it could not be breached it would not be an obligation, or it would cease to be 
one It seems nght to require that there must be certain indications that the obligation is going to be breached 
" Umon Académique Internationale, Dictionnaire, 352 and 276, respectively mentions both the possession 
('Jouissance d'un droit') and the exercise ('Exercise d'un droit') of rights The first is described as "Expression 
( ) qui ( ) désigne ( ) le fait, pour un état, d'être titulaire d'un droit, qu'il ait ou non la possibilité de le mettre 
en oeuvre " The latter stands for "Expression ( ) qui ( ) designe ( ) la mise en action par un étal, d'un droit 
dont lui-même ou un autre état est titulaire " 
™ Riphagen, Fourth Report, 8-9 
71
 The Court stated m the Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 44-45, regarding the discretionary nature of the power 
to exercise diplomatic protection, and especially when such nght is not exercised by the nght-holder "This cannot 
be regarded as amounting to a situation where a violation of law remains without remedy in short, a legal vacuum 
There is no obligation upon the possessors of nghts to exercise them Sometimes no remedy is sought, though 
rights are infringed To equate this with the creation of a vacuum would be to equate a nght with an obligation " It 
may be observed that this argument of the Court does not deal with the absence of correlative nghts, but with their 
non-exercise 
72
 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 46 Dissenting Opinion Fitzmaunce, Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, ρ 16, 224 "Here again, statements to the effect that certain re­
sults cannot be accepted because this would be tantamount to admitting that given nghts were in their nature im­
perfect and unenforceable, do not cany conviction as a matter of international law since, at the present stage of its 
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development, this is precisely what that system itself in large measure is, and will, pending changes not at present 
foreseeable, continue to be " 
7 3
 And in the Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 45, the Court observed "International judicial proceedings are but 
one of the means available to States in pursuit of their right to exercise diplomatic protection ( ) The lack of a 
jurisdictional link cannot be regarded either in this or in other fields of international law as entailing the non­
existence of a right " 
7 4
 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 36 
7 5
 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 10,12 and IS South Africa claimed that the Mandate Agreement was no 
longer in force, and that in any case there was no longer any member of the League of Nations due to the latter's 
demise For discussion of these objections against the Court's jurisdiction see South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia ν 
South Africa, Liberia ν South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962, ρ 319, 330-342 
7 4
 Note the Joint Dissenting Opinion Spender/Fitzmaunce, South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 547-
560, in which they argued that South Africa's third preliminary objection should have been upheld by the Court 
For discussion by the Court see ibid, 342-344 
7 7
 Dissenting Opinion Fitzmaunce, Namibia Opimon, 227-263 
7 8
 Fitzmaunce hinted so much at this solution, but refrained from adopting it Dissenting Opimon Fitzmaunce, Na­
mibia Opinion, 267, footnote 45 The conclusion that the Mandate had lapsed leads to the further conclusion that 
South Africa had no legal title whatsoever with regard to South West African territory, and that the pnnciple of 
self-determination had to be given effect For as the Court had earlier observed (though it did not adopt this view 
as a solution) "The authontv which the Union Government exercises over the Territory is based on the Mandate 
If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Government contends, the latter's authonty would equally have lapsed To re­
tain nghts denved from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified " International 
Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opimon, ICJ Reports 1950, ρ 128, Π3 
7 9
 See Separate Opimon Lauterpacht, Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1957, ρ 9, 49-50, 
where he referred to so-called potestative conditions dependent upon the will of the debtor 
"° Ko Swan Sik, De Verplichting in het Volkenrecht Τ M С Asser Instituut, 's-Gravenhage, 1991, 5, observes "( ) 
dat in geval een eenzijdige rechtshandeling bron is van een verplichting, deze slechts reële betekenis heeft als één 
van de twee polen in een tweezijdige verhouding, en wel tegenover het subjectieve recht dat een ander subject heeft 
op de vervulling van de verplichting " It is somewhat strange that he mentions the correlation of obligations and 
nghts only by reference to the case where the source of the obligation lies with a unilateral declaration Gaja, G, 
Obligations Erga Omnes, International Cnmes and Jus Cogens A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts, 
in Weiler, J , Cassese, A , and Spinetti, M (Eds), International Cnmes of State A Critical Analysis of the ELC's 
Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1989, pp 151-160, 154-155, holds "Whether a 
judicial remedy exists or not, it would be inconsistent with the existence of an obligation under a rule of interna-
tional law if no State could put forward a claim for ensuring that the State having an obligation complies with it 
and that in case of infringement this is discontinued " Footnote omitted 
" Commentary Article 1, Part One, 179-184 
82
 Text and Commentary Article 1, Part Two, YBILC 1983, Volume II, Part Two, pp 42-43, 42 
83
 Text and Commentary Article 5, Part Two, YBILC 1985, Volume II, Part Two, pp 25-27 
84
 And this reminisces of the argument to be found in Separate Opimon Fitzmaunce, Barcelona Traction Case, 
Judgment, 65-66, to the effect that "In particular I do not base myself as does the Judgment to some extent ( ), on 
any consideration tunning on the question of to whom, or to what entity, was the obligation owed in this case, not 
to act m a manner contrary to international law This does not seem to me to be the nght question to ask where the 
issue involved is not one of treaty or other particular obligations, but of general international law obligations m the 
sphere of the treatment of foreigners If in the latter area a State, ( ), acts illicitly, it stands m breach of interna-
tional law irrespective of whether anv other State is qualified to take the matter up For instance if an individual 
was concerned, he might be stateless If in the present case there have been contraventions of international law, 
they are in no way legitimized, nor do they become any the less illicit, because Canada has not (or even possibly 
could not) pursue the matter, and because Belgium is held to possess no locus standi injudiao for doing so " Foot-
note omitted While generally agreeing with this statement it should be noted that international law, on the theo-
retical level, does postulate the existence of nghts correlative to obligations 
Commentary Article 5, Part Two, 25 
86
 The phrase "complementary rules laying down correlative nghts" refers to those rules of Stale responsibility (thus 
they are secondary rules of international law) defining which States are deemed to be in possession of a correlative 
nght to demand performance of breached obligations These are being codified by the Commission in article 5, 
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Part Two, of the ILC-draft (on injured States) 
8 7
 In Separate Opinion Fitzmaunce, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 66, one may read regarding the treatment of 
aliens "If in the latter area a Stale, ( ), acts illicitly, it stands in breach of international law irrespective of 
whether any other State is qualified to take the matter up For instance if an individual was concerned, he might be 
stateless " The implication of this statement is unacceptable If no State is entitled, under international law, to ex­
tend ils protection to stateless individuals, then it must be concluded that the rule which provides for certain treat­
ment to foreigners only relates to individuals in possession of the nationality of another State (to this effect Dickson 
Wheel Car Company, 6 ILR 1931-1932, pp 228-231, 230, footnote 1) If one considers the rule in question also to 
relate to stateless individuals, then all States must be considered qualified to take the matter up The latter view is 
to be preferred, especially considering the quantitatively low number of stateless individuals 
8 8
 Which, according to article 38, paragraph 1 (c) of the Statute, may be applied by the Court to inter-State disputes 
The Commission, following Ago, observed in Commentary Article 3, Part One, 182, that "( ) unlike the situation 
in municipal law, there are no obligations on a subject which are not matched by an international subjective right 
of another subject or subjects, ( ) " It is submitted that this argument as to municipal law is irrelevant for the issue 
under consideration here If under municipal law an obligation of one subject is not matched by a right of another, 
such a construction will have resulted from explicit provisions, or because the preparatory works, which are much 
more important in municipal law due to their authoritative character, so indicate 
8 9
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 32 
9 0
 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (Jurisdiction), Publications PCIJ, 1927, Senes A, 
No 8, ρ 4, 21 Ehrhch's dissent on this point was directed towards the Permanent Court assuming jurisdiction to 
determine the nature and extent of such reparation, not towards the principle itself Dissenting Opinion Ehrlich, 
ibid, 37-38 
9 1
 Weil, Ρ, Towards Relative Normalivity in International Law?, 77 AJTL 1983, pp 413-442, 431 Footnotes omitted 
" Morelli explains that the use of terms such as 'qualité pour agir' and 'jus standi', although appearing to relate to 
some procedural capacity or a right to apply to court, should be understood to relate to substantive capacity or 
right Separate Opinion Morelli, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment 226 Here he states "The hypothesis of the 
existence of a certain obligation on the part of a given State (the respondent State) is assumed, and the question is 
which State possesses the corresponding hypothetical right, in particular whether or not that right pertains to the 
applicant State " And again (228) "The point is that any question of capacity can only be raised in relation to a 
rule of law which is either undisputed or assumed to exist " He further holds, 227, that the possession by an appli-
cant State of a substantive right need not be examined before other questions pertaining to the merits have been in-
vestigated 
" Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 44-45 
** See Separate Opimon Jessup, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 195 
95
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 21 In the same sense Sinclair, YBILC 1983, Volume I, 130 See the broad discussion of 
this topic by Bollccker Stern, Le préjudice, 50-90, which culminates in the conclusion (89-90) that States do not 
generally have a legal interest in the observance of any rule of international law In the same sense Graefrath, Β , 
Responsibility and Damages Caused Relationship between Responsibility and Damages, 185 RDC ADI 1984-11, 
pp 9-150, 50-51, also McCaffrey, S , Ілх Lata or the Continuum of State Responsibility, in Weiler et al. Interna­
tionale Crimes, pp 242-244, 243 
" Note also Lais, R., Die Rechtsfolgen völkerrechtliche Delikte, Verlag von Georg Sülke, Berlin, 1932, 140 
97
 Dupuy, Ρ -M, Action publique et crime international de l'état A propos de l'article 19 du projet de la Commission 
du Droit International sur la responsabilité des états, 25 AFDI1979, pp 539-554, 543 
** Consider this remark by Hafner, Bemerkungen, 195 "( ) ein aus einer norm des allgemeinen Volkerge-
wohnheitsrechts nicht Berechtigter oder Verpflichteter kann zur Änderung, Durchsetzung oder Geltendmachung 
dieser Norm nicht berufen sein " 
99
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 14 
IM
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 14 
101
 Consider Reuter, Ρ , Le dommage comme condition de la responsabilité internationale, in Homenaja al profesor 
Miaja de la Muela, volume II, 1979, pp 837-846, 845 "Déjà la Cour internationale de Justice avait, sous l'angle 
particulier du droit a mettre en mouvement une action judiciaire, été amenée à définir l'intérêt à agir d'Etats liés 
par la même règle de droit que l'Etat coupable mais n'invoquant pas un préjudice spécial du fait de sa violation " 
Footnote omitted In his note he refers to the South West Africa Cases of 1962 and 1966, but one may note here 
that Liberia and Ethiopia were not bound by any role binding also upon South Africa Indeed they were not even 
parties to the Mandate Agreement for South West Africa, as was noted aptly in the Dissenting Opinion 
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Spender/Fitzmaunce, South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 548 
1 0 2
 Sachanew, State Responsibility, 275 
' " Article 63 of the Statute runs 
1 Whenever the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parues is 
ш question, the Registrar shall notify all such States forthwith 
2 Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings, but if it uses this right, the construction 
given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it 
1 0 4
 Intervention is even more restricted than that since it has to relate to the principal proceedings "In regard to that 
question, the Court observes that every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case, it follows that a dec­
laration filed as an intervention only acquires that character, in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the 
pending proceedings " Haya de la Torre Case, Judgment, ICI Reports 1951, ρ 71, 76 
, o s
 The S S Wimbledon, Publications PCIJ, 1923, Senes A, No 1, ρ 6, 20 
1 0 6
 The 1919 Treaty of Peace with Germany, 13 AJTL 1919, Supplement, pp 151-386 
1 0 7
 Arangio-Ruiz, G, Preliminary Report on State Responsibility, 18 May 1988, A/CN 4/416, 34 pp , 12, and Aran-
gio-Ruiz, YBILC 1988, Volume I, 264-265 
, w
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 13 He does express the opimon (ibid ) that "There are, however, exceptions to the sepa­
rability of the bilateral relationships " Footnote omitted 
, M
 Sachanew, Norm, 496 
1 1 0
 Contrary Ushakov, YBILC 1984, Volume I, 277 "Іл that respect he endorsed the approach ( ), namely that the 
responsibility of the author State was not engaged until the injured State so requested " In the same sense Ogiso, 
YBILC 1984, ibid, 309, Riphagen, YBILC 1985, Volume 1,158 
111
 Hafner, Bemerkungen, 191 and 195-196 
1 , 1
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 14 Relevant footnote omitted 
113
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 183-184, Originally Ago, Second Report, 193-194 For a contrary position see 
Dclbcz, L, Les principes généraux du contentieux international, Librarne Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 
Pans, 1962, 160 
114
 That conclusion appears warranted also by reference to South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 32 
"
5
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 183 
"' Example mentioned by Koroma, YBILC 1990, Volume I, 193 
117
 For instance Bollecker Stem, 33, with regard to illegal border crossings, Reuter, Le dommage, 845, Graefrath, Re-
sponsibility and Damages, 30 and 35 
"" Commentary Article 3, Part One, 183 
"' Commentary Article 3, Part One, 183, Bollecker Stem, 31-35 
120
 Note that Pellet claimed "( ) he did not believe it was possible to speak of 'legal' injury Any injury arising from 
an internationally wrongful act must, assuming that there was responsibility, have a 'legal' element" Pellet, 
YBILC 1990, Volume I, 180 
121
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 183, Onginally Ago, R., Third report on State responsibility, YBILC 1971, Vol-
ume II. Part One, pp 199-274, 223 
122
 Anzilotti. D , La responsabilité internationale des états a raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers, 13 
RGDIP 1906, pp 5-29, 13 
123
 Sec comment by the French Government on article 3, as quoted by Tanzi, A , Is Damage a Distinct Condition for 
the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful Act', m Spinedi, M, and Simma, В (Eds), United Nations Codifica­
tion of State Responsibility, Oceana Publications, Ine, New York, 1987, pp 1-33, 6-7 
1 2 4
 Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages, 35 
1 2 5
 For a comment on such function of damage see Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages, 42-47 
1 2 6
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 83, footnote 97 
1 2 7
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 83 See especially Tanzi, Is Damage, 8-10 
1 2 8
 One can agree with "Ou bien l'on amve a prétendre que, pour l'Etat, toute atteinte a ses droits, c'est-à-dire toute 
violation du droit international dont il est victime, engendre un prejudice moral Celui-ci, dans ce cas, est inherent 
à tout acte illicite international, il n'est pas un élément distinct, identifiable, et la notion n'a plus de sens " Do-
miruce, С , La satisfaction en droit des gens, m Dutoit, В , and Gnsel, E (Eds), Melanges Georges Pemn, Diffu­
sion Pavot, Lausanne, 1984, pp 91-121, 116 Also 117-118 
1 1 9
 Commentary Article 3, Part One, 83 
1 3 0
 Reuter, in YBILC 1979, Volume I, 35 And he was supported in this by Verosta, ibid, 40, who called for deletion 
of 'injured State' from the draft article and commentary 
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Pinto, m YBILC, 1979, Volume I, 44 
Ago, in YBILC 1979, Volume I, 51 
Riphagen, W , Sixth report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft ar­
ticles), and "Implementation" (mise en oeuvre) of international responsibility and the settlement of disputes (part 3 
of the draft articles), YBILC 1985, Volume II, Part One, pp 3-19,6 
Riphagen, Sixth Report, 6 
Riphagen, Sixth Report, 8 Footnote omitted When introducing his Sixth Report to the Commission he made the 
following remarks (YBILC 1985, Volume I, 87), which again illustrates the confusion "The situation was the 
complete reverse under international law, which was typically bilateral ш that its norms created only bilateral rela­
tionships as between the State committing an internationally wrongful act and (he State legally affected by such an 
act It was surely the progressive development of international law that had brought into being real norms of inter­
national law, norms that in principle entailed legal consequences beyond the bilateral legal relationship between 
the author State and the State directly affected by its acts or omissions " See especially the remarks by Ushakov 
(YBILC 1985, Volume I, 119), to the effect that "Just as the author State was the State which had committed an 
internationally wrongful act - whether a delict or a crime - the injured State was the State with respect to which 
the act had been committed Nevertheless it was impossible to determine in any concrete fashion which was the 
author State and which was the injured State everything depended on the actual circumstances in which the inter­
nationally wrongful act occurred " 
Jagola, m YBILC 1985, Volume I, 155 
Riphagen, in YBILC 1985, Volume I, 162 
Riphagen claims correctly (YBILC 1984, Volume I, 262) "When thus defining the 'injured State', it was inevita­
ble to refer to the character of the primary obligation which had been breached " 
Although the criterion of 'affected' is frequently referred to in the work of the Commission on State responsibility 
Eg Ushakov, YBILC 1984, Volume I, 277 
Riphagen, Fourth Report, 8, observes that part 2 of the ILC-draft has to focus on injury to a particular State, to sev­
eral Slates, or to the community of States Ushakov remarks (YBILC 1983, Volume I, 125) "It was precisely the 
injury suffered as a result of a wrongful act that established a legal relationship between the victim and the author " 
In the same sense Ni, ibid ,132 
Text and Commentary Article 57, Law of Treaties, YBILC 1966, Volume II, pp 253-255 Simma, В , ReflecUons 
on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Its Background in General International Law, 
20 OZOR 1970, pp 5-83, 22 and 56, criticizes article 60 for not enabling a State injured by a material breach of a 
treaty to suspend or terminate another treaty which is of interdependent character with the first treaty Yet it may 
be noted that in fact the Vienna Convention in article 60 does not address the question whether, in case of the 
breach of a treaty, another interdependent treaty could be suspended or terminated An analogous argument, allow­
ing the suspension or termination of the interdependent treaty, could be made by reference to the law of State re­
sponsibility which allows the non-performance of obligations (as a countermeasure) consequent upon the breach of 
some other obligation Zollcr, E , Peacetime Unilateral Remedies An Analysis of Countermeasures, Transnational 
Publishers, Dobbs Ferry, Ine, New York, 1984, 85-93 See also Arangio-Ruiz, G, Fifth Report, 12 May 1993, 
A/CN 4/453, 63 pp , 30, footnote 74 
Dehaussy, J, Le problème de la classification des traités et le projet de convention établi par la Commission du 
Droit International des Nations Urnes, in Recueil d'études de droit international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim, 
Imprimerie de la Tribune de Genève, Genève, 1968, pp 305-326, Virally, M, Sur la classification des traites, A 
propos du projet d'articles de la Commission du Droit International, in Comunicazioni e Studi, volume 13, 1969, 
pp 17-35, Simma, Article 60, 70-75, Bleckmann, A , Probleme der Anwendung multilateraler Verträge, Gegen-
seitigkeit und Anwendbarkeit der Vertragspartner, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1974, 47-50, 57-59, and 66-78, 
Barile, G, The Protection of Human Rights in Article 60, Paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties, in Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago, Le droit international a l'heure de sa codification, volume II, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 1987, pp 3-14 See also Schwelb, E , Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty as a 
Consequence of its Breach, 7 IJIL 1967, pp 309-334, Rosenne, S , Bilateralism and Community Interest in the 
Codified Law of Treaties, in Fncdmann, W , Henkln, L , and Lissitzyn, О (Eds), Transnational Law in a Chang­
ing Society, Essays in honor of Philip С Jessup, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, pp 202-227, 
Duckwilz, E, Rechtsfolgen bei Verletzung völkerrechtlicher Vertrage, Duncker &. Humblot, Berlin, 1975, 62-65, 
Mazzeschi, R., Termination and Suspension of Treaties for Breach in the ILC Works on State Responsibility, in 
Spinedi and Simma, Umted Nations Codification, pp 57-94, Hutchinson, D , Solidarity and Breaches of Multilat-
eral Treaties, 59 BYBIL 1988, pp 151-215 
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1 4 3
 Although reference is made here to the case of multilateral treaties, the same problems anse with regard to rules of 
customary international law that bind more than two States The entena to determine the existence of a legal inter­
est consequent upon the breach of an obligation established under customary international law are, to the mind of 
this author, identical to those relating to obligations under multilateral treaties 
1 4 4
 The distinction in question may also be illustrated by reference to article 20, paragraphs 1 and 2 See Dehaussy, 
Classification, 312-313 
1 4 5
 Commentary Article 5, Part Two, 25-27 Original proposal by Riphagen, Sixth Report, 5-8 Discussed by Com­
mission in YBILC 1985, Volume I, 84-163 Commented upon by Graefralh, В , Das Verantwottlichkeilsverhältrus 
im Völkerrecht und die Definition des 'Verletzten Staates', in Graefralh, В , Probleme des Völkerrechts, Akade-
mie-Verlag, Berlin, 1987, pp 107-138, and Simma, Β , Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State 
Responsibility, in Dinstein, Y (Ed), Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, International Law at a Time of Per­
plexity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, pp 821-844 
1 4 4
 Riphagen, Sixth Report, 6, also Riphagen, YBILC 1985, Volume I, 162 
1 4 7
 Although it would be better anyway to refer to an infringement of a nght as an obstruction of the exercise of a 
nght Sec also Riphagen, W , Third report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibibty (part 2 
of the draft articles), YBILC 1982, Volume II, Part One, pp 22-50, 35, footnote 68 
, 4 S
 See also the comments of Tomuschat (YBILC 1985, Volume I, 125), Yankov (ibid, 145), Arangio-Ruiz (ibid , 
149), and Koroma (ibid , 152), which are supportive to Riphagen's approach with regard to defining the injured 
State as a State whose rights had been infringed (or violated) At this point one may note that to rely on such corre­
lation between primary rights and primary obligations is to present reasoning circular in character, for as Fitz-
maunce held (Separate Opinion, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 66) "Nor is the question of the entity to 
which the obligation is due helpful even for the purpose of identifying the party entitled to claim, for such entity 
would itself previously need to be identified, and the discussion would turn in a circle " 
1 4 9
 For instance Riphagen observes (Fourth Report, 13) "Such démarches or appeals may be made even before the 
internationally wrongful act has actually been committed " 
150
 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the Umted Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 
June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, ρ 12 
1 5 1
 Headquarters Agreement Opinion, 30 
1 S
 The opinion turned on the issue of interpretation of the Headquarters Agreement, since no conduct contrary to its 
provisions had as yet been given effect by the Umted States See Separate Opinion Schwebel, Headquarters Agree­
ment Opinion, 51 
l s s
 Riphagen, Third Report, 36 
1S4
 Hafner, Bemerkungen, 213, mentions in relation to the function of'Betroffenheit' that, "Fur diese Zwecke muß die 
Betroffenheit individualisierbar sein, der entsprechende Staat muß in der auf eine rationale Weise ihm zurechen-
baren, völkerrechtskonformen Interessenentfaltung selbst bedroht sein, wobei Gegenstand des Interesses Regelung-
sobjekt von primären Nonnen sein muß Den nur dann ist eine anderen Staaten auferlegte Verpflichtung als zu 
seinem Vorteil bestehend anzusehen oder ihm 'material' Interessen zu bescheinigen " 
, s s
 Arangio-Ruiz, G , Second Report on State Responsibility, 9 June 1989, A/CN 4/425, 125 pp, 27-39 See also 
Reuter, Le dommage, 837 
156
 The principle oí res judicata, e g article 59 Statute 
157
 YBILC 1984, Volume I, 262 
158
 Nuclear Tests Case, Judgment, 267-270 
159
 Ko Swan Sik, De Verplichting, 5 
"° Hafner, Bemerkungen, 204 
161
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 14, and Sixth Report, 7 Leaving aside here any question regarding stipulations for third 
States and objective régimes See also in this respect articles 35 and 36 of the Vienna Convention 
"
2
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 14 
1 0
 Commentary Article 5, Part Two, 26 
144
 Simma, Article 60, 67-70 
165
 Article 20 and Commentary, Waldock, H, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1962, Volume II. pp 27-
80, 72-77 Discussion by Commission in YBILC 1963, Volume I, 120-132, 245-247 and 294-295 Adopted in first 
reading as article 42, YBILC 1963, Volume II, 204-206, see Simma. Article 60, 68-70 
"* This recognition occurred after comments by the governments of the Netherlands and the Umted States to the ef-
fect that the provision as it stood would allow any party to suspend the treaty and not just the party whose interests 
were affected See Waldock, H, Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1966, Volume II, pp 1-50, 34-37 
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Discussion bv Commission in YBILC 1966, Volume I, Part I, 59-67 and 127-129 Adopted m second reading as 
article 57, YBILC 1966, Volume II, 253-255 
1 6 7
 Riphagcn, Sixth Report, 7 Three footnotes omitted 
1 6 8
 Riphagen, Sixth Report, 7 
" ' Sachanew, Norm, 498 
1 7 0
 Sachanew, Norm, 498 As examples he mentions treaties concerning diplomatic and consular relations, parts of 
the treaties on the law of the sea, and the Vienna Convention Also Sachanew, State Responsibility, 277-278 
1 7 1
 The Commission has indicated with regard to the article on compensation that damage may be caused directly (to 
the State's territory or organization in a broad sense) or indirectly (to its physical or juridical nationals or agents) 
Text and Commentary Article 8, Part Two, m Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
forty-filth session, 3 May - 23 July 1993, General Assembly, Official Records, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement 
No 10 (A/48/10), pp 168-193, 180-181 
1 7 2
 Riphagen, Fourth Report, 21, states "While the rule or obligation may be in abstract terms, the breach is always 
concrete and the injury is therefore easily allocated to a particular State Thus most obligations under general cus­
tomary international law are simply a reflection of the right of sovereignty of another State ( ) " Also YBILC 
1983, Volume I, 101 Also Riphagen, Sixth Report, 6 
1 7 3
 Especially the question whether aliens are to be accorded national treatment, or have to be treated in accordance 
with the international minimum standard has no influence on determining the legal interest of a State 
1 7 4
 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Publications PCU, 1924, Senes A, No 2, ρ 6, 12 
1 7 5
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 32 
'
7
' Riphagen, Fourth Report, 14, states "Actually, if the direct victim of the act is not a State but another entity, one 
still has to establish a link between that entity and a State in order to identify the injured State Such a link may be 
established by another (primary) rule of international law, such as the rules relating to what is often called 'the na­
tionality of claims' " Text and Commentary Article 22, Part One, YBILC 1977, Volume II, Part Two, pp 30-50 
1 7 7
 Article 1 of the 1971 Traité interdisant des armes nucléaires et d'autres armes de destruction massive sur le fond 
des mers et des océans ainsi que dans leur sous-sol, adopted by way of General Assembly resolution 2660, in 
Resolutions adoptées par l'Assemblee générale au cours de sa vingt-cinquime session, 15 septembre-17 décembre 
1970, Documents Officiel, Supplement No 10 (A/8028), pp 13-15 
178
 Article 4 of the 1967 Treaty on Pnnciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 61 AJIL 1967, pp 644-649 See also Sachanew, Norm, 
498-499 A further category mentioned by him concerns obligations performed or breached towards an interna-
tional organization Ibid , 499, and Sachanew, State Responsibility, 277 
"* Article 1 of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
57 AJIL 1963, pp 1026-1028 See also Sachanew, State Responsibility, 281 
180
 Simma, Article 60, 75-77 See also the proposed article 63 with regard to treaties providing for objective régimes, 
which did not make its way into the draft Waldock, H, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1964, Vol-
ume II, pp 5-65, 26-34 Discussed and eventually deleted by Commission in YBILC 1964, Volume I, 96-109 See 
also Dehaussy, Classification, 324-325 
181
 Commentary Article 57, Law of Treaties, 255 See also Dehaussy, Classification, 323-324 
182
 Brunnée, Common Interest, 797 He makes this statement in relation to an argument on reciprocity 
183
 Lefeber, The Exercise of Jurisdiction, 91 Footnote omitted 
184
 Lefeber, The Exercise of Jurisdiction, 91 
185
 Trail Smelter Award, 317 Smith envisages a distinction with regard to areas outside national jurisdiction between 
harm done to the high seas environment (or to put it differently harm to common interests), and harm to the inter-
ests of (a) particular State(s) Smith, State Responsibility, 86-87 
"* Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, ρ 15, 23 Admittedly the Court 
in a later judgment denied the existence of a legal interest on the part of Ethiopia and Liberia in respect of certain 
human nghts obligations allegedly breached by South Africa under the Mandate Agreement for South West Afnca 
South West Afnca Cases, Second Phase, 51 It is submitted that the said judgment provides little support against 
the argument here made, because in that case the legal situation was very much complicated by the disappearance 
of the League of Nations 
1 8 7
 Article 9 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Cnme of Genocide, adopted by way of 
IBB 
General Assembly resolution 260 (III), reprinted in 45 AJIL 1951, Supplement, pp 7-10 
Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 47 For the many contradictory interpretations see Bollecker Stern, Le préju-
dice, 84-86, Simma, В , Zur bilateralen Durchsetzung vertraglich verankerter Menschenrechte Aküvlegitimation 
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und zulässige Mittel nach allgemeinem Völkerrecht, in Schreuer, С (Ed), Autorität und internationale Ordnung, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1979, pp 129-154, 144, Simma, В , Fragen der zwischenstaatlichen Durchsetzung 
vertraglich vereinbarter Menschenrechte, in Staatsrecht - Völkerrecht - Europarecht, Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen 
Schlochauer, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1981, pp 635-648, 642-643, Frowein, J, Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes 
im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung, in Bernhardt, R. (Ed), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale 
Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte, Festschrift fur Hermann Mosler, Spnnger-Verlag, Berlin, 1983, pp 241-262, 
245-246, Quigley, J, The International Law Commission's Cnme-Delict Distinction A Toothless Tiger?, 66 
RDISDP 1988, pp 117-161, 130-132, МВауе, Κ, L'intérêt pour agir devant la Cour internationale de Justice. 209 
RDC ADI 1988-11, pp 223-345, 307-308, Kamminga, M, Inter-State Accountability for Violations of Human 
Rights, 1990, 154-156 Note also Genügten, W van. Mensenrechten tussen staatssoevereiniteit en internationale 
jurisdictie, 21 NTRR 1992, pp 204-223, 215-216 
Smith, State Responsibility, 95 He appears to correct his position somewhat when he refers to the idea that (97) 
"This is quite distinct from an obligation directed only to the community such as human rights obligations vis-à-vis 
the state's own nationals No individual state has a right or interest in such cases other than as a member of the 
community " He recognized, earlier on the same page, that "When an obligation logically may be defined as di-
rected only to the 'community', it is patent that only an actio popularts will support an action by any member state 
based on the breach of such obligation " On the next page (98) he then comes to the conclusion that "( ) the actio 
popularts now enjoys no more than inchoate status as a functional principle of customary law " Gaja, G , Jus Co-
gens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 RDC ADI 1981-III, pp 271-316, 280, to the contrary states "There are 
also some norms which create obligations towards States irrespective of the existence of a direct interest on their 
part For instance, multilateral treaties concerning human rights impose on each contracting State obligations 
which exist in any specific situation towards all the other contracting States " 
See however articles 41 and 42 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 61 AJTL 1967, 
pp 870-887 
The amendment which led to article 60, paragraph 5, was introduced by Switzerland, and finally adopted by the 
Conference See respectively Conférence des Nations Urnes sur le droit des traités, Première session, 
A/CONF 39/11, Vienne, 1968, Publications des Nations Urnes, New York, 1969, 385, and ibid, Deuxième session, 
A/CONF 39/11/Add 1, Vienne, 1969, Publications des Nations Urnes, New York, 1970, 178 For further comments 
see ibid , Premiere session, 386, 388-391, and ibid, Deuxième session, 119-123, and Simma, Article 60, 72-75 
Note however this statement by the Commission in relation to human rights instruments "( ) it is clear that not 
every one of the rights enumerated in these instruments, nor every single act or omission attributable to a State 
which could be considered incompatible with the respect of such rights even if an isolated act or mission (which 
might not even be intentional), must necessarily be qualified as giving nse to the application of the present provi-
sion " Commentary Article 5, Part Two, 27 
One may note that, contrary to the text of the other provisions of that article, it omits the words "to invoke it as a 
ground for" from its text An amendment by the United Kingdom to insert that phrase into it was defeated 
Commentary Article 5, Part Two, 27 Riphagen appeared to have this in mind when he discussed the issue of 
'constructive injury' Riphagen, Third Report, 36-38, and 43 Sec especially Zoller, E , Enforcing International 
Law through U S Legislation, Transnational Publishers, Ine , Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1985, 64-72 
The 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 51 AJTL 1957, pp 865-937 
For earlier drafts Lauterpacht, H, First Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1953, Volume II, pp 90-162, 154 
(article 15) For comment Yepcs, Mémoire, YBILC 1953, Volume Π, 163-166, 165-166, Fitzmaunce, G, Third 
Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1958, Volume II, pp 20-46, 26-27 (articles 16, paragraph 2, and 17), Wal-
dock, Second Report, 39 (articles 1 (c) and 13, paragraph 1) Drafting Committee, YBILC 1963, Volume I, 213, 
Commission, YBILC 1963. Volume II, 198 (article 37), Commission, YBILC 1966, Volume II, 247 (article 50) 
On yus cogens see among others Mann, F, The Doctrine of Jus Cogens in International Law, in Ehmke, H (Ed), 
Festschrift fur Ulnch Scheuner, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1973, pp 399-418, Sztucki, J , Jus Cogens and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A Critical Appraisal, Spnnger-Verlag, Wien, 1974, especially 164-
194, Wluteman, M, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected List, 7 GJICL 1977, pp 609-626, Gros 
Espici, H , Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in Cassesse, A (Ed). UN Law/Fundamental Rights, Two Topics in 
International Law, Sijthoff and NoordhofT, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979, pp 167-173, Gangle, W, The Л І Cogens 
Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 CJIL 1980, pp 63-87, Minagawa, Τ, Essentiality and Reality of Interna­
tional Jus Cogens, 12 HJLP 1984, pp 1-15, Sinclair, I, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Second 
Edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984, 203-241, Frowein, J, Jus Cogens, in Bernhardt, R. (Ed), 
EPIL, Instalment 7, Elsevier Science Publishers В V, Amsterdam, 1984, pp 327-330, Bedjaoui, M , Droit au de-
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veloppement et jus cogens, 54/55/56 YAAA 1984/85/86, pp 275-299, Chnstenson, G, The World Court and Jus 
Cogens, 81 AJIL 1987, pp 93-101, Saulle, M, Jus Cogens and Human Rights, m Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto 
Ago, pp 385-396, Jams, M, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 ConnJIL 1988, pp 359-363 and 370, Turpel, Μ, and 
Sands, Ρ, Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty Some Questions, 3 ConnJIL 1988, pp 364-369 and 371, 
Rosenne, S , Developments in the Law Treaties 1945-1986, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1989, 281-
288, Strydom, H, lus Cogens Peremptory Norm or Totalitarian Instrument?, 14 SAYIL 1988-1989, pp 42-58, 
D'Amato, A, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, U's Jus Cogens*, 6 CJIL 1990, pp 1-6, Kadelbach, S , Zwingendes Völker-
recht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1992, Charlesworlh, H, and Cfunkin, С , The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HRQ 
1993, pp 63-76 
Minagawa, Τ, Jus Cogens in Public International Law, 6 HJLP 1968, pp 16-28, 24 
Hannikainen, L , Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law, Historical Development, Criteria, Present 
Status, Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company, Helsinki, 1988, 4-5 He also uses terms such as vital common in­
terests and common interests of States (55-56) 
The Commission observed, Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 247, that "The view that in the last analysis 
there is no rule from which States cannot contract out has become increasingly difficult to sustain, ( ) " See also 
Fitzmaunce, Third Report, 27 and 39-41 As Minagawa, Jus Cogens, 17, points out, this freedom is based on the 
assumption that the consent of other States may be obtained In so far as the action of States in creating a new role 
of treaty law would purport to legalize conduct, prohibited by another rule of international law, with regard to 
Slates the consent of which has not been obtained, or with regard to States that had not taken part in the earlier 
treaty from the start, the treaty would lack legal effect due to the application of the rule oí pacta tertius nee provint 
пес nocent and the principle that treaties are res inter alios acta for third States See articles 30 and 34 to 38 Vi­
enna Convention If the States concerned would in effect give application to the treaty in their relations with other 
States this might lead to the engagement of international responsibility on their part Minagawa, Jus Cogens, 17, 
Lauterpachl, First Report, 154 
Yasseen (Irak), Conférence des Nations Urnes, Deuxième session, 110, observed "Personne ne conteste de nos 
jours qu'un traité qui vise à rendre légitime l'esclavage ( ) est nul ab initio " It is also for this reason that the con-
cept of jus cogens is looked upon as a limit to the freedom of States to conclude treaties See Bresson (France), 
Conference des Nations Urnes, Première session, 335 But it has to be noted that such limit does not actually in-
hibit States from concluding treaties that conflict with peremptory norms It is therefore also possible to view the 
provision of article 53 as laying down a prohibition to conclude a specified category of treaties, whose breach by 
two or more States cames with it its own exclusive sanction the voidness of the legal act thus performed 
This concerns the idea of what Gómez Robledo, A , Le jus cogens international sa genèse, sa nature, ses fonctions, 
172 RDC ADI I981-III, pp 9-217, 104-108, calls 'le double consentement' 
In the same sense Ruegger (Suisse), Conférence des Nations Unies, Première session, 110, who observes "Avec 
tout le respect du à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Urnes, [M Ruegger] ne saurait admettre qu'une résolution de 
cet organe, parfois adoptee à une très faible majorité, puisse établir du jus cogens " Apparently of contrary convic-
tion Rosenne (Israel), ibid, 337, who indicates that a void treaty could be declared so by any State and any inter-
national organization And it is for this reason that, a fortiori, there is no real need to refer to the convictions in 
this respect of "the teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations" (article 38 Statute) One may 
note that the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations in its article 53 does not envisage a role for international organizations in the 
acceptance and recognition phase Text in 25 ILM 1986, pp 543-589 See also Text and Commentary Article 53, 
Law of Treaties, International Organizations, YBHC 1982, Volume II, Part Two, ρ 56, 56 
Conference des Nations Urnes, Première session, 514 
Yasseen (Irak), Conférence des Nations Umes, Première session, 321, implicitly Jagota (Inde), ibid, 334 The for-
mer observed "Toutefois, les règles auxquelles aucune dérogation n'est possible ne relèvent pas toutes de jus co-
gens Lorsqu'un certain nombre d'Etats conviennent dans un traité, que les parties ne pourront pas conclure de 
conventions contraires à certaines clauses du traité, la violation de cette interdiction dans un traité ultérieur ne rend 
pas celui-ci nul, elle met simplement en jeu la responsabilité de l'Etat qui a commis une telle violation " For an 
example of a clause prohibiting the conclusion of a later treaty by only some of the parties to the former treaty see 
article 36 of the General Act of Berlin, text in Separate Opimon van Ey singa, The Oscar Chirm Case, Publications 
PCU, 1934, Senes А/В, No 63, ρ 65, 133 (see 133-136), and Separate Opinion Schucking, ibid, 148-150, who 
links the article to the notions of nullity, jus cogens and public morality 
Note that Anff (Malaisie), Conference des Nations Umes, Première session, 354 proposed the following phrase 
"reconnue en tant que telle par la communauté internationale" Yasseen, as president of the Drafting Committee, 
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referred to article 38 in explaining the term 'acceptée et reconnue' 
207
 Note that van Hoof observes "The point of departure, as was said, is that the opinio juris cogentis has to be ex-
pressed through the same manifestations of consent or acceptance in the sense of opinio juris " Hoof, G van, Re-
thinking the Sources of International Law, Kluwer, Deventer, 1983, 162 (more broadly 156-166) As an example 
of acceptance or recognition one may mention the statements of Nicaragua and the Umted States, noted by the 
Court, to the effect that the rule prohibiting the use of armed force constitutes a peremptory norm Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua ν Umted States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICI 
Reports 1986, ρ 14, 100-101 
2 0 i
 Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 247 
1Ю
 Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 248 
2 1 0
 Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 248 
2 1 1
 Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 248 
2 1 2
 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company ν The Government of the Libyan Arab 
Republic, Dupuy, Sole Arbitrator, Preliminary Award, 27 November 1975, and Award on the Merits, 19 January 
1977, 53 ILR 1979, pp 389-511, 479-483, Government of Kuwait ν American Independent Oil Company Ami-
noil), Arbitration Tribunal (Reuter, Sultan, Fitzmaunce), 24 March 1982, 66 ILR 1984, pp 518-627, 587-588 
2 . 3
 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, ρ 3, 42, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 100-101 References 
to yus cogens include Separate Opimon Padilla Nervo, North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports 1969, 97, 
Dissenting Opimon Tanaka, ibid , 182, Dissenting Opimon Lachs, ibid, 229, Dissenting Opinion Sorensen, ibid , 
248, Separate Opimon Ammoun, Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports 1970, 304, 311 (footnote 56), 312, and 
325, Separate Opimon Ranjeva, East Timor Case, Judgment, 30 June 1995, under I, Dissenting Opimon Weera-
mantry, ibid , in Part C, under (vii), and Dissenting Opimon Skubiszewski, ibid, paragraph 135 
2 . 4
 Especially Fitzmaunce discussed issues of State responsibility Fitzmaunce, Fourth Report, 37-81 Under the 
heading of "Limits of the Treaty Obligation (Circumstances Justifying Non-Performance)" (ibid, 43-46) he in­
cluded articles on self-defence and reprisals" And under the heading of "Consequences of Breach of Treaty", ibid, 
49-50, he included an article on cessation and reparation, which followed a paragraph that stated "Where there is 
a breach of treaty, it gives nse to international responsibility, ( ) " For his commentary see ibid, 62-70 and 80-81 
2 I S
 Sinclair (Royaume-Uni), Conférence des Nations Urnes, Première session, 488, Maresca (Italie), ibid, 489, see 
also Castro (Espagne), ibid, 490 
2
" And one may note that this provision drastically mitigates the fact that treaties which are void under article 53 are 
void in total (article 44, paragraph 5, of the Vienna Convention), and not merely the provisions in confila with the 
peremptory norm See Schwclb, E , Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International 
Law Commission, 61 AJTL 1967, pp 946-975, 971-972 
217
 Barros (Chili), Conférence des Nations Urnes, Premiere session, 325, Eek (Suède), ibid, 333, Rosenne (Israël), 
ibid , 337, Kebreth (Ethiopie), ibid, 341, Ruegger (Suisse), ibid , 352, although he only speaks of making protests, 
Fujisaki (Japon), ibid, 437-Í38, Bresson (France), ibid, 438, Trackenbrodt (République fédérale d'Allemagne), 
ibid, 445, implicitly Vallai (Royaume-Uni), ibid, 457, Wershof (Canada), ibid, 459, Pinto (Ceylan), ibid, 
Deuxième session, 131 Although he observed "Ceylan considère donc que tout Etat, ou du moins tout Etat partie 
à la convention, doit avoir le droit de contester la validité d'un traité en faisant valoir qu'il tombe sous le coup des 
articles 50 et 61, ( ) " In its context, since he supports a right for any State to invoke article 50, 'convention' ap-
pears to indicate the future Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and not (he convention thought to be void 
due to conflict with a peremptory norm. Guardia (Argentine), ibid, 132, implicitly Haraszti (Hongrie), ibid , 133, 
Bikoulha (Congo-Brazzaville), ibid Some delegates observed that article 50 was silent with regard to the question 
by which States it could be invoked Dons (Norvège), ibid , 353, Trackenbrodt (République fedérale d'Allemagne), 
ibid, 445 Of apparently different opimon Wanoba (République-Unie de Tanzanie), ibid , Premiere session, 468, 
and Ramani (Malaisie), ibid, Deuxième session, 112, seemingly Castro (Espagne), ibid, 132 
218
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between Inter-
national Organizations has adopted similar provisions in articles 65 and 66 
219
 The Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 248, states that "( ) nullity attaches to a treaty under the article 
only if the rule with which it conflicts is a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation 
is permitted, even by agreement of particular States " 
220
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 32 References to obligations erga omnes in international junsprudence in-
clude Separate Opimon Ammoun, Barcelona Traction Case, 324-327 Judge Ammoun does not mention obliga-
tions erga omnes, but his remarks seem to flow from paragraphs 33 and 34, Dissenting Opimon Riphagen, 
Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 338-340 and 354, especially Dissenting Opimon Schwebel, Military and 
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Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua ν United States of America), Provisional Measures, 
Order, ICJ Reports 1984, ρ 169, 195-198 On rights or obligations erga omnes (on self-determination) see Sepa­
rate Opinion Ranjeva, East Timor Case, under I, Dissenting Opinion Weeramantry, ibid, especially Part A, 3 (in), 
Part Β (χ), Part С (vi), Part D, Α (ι), С (ι) and (in), and Conclusions Commented upon by Charpentier, J , Affaire 
de la Barcelona Traction, Arrêt du 5 février 1970, 16 AFDI 1970, pp 307-328, Higgins, R., Aspects of the Case 
Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd, 11 VJIL 1970, pp 327-343, Francescakis, 
Ph, Lueurs sur le droit international des sociétés L'arrêt «Barcelona» de la Cour internationale de justice, 39 
RCDfP 1970, pp 609-664, Gnsel, E , L'arrêt de la Cour internationale de justice dans l'affaire de la Barcelona 
Traction (Seconde Phase) Problèmes de procédure et de fond, 27 SUR 1971, pp 31-48, Seidl-Hohenveldern, I , 
Der Barcelona Traction-Fall, 22 OZOR 1971, pp 255-309, Bnggs, H, Barcelona Traction The Jus Standi of 
Belgium, 65 AJIL 1971, pp 327-345 
111
 On obligations erga omnes see Frowein, Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes, 241-262, Meron, Τ, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 188-201, Meron, Τ, Common Rights of 
Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez, 85 AJIL 1991, pp 110-116, Simma, Β , Does the UN Charter Provide an 
Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes!, in Del­
brück, J (Ed), The Future of International Law Enforcement, New Scenarios - New Law?, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin, 1993, pp 125-146, Annacker, С, The Legal Régime οι Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 46 
AJPIL 1994, pp 131-166, and Annacker, С, Die Durchsetzung von erga omnes Verpflichtungen vor dem Inter­
nationalen Gerichtshof, Verlag Dr Kovac, Hamburg, 1994 See also Sperduti, G, Les obligations solidaires en 
droit international, in Makarczyk, J (Ed), Essays in International Law in Honour of Juge Manfred Lachs, Marünus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984, pp 271-275, Charney, J, Third Slate Remedies in International Law, 10 
MJIL 1989, pp 57-110, Thirlway, H The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989 (Part 
One), 60 BYBIL 1989, pp 1-157, 92-102, and Lachs, M , Slavery The Past and the Present in Delissen, A , and 
Tanja, G (Eds), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Essays in Honour of Fritz Kalshoven, Martinus Nyhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, pp 613-625 
221
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 32-33 
223
 The French text, which is authoritative, runs slightly different "La responsabilité est le corollaire nécessaire du 
droit" Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 33 In view of this formulation one would have expected the English 
text to read, as a literal translation, that responsibility is the necessary corollary oí law 
224
 The Court observed later on "Hence the Belgian Government would be entitled to bring a claim if it could show 
that one of its rights had been infringed and the acts complained of involved the breach of an international obliga-
tion arising out of a treaty or a general rule of law " Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 46 
225
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 46 
224
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 32 
227
 The Court has held, relatively recently, that "In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to 
self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, 
is irreproachable " East Timor Case, paragraph 29 It observed furthermore that, for the parties, the territory of 
East Timor remains a non-self-govermng territory and that its people has the right to self-determination Ibid, 
paragraphs 31 and 37 
228
 Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, 151, observes in regard to an analysis of the concepts of obligations erga omnes, 
international crimes ana jus cogens "The necessary starting-point for an analysis appears to be the distinction 
between legal rules that impose on States obligations whose breach in a concrete case only concerns one or more 
specifically affected States, on the one hand, and, on the other, those rules whose violation in a concrete case af-
fects a number of States, irrespective of the existence of a specific interest on their part " 
21
' Eg Seidl-Hohenveldera, I , Actio Popularis im Völkerrecht?, in U processo internationale, Studi in onore di Gae-
tano Morelli, Comunicazione e Studi, volume 14, Giuffré, Milano, 1975, pp 803-813. 804-806 and 813 For the 
contrary view see Schwelb, E , The Actio Popularis and International Law, 2 rVHR 1972, pp 46-56 
23,1
 Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 47 
2 ,1
 For a view that such a distinction could possibly be made see Meron, Τ, On a Hierarchy of International Human 
Rights, 80 AJIL 1986, pp 1-23, 10-11, and Meron, Human Rights, 192-194 
2 2 2
 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 61 AJIL 1967, pp 861-870 
1 1 3
 For a view tending to the same conclusion see Meron, Human Rights, 196-200 
2 3 4
 Meron, On a Hierarchy, 9 See also Meron, Human Rights, 192 
2 3 5
 Ago, R, Obligations Erga Omnes and the International Community, in Weiler et at. International Crimes, pp 
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237-239, 237 Also in this sense Annacker, The Legal Regime, 135-136 
Ago, Obligations Erga Omnes, 237-238 
Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, 154 
Annacker, The Legal Régime, 135-137 and 149-150 
Annacker, The Legal Régime, 149-150 For similar observations see Dupuy, Ρ -M, The International Law of State 
Responsibility Revolution or Evolution?, 11 MJIL 1990, pp 105-128, 120-123, Dupuy, Ρ -M, Responsabilité et 
légalité, in SFDI, Colloque Du Mans, La responsabilité dans le système international, Editions A Pedone, Pans, 
1991, pp 263-297,289-290 
Annacker, The Legal Régime, 136 and 149 
Annacker, The Legal Régime, 149 
С f Simma, Does the UN Charter, 132-133, who observes "First, I suggest that we maintain the distinction be­
tween obligations erga omnes in the Barcelona Traction sense and rules of general international or multilateral 
treaty law whose structure of application ( ) is such that they cannot be split up into a number of parallel bilateral 
relationships Certain uses of the high seas, for instance, cannot be agreed upon by pairs of slates without en­
croaching upon the nghts and interests of others But this does not necessarily mean that obligations of such inte­
gral structure will also constitute genuine obligations erga omnes I submit that the factor distinguishing the latter 
can only be seen in a particular value judgment according to which the international community as a whole con­
siders observance of certain obligations as imperative From this perspective, the core provisions of the great hu­
man nghts or humanitarian conventions also referred to by the Barcelona Traction dictum might be taken as 
examples where integral treaty and truly erga omnes obligations coincide " 
Then special rapporteur Ago, commenting upon the Barcelona Traction Case, noted "It follows, the Court held, 
that the responsibility flowing from a breach of those obligations is entailed not only with regard to the State that 
has been the direct victim of the breach (e g a State which has suffered an act of aggression in its territory), it is 
also entailed with regard to all the other members of the international community Every State, even if it is not 
immediately and directly affected by the breach, should therefore be considered justified in invoking the responsi­
bility of the State committing the internationally wrongful act " Ago, R, Fifth report on State responsibility, 
YB1LC 1976, Volume II, Part One, pp 3-54, 29 Footnote omitted Note the somewhat different text in Commen­
tary Article 19, Part One, 99 
Note that Jenks argues in favour of an actio popularis when two conditions are met that the beneficiary of sub­
stantive nghts is not in a position to act on his own behalf, and that this situation was foreseen and explicit provi­
sion was made for it Jenks, С , The General Welfare as a Legal Interest, in Wilner, G (Ed), Jus et Societas, 
Essays in Tnbute to Wolfgang Fnedmann, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1979, pp 151-158, 154-158 
See further Simma, Durchsetzung, 142, Silagi, M, Die Popularklage als Fremdkörper im Völkerrecht, 4 SAYIL 
1978, pp 10-28, 13-14, Mann, The Doctnne, 406, Macdonald, R, Fundamental Norms in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 25 CYIL 1987, pp 115-149, 136-139, Brunnee, Common Interest, 801, Meron, Human Rights, 194, 
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention, 213, Gomez Robledo, Le jus cogens international, 171, implicitly Bollecker 
Stern, Le prejudice, 87-88, Nagy, К, Forms of Legal Relationship in International Responsibility, in Haraszli, G 
(Ed), Questions of International Law, volume 2, Sijthoff and Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen a/d Rijn, 
1981, pp 129-145, 135-140 
Separate Opinion Ammoun, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, 325 See also 304, 311 (footnote 56) and 312 for 
references io jus cogens not linked to the idea of legal interests 
Note the examples m Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, 248 And also Dupuy, Ρ -M , Observations sur la 
pratique des "sanctions" de l'illicite, 87 RGDIP 1983, pp 505-548, 536-537, Macdonald, Fundamental Norms, 36 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 102 See also ibid ,116 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 95-96 Special rapporteur Ago's draft (Fifth Report, 54) on article 18, para­
graphs 2 and 3 (renumbered 19) read 
"2 The breach by a State of an international obligation established for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security, and in particular the breach by a State of the prohibition of any resort to the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State, is an 'international enme' 
3 The serious breach by a State of an international obligation established by a norm of general international law 
accepted and recognized as essential by the international community as a whole and having as its purpose 
(a) respect for the principle of the equal nghts of all peoples and of their nght of self-determination, or 
(b) respect for human nghts and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction based on race, sex, language or 
religion, or 
(c) the conservation and the free enjoyment for everyone of a resource common to all mankind is also an 
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'international crime' " 
On the distinction see Graefrath, В , Oeser, E, and Steiniger, Ρ , Internationale Verbrechen - Internationale De­
ukte, 22 DA 1977, pp 90-101, Hofmann, R, Zur Unterscheidung Verbrechen und Delikt im Bereich der Staaten-
verantwortlichkeit, 45 ZAORV 1985, pp 195-231, Mohr, M, The ILC's Distinction between "International 
Crimes" and "International Delicts" and its Implications, in Spinedi and Simma, United Nations Codification, pp 
115-141, Quigley, The International Law Commission's Cnmc-Dehct Distinction, 117-161, Palrmsano, G, Les 
causes d'aggravation de la responsabilité des états et la distinction entre «cnmes» et «délits» internationaux, 98 
RGDIP 1994, pp 629-673 
On the relationship between the two concepts Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, 151-160, Hoogh, A de, The Rela-
tionship between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Cnmes Peremptory Norms in Perspec-
tive, 42 AJPIL 1991, pp 183-214 It may be noted here that the first comments by Commission members focused 
on the idea of international crimes constituting breaches of obligations established under peremptory norms See 
Tammes, YBILC 1976, Volume I, 64, Hambro, ibid, 65, Sette Cámara, ibid, 68, Vallat, ibid, 68-69, Sahovic, 
ibid, 70, Martinez Moreno, ibid, Rossides, ibid, 83 
On cnmes see among others Marek, K, Cnminalizing State Responsibility, 14 RBDI 1978-1979, pp 460-485, 
Domimce, С , Die internationalen Verbrechen und deren rechtliches Regime, in Völkerrecht und Rechtsphiloso-
phie, Internationale Festschnft für Stephan Verosta zum 70 Geburstag, 1980, pp 227-248, Green, L, New Trends 
in International Cnminal Law, 11 IYHR 1981, pp 9-40, Gounelle, M, Quelques remarques sur la notion de 
«cnme international» et sur l'évolution de la responsabilité internationale de l'état, in Le droit international unité 
et diversité, Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter, Pedone, Pans, 1981, pp 315-326, Bindschedler, R_, Völkerrechtliche 
Verantwortlichkeit als Verbrechen, in Dutoit, В , and Gnsel, E (Eds), Mélanges Georges Pernn, Diffusion Payot, 
Lausanne, 1984, pp 51-61, Graefrath, В , Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für internationale Verbrechen, in 
Graefrath, В (Ed), Probleme des Völkerrechts, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1985, pp 89-110, Malekian, F, Inter-
national Cnminal Responsibility of States, Borgstroms Trycker AB, Stockholm, 1985, especially 168-197, Grae-
frath, В , and Mohr, M, Völkerrechtliche und strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fur internationale Verbrechen, 35 
SR 1986, pp 29-40, Cassese, A , Remarks on the Present Legal Regulation of Cnmes of State, in Etudes en 
l'honneur de Roberto Ago, volume III, pp 49-64, Rigaux, F, Le cnme d'etat, Reflexions sur l'article 19 du projet 
d'articles sur la responsabilité des états, in Etudes, ibid, pp 301-325, Sahovic, M, Le concept du cnme interna-
tional de l'elat et le développement du droit international, in Etudes, ibid, pp 363-369, Napcl, H -M ten, The 
Concept of International Cnmes of States Walking the Thin Line between Progressive Development and Disinte-
gration of the International Legal Order, 1 LJIL 1988, pp 149-169, Gilbert, G, The Cnminal Responsibility of 
States, 39 ICLQ 1990, pp 345-369, and Dekker, I, Cnminal Responsibility and the Gulf War of 1980-1988 The 
Cnme of Aggression, in Dekker, I, and Post, H (Eds), The Gulf War of 1980-1988, The Iran-Iraq War m Inter-
national Legal Perspective, Martinus Nyhofl* Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992, pp 249-268 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 117 
С f article 14, paragraph 1, Part Two, proposed by Riphagen, W, Fifth report on the content forms and degrees of 
international responsibility (part 2 of the draft articles), YBILC 1984, Volume II, Part One, pp 1-4, 4, which ran 
"An international cnme entails all the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act and, in addition, such 
nghts and obligations as are determined by the applicable rules accepted by the international community as a 
whole " Contrary Commentary Article 19, Part One, 117-118 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 119 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 119 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 120 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 120 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 120 Mohr expressed doubts as to the cntenon of senousness, since it would 
leave too much room for subjectivism See Mohr, The ILC's Distinction, 123 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 121 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 110 A member of the Commission asked the question "( ) why a 'small ag­
gression' which caused relatively minor destruction of property and the death of a few innocent people should en­
tail additional consequences in terms of authorized armed countermeasures when such countermeasures would 
presumably not be allowed in the case of a wide-scale genocide " See Commission Report 1994, 338 Note also 
Napel, The Concept of International Cnmes, 157 
Note Dupuy, Ρ -M , Observations sur le "cnme international de l'état", 84 RGDIP 1980, pp 449-486, 463-464 
Apparently contrary Graefrath, В , Oeser, E, and Steiniger, Ρ , Internationale Verbrechen, 96 See also Yokola, 
К , War as an International Cnme, in Constantopoulos, D, Eustathiades, С, and Fragistas, С (Eds), Grundprob-
78 CHAPTER 1 
lerne des internationalen Recht, Festschrift für Jean Spiropoulos, Schimmelbusch & Co, Bonn, 1957, pp 453-460, 
Mazov, V , Responsibility for Aggression in International Law, 6 IA (Moscow) 1972, pp 43-48, Suchantkul, S , 
Terrorism as an International Crime Questions of Responsibility and Complicity, 19 IYHR 1989, pp 247-258, 
Graefrath, В , and Mohr, M, Legal Consequences of an Act of Aggression The Case of the Iraqi Invasion and Oc­
cupation of Kuwait, 43 AJPIL 1992, pp 109-138 
2 6 3
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 121 
2 4 4
 Contrary Palrmsano, Les causes d'aggravation, 641-642 "En effet, l'agression est menionnée dans le paragraphe 
non pas comme contenu d'une interdiction posée par «une obligation internationale d'importance essentielle», ob-
ligation dont la grave violation représenterait un cnme Autrement dit, on définit comme un crime, non pas 
l'agression tout court, mais la violation grave de l'interdiction d'agression (ainsi que la violation grave de 
l'interdiction de domination coloniale, de génocide, etc ) " Two footnotes omitted At the next page he indicates 
his adherence to the opposite stance, which, though less faithful to the text, corresponds to the intentions of the 
Commission 
245
 See Palrmsano, Les causes d'aggravation, 642, footnote 29 
244
 С f Palrmsano, Les causes d'aggravation, 643 
2 6 7
 Arangio-Ruiz, G , State Fault and the Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility Questions of Attribution 
and Relevance, in Le droit au service de la paix, de la justice et du développement, Mélanges Michel Virally, Édi-
tions A Pedone, Pans, 1991, pp 25-41 
248
 Some members of the Commission have pointed to the fact, in the 1994 discussion, that the concept of fault was 
inseparable from the concept of cnme See Report 1994, 337 Arangio-Ruiz stated "There is hardly any question 
that wilful intent (dolus as the gravest degree of fault) is an essential, sine qua non feature of a cnme " Arangio-
Ruiz, G, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, 9 May 1995, A/CN 4/469, 49 pp ,19 In a similar sense Tunkin, 
G, International Law, A Textbook, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, 229 
" ' Pamisano, Les causes d'aggravation, 645 Emphasis in the original Note also Ago, R-, Remarks on Some Classes 
of Crimes by States, in Weiler et al, International Crimes, ρ 215, 215, and generally Salmon, J , L'intention en 
matière de responsabilité internationale, in Le droit au service de la paix, pp 413-422 
270
 Pamisano, Les causes d'aggravation, 645-647 
271
 Note Trail Smelter Award, 317, Corfu Channel case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, ρ 4, 18, and Nicaragua Case, 
Ments, 83-85 
2 7 1
 Palrmsano, Les causes d'aggravation, 648, noted in this regard "Il est impensable que l'instauration d'un régime 
politique, économique, social ou culturel contraire à la volonté du peuple - d'un peuple d'une colóme, aussi bien 
que d'un peuple «métropolitain», ou encore d'un peuple d'une race ou d'une foi différente par rapport à celle du 
groupe sociale qui constitue la classe dominante - se réalise «par hasard», soit «par négligence» Il faut toujours un 
projet prémédité de la part de l'Etat qui l'effectue " More generally ibid, 647-652 
273
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 121 The phrase mentioned in the text constitutes only part of a sentence, and 
the Commission continued that sentence by adding "( ), even if that will has not been manifested, or has not yet 
been manifested, by armed opposition " 
274
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 121 Note especially G Ρ R., Torture and Other Violations of Human Rights as 
International Cnmes, 17 RICJ 1976, pp 41-50, 46-50, Medina Quiroga, С , The Battle of Human Rights, Gross, 
Systematic Violations and the Inter-Amencan System, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, 7-19, and 
Palmisano, Les causes d'aggravation, 653-659 
2 7 5
 The 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Cnme oî Apartheid, adopted by way 
of General Assembly resolution 3068 (XXVIII), repnnted m 13 ILM 1974, pp 50-57 Sec also the 1966 Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 60 AJIL 1966, pp 650-661 See 
Booysen, H , Convention on the Cnme of Apartheid, 2 SAYIL 1976, pp 56-96, 91-92, who claims that the Con-
vention is void due to conflict with a peremptory norm, since the object of the Convention, the suppression of 
apartheid, could only be accomplished by way of aggression See also Wellens, К , Apartheid, An International 
Cnme, in Heyde, L, Leijten, J, Merlens, Th, and Vermeulen, В (Eds), Begrensde Vnjheid, Opstellen over 
mensenrechten aangeboden aan Prof Dr D F Scheltens bij zijn afscheid als hoogleraar aan de Katholieke Uni­
versiteit Nijmegen, Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1989. pp 288-311 
1 7 4
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 119 Note also Ago, R, The Concept of "International Community as a Whole" 
A Guarantee to the Notion of State Cnmes, in Weiler et al. International Cnmes, pp 252-253, and Palmisano, Les 
causes d'aggreavation, 638 
2 7 7
 Text in Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, 24 May 1995, A/CN 4/469/Add 1, 4 pp , 4 Argu­
ments in Seventh Report, 25-49 He has also proposed an article 7, Part Three, which would provide jurisdiction 
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for the Court to decide disputes over the implementation of the consequences of crimes, that is reparation and 
countermeasures See Arangio-Ruiz, G, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, 29 May 1995, A/CN 4/469/Add 2, 
Зрр.З 
On which generally Brunnée, Common Interest, 791-808, Lefeber, The Exercise of Jurisdiction, 81-137, Gormley, 
W, The Legal Obligation of the International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment The Ex-
pansion of Human Rights Norms, 3 GIELR 1990, pp 85-116, Wolfram, R, Purposes and Principles of Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 33 GYTL 1990, pp 308-330, Boyle, A , State Responsibility for Breach of Obligations 
to Protect the Environment, in Butler, W (Ed), Control over Compliance with International Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, pp 69-81, Kiss, Mazzeschi, Spinedi, Dupuy (P -M ), Charney, Conforti, and the late 
judge Ago, in Franciom, F, and Scovazzt, Τ (Eds), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, Graham 
&Trotman, London, 1991, at respectively pp 3, 15, 75, 125, 149, 179, and 493, and Palnusano, Les causes 
d'aggravation, 659-664 
Ago, Fifth Report, 32 (footnote 148), 48 (footnote 262), 49 (footnote 270), 52, and 53 
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CHAPTER 2 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, AND THE LEGAL 
INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
2.1. Introduction 
Up to this point the present writer has deliberately abstained from undue reference to the phrases 
"international community" and "community interest". There can be no doubt as to the reason if 
there is a community interest in the performance of State obligations, then it must be the community 
that is in possession of a correlative right to demand performance, and a legal interest if obligations 
are breached Whatever may be thought of the use in article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the 
phrase "international community of States as a whole", it cannot be understood to incorporate the 
community interest with regard to treaties void for conflict with a peremptory norm.1 Only the refer-
ence (article 66 of the Vienna Convention) of disputes concerning articles 53 and 64 to the Court 
may, in a limited way, be considered to stand for community involvement.2 
Article 19, Part One, of the ILC-draft has not made any significant change in this respect, not-
withstanding its deletion of the reference to States after "international community" as a determining 
factor in the manner of recognition of internationally wrongful acts as international crimes 3 The sole 
origin of the idea of a legal interest for the international community lies therefore with the notion of 
obligations erga omnes, which, by word of the Court, are "obligations towards the international 
community as a whole".4 Now that language closely resembles the similar phrase in article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention. But although there appears to be a close identification between the notion of 
obligations erga omnes and that oí jus cogens, one cannot assume them to convey the same meaning 
of international community Because "international community" within the concept of jus cogens re-
fers to the creation of law - admittedly a special kind of law - , whereas with regard to obligations 
erga omnes it concerns, more properly speaking, the enforcement of law 
Within the State communities making up the international community, the enforcement of law is gen-
erally centralized in community organs Exceptions to this monopoly of community enforcement of 
law exist only as clearly circumscribed provisions in special laws, and then always under control by 
the courts On the international level the first question to ask is "which are the community organs 
designed to enforce the laws within the international community"? There is a theory claiming that 
States besides creating the law also enforce the law, and that in doing so they are to be considered to 
be acting in dual capacity The capacity conferred by law to resort to unilateral enforcement of one's 
rights, and the capacity to act as a community organ to enforce the law.5 It may be submitted that the 
theory is based on false premises One cannot equate decentralized enforcement by States acting in-
dividually to centralized enforcement through community organs Nor can one claim that decentral-
ized enforcement constitutes at the same time community enforcement (exception made with regard 
to the European Union) ' Community enforcement generally exists only by means of centralizing the 
enforcement function in community organs. If that is the case it becomes clear that for community 
enforcement one has to look, not to States, but to international organizations. 
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In its commentary to article 1, Part One, the Commission noted that 'Responsibility" would cover 
the new relations resulting from an internationally wrongful act whether or not those were:7 "(...) 
limited to the offending State and the directly injured State or extend also to other subjects of inter-
national law, (...)." At this stage of the development of international relations therefore the role to be 
played by international organizations as subjects of international law, and especially the United Na-
tions, regarding community enforcement cannot be neglected. In the past international organizations 
have had much to do with the performance, or non-performance, of the obligations States had ac-
cepted by becoming a party to an organization's constituent instrument. Provisions in constituent 
treaties are for the most part concerned with the organization's power of suspension of membership, 
or expulsion from the organization. Some of those treaties also provide for coercive measures 
against States decided upon by the organization, and which are to be implemented by the members. 
Generally such provisions do not state in any outright manner that the organization has the right to 
claim the performance of the obligations accepted by States under the constituent instrument, or that 
the obligations concerned are performed towards the organization. 
Arangio-Ruiz has proposed, in article 18, paragraph 2, Part Two, to confer jurisdiction on the 
Court to determine the existence of a crime.8 The right to seize, unilaterally, the Court would be 
vested in every State, subject to the condition that either the General Assembly or the Security 
Council would have resolved, by qualified majority, that an allegation of the commission of a crime 
was sufficiently substantiated to justify the serious concern of the international community. The 
question is of course to what extent the international community already has a role to play regarding 
international crimes, that is whether the community possesses the right to invoke the responsibility of 
a State committing a crime. This chapter will consequently investigate under which circumstances 
the community, as personified by the United Nations, can be considered to be in possession of a legal 
interest consequent upon the commission of an internationally wrongful act. 
This chapter will first of all discuss, in section 2, the phrase "obligations towards the international 
community as a whole". Certain arguments on the international legal personality of the United Na-
tions will be examined in section 3. Next, in section 4, the criteria to determine the legal interest of 
States examined in chapter one (section 1.5) will be discussed from the angle of determining the legal 
interest of the United Nations. Section 5 will follow up on this by examining the legal bases of the 
United Nations' legal interest. Finally section 6 will focus on the legal interest of the United Nations 
consequent upon the commission of an international crime, and on the question whether a committed 
international crime vests ipso facto the competence of the Security Council under article 39 of the 
Charter.9 The Security Council, however, may not be able to come to any decision, measures, or ac-
tion under chapter VII of the Charter. For that reason it will also be investigated in this section which 
effects accrue to recommendations of the General Assembly or the Security Council. 
2.2. Obligations towards the international community as a whole 
When discussing the concept of obligations erga omnes, in connection to international crimes, the 
late judge Ago commented upon the notion of the international community as follows:10 
"When erga omnes was used in the obiter dictum of the Barcelona Traction decision, the 
Court had something else in mind: obligations towards the international community. We then 
began to see the emergence of something which already exists to some extent today and we 
hope will go on growing; namely that the entity called the international community, distinct 
from its members who have rights and obligations, is able to enter into legal relationships with 
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its members That is a very great advance, and very probably notions like that of jus cogens 
or of international crimes will be able truly to take form only once that phenomenon has be-
come a reality I do not believe that one can say "if there is an internationally wrongful act a 
little more serious than another one, or than other ones, we shall call it a 'crime', and all 
States will legitimately be able to intervene" Not at all It is not all States, but rather the in-
ternational community that is envisaged as the possible bearer of a right of reaction to this 
particularly serious form of internationally wrongful act Accordingly, the whole idea of obli-
gations erga omnes is bound up not only with the fact of recognition of the existence of that 
community as such, but also with the fact of more advanced institutionalization of that com-
munity ( ) That was the intention, and that is why I believe that it is extremely important for 
institutions to be established through which progress can be achieved in this area." 
As a comment on late judge Ago's identification of obligations erga omnes to obligations towards 
the international community, it has to be noted that his conception is not borne out by the terms of 
paragraph 33 of the Barcelona Traction Case Superficially the Court appears to use the phrases 
"obligations towards the international community" and "obligations erga omnes" in an interchange-
able fashion However, the Court observes that the obligations towards the international community 
are by their very nature "the concern of all States", and that "in view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection" " These sentences illus-
trate that by mentioning obligations towards the international community, in the sense of obligations 
erga omnes, the Court did not have in mind a personified (or even abstract) international community, 
but States Whatever the Court may have thought, or may think, with regard to the international 
community, it appears thus to have kept within the traditional bilateral concepts of inter-State rela-
tions Furthermore, one may note that the Court uses the expression "international community as a 
whole", and that refers back to the concept of jus cogens as laid down in article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention Indeed, it would seem strange if the Court, in the context of contentious proceedings, 
would have had anything else in mind but States Especially so since it used paragraph 33, in which 
appears the idea of obligations erga omnes as obligations towards the international community, as an 
argument for denying Belgium any yus standi with regard to the denial of justice (allegedly) commit-
ted by Spain 12 
'Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of the 
same category It cannot be held, when one such obligation is in question, in a specific case, 
that all States have a legal interest in its observance " 
Obviously one may draw the inference that if Belgium had pointed to a(n) (breached) obligation of 
Spain towards the international community, then it would also have had a legal interest in its obser-
vance 
Does all this mean that there is no room for obligations whose breach gives rise to a legal interest 
on the part of the international community' That would be a hasty conclusion, although Ago, then 
special rapporteur, argued in his second report:13 
"In spite of the divergence of the views described above, the different conceptions of 
responsibility nevertheless coincide in agreeing that every internationally wrongful act creates 
new legal relations between the State committing the act and the injured State As has already 
been pointed out, this in no way precludes the establishment of other relations between the 
former State and other subjects of international law What must be ruled out, it appears, at 
least at the present stage of international relations, is the idea that as a result of an 
internationally wrongful act general international law can create a legal relationship between 
the guilty State and the international community as such, just as municipal law creates a 
84 CHAPTER 2 
relationship between the person committing an offence and the State itself International law 
can have no such effect, so long as it does not recognize a personification of the international 
community as such But this situation has certainly not prevented international treaty law 
from providing that in certain cases a particular internationally wrongful act may be the 
source of new legal relations, not only between the guilty State and the injured State, but also 
between the former State and other States or, especially, between the former State and 
organizations of States The development of international organization, as early as the League 
of Nations but more particularly with the United Nations, has led to consideration of the 
possibility that a State committing an internationally wrongful act of a certain kind and of a 
certain importance might be placed in a new legal relationship not only with the injured State, 
but also with the Organization " 
Now these two displayed comments by the late judge Ago are highly revealing, because they show 
that he considers it possible to envisage a personified international community, although of course in 
1970 he denied the presence of such a community His later comment on international crimes, framed 
in rather more positive terms, is not inconsistent per se with his earlier comment contained in his 
second report In both comments he links the personification of the international community to the 
then present degree of institutionalization of international relations 
In this last passage it appears that then special rapporteur Ago makes a distinction between treaty 
regimes and general international law If one takes general international law to stand for customary 
international law, an argument could be made that the personified international community is not 
likely to be established by customary international law That argument is bolstered by his references, 
in both instances, to the United Nations, even if in his 1970 views on the matter the personified in-
ternational community and the United Nations do not quite coincide The inevitably intricate charac-
ter of the relations between a personified international community and its members leads to the 
conclusion that the basis for such a community must be a treaty regime And his rejection, in 1970, 
of the existence of a personified international community should perhaps be considered to be some-
what hasty in view of his scant examination of the question 
However, the comprehensively universalized character of the relations between any community and 
its members further leads one to observe that the requirement of consent by members of the interna-
tional community to the establishment of treaty relations with one another to a certain degree ham-
pers the establishment of a personified community The reference by the Court, in paragraph 34 of 
the Barcelona Traction Case, to corresponding rights of protection laid down in general international 
law or m international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character, even if apparently only 
in the context of legal interests of States, must be seen to lend credibility to the universal character of 
rules laying down obligations erga omnes Universal character of the rules in question is not ensured 
solely by reference to relevant instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character, but also by 
reference to general international law14 The personified international community, to be established 
through universal membership in an organization established by way of treaty, may have to rely on 
customary international law to the extent that certain members of the community decline to take up 
membership in the intended universal organization1S Substantive rules of customary international 
law, co-existent and in a general sense identical to the treaty rules,16 may make up for the lack of 
universal membership of an organization 
However, the fact that rules of customary international law apply to States irrespective of their 
being bound by similar or identical treaty rules accepted through their membership in an international 
organization, cannot ipso jure lead to the conclusion that the organization itself has the right to de-
mand the performance of the obligations under the relevant rules of customary international law 
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And this same observation goes for rules contained in treaties other than the organization's constitu-
ent instrument or treaties drafted by the organization itself. Not even the case of rules contained in 
treaties concluded under the organization's auspices provides as clear-cut a case as some would 
make one believe. Considering these uncertainties it becomes clear that the organization's legal inter-
est with regard to breaches of obligations ought to be examined within a broad context, and that a 
mere superficial glance at the organization's constituent instrument does not suffice. International 
personality appears, to this writer, to be the perfect starting point for examining questions concern-
ing an organization's legal interests. And since the United Nations is the only organization that could 
be said to represent the personified international community,17 it appears fully justified to limit the 
following analysis to the United Nations. 
2.3. The international legal personality of the United Nations 
That a personified international community, taking the form of an international organization, must 
have international personality flows from the use of the term "personified". A community or organi-
zation that does not take any distinct form compared to its members could at the most be considered 
to represent the members' interests (whatever these may be). The Court already early in its existence 
proclaimed by way of general principle, insofar as the United Nations is concerned, the international 
personality ofthat organization.18 It decided that issue in its reply to the request by the General As-
sembly whether the United Nations could bring an international claim, and the Court deduced inter-
national personality first and foremost from the fact this was indispensable to achieve the ends for 
which the United Nations had been founded.19 The Court then, indirectly, pointed to a number of 
provisions in the Charter which endorsed its conclusion: article 2, paragraph 5, article 25; articles 10, 
11, 13, and 14; articles 104 and 105; and articles 43, 75, 77, and 105, paragraph 3.20 
More important perhaps was the definition adopted by the Court on international personality, if 
only for the purposes of its opinion, to the effect that:21 
"(...) if the Organization is recognized as having that personality, it is an entity capable of 
availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its Members." 
Here the Court finds that the essence of international personality lies in the capability to avail oneself 
of other persons' obligations. This, as such, appears to be somewhat ambiguous phrasing, but the 
French text more strikingly refers to:22 "(...) une entité capable d'être bénéficiaire d'obligations in-
combant à ses Membres." Later the Court reached the conclusion that the United Nations is an inter-
national person, which in the words of the Court meant:23 
"(...) that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and 
duties, and that it has the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims." 
The Court elaborated on that statement in its discussion of the institute of diplomatic protection, and 
held:24 "(...) that only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in re-
spect of its breach." It is essential to observe that these quotes are all of the same order in implying 
that State responsibility can be invoked not only by States, but also by the United Nations.25 The 
Charter provisions referred to by the Court, however, do not explicitly point to breaches of obliga-
tions by States or incurred State responsibility towards the United Nations.26 
An important aspect of the Court's opinion concerns the fact that it upholds the United Nations' 
legal personality, and capacity to bring claims, not only in regard to Members of the United Nations, 
but also towards non-Members:27 
86 CHAPTER 2 
"On this point, the Court's opinion is that fifty States, representing the vast majority of the 
members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international law, 
to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely 
personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims." 
The argument made here is certainly valid to the extent that it concerns the possibility for States to 
create an organization in possession of objective international personality. But that is not the point! 
Either an organization can bring claims, or it cannot. If it can proceed to bring claims against mem-
bers, it will also be in possession of the international competence to do so with regard to non-
members. No, the essential question is whether the organization can, in the words of the Court, avail 
itself of the obligations of the non-member; whether the non-member State has any obligation with 
regard to the agents of the organization; and whether that obligation is in any way distinct from any 
obligation the specific non-member State may have under the rules of customary international law 
regarding the protection of aliens. These questions were not answered by the Court since they had 
not been submitted to it. The question was phrased in abstract terms and assumed that State respon-
sibility had been incurred.28 The Court on a number of occasions referred to injury caused by the 
breach of obligations towards the United Nations,19 and it had no problem in finding:3* 
"The question lies within the limits already established; that is to say it presupposes that the 
injury for which reparation is demanded arises from a breach of an obligation designed to help 
an agent of the Organization in the performance of his duties." 
In relation to members of the United Nations that obligation can hardly be denied in view of the obli-
gation contained in article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter, and the Court pointed this out.31 But the 
matter is more complicated with regard to non-members. The Court's only answer to the question 
whether the United Nations could make claims against non-members was that:32 
"(...) fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international commu-
nity, had the power (...) to bring into being an entity possessing objective international per-
sonality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring 
international claims." 
This does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question which obligation, owed to the United 
Nations, could be breached by a non-member. The Court denied that there existed any analogy be-
tween the United Nations' right to functional protection and the right of diplomatic protection of 
States with regard to their nationals.33 Though of course that analogy could have provided the neces-
sary basis of obligation for non-members.34 Notwithstanding article 2, paragraph 6, obligations for 
non-members cannot be founded on the Charter, since that cannot create obligations for them.35 The 
only remaining basis would then have to be sought in the analogous application of rules of customary 
international law regarding the immunities to be accorded to diplomatic or consular agents. The 
analogy can certainly be made, but one would have expected the Court to come up with more of an 
argument on the specific basis of obligation of non-members than it did. 
One further question must be addressed, which concerns the potential scope of the legal interests 
considered to be in possession of the United Nations. In concluding that the United Nations is an in-
ternational person (and can bring claims against States), the Court observed:36 
"That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal 
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is it the same thing 
as saying that it is a 'super-State', whatever that expression may mean." 
The United Nations should therefore not be considered - fortunately so - a State, nor for that matter 
- perhaps unfortunately so - a super-State. What the Court significantly indicates here is that the 
United Nations need not be in possession of the same rights and obligations as States are. To put it 
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otherwise, the United Nations cannot ipso jure claim the possession of rights enjoyed by States un-
der customary international law, or be considered to be obligated the same way as States are under 
customary international law But if that is the case, how then to decide under which circumstances 
the United Nations will be entitled to demand the performance of obligations by States? The Court, 
m a follow-up to its observation concluded with the important remark that37 
"Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by inter-
national law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend on the 
purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in 
practice ( ), the Court concludes that the Members have endowed the Organization with 
capacity to bring international claims when necessitated by the discharge of its functions " 
While not denying that the United Nations' exercise of rights (or performance of obligations) should 
be in some relation to the constituent instrument's purposes and functions, nevertheless one could 
find arguments militating m favour of a broader view towards the existence of rights than a capacity 
to bring international claims on the basis of a necessity for discharging its functions 
The (non-) exercise of rights generally takes place on the basis of a weighing of interests, and the 
consequent decision may just as well lead to exercise, as not The argument of necessity for dis-
charge of functions cannot be upheld, since any subject is generally free to exercise or fail to exercise 
rights Furthermore, it can hardly be denied that the scope of functions of the United Nations is so 
broad as to bring almost any activity, whether in the exercise of rights or not, in relation to the dis-
charge of functions Yet the mere fact that certain activities could be said to be necessitated by the 
discharge of functions by the United Nations cannot alone be considered sufficient argument to con-
clude that a right exists 
On the other side of the scale, that of obligations, it is obvious that the United Nations cannot under-
take activities which States, whether or not Members, are not allowed to engage in their individual 
capacity That conclusion is based of course on the argument that States cannot create a collectivity 
in order to do what they cannot do individually3e It is well known however that States are not to the 
same extent bound by obligations The United Nations therefore can only be bound to international 
law insofar as obligations exist universally, that is, for all States This leads to the conclusion that the 
United Nations is bound, if circumstances so require, by universal customary international law 
However, States are free, subject to considerations oí jus cogens, to alter the rules applicable in their 
inter se relations Ал illustration of this is provided by the regulation of the use of force in the United 
Nations Charter Members are under the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
other States, and may only react to uses of force that come under the heading of an armed attack 
That means effectively that members are under the obligation to refrain from using force in reaction 
to another State's use of force if that other State's force could not be considered an armed attack 
The Security Council could be said to be obligated, under the argument that it is prevented from do­
ing what individual members are not allowed to do, not to use force against States However, the 
criterion to determine whether or not the Security Council is entitled to resort to force in reaction to 
a certain situation, or certain acts, is not the criterion of armed attack, but the criterion of threat to 
the peace Thus in so far as the use of force is concerned it is allowed to do what members are not 
allowed to do 
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2.4. Criteria to determine the United Nations' legal interest 
The starting point regarding the search for criteria determining the legal interest of the United Na-
tions lies with a discussion of the criteria, either rejected or adopted in chapter one, that determine 
the legal interests of States Thus it will be examined in this section whether such criteria would ap-
ply in determining the United Nations' legal interest 
2 4 1 The United Nations and the general interest in the performance of obligations 
That the United Nations has an interest regarding the performance of international obligations cannot 
be doubted Indeed there are references in the Charter that witness such interest Thus the Preamble 
of the Charter affirms the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to "establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained",39 article 1, paragraph 1, witnesses that the primary goal of the United 
Nations is "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and in-
ternational law, the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace", and article 13, paragraph 1 (a), ordains that the General Assembly "shall 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ( ) encouraging the progressive de-
velopment of international law and its codification" *" 
But in order for an interest to generate legal rights and obligations, as the Court indicated in the 
1966 South West Africa Cases, it must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal form n 
In this regard it may be noted that the most firm of these texts is contained in the Preamble, which, as 
was noted by the Court, constitutes only "the moral and political basis for the legal provisions 
thereafter set out"41 Of the two legal provisions mentioned just now, article 13, paragraph 1 (a) is 
rather more concerned with the abstract or theoretical development of international law than with the 
application ofthat law in the field of State responsibility Only article 1, paragraph 1, appears to 
provide some indication that the United Nations would be in possession of a general legal interest 
with regard to the performance of obligations by States Yet that indication is at the same time 
weakened by the fact that the United Nations' purpose, to bring about settlement of disputes, or ad-
justment of situations, in accordance with international law and justice, only operates insofar as the 
dispute or situation concerned could lead to a breach of the peace Generally speaking of course any 
dispute or situation may lead to a breach of the peace, but in concreto most of them will not It 
would not seem right therefore to deduce from this a general legal interest in the performance of ob-
ligations 
That conclusion is strengthened by certain arguments regarding other provisions of the Charter, 
namely articles 5, 6, 14, 39 in conjunction to 41 and 42, and article 94, paragraphs 1 and 2 * 
Before embarking upon the arguments concerned there is need to reflect upon a rather important 
argument It concerns the finding that where there is a power or competence to resort to sanctions 
for the breach of obligations by a Member there is also the necessary implication of the possession of 
a competence to determine that a Member has breached its obligations ** This in fact amounts to 
saying that a legal interest exists for an organization entitled to resort to sanctions against Members 
Now that is clearly a correct way of phrasing, because there is an unbreakable connection in the 
chain obligation - breach of that obligation - obligation to repair the breach (right to reparation) -
and the right to resort to sanctions or to use force45 The Charter in fact does include references to 
breaches of obligation and/or to resort to sanctions or force in consequence of such breaches 
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The only provision in which a direct link can be said to exist between the breach of obligations 
(though in rather unsatisfactory terms) and a consequent resort to sanctions is article 6 of the Char-
ter. In that article is said that a Member of the United Nations may be expelled from the Organization 
if it has persistently violated the Principles of the Charter. On the other hand that means that a Mem-
ber could not be expelled on the mere ground that it has (allegedly) breached obligations other than 
those contained in article 2 regarding the Principles. The basic obligations of article 2 are those in 
paragraph 3 on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and paragraph 4 on the prohibition of the use of 
force. 
In article 5 no reference is made to any breach of obligation on the part of a Member. It stipulates 
however that a Member may be suspended from the exercise of the right of privileges of membership 
if preventive or enforcement action has been taken against that Member. Preventive or enforcement 
action is generally interpreted as meaning measures under article 41, or action under article 42 of the 
Charter,46 and those are in tum dependent on the application by the Security Council of its power, 
expressed in article 39, to determine a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 
The interpretation of article 39 is in fact decisive for the issue here at stake, that is, the general 
interest in the performance of obligations. In this context it may be observed, preliminary, that there 
are authors who deny the necessity of any breach of obligation by a member of the United Nations in 
order to provide a basis for Security Council action under article 39, and thus consequent action un-
der articles 41 and 42.47 Apparently the main argument in support of this stance concerns the obser-
vation that threats to the peace encompass acts and situations which do not constitute threats or uses 
of force. For some there is no question of any correlation between threats to the peace and threats of 
force, which for them implies that no obligation need be violated in order to provide a basis of Se-
curity Council action.48 To a limited extent this appears acceptable. A determination by the Security 
Council under article 39 need not entail direct consequences for the State at the origin of the threat 
to the peace. 
The picture changes if the Security Council proceeds, on the basis of such a determination, to edict 
measures under article 41, to take action under article 42, or authorizes action {infra chapters four 
and five), as against a specific (member) State. Under customary international law a State can only 
be subjected to certain measures involving a breach of obligation by the State(s) inflicting them if it 
has committed a prior breach of obligation. Taking into account that the measures of articles 41 or 
42 may involve, for the States implementing the decision of the Security Council, breaches of their 
obligations towards the target State, that means, under the theory that a threat to the peace need not 
involve any breach of obligation, that they would be justified (and of course obligated under article 
25) to apply those measures notwithstanding that the target State had not committed any prior 
breach of obligation. An interpretation of the powers of the Security Council under articles 39, 41 
and 42 in that sense would amount to an unacceptable derogation from one of the most fundamental 
conditions attached to the enforcement of the responsibility of States, namely that countermeasures 
or the use of force can only be resorted to in response to a prior internationally wrongful act. 
Hereafter it will be assumed that where the Security Council makes a determination under article 39, 
and resorts to measures under article 41, action under article 42, or authorizes action, it enforces the 
responsibility of a (member) State, and more particularly that State's reparation obligations. 
The argument in the previous paragraphs was that the imposition of measures under articles 41 
and 42, to the extent that they could not be considered to amount to retorsions, requires a prior 
breach of obligation by the targeted State. Another argument sometimes put forward relates to an 
alleged absolute discretionary power possessed by the Security Council in determining whether or 
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not certain facts constitute a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Gowl-
land-Debbas argues that regarding49 
"( ) the question of what constitutes a threat to the peace, it is evident that in accordance 
with Charter requirements the determination of its existence entails a factual and political 
judgement and not a legal one " 
And a few sentences later she asserts M 
"A determination by the Council is not for instance the sort of question that could be re-
viewed by the International Court of Justice as some have proposed " 
If a decision of the Security Council as to the existence of a threat to the peace is really of political 
character, and does not have any legal component, or if such a decision could not be reviewed by the 
Court as to its compatibility with Charter requirements or international law in general, then the an-
swer to the question - whether the United Nations is in possession of a general interest in the per-
formance of obligations by Members - would be devoid of interest For in both cases the Security 
Council's freedom of action would be absolute If its decision is to be considered of political charac-
ter, no legal rules or requirements could be held against it, since no objective meaning could be ad-
duced to "threats to the peace"Sl If its decision could not be reviewed by the Court, then no other 
organ (and certainly not an individual State) could be said to obtain that possibility, the General As-
sembly's powers of appreciation being restricted to the making of recommendations Questions of 
review of Security Council resolutions by the Court stand postponed, however, to chapter six 
The statement that the determination of threats to the peace by the Security Council involves no 
legal pronouncements is unfounded The Court had stated as early as 1948, in its Admission Opinion, 
that51 
"The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provi-
sions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for 
its judgment " 
The Admission Opinion of course concerned the interpretation of the word "peace-loving" in article 
4, paragraph 1, of the Charter It cannot be gainsaid, however, that the phrase "threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression", featuring in article 39, does provide limitations on the Se-
curity Council's powers and criteria for its judgment Because the power of the Council to resort to 
measures under article 41, or action under article 42, is grafted upon a determination under article 39 
to the effect that, as a minimum, a threat to the peace exists And in its Expenses Opinion the Court 
had ample opportunity to note s 
"It has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with political questions, 
and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion It is true that most inter-
pretations of the Charter of the United Nations will have political significance, great or small 
In the nature of things it could not be otherwise The Court, however, cannot attribute a po-
litical character to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, 
the interpretation of a treaty provision " 
This observation of the Court was made in the context of a request for an advisory opinion, and one 
may wonder whether the same could be held to apply in regard to its contentious jurisdiction The 
Nicaragua Case shows some insight in this issue In that case the United States had argued, in an at-
tempt to show that Nicaragua's claims were inadmissible, that ** 
"( ) a claim of unlawful use of armed force is a matter committed by the United Nations 
Charter and by practice to the exclusive competence of other organs, in particular the Secu-
rity Council," 
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The Court noted on the basis of this argument that the United States had not advanced the more 
radical stance that the dispute was not legal in character, and that the United States itself had em-
phasized that the argument did not mean that international law was not relevant" 
Furthermore, the Court, in order to decide on the legitimacy of the exercise of a right of self-defence 
by the United States, proceeded in that same judgment with the interpretation of the decisive condi-
tion of armed attack.56 Admittedly that interpretation was not made in relation to article 51 of the 
Charter, since the Court had somewhat earlier decided that it had to apply the multilateral treaty res-
ervation and hence could only apply customary international law.57 However, in interpreting the 
condition of armed attack the Court drew upon both the Charter and General Assembly Resolution 
3314 which defined aggression. If the phrase "armed attack" is subject to legal interpretation, then 
why not also the phrase "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression"? 
In this respect the phrases "breach of the peace" and "act of aggression" clearly refer to situations 
in which force is actually being used.58 The phrase '4hreat to the peace" moreover implies the idea 
that a situation exists that may lead to a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. This can be de-
duced from the prime purpose of the United Nations, laid down in article 1, paragraph 1, of the 
Charter, which is: 
"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;" 
Of course the Charter does not contain any definition of the phrases of article 39,59 and this must 
mean that the Security Council enjoys a very wide margin of appreciation as to the exercise of its 
power under article 39. Yet even the Security Council may venture outside such margin, and thus 
determine the existence of a threat to the peace where there actually is none. 
In sum, the Security Council is limited in determining a threat to the peace by the consideration 
that a situation lying at the basis of such a threat could, at least arguably, lead to a breach of the 
peace.60 There does not seem to be any compelling reason for considering the question which situa-
tions or acts would come under the heading of a threat to the peace to be a political rather than a le-
gal one. These arguments are complemented by another one concerning article 94, paragraph 2, of 
the Charter. 
Article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter states that members of the United Nations undertake to 
comply with decisions of the Court to which they are a party. Paragraph 2 then stipulates: 
"If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment 
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, 
if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgment." 
The measures referred to are generally considered to encompass measures similar to those of article 
41, or even those of article 42. Now assuming for the sake of argument that the Security Council is 
completely free to determine that a situation constitutes a threat to the peace, irrespective of whether 
that situation would involve a breach of obligation by a member, then one would wonder why article 
94, paragraph 2, had been inserted at all. For that provision would be completely superfluous, and 
certainly there would be no need to envisage the possibility of resorting to sanctions in case of failure 
to abide by a judgment of the Court. Applying the well known interpretation rule that an interpreta-
tion of a provision ought not to lead to the result of making it devoid of effect, one should also reject 
92 CHAPTER 2 
the idea that failure to abide by the obligations under a judgment of the Court should ipso jure be 
considered a threat to the peace6I 
Furthermore, it is possible, on the basis of an α contrario argument, to assert that if the Security 
Council has the power to enforce the breach of obligations m the specific case of failure to abide by a 
judgment of the Court, then it should be denied that power with regard to the enforcement of the 
breach of obligations generally a Contrary to what has been claimed before the Senate of the United 
States, the provision of article 94, paragraph 2, indeed envisages that the Security Council will func­
tion as sort of a sheriff, and will enforce the judgment of the Court ° A difference with the position 
under certain national legal systems is that the Security Council is not under any obligation to en­
force obligations contained in the judgment of the Court, since the Security Council will do so only 
"if it deems necessary" and can also not be ordered to do so But the fact that the Security Council's 
power to decide on measures to ensure the fulfilment of the Court's judgment is discretionary in na­
ture cannot be seen to justify the stance that the Security Council could also resort to measures to 
enforce obligations in general Indeed the Security Council's power under article 94, paragraph 2, to 
react to the failure by one party to fulfil its obligations under the judgment is dependent on the other 
party deciding to have recourse to the Security Council In the absence of a request by the other 
party the Security Council could not resort to the recommendations or measures envisaged m article 
94, paragraph 2 ** 
On the basis of the above interpretations it is safe to say that the United Nations is not in posses­
sion of a general interest with regard to the performance of obligations by its members A fortiori 
that will mean that it also possesses no general interest in the performance of obligations by non-
members To the extent that the Security Council may, under article 39, concern itself with the non­
performance of obligations, this finds a limit in that a breach of obligation could only be considered a 
threat to the peace, as a minimum, if it could lead to a breach of the peace 
2 4 2 The United Nations and the common interest in the performance of obligations under rules of 
international law 
In chapter one the question was discussed whether or not States could be considered to be m pos­
session of a legal interest with regard to the performance of obligations under a certain rule on the 
basis of the mere fact that they are bound by that rule The same question may be asked in regard to 
the United Nations And it would seem, as was the case in chapter one, that the answer has to be in 
the negative 
If we take as a starting-point the observation made above that the United Nations cannot do 
collectively what a State taken by itself is not allowed to do individually,65 the conclusion imposes 
itself that the United Nations is also bound by the rules of universal customary international law 
Nevertheless, this does not lead us to the further conclusion that it can also demand the performance 
of obligations by members whenever those obligations are breached First of all it has to be 
remembered that in view of the correlation between obligations and rights there is always another 
State which is in possession of a legal interest The fact that the United Nations is considered also to 
be bound by the rule under which allegedly an obligation has been breached does not suffice to 
provide the United Nations with a legal interest regarding such alleged breach If for instance an 
exclusively bilateral relationship is established in consequence of the breach of an obligation under 
the rules laying down the correlative right (article 5, Part Two, of the ILC-draft), other States also 
bound by the rule in question would not have any right to involve themselves in that relationship 
The fact that the United Nations should be considered bound by the rule in question, based on the 
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assumption that it is universal in character, therefore has no relevance. If the other States bound by 
the rule may not, individually, interfere with the relationship between the author State and the injured 
State, then the collective membership of the United Nations may likewise not interfere This 
conclusion may of course also be based on the well known principle that one cannot transfer more 
rights to another than one oneself possesses. 
In this context one may note that Meng mentions the situation in which a breach of obligation would 
be directed against one of the members of the EEC, that is, not against all of them, and then gives the 
example of an expropriation of German corporations by a commercial partner of the EEC He quite 
correctly acknowledges that only the Federal Republic of Germany would be entitled to resort to re-
prisals against the State in breach of its obligations under the rules regarding the protection of aliens 
But he proceeds with the surprising observation that ** 
"( ) nach der im Volkerrecht für internationale Organisationen geltenden konstitutiven An-
erkennungstheorie nur solche Staaten Rechte gegen die Gemeinschaft erwerben können - die 
dann im Repressalienfall wieder entzogen werden können - , welche die Gemeinschaft als 
Volkerrechtsubjekt anerkannt haben. Mit dieser Anerkennung wird aber auch der Integra-
tionsstand und auch der Bestand an übergangenen Gemeinschaftskompetenzen anerkannt 
Wer also die Rechte eines Mitgliedstaat verletzt, muD mit dem Kompetenzubergang und 
damit rechnen, daß die Gemeinschaft mit Sanktionen antwortet Durch die Anerkennung dur-
fte die kollektive Antwort rechtmäßig werden " 
Now that is a big step Imagine that one member of the EEC has under international law the right to 
resort to reprisals consequent upon the breach of an obligation Because it has, under the EEC-treaty 
no longer any competence to resort to certain specific measures of reprisal, since that competence 
has passed on to the EEC, the EEC itself becomes the bearer of the right of reprisal. If States outside 
the EEC had realized that by entering into relations with the EEC they would run the risk of having to 
face economic sanctions by the EEC every time they were in breach of an obligation that has nothing 
to do with the EEC, they undoubtedly would have thought twice before entering in such relations 
The application of some sort of constitutive recognition theory appears not to overcome the rule that 
a State cannot transfer more rights than it possesses 
One may legitimately wonder whether (and the question logically flows from the argument that the 
United Nations cannot engage in conduct which States individually cannot engage in) the United 
Nations is entitled to act where States are individually, or in concert, entitled to act If one looks at 
the rules laying down the correlative rights for States, it becomes clear that in a number of cases le-
gal interests will accrue to each and every State in the international community Does this then mean 
that the United Nations is in possession of a legal interest, since each and every one of its members is 
in possession of a legal interest with regard to a certain breach of obligation7 The above mentioned 
principle, that one cannot transfer more rights than one possesses, does not stand in the way of con-
sidering the United Nations in possession of a legal interest if that is held in common among its 
members Yet something more is needed, or so it would seem, than the mere fact that all members 
are individually in possession of a legal interest A transfer of legal interest from the members to the 
United Nations would appear to be required That transfer cannot be said to be present on the basis 
of the mere fact that all the Members of the United Nations should be considered bound by a certain 
rule of international law, and may, in case of a specific breach of obligation under the rule, exercise 
their right to demand the performance of that obligation. If one were to hold that the existence of 
rights for the entire membership of an organization would lead to an independent legal interest on the 
part of the organization itself, that would mean that organizations which had no interest (in the sub-
jective sense) in the particular rule would be entitled to demand the performance of obligations under 
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the rule. An organization established for the promotion of the economic welfare of its members 
would thus be able to demand the performance of its members' obligations under, for instance, a 
treaty providing for the protection of human rights. Clearly that would be a rather unsatisfactory 
state of affairs, and the fact that all the members of a certain organization, or the United Nations, are 
in possession of a legal interest with regard to a certain breach of obligation cannot be considered 
sufficient ground to conclude upon the existence of an additional and separate legal interest of the 
organization, or the United Nations, itself. Limitations of a functional nature, flowing from the con-
stitutional instrument, apply to all international organizations, even to the United Nations. 
2 4.3. Performance of obligations towards the United Nations 
In chapter one, subsection 1 5.3, was discussed whether the criterion to determine the legal interests 
of States should lie with the performance of obligations towards specific States In that context an 
argument by Sachariew was discussed to the effect that prohibitive rules would give rise to concrete 
rights and obligations even before any breach would take place That stance was rejected by refer-
ence to the example of the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force against other States For if a 
State performs its obligations in this respect, and abstains from the threat or use of force, it cannot be 
said that the State in possession of a correlative right to demand performance could be identified 
before an actual or imminent breach took place. The question in this subsection is whether one could 
consider that obligations imposed on States are performed ipso jure towards the United Nations irre-
spective of the circumstances surrounding any actual or imminent breach 
Although universal rules of customary law should be considered binding on the United Nations, 
that does not mean that the obligations imposed on States by the rule are ipso jure also performed 
towards the United Nations as such. Rules of customary international law, for instance, have, to a 
considerable degree, been created without the participation of the United Nations They are created 
through means of a process of crystallization of State practice and the conviction of the States par-
ticipating in the practice that the said practice is binding upon them as a matter of law. Obligations 
under those rules are generally performed by States in their relations with other States, and a breach 
of obligations could not therefore be considered a breach towards the United Nations Furthermore, 
if a State acquires a legal interest in consequence of the breach of an obligation by another State, 
there does not appear to be any reason why it should be possible for the United Nations to interfere 
with the relationship of responsibility established between the author State and the injured State. 
An independent legal interest for the United Nations, moreover, could not be based on the argu-
ment that the obligation concerned was performed or breached towards the collectivity of States, and 
therefore also performed or breached towards the United Nations Applying the fiction involved, to 
the effect that obligations were being performed not only towards States but also towards the United 
Nations, would appear to be stretching reality a little bit too far Even though it is possible to envis-
age the realization of the collective (or even common) interest by means of organizational action in-
tended to supplement or provide a substitute for State action, an independent legal interest for an 
organization cannot be said to accrue to it from the mere fact that an obligation is breached towards 
its members In that sense the above mentioned argument on functional restrictions applies equally to 
the criterion under discussion 
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2.4.4. The effects of an internationally wrongful act as criterion to determine the existence of a legal 
interest of the United Nations 
The conclusion of the previous subsection would not hold, of course, if the United Nations could 
point to an interest of its own regarding the performance of the obligations concerned. Obligations 
and rights have to be performed and exercised in concrete circumstances, and it is only when certain 
circumstances occur that rules can be invoked or applied. If the United Nations were to engage in 
certain activities which, when carried out by individual States, would trigger the applicability of the 
rules in question, then obligations normally performed by States in relation to other States must also 
be performed by them in their relations with the United Nations. Of course the Court expressly de-
nied, in its Reparation Opinion, that it analogously applied rules regarding the diplomatic protection 
of aliens to agents of the United Nations.67 It based the United Nations' capacity to make claims for 
reparation on the basis that an obligation had been breached towards the United Nations. While not 
in itself implausible, the argument fails due to the fact, as argued above, that the Court did not estab-
lish the existence of any obligation of non-members to treat agents of the United Nations in a certain 
way. Such an obligation appears to exist only insofar as it is possible to apply in an analogous man-
ner the rules regarding the treatment of aliens. It is therefore submitted that analogous application of 
rules to the relations between the United Nations and States is not only feasible, but in certain cases 
even required. 
That rules may at times be analogously applied to the relations between the United Nations and 
States does not lead to the conclusion that the prejudice done to the United Nations in consequence 
of breaches of obligations by States, whether or not members, will constitute the only basis or crite-
rion for considering the United Nations in possession of a legal interest. Indeed a number of provi-
sions in the Charter bears witness to the existence of a legal interest on the part of the United 
Nations, irrespective of any injury having been suffered by the United Nations. It will furthermore be 
found that the existence of a legal interest on the part of the United Nations is not even restricted to 
breaches of obligations by members, and that on some occasions it extends beyond the individual 
and/or common legal interests possessed by States themselves. 
2.5. Legal bases of the United Nations' legal interest 
2.5.1. The United Nations' legal interest regarding breaches of obligation under the Charter 
As noted above, in subsection 2.4.1, there is an unbreakable link in the chain obligation - breach of 
that obligation - obligation to repair the breach (right to reparation) - and the right to resort to 
sanctions. As also noted there, this means that a legal interest exists for the United Nations in those 
cases where it may resort to sanctions. That this is so follows most clearly from the provision of ar-
ticle 6 which authorizes the United Nations to expel a member which has consistently violated the 
Principles of the United Nations. The most important of those principles are of course paragraphs 3 
and 4 of article 2, which prescribe that members shall settle their disputes peacefully and that they 
shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
The provision regarding suspension, article 5, makes a cross-reference in that it allows suspension of 
members against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council. 
Thus suspension of a member can only take place if the Security Council has determined a threat to 
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the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and has singled out a particular member against 
which measures are taken under articles 41 or 42. The legal interest of the United Nations is most 
clearly present with regard to situations constituting a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression. 
In subsection 2 4.1 it was argued that that there is, or should, always be a breach of obligation at 
the basis of the Security Council's resort to the measures of articles 41 or 42. The question arises 
whether any breach of obligation would suffice to establish the Security Council's competence under 
chapter VII. It has already been asserted (subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) that the United Nations is not 
in possession of a general or common interest regarding breaches of obligations. Determinations of a 
breach of the peace or act of aggression by the Security Council under article 39 should be seen in 
relation to the obligations of members to settle their disputes peacefully, and to refrain from the 
threat or use of force, as laid down in article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter. Obviously any 
use of military force across international frontiers, or against the armed forces of another State, will 
be considered not merely a threat to the peace, but a breach of the peace or even an act of aggres-
sion. 
Nobody will deny, more generally speaking, that the United Nations is allowed to discuss viola-
tions of the Charter.6" Article 10 grants the General Assembly the power to discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the Charter. Article 14 more specifically mentions that the General 
Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation which it deems 
likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting 
from the violation of the provisions of the Charter setting forth the Purposes and the Principles of the 
United Nations. It is clear from the broad scope of the provisions laying down the purposes and 
principles (articles 1 and 2) that any subject contained in the Charter may thus be discussed Article 
11, paragraph 2, furthermore envisages the General Assembly discussing questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and making recommendations to the State(s) con-
cerned or to the Security Council69 
The provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter on the other hand bear witness to the competence of the 
Security Council with regard to disputes that could endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and it would certainly not be farfetched to consider certain violations of the Charter 
giving rise to such disputes. Article 34 stipulates that the Security Council may investigate any dis-
pute in order to determine whether or not it is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security. It is worth mentioning moreover that apart from the provisions dealing with pro-
cedures or methods of peaceful settlement (articles 33, 36 and 38) article 37 offers the possibility to 
the Security Council of recommending "such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate"70 
2 5 2. The United Nations' legal interest regarding breaches of obligation under treaties 
between the United Nations and States 
In the Reparation Opinion the Court not only declared the United Nations to be in possession of in-
ternational legal personality, but it also pointed to the treaty making capacity of the United Nations 
as evidence of such personality.71 Indeed the Court observed that.72 
"The 'Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations' creates rights and 
duties between each of the signatories and the Organization." 
It is clear that if and when a signatory of that treaty were to deny agents privileges and immunities 
due to them because of that treaty, the United Nations would be the only party entitled under the 
treaty to demand the performance of the obligations imposed, and compensation in case cessation or 
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restitution would no longer be possible. Obviously it would be possible for States (whether parties to 
the treaty or third States) to make complaints regarding the treatment of agents of the United Na-
tions possessing their nationality. The basis of such complaints would not however be a breach of 
obligation under such treaty, but a breach of obligation regarding the treatment due to aliens. That 
such concurrence of legal interests may take place follows from the Reparation Opinion, in which the 
Court also decided that there is no rule assigning priority to either the rights of the United Nations, 
or to the rights of the national State.74 
That such a legal interest exists for the United Nations with regard to breaches of obligations un-
der any treaty to which it is a party may also be seen from the Headquarters Agreement Opinion.75 In 
that opinion the Court determined that the United States was under an obligation to arbitrate a dis-
pute which existed between itself and the United Nations. The United Nations had initiated the arbi-
tration procedure on the basis that there existed a dispute regarding the interpretation or application 
of the Headquarters Agreement. The United States agreed with the interpretation advanced by the 
United Nations, and denied that it had, as yet, breached its obligations under the agreement. The 
Court noted that a concurrence on the view that there existed a breach of obligation, or that certain 
conduct to be adopted would constitute a breach of obligation, did not mean that no dispute regard-
ing the interpretation or application of the agreement existed.76 It has to be admitted of course that 
the Court was not concerned here to determine whether or not the United States had breached its 
obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, but that the question was whether the United Na-
tions had sufficient grounds to insist that the United States was under the obligation to participate in 
the arbitration process. Naturally the Court could not have endorsed the United Nations' stance that 
there existed a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agreement if 
the United Nations could not establish any legal interest regarding breaches of obligation thereunder. 
The situation described above is typical in the sense that both treaties referred to in this subsection 
concern bipolar treaties, meaning that the rights and obligations contained in such treaties operate 
between United Nations, as one party, and a number of States, as other parties. Or to put it differ-
ently the rights and obligations contained in the treaty do not operate between the States parties, but 
between the United Nations and States parties. The case would of course be different if the United 
Nations would become a party to a certain treaty on an equal basis with States. In such a case, or so 
one could assert, the question of a legal interest for the United Nations, upon consequent breaches of 
obligations under such a treaty, would have to be decided analogously to the rules applicable to 
States (infra chapter one). 
2.5.3. The United Nations' legal interest regarding breaches of obligation under treaties 
sponsored by the United Nations 
One may note that the Charter envisages in article 13, paragraph 1 (a), that the General Assembly 
will promote the progressive development and codification of international law. It is well known of 
course that the General Assembly instituted the International Law Commission in furtherance of the 
function ascribed to it,77 and that it has since, sometimes on the basis of texts prepared by the Com-
mission, convened international conferences in pursuit of the conclusion of highly important treaties. 
The question rises what role, if any, the United Nations can play with regard to the treaties con-
cluded upon its initiative and under its organization. And more particularly, can the United Nations 
claim a legal interest with regard to States breaching their obligations under such treaties? 
A first remark regarding the question at hand concerns the observation that the function assigned 
to the General Assembly under article 13 of the Charter does not modify, nor takes away, and nor 
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takes the place of, the treaty making capacity of United Nations members. They clearly remain free 
to conclude treaties as they see fit (leaving aside any question of jus cogens), and they are under no 
obligation to involve the General Assembly in the preparation of any treaty that they would wish to 
come to life The argument could be made that in situations where States accept the role of the 
United Nations in preparing such treaties they can no longer be heard to deny the existence of a legal 
interest on the part of the United Nations in case of breaches of obligations under those treaties ™ 
It must be asserted nevertheless that the United Nations is in need of a provision enabling it to 
exercise functions in respect of such treaties One of the few discussing this issue in terms of legal 
interest, Morgenstern, appears to envisage a legal interest for international organizations only to the 
extent that those are involved in the supervision or enforcement procedures established in such a 
treaty She seems to deny international organizations any legal interest regarding breaches of 
obligation under the treaty if the body destined to discuss implementation reports is composed of 
nationals elected by the States parties7 9 That argument is bolstered moreover by another one 
concerning article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States 
and International Organizations or between International Organizations 8 0 That provision stipulates 
that a provision of a treaty does not give rise to rights for third organizations (meaning an 
organization that is not a party to the treaty in question, article 2 (h)) This rule, applied 
analogously,81 would prevent any right arising for the United Nations unless an express provision of 
the treaty were so to stipulate 
Another argument in support of this stance may be derived from the Court's opinion on the 
Genocide Convention, in which it observed ю 
"( ) there can be no doubt that the precise determination of the conditions for participation 
in the Convention constitutes a permanent interest of direct concern to the United Nations 
which has not disappeared with the entry into force of the Convention " 
This position was taken up by the Court in response to an objection made to the effect that the As­
sembly's request for an opinion constituted an inadmissible interference in the interpretation of the 
convention To counter that claim the Court pointed out that it had been the Assembly which took 
the initiative in respect of the Genocide Convention, drew up the provisions, and opened it for signa­
ture and accession ю In one breath the Court also mentioned the two articles which connected the 
General Assembly with the life of the Genocide Convention M But the provisions in question, articles 
XI and XVI, merely deal with the role of the General Assembly regarding signatures and revision re­
quests It is quite noteworthy that the Court did not refer to article VIII which envisages States par­
ties having recourse to the competent organs of the United Nations Such a provision could of 
course be considered to be connected to questions of supervision or implementation Yet the Court 
apparently saw no need, in the context of a request for an opinion regarding reservations, to make a 
reference to article VIII Indeed, the text of article VIII itself militates against the existence of an in­
dependent legal interest of the United Nations 8 S It stipulates that the States parties may call upon the 
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charier as they consider ap­
propriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide This would seem to indicate that 
the competent organs do not act on their own accord under the Genocide Convention ** For any ac­
tion appropriate for the prevention or suppression of acts of genocide must be taken on the basis of 
the Charter, not on the basis of the Genocide Convention 
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2 5 4 The United Nations' legal interests regarding breaches of obligation 
under treaties extraneous to the Charter and United Nations activities 
A fortiori, of course, it would seem that the United Nations also cannot claim any legal interest with 
regard to breaches of obligations under treaties to which it is not a party, with regard to which it has 
not participated in the preparation, and with regard to which it has not been accorded any supervi­
sory functions ет On this account it has quite correctly been claimed by Sur ю 
"De facon plus générale, le Conseil de sécurité serait sans doute dans une position juridique-
ment délicate pour constater la violation de traités auxquels il n'est pas partie, ni 
l'Organisation dont il est une organe, et qui sont conclus en dehors du cadre de Г ONU Con­
stater une telle violation relève de la compétence exclusive des parties, et la constatation est 
subordonnée aux procédures acceptées par elles Le Conseil n'a pas de compétence à cette 
fin Lorsqu'il est habilité à intervenir dans le cadre d'un traité, celui-ci doit le prévoir expres-
sément, et cette compétence doit en outre être compatible avec la Charte C'est ainsi que, aux 
termes de l'article 94 de la Charte, le Conseil est autorisé à intervenir pour assurer le respect 
des arrêts de la Cour internationale, à la demande d'une partie au litige, et à réagir le cas 
échéant contre les violations du Statut de la Cour Mais la Charte ne lui attribue pas une com-
pétence générale à l'égard de l'ensemble des traités, même lorsqu'ils sont relatifs à la paix et à 
la sécurité internationale En pareil cas, il ne peut que se fonder sur ses propres compétences, 
établir directement les obligations des membres et les mesures d'exécution qu'elles appellent, 
sans s'appuyer sur aucun traité particulier " 
The key words in this context are "qui sont conclus en dehors du cadre de Г ONU" Sur nowhere 
explains what should be understood by these words, but one may guess that treaties drawn up by the 
General Assembly would qualify as treaties concluded in the United Nations sphere It is not clear 
whether he would consider the Security Council competent to determine a breach of obligations un­
der such treaties But certainly his conclusions with regard to treaties otherwise unrelated to the 
United Nations are correct 
2 5 5 The United Nations' legal interests regarding breaches of obligation 
under customary international law 
As has been argued above the United Nations is bound by universal rules of customary international 
law,89 and thus may either derive rights from those rules, or may be placed under obligations through 
those rules It may furthermore be asserted that the rules of customary international law regarding 
international responsibility are also applicable to international organizations90 It follows that the 
United Nations may incur international responsibility for acts attributable to it, if and when those acts 
are inconsistent with its international obligations Additionally that means that the United Nations 
can invoke the international responsibility of other subjects of international law whenever it is af­
fected by such other subjects' breaches of obligations 
This possibility of the United Nations acquiring the right to invoke responsibility for breaches of 
obligation is not restricted to invoking the responsibility of its own members, but also extends to 
non-member States and to other international organizations This latter option, invoking the respon­
sibility of other international organizations, may be thought to be quite logical in view of the possi­
bility of the conclusion of treaties between international organizations If such a treaty is concluded 
and only organizations may become parties to it, then only organizations that have become a party to 
it may acquire the right to demand performance of the obligations contained in the treaty In such a 
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case the decision to exercise the organization's rights under the treaty will of course be subjected to 
the constituent instrument's procedures 
The first possibility, invoking the responsibility of non-member States, may be thought to have been 
conspicuously approved by the Court in its Reparation Opinion What is most important about that 
opinion is the fact that the Court envisaged a right to demand the performance of obligation of non-
member States, thus implying that the United Nations could acquire rights, and eventually exercise 
them, under rules of customary international law Of course the Court did not indicate any basis of 
obligation for the non-member State in question, and expressly denied any analogy to rules of cus-
tomary international law regarding the treatment of aliens But the fact is that the basis of obligation 
for non-member States could not be found in any treaty, which only left a basis of obligation under 
rules of customary international law 
As to the exact limits of the possibility of the United Nations to invoke rights under rules of cus-
tomary international law, it may first of all be pointed out that the United Nations is not in possession 
of a general or common interest regarding the performance of obligations by its members or by non-
members It would seem to follow that the United Nations could only claim a legal interest if it, as an 
organization, was (or would be) affected by a particular breach of obligation The United Nations 
being affected by a particular breach of obligation could only happen in a situation in which the 
United Nations in fact engaged in activities covered by the subject-matter of the particular rule laying 
down the obligation As examples of rules being applicable to the United Nations, and which conse-
quently could give rise to rights for the United Nations, one could mention the customary rules of 
humanitarian law But that is not where it ends One could, for instance, envisage the United Nations 
owning boats or ships, and registering them at the United Nations Headquarters In such a case the 
United Nations could provide diplomatic protection to ships under its flag in instances where those 
ships engage in activities on the high seas on an equal footing with States In all such situations the 
rules laying down the correlative rights of States, discussed in chapter one, ought to be applied 
analogously to the United Nations 
2.6. The United Nations, obligations erga omîtes and the distinction between international 
delicts and international crimes 
In the introduction to this chapter the present writer has indicated the belief that if obligations erga 
omnes are to be considered obligations towards the international community, then obligations to-
wards the community ought not only be seen in terms of obligations towards States, but in terms of 
obligations towards an international organization, that is, towards the United Nations 91 Before that 
it had been found, in chapter one, that the serious breach of obligations laid down by peremptory 
norms may entail the label of international crime, which, according to article 5, paragraph 3, Part 
Two, of the ILC-draft, entails injured State status for all States9 ì In that line of thought it would 
follow that a legal interest pursuant to the commission of an international crime would not only ac-
crue to all States, but also to the United Nations It has been claimed in the past that the United Na-
tions has jurisdiction over international crimes,93 and more particularly thatM 
"Under article 19 ( ) an international crime would involve the breach of an obligation to-
wards the international community as represented by the United Nations " 
Thus an obligation erga omnes, which in the words of the Court entails a legal interest for all States, 
would also entail a legal interest for the United Nations However, that conclusion is not as clear-cut 
as could be thought Now Riphagen quite correctly observes "* 
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"Article 19 of part 1 of the draft also seems to presume that an international crime, in the 
sense of para 2 ofthat article, may not be at the same time 'a serious breach of an interna­
tional obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and secu­
rity' in the sense of para. 3, under (a) " 
He then gives a follow-up to this remark by stating his inclination to a positive answer to the ques­
tion whether or not the international community as a whole, by recognizing certain conduct as a 
crime, should be considered to have declared applicable the procedures contained in the Charter for 
collective decision making "* Since the possibility for collective decision making in the Charter is, 
generally speaking, the competence of the Security Council (article 25), one may assume that Ripha-
gen's stance boils down to the, in his report unsubstantiated, assertion that each and any international 
crime amounts, at the very least, to a threat to the peace That assertion warrants, indeed requires, 
further scrutinization 
First of all it may be said that the competence of the Security Council in the field of peace and secu­
rity is not determined by customary international law, nor generally by conventional sources, but by 
the Charter Thus Riphagen's remark that, unless a contrary intention is clearly established, the in­
ternational community in recognizing particular conduct as a crime should be considered to have de­
clared applicable Security Council procedures, fails to convince " In analogy to existing rules 
regarding the creation of rights for third States or international organizations (articles 36 of the Vi­
enna Conventions) it would seem rather that parties to a particular treaty (in this case a future con­
vention on State responsibility) should express their intention to establish Security Council 
competence regarding international crimes ** Given the absence of a convention on State responsi­
bility at present, the applicability of Security Council procedures regarding threats to the peace to 
international crimes could only be based on customary international law It would seem to be re­
quired therefore to establish the existence of a general practice, accepted as law, to the effect that 
certain breaches of obligations by States which, in abstracto, are recognized as international crimes 
will generally be considered threats to the peace by the Security Council 
In subsections 2 4 1 and 2 4 2 the conclusion was reached that the United Nations in general, and 
the Security Council in particular, could not be considered to be in possession of a general or com­
mon interest in the performance of obligations by members or non-members This means that the 
United Nations cannot claim to possess a legal interest regarding just any breach of obligation by its 
members The more specific question needs to be raised if a serious breach of an obligation essential 
for the protection of the fundamental interests of the international community gives rise to an inde­
pendent legal interest on the part of the United Nations The connected question to be answered also 
is whether a committed international crime vests, ipso facto, the competence of the Security Council 
under article 39 of the Charter The Security Council may, for one reason or another, refrain from 
adopting any decision under Chapter П In the second place will be discussed therefore which ef­
fects accrue to recommendations adopted by either the General Assembly or the Security Council 
2 6 1 The United Nations' legal interest consequent upon the Commission of an international crime 
and the competence of the Security Council under article 39 of the Charter 
The United Nations ' legal interest regarding the maintenance of international peace and security 
and the competence of the Security Council under article 39 of the Charter 
That the General Assembly may act in relation to situations in which States threaten or use force may 
be seen from the texts of articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter Thus it may discuss and make rec­
ommendations regarding any matter within the scope of the Charter and regarding questions related 
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to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by States or the Security 
Council, and it may recommend the adjustment of situations resulting from violations of articles 1 
and 2 of the Charter. It has, furthermore, considered itself competent, by way of resolution 377 (V), 
to recommend measures, including the use of armed force, in relation to situations constituting 
breaches of the peace or acts of aggression if the Security Council, due to the lack of unanimity 
among permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility.99 The Security Council has 
accepted such competence, since in accordance with the terms of article 12, paragraph 1, of the 
Charter, it has called for emergency sessions of the Assembly, as provided in resolution 377, in order 
to make the appropriate recommendations.10* 
There can be no doubt as to the competence of the Security Council in the field of maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Charter is first of all focused on the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes between States, and secondly, should peaceful settlement have failed, on the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security. In order to achieve the latter the Security Council has 
been endowed with the competence, under article 39 of the Charter, to determine the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.101 Should such threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression not be brought to an end through the voluntary action of 
those capable of doing so, the Security Council has been given the power to call upon its members to 
apply the measures of article 41,102 to take military action under article 42,103 or as has been the case 
lately to authorize the use of armed force.104 In addition it may be noted that decisions of the Secu-
rity Council under articles 39, 41 and 42 (insofar as the Security Council has at its disposal the mili-
tary means to resort to action under article 42) are binding on members, since they have agreed, 
under article 25, to accept them and carry them out. 
Taking a look now at article 19, paragraph 3 (a) of the ILC-draft, it is to be noted that an interna-
tional crime may result from a serious breach of an obligation essential to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression. Comparing that provision with the 
competence of the Security Council under article 39, one cannot but acknowledge that the compe-
tence of the Security Council is not restricted to serious threats to the peace, serious breaches of the 
peace, or serious acts of aggression. On the assumption that a serious breach of an obligation essen-
tial for the maintenance of international peace and security means a breach of obligation under article 
2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter, one could assert that there is not even a perfect correlation 
between threats of States to use force and threats to the peace. Apparently there may be threats to 
the peace without there even being a State using, or threatening to use, force against another State. 
The reference to the rule prohibiting aggression should furthermore not be understood to be a refer-
ence to "aggression" in a general sense, as in the General Assembly resolution on the Definition of 
Aggression, but to the idea of aggression as an international crime, e.g. aggression as an armed at-
tack. Indeed the Commission observed in relation to the criterion of seriousness that article 39 of the 
Charter differentiates between threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.105 
The Court, in the Nicaragua Case, furthermore distinguished:106 "(...) the most grave forms of the 
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms." Certainly minor 
breaches, such as clashes along the borders, cannot be considered to constitute the crime of aggres-
sion. It may be recalled that intent and premeditation should be considered a constituent element of 
any international crime (chapter one, subsection 1.9.2). 
In view of the above arguments it is clear that the competence of the Security Council is beyond 
doubt with regard to international crimes involving the use of force, and that it is not limited to 
armed attacks as the most serious breaches possible under article 2, paragraphs 3. or 4. 
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The United Nations ' legal interest regarding the safeguarding of the right of self-determination of 
peoples and the competence of the Security Council under article 39 of the Charter 
The principle of self-determination of peoples does have a place within the Charter Thus article 1, 
paragraph 2, of the Charter states one of the purposes of the Charter to be the development of 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples 
This phrase then reappears in article 55 of the Charter, with regard to which article 56 provides that 
Members pledge to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United Nations for the 
achievement of the purposes of article 55 Though these two provisions would not seem to lay down 
any specific competence of the United Nations to concern itself with issues of self-determination, 
chapters XI and XII of the Charter clearly envisage a substantial role of the United Nations in regard 
to the principle involved 
Article 76 (b) provides that one of the objectives of the Trusteeship System is to promote self-
government or independence for territories placed under trust The move towards the progressive 
development of self-government or independence is to be attained in accordance with the freely ex­
pressed wishes of the peoples concerned 
Chapter XI of the Charter, headed "Declaration regarding Non-Self-Goveming Territories", provides 
in article 75 that Members which are responsible for such a territory shall promote the well-being of 
the inhabitants, and that to that end they are to develop self-government and to assist them in the 
progressive development of their free political institutions While not making any express reference 
to the "freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned", one may assume that the provision, by 
mentioning free political institutions, intended the territories concerned to also attain, possibly, inde­
pendence 
The General Assembly eventually adopted resolution 1514 (XV) in which it declared that1 0 7 "All 
peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue ofthat nght they freely determine their politi­
cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development " It continued by declar­
ing that immediate steps were to be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples living in Trust 
Territories and Non-Self-Govermng Territories As a follow-up the 1966 Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, drawn up by the Assembly, both cop­
ied the formulation of resolution 1514 (XV) m their common article 1 1ββ 
The Security Council has concerned itself with issues of self-determination when discussing cer­
tain situations or disputes In this context it has made references to self-determination in a number of 
resolutions,109 and to elections and the like m others In some cases it has determined a threat to the 
peace under article 39 of the Charter Ι 1 β 
As to these resolutions it may be noted that m five cases the Security Council resorted to the indica­
tion of measures under article 41 of the Charter,"1 and in five others it called upon or authorized the 
use of armed force l 1 2 However, some of the resolutions related to tense relations between certain 
specific States One may note that the situation regarding Jammu and Cashmere relates to a dispute 
between India and Pakistan Whereas the situation regarding the Western Sahara concerned Spain, 
Morocco and Mauritania And the situation in Cyprus relates to the United Kingdom, Greece and 
Turkey In none of these situations did the Council decide on measures The situations m the Congo, 
the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Angola are all complicated by civil war and wide­
spread human suffering The cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Haiti would seem to be the only 
ones where the Council has acted upon some notion of self-determination The first two situations 
were accompanied by armed acts, the second moreover by institutionalized racial discrimination, 
whereas the latter involved a refugee flow to the United States thus causing tension The Security 
Council decided on a broad range of measures against Rhodesia, including a limited use of force, on 
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a broad arms embargo against South Africa, and a broad range of measures against Haiti followed by 
an authorization to use force. 
Though the Security Council has clearly felt itself empowered to discuss the situations concerned, 
one cannot escape the conclusion that a denial by one State of the right of self-determination of a 
people living in a territory under its administration will not inevitably result in the existence of a 
threat to the peace. The most that can be said is that the competence of the Security Council under 
article 39 will probably be established if the denial of self-determination coincides with actual fighting 
going on within the territory concerned or tense relations between specific States. 
The Commission may have realized as much, because it did not merely provide that a serious 
breach of an obligation essential for the safeguarding the right of self-determination constituted an 
international crime. On the contrary It added, in the sentence mentioning the examples, that the es-
tablishment or maintenance of colonial domination should be "by force". However, in its commen-
tary on article 19 the Commission explained:113 
"The expression 'by force' should be understood as meaning against the will of the subject 
population, even if that will is not manifested, or has not yet been manifested, by armed op-
position." 
By using the expression "by force", while in the commentary adding that this is to mean against the 
will of the population, the Commission somewhat creates confusion In the minds of most scholars 
the term "force" is nowadays closely identified to that contained in article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter In that provision it is generally interpreted as meaning armed or military force. When using 
the expression in article 19, paragraph 3 (b), of Part One of the draft, the Commission appears to 
suggest that for international crime to be present there must be a use of armed force against either 
the population or the liberation movement of the territory under control. Following up on this line of 
thought it may be said that such a use of force, while technically speaking not of international charac-
ter, could lead to the existence of a threat to the peace.114 It may be noted in this connection that the 
Security Council has, on occasion, called upon a certain State to cease colonial wars,115 and has rec-
ognized, in that context, the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples or liberation movements.116 In-
deed, the Security Council has gone even further than that, urging Members.117 
"( ) to render moral and material support to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their strug-
gle to achieve their freedom and independence." 
But although the Security Council has called upon States to implement the right of self-determination 
with regard to peoples under their domination, it has generally refrained from determining the exis-
tence of a threat to the peace followed by mandatory sanctions under article 41 of the Charter or the 
use of force (with the obvious exception of Rhodesia, the less obvious example of South Africa, and 
the clear case of Haiti). The call for material support to peoples struggling for independence cannot, 
as such, be interpreted as an absolute call for military support for liberation movements.118 
In the absence of any military confrontation between the colonizing State and a liberation move-
ment, or forceful repression of the population itself, or tense relations between certain interested 
States, the competence of the Security Council under article 39 will not ipso facto be established re-
garding the crime of denial of self-determination of peoples. 
The United Nations ' legal mierest regarding the safeguarding of the human being and the 
competence of the Security Council under article 39 of the Charter 
The expression "human rights", as is the case with the phrase "self-determination of peoples", is 
mentioned a number of times in the Charter. Thus the Preamble affirms "faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women (...)." Article 1, 
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paragraph 1, of the Charter, as one of the Purposes of the United Nations, then mentions the need to 
"achieve international co-operation (...) in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;" And in 
chapter IX the Charter provides in article 55, under (c), that the United Nations shall promote 
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without any 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Article 56 is again relevant, since it provides that 
all Members "pledge to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Responsibility for the discharge of the functions 
under chapter IX lies with the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, 
with the Economic and Social Council (article 60). And finally,119 article 62, paragraph 2, observes 
that the Economic and Social Council may make "recommendations for the purpose of promoting 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."120 
A milestone in the development of the field of human rights constituted the adoption, by the Gen-
eral Assembly, of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.121 Considering the legally non-
binding nature of recommendations, irrespective of the names given to them, of the General Assem-
bly, the logical follow-up was the preparation of a draft convention on human rights. That follow-up 
was realized in 1966, at which time the General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Apart from these general conventions on human rights the General Assembly has adopted a number 
of conventions related to the protection of specific groups of persons,112 or with regard to protection 
against violations of specific human rights.123 
Regarding the protection of human rights it may also be noted that the Economic and Social 
Council adopted resolution 1235, in 1967, which authorized the Human Rights Commission and its 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to "examine informa-
tion relevant to gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as exemplified by the 
policy oí apartheid as practised in the Republic of South Africa (...) and racial discrimination as 
practised notably in Southern Rhodesia, (...)." Later on it decided, in resolution 1503 of 1970, to 
authorize the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to insti-
tute a working group that was to examine communications, including replies by governments, that 
apparently revealed a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights. 
The Security Council has, in a number of resolutions, issued certain demands or calls regarding 
(violations of) human rights, and in that context has made references to instruments for the protec-
tion of human rights. In some of the relevant resolutions the Security Council has considered certain 
acts or situations capable of endangering the peace, disturbing the peace (etc.). In regard to a num-
ber of cases the Security Council has actually determined, under article 39 of the Charter, the exis-
tence of a threat to the peace, or referred to chapter VII.124 
First of all it may be noted, with regard to the resolutions determining the existence of a threat to the 
peace, that they were increasingly followed by measures under article 41, especially arms embargoes, 
and authorizations to use force. Taking a closer look at the situations underlying the particular reso-
lutions, one has to come to the conclusion that in most of them the human rights performance was 
not of primary concern to the Security Council. 
Thus the situation in Congo was marked by the occurrence of a civil war, interference by certain 
States, and the absence of rule of law, generally, in Congo.12* 
In regard to Rhodesia there can be no doubt that what was at stake was its people's right to self-
determination.126 Indeed the resolution in which the Security Council censured human rights 
violations in Rhodesia was not the first to determine a threat to the peace in that regard.127 It may 
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furthermore be observed that a denial of self-determination will almost inevitably lead to a situation 
in which the civil and political rights of individuals will be violated. 
The determination of a threat to the peace with regard to the situation prevailing in and around 
South Africa was focused on the military build-up by South Africa and its repeated acts of aggres-
sion against neighbouring States.128 Even if one were to consider the aggression aspects subordinate 
to the context of human rights violations,129 still it may be pointed out that these human rights viola-
tions could be considered incidental to South Africa's refusal to allow the South African people to 
decide freely its own future. Thus the issue would be reduced to one of self-determination (as is not 
too unlikely in the light some Security Council resolutions to that effect).130 
The situation regarding Iraq's repression of Kurds in the northern parts of its territory appears to 
present a more plausible example of the Security Council's involvement with human rights violations. 
Yet the way in which the issue was phrased in the preambular parts of resolution 688 may raise 
doubts as to such involvement: 
"Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, 
including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees 
towards and across international frontiers and to cross border incursions, which threaten in-
ternational peace and security in the region," 
And in the first paragraph the Security Council condemned Iraq's repression of its population, in-
cluding the Kurds, the consequences of which threatened international peace and security. Arguably 
it was not Iraq's repression of its population that threatened international peace and security, but the 
fact that such repression led to a cross-border flow of refugees and cross-border incursions. 
Insofar as the situation in the former Yugoslavia is concerned, the main origin of the human rights 
violations taking place there lie with the occurrence of the civil war. That civil war, in tum, was due 
to the revival of the national (and nationalistic) aspirations of the peoples living within the former 
Yugoslavia. While a large part of the Security Council's attention has been devoted to the inhuman 
practices of some (or all) of the parties concerned, one has to acknowledge that its main concern has 
been to ensure the cessation of fighting and the achievement of peaceful solutions to the crisis.131 In 
the same vein it may be observed that the Security Council's resolution determining the existence of 
a threat to the peace was adopted over seven months earlier than its resolution calling upon parties 
to ensure cessation of forcible expulsions and attempts to alter the demographic circumstances of 
particular areas in the former Yugoslavia.132 
The situations of Somalia, Liberia, Georgia, Angola and Rwanda, may all be characterized as civil 
wars. The Security Council's concern with the cases of Liberia, Angola, and Georgia cannot be said 
to be based on human rights issues.133 The examples of Somalia and Rwanda on the other hand are 
based on human rights concerns. However, though the Council eventually took effective action for 
humanitarian relief in Somalia,134 it failed to take effective action in regard to the genocide in 
Rwanda.135 
That leaves the situation in Haiti which has effectively been dealt with. Yet there the human rights at 
stake were the civil and political rights of the Haitian people. Though the defacto régime engaged in 
repression of the population, it would rather seem that the issue at stake was one of ongoing self-
determination, that is, exclusion of an elected government, rather than human rights.136 
As to the works of the Commission, it cannot be ignored that it seems to take as a basis the 
distinction between certain classes of human rights obligations.137 Indeed, in the Barcelona Traction 
Case the Court observed that obligations erga omnes derive, among others, from the principles and 
rules concerning the "basic" rights of the human person.138 Which rights were to be considered basic 
was not exactly specified by the Court, though it mentioned that they included protection from 
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slavery and racial discrimination (before its mention of basic rights of the human person it had made 
a reference to the prohibition of genocide). Thus the main core of human rights obligations would lie 
with the right to life (and probably the right not to be subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment), the right not to held in slavery, and the right to equality before the law. 
An interesting feature of article 19, paragraph 3 (c), that ought to be discussed, concerns the fact 
that it derogates from the usual formula adopted with regard to the other examples. Thus it specifies 
that the serious breaches must not only concern obligations essential for the safeguarding of the hu-
man being, but that they must be committed on a widespread scale. In its Commentary on article 19 
the Commission observed that this phrase should be read to mean that:139 
"(...) for a breach to be characterized as an international crime, (...), it must take the form of a 
large-scale or systematic practice adopted in contempt of the rights and dignity of the human 
being." 
The Commission further explained that the purpose of the qualification was not to extend beyond 
what was reasonable the category of international crimes, and to keep in line with the rules of inter-
national law then in force.14* Although one could imagine this addition to reflect a quantitative stan-
dard, it appears rather to represent a qualitative condition. For especially if the breaches of human 
rights obligations may be said to constitute systematic practices perpetrated by the government re-
sponsible for law and order within the State, it becomes clear that the acts and omissions of that 
government are not merely attributable to the State, but that such acts or omissions are engaged in 
with intent. It would be well to relate this issue to article 56 of the Charter, in which members pledge 
to take joint and separate action, in co-operation with the United Nations, for the achievement of the 
purposes laid down in article 55. One of the purposes of article 55 is universal respect, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Any member that engages in systematic practices 
of human rights violations cannot be considered to have lived up to its obligation under article 56 of 
the Charter. 
By way of conclusion it cannot be said that the Security Council has taken breaches of obligations 
for the protection of human rights as the decisive or sole basis of its decisions under article 39. How-
ever, the possibility of the Security Council determining the existence of a threat to the peace on the 
ground of systematic human rights violations cannot wholly be discarded. The practice of the Secu-
rity Council up to date, with regard to human rights violations, does bear witness to an increased 
vigilance on its part, but its action has not exactly been effective. 
In sum it may be said that the United Nations will be in possession of a legal interest consequent 
upon the commission of an international crime. It cannot be said however that the practice of the Se-
curity Council shows the consistency necessary to conclude to the existence of a rule of customary 
international law indicating that an international crime will ipso facto be considered a threat to the 
peace under article 39 of the Charter. 
2.6.2. The effects of recommendations adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council 
Another question to be asked, and this brings us in fact to the issue of consequences, is what the ef-
fect is that may be brought about by resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council, pursu-
ant to the United Nations' legal interest, phrased by way of recommendation. On that account it may 
be noted, preliminary, that the Court, in its Namibia Opinion, took a broad stance with regard to the 
General Assembly's powers:141 
"This is not a finding on facts, but the formulation of a legal situation. For it would not be 
correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in principle vested with 
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recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in specific cases within the framework 
of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design " 
Although eventually the Court proceeded with its opinion on the basis of its assessment that the Se-
curity Council had made an article 24 binding declaration of illegality, it may be observed that the 
opinion is also based on the finding that the General Assembly had legitimately terminated the Man-
date And the above quotation appears to lead to the conclusion that such termination by the General 
Assembly had binding effect for United Nations members W1 The observations of the Court are fur-
thermore based on the premise that the United Nations was in law the successor of the League in re-
spect of the Mandate agreement for South West Africa, and that therefore the General Assembly, 
when faced with breaches of a fundamental character by South Africa, acted as a party in terminating 
the Mandate agreement143 As such one ought to take as a guide-line, as the Court did, the provi-
sions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in regard to material breaches of trea-
144 
ties 
Article 60 makes provision for a State party to invoke a material breach of a treaty as a ground for 
suspending or terminating it in whole or in part If a party actually invokes article 60 it has to, in ac-
cordance with article 65, send a notification to all the other parties stating the measures to be 
adopted and the reasons therefor If no other party objects, within three months, to the adoption of 
such measures those can be carried out If any objection is raised within that period the parties con-
cerned must seek, within twelve months, a peaceful solution to their dispute in accordance with arti-
cle 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. And finally article 66 provides, if the attempt to arrive at 
a peaceful solution fails, that an obligatory conciliation procedure will be utilized The outcome of 
that procedure, as the Annex states in its sixth paragraph, is not binding on the parties and conclu-
sions drawn by the Conciliation Commission are to be considered of recommendatory character only 
It follows from these procedures that eventually any party wishing to invoke a material breach as a 
ground for terminating a treaty will not be bound by any conclusions as to facts or law established by 
the Conciliation Commission It also shows that ultimately a party terminating a treaty does so with-
out any judicial determination having been made regarding the existence of an (alleged) material 
breach u s 
Since in this case the United Nations, and not its members as such, was considered to be a party 
to the mandate agreement, the United Nations naturally could act as a party on the subject of treaty 
termination And because the United Nations may avail itself, in certain circumstances, of the right of 
terminating a treaty, the obvious conclusion must be that, once exercised, the individual United Na-
tions members will become bound by the act of treaty termination The Court, in its Namibia Opin-
ion, laid down the consequences (obligations) for United Nations members (and in this particular 
case even for non-members) of a binding declaration of illegality by the United Nations. Basically 
those could be said to reflect a duty of non-recognition, and a duty to abstain from support or assis-
tance, with regard to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibial4* 
Generally speaking the powers which the General Assembly possesses are of recommendatory 
character only There are but few examples that witness a power of the General Assembly to issue 
resolutions that will bind United Nations members As such the question may be asked whether the 
consequences that are normally attached to a declaration of illegality contained in a binding resolu-
tion of the General Assembly or Security Council will ensue also if the resolution concerned cannot 
be considered to contain decisions, but recommendations of those organs only Recommendations of 
the General Assembly, or even the Security Council, so it is recognized, do not create obligations for 
United Nations members And though it might be said that United Nations members are under an 
obligation to consider, in good faith, whether or not to take the action recommended by one of those 
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organs, still they would not be obliged, in law, to act in accordance with the recommendation. * To 
the extent however that the General Assembly and the Security Council would not be acting in their 
capacity of representing the Organization, that is as an independent subject of international law, the 
conclusion cannot be the same. Even if the United Nations would be acting in the exercise of a right 
to demand performance of certain specific obligations, and in furtherance of that cause determines 
the existence of a breach of obligations by members or non-members,ш that alone would not make it 
a decision of the United Nations binding the members. Thus the fact that the United Nations would 
authoritatively determine the existence of a breach of obligation by a member or non-member would 
not entail the obligation for members or non-members to recognize the illegality of the acts or situa­
tion concerned and to refrain from support or assistance in respect of those acts. As recommendatory 
resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council do not create obligations to act in ac­
cordance with them, mere declarations of illegality, which do not require any further action, also do 
not acquire binding force. 
At this junction it may be noted that the Court not only justifies its conclusions regarding non-
recognition by reference to the Charter, but also by reference to general international law.149 It may 
be doubted whether general international law, customary international law that is, contains a general 
obligation for States not recognize certain (allegedly illegal) acts or situations. Since most of interna­
tional law is dispositive in character States may eradicate the illegality of certain acts or situations by 
concluding a treaty to that effect, or by not invoking and executing the responsibility of the author 
State. That circumstance is fortunately mitigated because of the existence of the well known maxim 
that nobody can transfer more rights than it possesses. Thus a decision of a State not to invoke the 
responsibility of another State will only affect its own right to demand the performance of the obli­
gations breached, and will obviously not affect other States' rights. To put it in more concrete terms, 
one State's recognition does not, indeed cannot, wipe out the illegality of the acts or situation con­
cerned.15* There does exist an obligation not to recognize any acquisition of territory effected 
through the use of force.151 Furthermore, Arangio-Ruiz has proposed in relation to crimes to stipu­
late an obligation for States, subject to a prior determination of the existence of a crime by the Court, 
not to recognize as legal a situation created by a crime.152 
The picture is somewhat different insofar as support or assistance is concerned. The common 
yardstick in this regard would appear to be article 27, Part One, of the ILC-draft on State Responsi­
bility, which provides:153 
"Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is established that it is rendered for the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act carried out by the latter, itself constitutes an 
internationally wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute 
the breach of an international obligation." 
Although this provision appears to narrow down the options open to States for rendering support or 
assistance to States committing internationally wrongful acts, the commentary to article 27 offers 
certain clarifications that limit considerably its impact. The Commission explains that the sentence "if 
it is established that it is rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act" lays down 
the condition of intent on the part of the providing State.154 Intent in this context means that the aid 
or assistance must have been rendered so as to facilitate the commission of the internationally 
wrongful act.155 This in tum means that it is not enough that a State providing aid or assistance is 
aware that it could be used (eventually) for unlawful purposes,156 but rather that it should have 
knowledge of the intention of the receiving State to use such aid or assistance for the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act. Furthermore, as the commentary points out, intent on the part of the 
providing State must be established and cannot be presumed.157 Arangio-Ruiz has quite rightly 
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proposed, in his latest report, an article 18, paragraph 1 (b), to place States under the obligation, 
subject to a prior determination of the existence of a crime by the Court, to abstain from any act or 
omission which may assist the wrongdoing State in maintaining the situation created by a crime 
To come back now to the issue under consideration, the legal effect of General Assembly or Se­
curity Council recommendations, if a declaration of illegality is contained in a non-binding resolution 
States will generally have to consider in good faith whether or not that declaration is justified in fact 
and law It may be assumed that both facts and law will be (well) documented, and that therefore no 
State will be able to assert ignorance as to the essentials In the light of such knowledge all States 
will have to determine their position with regard to the allegations made, and if they find the allega­
tions to have been true they will have to draw the consequences They will have to refrain from giv­
ing aid or assistance with the purpose of facilitating the commission of further internationally 
wrongful acts That is of course not to say that a State which finds the allegations to be unfounded 
can legitimately provide aid or assistance in support of the acts concerned In the absence of binding 
decisions by competent organs each State determines for itself its legal position But whether or not 
such position is correct must be evaluated in the light of the facts of the case and the law applicable 
to such facts A State that finds certain acts of another State to be lawful may be found wrong in its 
evaluation, and if it has given aid or assistance to that other State in support of future acts (pursuant 
to its perception that previous acts had been lawful), it will be found to have committed its very own 
internationally wrongful act 
2.7. Summary 
The reference in the Barcelona Traction Case to obligations towards the international community as 
a whole must be read in the light of the Court's other claims, namely that they are the concern of all 
States and that all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection The question whether 
there exists a personified international community depends on the degree of institutionalization of 
international relations Due to the intricate and complex character of the relations between any com­
munity and its members, a personified international community must be based on a treaty régime in-
tended to form the basis of a universal international organization To the extent that certain members 
of the international community decline to take up membership in the organization, a personified in-
ternational community may have to rely on those universal rules of customary international law sub-
stantially identical to the treaty rules. However, the fact that non-members are bound by such 
universal rules of customary international law does not mean that the organization can ipso jure 
claim the performance of obligations under such rules The United Nations is the only organization 
that could credibly make a claim to constitute a personified community, and its international per-
sonality constitutes the key to the investigation of its legal interests 
As a subject of international law the United Nations possesses international legal personality This 
means that it may possess the right to demand the performance of obligations by both members and 
non-members However, the United Nations, as it is not a State, cannot ipso jure be considered to 
claim rights under customary international law However, it can also not be considered bound to 
customary international law in the same way On the basis of the argument that an organization can-
not do what the members cannot do individually, the United Nations is bound by universal rules of 
customary international law States are however free, generally, to change international legal rules in 
their inter se relations An illustration of this is constituted by the prohibition of the use of force in 
LEGAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 111 
the Charter, because States can only use force lawfully in case of defence against an armed attack, 
whereas the Security Council can use force if it determines the existence of a threat to the peace. 
As to the criteria to determine the United Nations' legal interest in the performance of obligations 
by States, it cannot be said that the United Nations, and more particularly the Security Council, is in 
possession of a general interest to that effect. Though the latter can claim the performance of obliga-
tions through its powers under article 39 of the Charter, it can do so only if it determines the exis-
tence of a threat to the peace. That phrase can be interpreted objectively in the sense that a threat to 
the peace must concern a situation that could lead to a breach of the peace. The United Nations also 
cannot be considered to possess a common interest in the performance of obligations. Although it is 
bound by the universal rules of customary international law, limitations of a functional nature prevent 
it, generally, from claiming the performance of obligations under such rules. For analogous reasons 
such obligations cannot be said to be performed towards the United Nations. However, if the United 
Nations engages in activities ordinarily engaged in by States, and suffers prejudice as a result of 
breaches of obligation by States, it will be in possession of a legal interest in relation to the author 
State. 
Other bases of legal interests exist for the United Nations. In circumstances in which the Charter 
envisages sanctions, basically articles S, 6 and 39 to 42, the United Nations must be considered to 
possess a legal interest regarding breaches of obligation by members. The United Nations may fur-
ther possess a legal interest regarding breaches of obligations under treaties to which it is a party. A 
legal interest must generally be denied to the United Nations regarding breaches of obligations under 
treaties to which it is not a party. Only if the treaty concerned envisages specific rights for the United 
Nations regarding the supervision or the implementation of the treaty could any question of legal in-
terest arise. To the extent that the United Nations is affected by breaches of obligations under rules 
of customary international law, it will possess a legal interest regarding such breaches. In this light 
the United Nations may be entitled to claim the performance of obligations even in respect of other 
international organizations and non-member States. 
The United Nations is necessarily in possession of a legal interest regarding the crime of aggres-
sion. Furthermore, the competence of the Security Council under article 39 of the Charter is present 
regarding any situation involving a threat or use of force contrary to article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4. 
The United Nations is in possession of a legal interest regarding the crime of denial of self-
determination. However, the Commission has explained that the phrase "by force" applicable to the 
example of colonial domination mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3 (b), means against the will of 
the population even if that will is not manifested by armed opposition. Viewed also in that light, it 
cannot be said that the Security Council has considered itself competent under article 39 of the 
Charter regarding the crime of denial of self-determination. To the extent that the crime of denial of 
self-determination is accompanied by military confrontation between a government and armed op-
position, by forceful repression of the population, or by tense relations between interested States, 
Security Council competence under article 39 will be established. 
The United Nations is in possession of a legal interest consequent upon the commission of the crime 
of widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations. The resolutions in which the Security 
Council has concerned itself with the crime of widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations 
do not reveal, however, that it will inevitably consider that crime a threat to the peace. 
Resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council phrased by way of recommendation 
do not carry with them any obligation to act in accordance with them. However, if one of those 
organs determines a breach of obligation, and demands the performance of obligations by an author 
State, other States are put on guard and cannot claim ignorance regarding the factual and legal 
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situation Should States on their own evaluation of the facts and the law provide aid or assistance to 
the author State with a view to facilitating the commission of further (wrongful) acts, they will 
commit their own internationally wrongful acts 
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which those rules apply are pertinent Also Tunkin, G, The Legal Bases of International Organization Action, in 
Dupuy, R -J , A Handbook on International Organizations, pp 261-276 
35
 See articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention Krylov observed that in order for non-member States to be bound 
by a legal obligation (even if such States could not fail to recognize the existence of the Umted Nations as an ob-
jective fact), the Umted Nations and those Slates ought to have concluded a general or special agreement Dissent-
ing Opinion Krylov, Reparation Opinion, 217 and 218-219 
M
 Reparation Opinion, 179 
17
 Reparation Opinion, 180 Emphasis added Judge Hackworth endorsed the Court's view that the Umted Nations 
could bring claims for damage suffered by the Organization He criticized the Court for assuming the existence of 
an implied power with regard to the espousal of private claims, since he considered that power not to be necessary 
to the exercise of powers expressly granted Dissenting Opinion Hackworth, ibid, 198 Judge Badawi Pasha ob-
served that international persons are deemed to exist only for the benefit of States that signed and ratified or ac-
ceded to its constitutions Dissenting Opinion Badawi Pasha, ibid, 205 He also denied the Umted Nations the 
possibility of endorsement of private claims Ibid, 213-216 
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M
 Argument to be found with Morgenstern, Legal Problems, 32 One may note that Bleckmann observes (Zur Ver-
bindlichkeit, 118), discussing the question whether any difference exists between organizations with or without le-
gal personality, that "Die Mitgliedstaaten, die durch eine internationale Organisation mit eigener 
Rechtspersönlichkeit handeln, dürfen aber vom Völkerrecht nicht anders gestellt sein, als wenn sie außerhalb der 
internationalen Organisation oder innerhalb einer internationalen Organisation ohne Rechtspersönlichkeit han-
deln Der »Schleier« der juristischen Person muß insoweit durchstoßen werden Die »Flucht m die internationale 
Organisation« zur Umgehung des Völkerrechts muß verbaut werden " 
3
' Only references in the Charter to international law are discussed and the references to justice will not That is be-
cause justice is in fact not a legal concept and may stand in opposition to international law Kelsen, H, The Law of 
the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1951, 15-
18, Fitzmaunce, G, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 
MLR 1956, pp 1-13, 12-13, and Aulagnon, L, Aperçus sur la force dans la regle de droit, in Melanges en 
l'honneur de Paul Roubier, volume 1, Théorie génerale du droit et droit transitoire, Librairies Dalloz & Sirey, 
Pans, 1961, pp 29-37, 35-37 
40
 It is of course well known that the Assembly, in order to implement this latter provision, has initiated the estab-
lishment of the International Law Commission as one of its subsidiary organs And this study of course largely fo-
cuses on the outcome produced by that Commission See United Nations, The Work of the International Law 
Commission, Fourth Edition, New York, 1988 
41
 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, ρ 6, 34 
4 2
 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, 34 Kelsen's view is that a preamble may contain obligations insofar as 
sanctions would be attached to the violation of such obligations He agrees however on the non-binding nature of 
the Preamble of the Charter Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 9-10 
4 3
 The provision of article 19 regarding the loss of the right to vote in case of failure to pay the contribution due to the 
Umted Nations will not be discussed separately, since the sanction of the loss of the right to vole is foreseen as the 
sanction for the violation of a specific kind of obligation and therefore has no relevance for the question of a gen­
eral legal interest in possession of the Umted Nations The same argument furthermore counts for the provision of 
article 102, paragraphs 1 and 2 On these issues Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, respectively 717-720 and 
721-724 
4 4
 Argument found in Schermers, Inleiding, 58 "Mag een organisatie bijvoorbeeld sancties nemen tegen een lidstaat 
die zijn verplichtingen met is nagekomen, dan zal men daaruit mogen afleiden dat de organisatie ook een be­
slissing mag nemen over de vraag of een lidstaat zijn verplichtingen al of met is nagekomen Zonder een dergelijke 
bevoegdheid zou de bevoegdheid tot het nemen van sancties immers met kunnen worden uitgeoefend Men gaat er 
dan van uit dat de constatenngsbevoegdheid is opgenomen (implied) in de bevoegdheid tot hel nemen van sanc­
ties " This quote only serves to emphasize the relation between the four elements mentioned in the mam text, and 
it is not meant to express any principle of finality with regard to the determination made by an international or­
ganization that a member would not have fulfilled its obligations 
4 5
 The term sanction is used in the most general way, and encompasses, here, both measures by States and interna­
tional organizations See infra chapter four 
4 4
 Schutz, H -J, Article 5, in Simma, В (Ed), The Charter of the Umted Nations, A Commentary, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994, pp 175-185, 177-181 Though he slates that in some cases it seems justified to accept a rec­
ommendation as 'action' within the meaning of article 5 Ibid, 180 
4 7
 Nolablj Gowlland-Debbas, V, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law, Umted Nations Action in 
the Question of Southern Rhodesia, MarUnus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, 452, Sur. S, La résolution 687 
(3 avril 1991) du Conseil de Secunte dans l'affaire du Golfe Problèmes de rétablissement et de garantie de la paix, 
37 AFDI 1991, pp 25-97, 41, and Combacau, J, Le pouvoir de sanction de ΙΌ N U, Etude théorique de la coer-
cition non militaire, Editions A Pedone, Pans, 1974, 93 The latter notes that in practice the Umted Nations has 
always justified resort to the measures under article 41 by reference to the violation of a pre-existing obligation 
48
 Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses, 452, Sur, La résolution. 41 Gowlland-Debbas has staled in a later publi-
cation that insofar as the determination of an internationally wrongful act forms a constituent part of the Council's 
determination of a threat to the peace it could be reviewed as to its factual and legal basis Gowlland-Debbas, V, 
Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 ICLQ 1994, pp 55-98, 97-98 
4
' Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses, 451-452 Boldness in the original Footnote omitted Repeated in Gowl-
land-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement, 61 and 71-72 In the same sense McDougal, M, and Reisman, W, 
Rhodesia and the United Nations The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AJIL 1968, pp 1-19, 8, Ruzie, D , 
Organisations internationales et sanctions internationales, Librarne Armand Colin, Pans, 1971, 87, and Sinclair, 
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I, State Responsibility and the Concept of Cnmes of States, in Weiler et al. International Crimes of State, pp 223-
225, 224 This was also the stance taken by the United Stales in the Nicaragua Case, Merits, 27 Annacker, The 
Legal Régime, 157, claims that the determination of threats to the peace is left to the discretion of the Security 
Council, and that any situation so characterized by the Council must be considered a threat to the peace 
50
 Gowlland-Debbas, Collective Responses, 452 See also Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement, 72, 74, 
and 97-98 
51
 Gaja, G , Reflexions sur le role du Conseil de Secunte dans le nouvel ordre mondial, A propos des rapports entre 
maintien de la paix et cnmes internationaux des Etats, 97 RGDIP 1993, pp 297-320, 315 claims, as a first hy-
pothesis, that a determination that a threat to the peace exists poses questions of an essentially political order, and 
that the Court could only exercise any control if it qualifies the determination as arbitrary A second hypothesis 
concerns the situation where the Security Council would determine the existence of a violation of an obligation, in 
which case the Court could exercise full control and declare, on the basis of legal and factual considerations, that 
the violation does not exist In agreement, as to the second hypothesis, Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council En-
forcement, 97-98 
B
 Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art 4), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1948, ρ 57, 64 
5 3
 Certain expenses of the Umted Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1962, ρ 151, 155 See also Admission Opinion, 61 
5 4
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 26 
я
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 27 
я
 Nicaragua Case, Menls, 103-104 and 110-111 
5 7
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 29-38 
** С f Frowein, J, Article 39, in Simma, The Charter, pp 605-616, 609-610 
" Article 1 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) defines aggression as follows "Aggression is the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the Umted Nations, as set out in this Definition " 
4 0
 С f Halderman, J, Some Legal Aspects of Sanctions in the Rhodesian Case, 17 ICLQ 1968, pp 672-705, 692, and 
Gaja, Reflexions, 301 "Le Chapitre VII n'a pas été écrit pour donner au Conseil de sécurité une competence dans 
n'importe quelle matière II ne semble pas que la notion de menace à la paix puisse être dissociée de l'existence du 
risque d'un conflit arme international ( ) Encore faut-il que le risque d'un conflit soit véritablement pris en con-
sidération par le Conseil et qu'il ne soit pas un prétexte invoqué pour lui permettre d'exercer des pouvoirs qui ne 
lui auraient pas été attribués " However, after examining the practice of the Security Council (302-307), he con-
cludes (307) "Il semble toutefois que les résolutions du Conseil s'inscrivent dans la tendance à utiliser en fait une 
notion de menace contre la paix qui, ( ), n'a pas un rapport étroit avec le risque d'un conflit armé international 
Cette tendance trouve surtout sa raison d'être dans l'exigence de répondre à des violations d'obligations essen-
tielles pour la société internationale " 
" See the discussion of the issue of whether article 94, paragraph 2, enlarges the competence of the Security Council 
in Goodrich, L, and Hambro, Ε, Charter of the Umted Nations, Commentary and Documents, Second and Re­
vised Edition, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1949, 486487, Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 540-544 
and 721, Pillepich, A, Article 94, m Cot, J -P, and Pellet, A (Eds), La Charte des Nations Urnes, Commentaire 
article par article, 2e edition, revue et augmentée. Economica, Pans, 1991, pp 1275-1285, 1276, and Mosler, H, 
Article 94, m Simma, The Charter, pp 1003-1007, 1005-1007 All four appear to be of the view that article 39 
need not be applied by the Security Council before resorting to the measures envisaged in article 94 
42
 Argument refened to by Giraud, E, Le droit international public et la politique, 110 RDC ADI 1963-Ш, pp 419-
809,682 
° Argument of Pasvolsky, quoted by Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, 486 
** And contrary to what has been asserted by Kelsen the Secunty Council cannot endorse the position of the party 
that fails to honour its obligations under the judgment Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 539-541 In 
agreement on the position taken here Klein, E, Paralleles Tätigwerden von Sicherheitsrat und Internationalem 
Gerichtshof bei Fnedensbedrohenden Streitigkeiten, Zu Fragen der Zuständigkeit und Organtreue, in Bernhardt, 
R (Ed), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung - Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit - Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Her-
mann Mosler, 1983, pp 468-491,489490 
68
 But note the example of the use of force discussed in the final paragraph of section 2 3 
" Meng, W, Die Kompetenz der EWG zur Verhangung von Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Drittländer, 42 ZAORV 
1982, pp 780-803,795-796 
" Reparation Opinion, 182 
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β
 See generally Schachter, О, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, 58 AJIL 
1964, pp 960-965, and Higgins, R., The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security 
Council, 64 AJIL 1970, pp 1-18 
" The competence of the General Assembly under article 11 is however restricted by the feet that "Any such ques­
tion on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or 
after discussion " Article 12, paragraph 1, furthermore provides that "While the Security Council is exercising in 
respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall 
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests " 
7 0
 Terms of settlement in this context may be taken to mean that the Security Council may propose that a specific so­
lution be adopted for the settlement of the dispute in question Higgins, The Place of International Law, 8-9, 11-13, 
and 16 Note that she envisages the Security Council recommendation as to the terms of settlement of a dispute to 
be in conformity with international law principles 
7 1
 Reparation Opinion, 179 
7 2
 Reparation Opinion, 179 
7 3
 That the bases of claims were different was acknowledged by the Court Reparation Opinion, 186 
7 4
 Reparation Opinion, 185 
7 5
 Although it may be noted in relation to that opimon that the right of the United Nations to invoke the arbitration 
clause rested upon a potential breach of obligations rather than on an actual breach of obligations by the United 
States Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agree­
ment of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1988, ρ 12, 28-30 On the relation between breaches of ob­
ligations and disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the agreement see Separate Opimon Schwebel, 
ibid, 51 
7
' Headquarters Agreement Opinion, 28 
7 7
 See generally Umted Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission 
7 8
 Confirmed rather implicitly by Sur, La résolution, 59 
7
' The fact that such a body may function within the system of the Umted Nations appears not to influence her stance 
that the organization has no legal interest Morgenstern, Legal Problems, 115-117 
*" The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between Stales and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations. 25 ILM 1986, pp 543-589 
al
 And it can only be applied analogously since the situation discussed here, a right arising for the Umted Nations 
with regard to a treaty between States, is not covered by the convention It only applies to treaties between States 
and international organizations or to treaties between international organizations (article 1 (a)) 
82
 Genocide Convention Opimon, 20 It also observed on page 19 "It is indeed beyond dispute that the General As-
sembly, which drafted and adopted the Genocide Convention, and the Secretary-General, who is the depositary of 
the instruments of ratification and accession, have an interest in knowing the legal effects of reservations to that 
Convention and more particularly the legal effect of objections to such reservations " 
83
 Genocide Convention Opimon, 19 
M
 Genocide Convention Opimon, 19 
85
 Note also for instance article 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which provides that notice of a withdrawal shall be 
communicated to the States parties and to the Security Council See the 1968 Traite sur la non-proliferation des 
armes nucléaires, 73 RGDIP 1969, pp 248-253 
86
 С f Cassese, A , La communauté internationale et le genocide, in Le droit au service de la paix, de la justice et du 
développement, Melanges Michel Virally, Editions A Pedone, Pans, 1991, pp 183-194, 185, who notes that 
military measures against a responsible State can only be adopted by the Security Council if the genocide consti-
tutes a threat to the peace, act of aggression, or breach of the peace 
87
 Contrary to what has been claimed the registration of a treaty in accordance with article 102, paragraph 1, of the 
Charter does not lead to a competence of the Security Council to impose respect of the treaty Weckel, Ρ , Le 
Chapitre VII de la Charte et son application par le Conseil de Sécunte, 37 AFDI 1991, pp 165-202, 182, footnote 
54 
88
 Sur, La résolution, 59 Footnote omitted 
89
 Tunkin, The Legal Bases, 261-262 
90
 Butkiewicz, The Premisses, 117-122 
91
 Note the remark made by a member of the Commission, in the 1994 discussion, to the effect that "( ) in the case 
of an international crime, the victim was the community of States as a distinct legal entity and that the concept of 
international crimes helped to promote the international community to the status of, as it were, a quasi-public legal 
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authority " See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May - 22 Jury 
1994, General Assembly, Official Records, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No 10 (A/49/10), 335 Note also the 
opinions expressed at 340-341, 346, 349-354, 359-362 
я
 One has to keep in mind here that a certain breach of obligation is not an international crime because the obliga­
tion concerned is of erga omnes character, but because the obligation concerns the fundamental interests of the in­
ternational community and is recognized as such by States For a reversal of cause and effect in this context see 
Ushakov, YBILC 1981, Volume I, 142 
n
 Riphagen, W, Fourth report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft 
articles), YBILC 1983, Volume II, Part One, pp 3-24, 11 He adds that this does not necessarily mean that an in­
ternational crime constitutes a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under article 39 of the 
Charter Ibid, 11-12 In Riphagen's opimon one consequence of jurisdiction of the Umted Nations over interna­
tional crimes is that the commission of an international crime cannot constitute a matter essentially within the do­
mestic jurisdiction of a State under article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter Ibid, 12 It is difficult to see any ratio for 
the consideration that the essence of Umted Nations jurisdiction over international crimes means that the acts con­
cerned are not within the domestic jurisdiction of a State Difficult to see because what is, and what is not, within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a State depends on whether or not the acts in question are covered by existing rules of 
international law Thus any breach of an international obligation means that the conduct m question is not within 
the domestic jurisdiction of States Most members did not express any opimon on Umted Nations jurisdiction over 
international crimes The American member of the Commission adopted Riphagen's position regarding Umted 
Nations jurisdiction over international crimes, and indeed envisaged the applicability of Chapter VII to all interna­
tional crimes McCaffrey, YBILC 1983, Volume I, 142-143 Only one member doubted Riphagen's position of 
Umted Nations jurisdiction over all the international crimes listed in article 19 Sinclair, ibid, 131 See also the 
critical observations regarding the Security Council functioning on the basis of a veto power for only a few States 
Diaz Gonzalez, ibid, 148 In relation to Riphagen's next report the Soviet member expressed the view that all in­
ternational crimes should be regarded as detrimental to international peace and security, and claimed that only the 
international community could take measures Ushakov, YBILC 1984, Volume I, 277-278 See also Quentin-
Baxter, ibid, 306, and Malek, ibid, 310-311, McCaffrey, ibid, 313, Balanda, ibid, 315, Riphagen, ibid, 317 In 
his commentary on article 14 Riphagen insists on the exercise of rights, in case of international crimes, by injured 
States in the context of the organized international community Riphagen, W, Sixth report on the content, forms 
and degrees of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft articles), and 'Implementation' (mise en oeuvre) of 
international responsibility and settlement of disputes (part 3 of the draft articles), YBILC 1985, Volume Π, Part 
One, pp 3-19, 14 Reuter asserts that the phrases "organized international community" (the Umted Nations) and 
"international community as a whole" do not quite coincide Reuter, YBILC 1985, Volume I, 94 See also McCaf­
frey, ibid, 96 and 98, Ogiso, ibid, 122, Tomuschat, ibid, 127, Barboza, ibid, 132, Diaz Gonzalez, ibid, 133, 
Malek, ibid, 147-148, Arango-Ruiz, ibid, 150 
и
 Calle у Calle, YBILC 1980, Volume I, 87 Other references lo obligations towards the international community 
may be found with Schwebel, YBILC 1980, Volume I, 92, Evensen, ibid , 94 See also Riphagen, ibid, 81 and 97 
In agreement with Calle у Calle, Gracfrath, В , Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für internationale Verbrechen, 
in Graefrath, В (Ed), Probleme des Völkerrechts, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1985, pp 89-110, 104, Mohr, M, 
The ILC's Distinction between "International Crimes" and "International Delicts" and its Implications, in Spincdi 
and Simma, Umted Nations Codification, pp 115-141, 126-127, and Quigley, J , The International Law Commis-
sion's Cnme-Delict Distinction A Toothless Tiger?, 66 RDISDP 1988, pp 117-161, 134-137 
" Riphagen, Third Report, 45 Similarly Bindschedler, R, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit als Verbrechen, in 
Dutoit, В, and Gnsel, E (Eds), Melanges Georges Pemn, Diffusion Payot, Lausanne, 1984, pp 51-61, 60, who 
claims that the Charter would have to be amended to cover the other international enmes 
* Riphagen, Third Report, 45 In a footnote (142) he adds that in this respect there is no need for formal amendment 
of the Charter In the commentary on his proposed article 6 he mentions that one cannot exclude the occurrence of 
situations in which an international crime will not mvolve the maintenance of international peace and security 
After that he claims "The definition of 'international crime' in article 19, paragraph 3, part 1 of the draft articles 
implies that the international community as a whole is injured by such wrongful act It may therefore be presumed 
that the orgamzed international community, that is, the Umted Nations Organization, has a role to play in deter­
mining the special legal consequences entailed by such act, even if the maintenance of international peace and se­
curity is not considered to be involved " Riphagen, Third Report, 48 One may note that he nowhere explains in 
detail what kind of other role could be played by the Umted Nations in determining the special legal consequences 
of an international crime that does not involve the maintenance of international peace and security On page 49 he 
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merely mentions that States, by recognizing certain breaches of obligation as crime, accept a role of the organized 
international community, and that the United Nations has been involved in some way or another with all the ex­
amples mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3 An important remark on his count is that such role of the United Na­
tions need not be based on the Charier, and he mentions the case of Namibia as an example for that position 
" Riphagen, Third Report, 45 
" A perfect example of such conferred, extra-Charter, competence may be found in article 11 of the 1958 Convention 
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, in which the powers of the Security 
Council under article 94, paragraph 2, are declared applicable to decisions of a special commission established un­
der articles 9 and 10 of the aforementioned Convention Text in 52 AJIL 1958, pp 851-858 
" General Assembly resolution 377 (V), Uniting for Peace 
, и >
 See Security Council resolutions 119, 120, 129, 157, 303, 462, 500, 571, 572, 573, 577, 580, and 612 
1 0 1
 See the following resolutions of the Council making initial determinations regarding the use of armed force 
(reaffirmations omitted) 54 (Palestine), 82 (Koreas), 502 (Argentina-United Kingdom), 598 (Iraq-Iran), 660 
(Iraq-Kuwait), arguably 713 (Yugoslavia), arguably 733 (Somalia), 748 (Libya), 757 (former Yugoslavia), 788 
(Liberia), arguably 858 (Georgia), 864 (Angola), and arguably 918 (Rwanda) 
1 0 1
 Note the following resolutions on measures under article 41 in response to situations involving recourse to armed 
force arguably 418 (South Africa), 661 (Iraq-Kuwait), 670 (Iraq-Kuwait), 687 (Iraq-Kuwait), 713 (Yugoslavia), 
748 (Libya), 787 (former Yugoslavia), 788 (Liberia), 820 (former Yugoslavia), 864 (Angola), 883 (Libya), argua­
bly 918 (Rwanda), and 942 (former Yugoslavia) 
1 0 5
 Arguably resolution 161 (Congo) 
'** See the following resolutions arguably 665 (Iraq-Kuwait), 678 (Iraq-Kuwait), arguably 787 (former Yugoslavia), 
arguably 794 (Somalia), 817 (former Yugoslavia), 836 (former Yugoslavia), 908 (former Yugoslavia), arguably 
929 (Rwanda), 958 (former Yugoslavia), and 981 (former Yugoslavia) 
"* Commentary Article 19 Part One, 121 
106
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 101 
1 6 7
 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples 
l e
* The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, 61 AJIL 1967, pp 870-887, and the 1966 Interna­
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 61 AJIL 1967, pp 861-870 
"" See the following resolutions (reaffirmations omitted) 163, 180, 290, 302, and 322 (Portuguese domination over 
certain (specific) African territories), 202 (Rhodesia), 246 (Namibia), 377 (Western Sahara), 384 (East Timor), 
417 (South Africa), 668 (Cambodia), 956 (Patau) Note also the vaguely phrased resolutions 713 and 724 regard­
ing the situation in the former Yugoslavia 
1 , 0
 Resolutions 161 (Congo), 221 (Rhodesia), 353 (Cyprus), 713 (former Yugoslavia), arguably 733 (Somalia), 864 
(Angola), 886 (Somalia), 917 (Haiti) Arguably it did so with regard to certain Portuguese actions in Africa 
(resolutions 290 and 302) 
1 1 1
 Resolutions 232 (Rhodesia), 713 (Yugoslavia), 733 (Somalia), 864 (Angola), 917 (Haiti) As the Security Council 
terminated, in resolution 919, the arms embargo against South Africa, it referred to the establishment of a united, 
democratic, non-racial government 
1 1 1
 See the following resolutions 221 (Rhodesia), 794 (Somalia), 816 (former Yugoslavia), 836 (former Yugoslavia), 
908 (former Yugoslavia), arguably 917 (Haiti), 929 (Rwanda), 940 (Haiti), 958 (former Yugoslavia), 981 (former 
Yugoslavia) A salient detail regarding resolution 221 may be found in that, at that moment, the Security Council 
had not yet imposed mandatory sanctions with regard to the territory of Southern Rhodesia 
1 1 3
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 121 
If one were to consider the dominated territory and its people to constitute a new or incipient State, one might even 
consider the use offeree by the colonial Slate an international use of force See particularly Ago, R, Fifth report on 
State responsibility, YBJJX 1976, Volume II, Part One, pp 3-54, 35 (footnote 171) and 37 In resolution 290 the 
Security Council came no further than a declaration that Portuguese colonialism on the African continent was a 
serious threat to the peace and security of independent African States 
"
sEg resolution 312 
"'Resolution 312 regarding Portuguese colonies (reaffirmed in resolution 322), resolution 232 regarding Southern 
Rhodesia (reaffirmed in resolutions 253, 328, 386, 403, 411, 424, 445 and 448), resolution 269 regarding Namibia 
(reaffirmed in resolutions 301, 428, 447 and 566), resolution 282 regarding South Africa (reaffirmed in resolutions 
417, 473, 554, 556 and 591) 
Resolution 253 (reaffirmed in resolutions 277 and 411) With regard to the people of Namibia see resolution 269 
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(reaffirmed m resolution S66) 
119
 Cassese discusses the issue from a somewhat different angle, and observes that liberation movements have the right 
to use force in search for the implementation of their right to self-determination since such use offeree would not 
constitute a breach of the international prohibition on the use of force As regards the support which may be lent to 
liberation movements he then claims that third States can only give various forms of support and that they cannot 
use force themselves (he adds that third States have the right to resort to peaceful countermeasures) Cassese, A , 
Remarks on the Present Legal Regulation of Crimes of States, in Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago, Le droit in-
ternational à l'heure de sa codification, volume III, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987, pp 49-64, 51-54, and especially note 1 
"' A further reference to human rights may be found in article 76, sub (c), of the Charter, regarding the objectives of 
the trusteeship system 
l 2
' Article 62 does not state with regard to which entity the recommendations may be made, but paragraph 1 of the 
article also provides that recommendations may be directed towards members Paragraph 3 on the other hand pro-
vides that the Economic and Social Council may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assem-
bly 
111
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 (III) It may be noted that a number of 
European States took the initiative, as a follow-up, of concluding the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 45 AJIL 1951, Supplement, pp 24-39 More slowly the American States 
adopted the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 65 AJIL 1971, pp 679-701, and some tune after that 
the African States adopted the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 21ILM 1982, pp 59-68 
122
 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 63 AJIL 1969, pp 389-407, the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by way of General Assembly resolution 
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CHAPTER3 
THE OBLIGATION OF AN AUTHOR STATE TO PROVIDE REPARATION, AND THE 
CORRESPONDING RIGHT OF INJURED STATE(S) OR THE UNITED NATIONS TO 
DEMAND SUCH REPARATION, IN CASE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
3.1. Introduction 
The Commission, commenting on the use of the term "international responsibility" in article 1, Part 
One, of its draft articles, indicated that this was intended ' 
"( ) to cover every kind of new relations which may anse, in international law, from the in-
ternationally wrongful act of a state, whether such relations are limited to the offending State 
and the directly injured State or extend also to other subjects of international law, and 
whether they are centred on the duty of the guilty State to restore the injured State in its 
rights and repair the damage caused, ( ) " 
The first two chapters of this thesis have been devoted to issues concerning the determination of the 
subjects of international law entitled to invoke the responsibility of a State for having committed an 
internationally wrongful act Or to put it in other words, in determining the subjects involved, besides 
the author State, in the new relationship established on the basis of incurred responsibility The ques-
tion then anses what does that new relationship amount to What does it mean to be responsible? 
And what is it injured States or the United Nations can demand of the author State m order for the 
latter to absolve itself of all responsibility7 The Commission answered these questions by noting 
that2 
"A State discharges its responsibility incumbent on it for breach of an international obligation 
by making good, that is to say, by making reparation for the injury caused " 
It is further necessary to determine the existence of an obligation on the part of the author State to 
provide reparation to the injured State(s) or the United Nations, as well as the determination of 
which forms of reparation ought to be granted to such State(s) or the United Nations In view of the 
opinions expressed in chapter one on the correlation between obligations and nghts, it may be 
pointed out that any obligation to provide reparation corresponds to the nght(s) of the injured 
State(s) or the United Nations to demand and receive such reparation 
Article 19, Part One, devoted largely to the distinction between international delicts and international 
cnmes, constitutes a break with tradition The commentary specifies that the importance of the sub-
ject-matter of certain obligations and the senousness of their breach should lead to a difference in 
characterization of internationally wrongful acts 3 And it is at this point that the Commission ac-
knowledges that4 
"( ) having differentiated between internationally wrongful acts, it will inevitably be com-
pelled to go on and differentiate between the regimes of responsibility applicable " 
Answenng the question as to what would be the content of the regime applicable to international 
cnmes was postponed until the consideration of Part Two of the draft articless Yet it was indicated 
in the commentary that, since the acts in question are more senous than others, they should entail 
more severe legal consequences6 While attention has been devoted mainly to the subjects entitled to 
REPARATION 123 
act and the kind of measures they could resort to, it was recognized later on that the area of repara-
tion also lent itself to the forwarding of more demanding claims by injured subjects7 
The Permanent Court has held in the past that " 
"It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obliga-
tion to make reparation m an adequate form." 
The reparation provided by an author State should always be adequate to remedy the internationally 
wrongful act Since the distinction established by the Commission is intended to be of normative 
character, the consequences of crimes should be more severe than those of delicts Meaning of 
course that the new, more far-reaching, obligations which are, in addition, imposed on an author 
State of a crime cannot also be imposed on the author State of a delict That is not to say that the 
general forms of reparation ought to be different, but rather that the scope of the obligations imposed 
under the rules of a specific form of reparation will be more extensive The special or supplementary 
consequences that attach to international crimes in the field of reparation constitute the subject-
matter of this chapter 
The present chapter will first of all devote some arguments to the basis and nature of reparation 
It will continue to examine the various forms of reparation in sections 3 to 7, namely cessation, resti-
tution, compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees against repetition Section 8 finally will focus on a 
number of restrictions that may, or may not, apply regarding the exercise of rights of reparation 
3.2. The basis and nature of reparation 
3 2 1 The basis of reparation obligation and/or right 
What is the essence of reparation and on what basis does one conclude to the existence of an obliga-
tion to provide reparation? The fundamental answer to these questions seems to lie with that so often 
quoted dictum of the Permanent Court in the Chorzów Factory Case9 
"The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which 
seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the il-
legal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum cor-
responding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear, the award, if need be, of dam-
ages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place 
of it - such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation 
due for an act contrary to international law " 
The Permanent Court here observes that the essential principle of reparation is that it "must, as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, 
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed" Indeed it considers this principle 
to be "contained in the actual notion of an illegal act" If we relate this stance to some of the 
opinions expressed in chapter one, it may be said that law always desires that a certain specified 
situation exists, and that a certain course of conduct is followed by those subjected to the law Thus 
the existence of an act not in conformity with what is required of a subject of law under an obligation 
ofthat subject leads to the conclusion that the course of conduct desired by the law is not realized in 
actual fact and that an illegal act, or in international law an internationally wrongful act, has taken 
place10 The law, of course, cannot remain indifferent to illegal acts, and consequently contemplates a 
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strategy in order that the objective desired by it shall nevertheless be accomplished. Since law in 
general is focused on the peaceful settlement of disputes (such settlement to be proceeded with in 
accordance with the substantial rules applicable to the dispute), it does not resort immediately to the 
enforcement procedures at its disposal, but first interposes an obligation on the author of the illegal 
act to redress the wrong committed. And if such redress by the author is provided on an expedient 
basis, the author of an illegal act may prevent the occurrence of further consequences contemplated 
by law. One may note on this account that for instance Arangio-Ruiz remarked, in the context of the 
obligation to discontinue an internationally wrongful act, that:" 
"(...) there is a chance that the wrongdoer will realize the illegality of its behaviour and the 
obligation to correct it;" 
Having reached this point it becomes necessary to reflect a bit more on the choice of the Com-
mission to opt for (as a matter of drafting technique) coaching the issue of reparation in terms of 
rights of the injured State.12 The Commission of course recognizes that the rights of the injured State 
stand against the obligations of the author State. However, though recognizing the correlation that 
exists in this respect, it seems that the Commission tends to conceal a fundamental misconception re-
garding the basis of responsibility, as well as that of reparation. The Commission observed in its 
commentary to the provision on cessation of wrongful conduct:13 
"Whereas, as far as the various forms of reparation are concerned, the preference for a formu-
lation in terms of rights of the injured State is justified in view of the fact that it is by decision 
of the injured State that a secondary set of legal relations is set in motion." 
While it is clear that through the decision of an injured State to press a claim against the author State 
secondary legal machinery may be set into motion (although that might also result from the initiative 
of the author State), that is not exactly the same thing as saying that the secondary legal relationship 
would not come into existence if the injured State were not to press any claim. And that is exactly 
what the Commission is saying here. 
Considering article 1, Part One, of the ILC-draft, it seems somewhat strange to insist that the sec-
ondary relationship between an author State and injured State (or organization) would not come into 
existence in the absence of a claim for reparation on the part of the injured State. Article 1, Part One, 
stipulates that: 
"Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State." 
Thus it is premised on the idea that where there is an internationally wrongful act, there will also be, 
on the part of the author State, ipso jure, incurred international responsibility.1" Taking the con-
struction proposed by the Commission as a starting-point, that would lead to the conclusion that a 
State would be responsible, but would nevertheless not be obliged to do anything in response to that 
responsibility unless an injured subject would press a claim. Indeed secondary obligations would not 
come into existence on the basis of the legal rules on responsibility, but on the basis of the voluntary 
decision of an injured subject. One may ask however on what basis an injured subject would be enti-
tled to claim reparation if not on the basis of a pre-existing right to demand such reparation. Other-
wise one would have to say that an injured subject would have the power to unilaterally create its 
own right. Yet rights are ordinarily created through the operation of rules of law. And if one con-
cludes to the existence of a pre-existing right to demand reparation, one also has to conclude to the 
existence of a corresponding obligation on the part of the author State to provide such reparation. 
Thus there would come into existence secondary legal relationships, meaning new correlated obliga-
tions and rights, even before any injured subject would press a claim for reparation.15 
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Now article 1, Part Two, of the ILC-draft adds to the premise of article 1, Part One, that 
"The international responsibility of a State which, pursuant to the provisions of part 1, arises 
from an internationally wrongful act committed by that State, entails legal consequences as 
set out in the present part " 
Again terminology in this article leads to a conclusion opposite to that of the Commission The inter-
national responsibility of a State entails legal consequences for that State. Again the rule is phrased in 
objective terms The article does not say that the legal consequences entail because of the decision of 
an injured subject to press a claim for reparation It merely states that legal consequences ensue from 
the fact that a State has incurred international responsibility " The same findings may be deduced 
from the articles provisionally adopted by the Commission so far One may read in articles 6 bis to 
10 bis the phrase "the injured State is entitled to obtain" ,7 It seems somewhat circular to state that a 
State is entitled to obtain, while at the same time asserting that making a claim creates the entitle-
ment 
All these arguments are buttressed especially by considerations related to the issue of interest In 
his second report Arangio-Ruiz discussed the question as from which date (dies a quo) interest 
should be paid by the author State to the injured State '8 In determining the dies a quo he discussed 
three possible positions interest to be paid as from the date of damage, interest to be paid as from 
the date a claim was made, and interest to be paid from the date of the award of the principal dam-
age At the end of his discussion he supports the view that interest should be paid as from the date of 
the damage, and he quotes Brownlie in support 19 
"( ) the dies a quo is the date of the commission of the wrong " 
If that is really the case, it becomes clear that secondary legal relationships come into existence, not 
at the will of the injured State, but from the operation of the law on the date at which the interna-
tionally wrongful act is committed How could there be an obligation on the part of the author State 
to pay interest to the injured State if the two States do not stand in some relation to each other Sec-
ondary legal relationships must have come into existence on the date of the commission of the inter-
nationally wrongful act, and not on the date of a claim by the injured State Otherwise this would 
amount to saying that an obligation is imposed on the author State (since it is under an obligation to 
pay interest as from the day of the internationally wrongful act), even though secondary legal rela-
tionships (based on a claim by the injured State that the author State has committed an internation-
ally wrongful act) have not yet come into existence 
An injured State under article 5, Part Two, will be entitled to invoke the responsibility of the 
author State and demand reparation That position is adequately reflected in article 6 bis, paragraph 
1, Part Two, on delicts, as adopted by the Commission20 
"The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally 
wrongful act full reparation in the form of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and 
assurances and guarantees on non-repetition, as provided in articles 7, 8, 10 and 10 bis, either 
singly or in combination " 
Under article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two, all States are injured States if the internationally wrongful 
act constitutes an international crime Arangio-Ruiz has followed up on this, and posited the right of 
all States to demand reparation, by proposing an article 16, paragraph 1, Part Two, on crimes2I 
"Where an internationally wrongful act of a State is an international crime, every State is en-
titled, subject to the condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below, to demand that the 
State which is committing or has committed the crime should cease its wrongful conduct and 
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provide foil reparation in conformity with articles 6 to 10 bjs, as modified by paragraphs 2 and 
3 below " 
The reference to article 19, paragraph 5, Part Two, subjects cessation and reparation demands to a 
decision of the Court that a crime is, or has been, committed The modifications proposed in para-
graphs 2 and 3 concern the partial relaxation of certain restrictions applicable to restitution in kind, 
satisfaction, and guarantees against repetition. Under this proposal the only safeguard left for an 
author State of an international crime would be the preservation of its existence as an independent 
member of the international community, its territorial integrity, and the vital needs of its people 
While fully agreeing with the right of every State to demand reparation in case of crimes, one would 
have to object, as a matter of legal principle, to the implications deriving from this text It may be 
noted that the right of States to demand reparation is subjected to a prior determination of the exis-
tence of a crime under article 19, paragraph 5, Part Two. In effect this means that injured States can-
not exercise their right to demand reparation until after the Court's determination While the right to 
resort to countermeasures in case of delicts will most likely be subjected, in one way or another, to 
dispute settlement procedures, the right of an injured State to demand reparation exists and can be 
exercised in case of delicts as soon as an internationally wrongful act has been committed The idea 
of differentiating two régimes of responsibility applicable to respectively delicts and crimes is grafted 
upon the idea that aggravated consequences for the author State will be instituted under the latter If 
the right to demand reparation in case of crimes is subordinated to a prior determination by the 
Court, this amounts to imposing more stringent conditions for injured States in case of crimes than 
are applicable in case of delicts 
Furthermore, the proposed article 19, paragraph 5, Part Two, states that the Court's determination 
will fulfil the condition for implementation of the special or supplementary legal consequences as 
contemplated in articles 16 to 18. Yet article 16, paragraph 1, provides that after that determination 
States will be entitled to demand cessation and reparation. Yet, as will be seen hereafter, not all the 
forms of reparation constitute aggravated consequences of the commission of a crime There is thus 
a discrepancy between the texts of article 16, paragraph 1, and article 19, paragraph 5, Part Two 
From a practical point of view, moreover, this means that the exercise of the right to demand repara-
tion will be possible only after the termination of full-fledged contentious proceedings before the 
Court22 Taking into account the length of such proceedings generally, this might imply that the ex-
ercise of the right to demand reparation could take place only after a period of time ranging between, 
probably, one to five years However, the purpose of attaching aggravated consequences to interna-
tional crimes lies with the need for more effective suppression of the crime Certainly that purpose 
cannot be accomplished by subordinating the exercise of the right to demand reparation to a prior 
determination of the existence of a crime by the Court 
It may be observed, in conclusion, that a State which has committed an internationally wrongful 
act will incur international responsibility In order to absolve itself from that responsibility it will have 
to provide reparation to the injured State(s) Any injured State in the sense of article 5, Part Two, 
should have the right to demand reparation, whether in case of delicts or in case of crimes, as from 
the moment the wrongful act was committed 
3 2 2 The nature of reparation reparatory and/or punitive traits 
Another important issue to be discussed concerns the hotly debated question whether reparation is of 
reparatory character or whether it also has punitive character Although the question is ordinarily 
asked more in connection to the question whether countermeasures or sanctions should be seen as 
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punitive measures, the question nevertheless has to be raised also in regard to the subject of repara-
tion. 
The preliminary question, however, is what should be understood by the reparatory character of 
reparation and what should be understood by the punitive character of reparation. It does not fully 
make sense to assert that anything going beyond repairing the wrongful act should be considered to 
constitute punishment. Because at this point one defines the one element only in connection to the 
other, without giving a definition of that other element. So in order to determine the character of 
reparation one has to define what is meant by reparatory traits as well as punitive traits of reparation. 
As to this preliminary question it seems that its answer must lie with the object pursued by repa-
ration in a temporal sense. The Permanent Court observed in the Chorzów Factory Case that repara-
tion must "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, 
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed." As may be noted from this formu-
lation, the object of reparation, according to the Permanent Court, is to eliminate all those conse-
quences which flow from a wrongful act, that is to say to eliminate all those consequences which 
flow from an act committed in the past. The goal of reparation, in the strict sense, is to undo what 
has been done. Indeed, the Permanent Court after having defined the forms which were to implement 
this basic premise, specified that reparation should consist of "Restitution in kind, or, if this is not 
possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or 
payment in place of it -". It cannot but be noted that there is no mention whatsoever of those forms 
of reparation which are commonly understood to fall under the category of satisfaction. And espe-
cially those forms could be said to be directed, not towards past acts and any consequences flowing 
therefrom, but towards the potential commission, in the future, of similar or identical internationally 
wrongful acts. 
However, one would be simplifying matters unduly by claiming that punishment could not be di-
rected at past acts. Punishment is directed at the past, even if it would ordinarily take away the exis-
tence or restrict the freedom of an author of a wrongful act, or compel it to make a financial 
contribution in the near or distant future. But the essential characteristic of reparation in the strict 
sense is that its goal consists of establishing the situation that would have existed had the wrongful 
act not taken place. The measures ordinarily resorted to under the heading of punishment do not in 
any way contribute to that goal, and hence are to be considered as retribution for wrongful conduct. 
It is on that basis one has to view statements to the effect that anything going beyond restitution and 
compensation would constitute punishment. It is therefore proper to discuss here in more detail 
those forms of reparation called satisfaction, in particular punitive damages, and guarantees against 
repetition. 
The frequent use of the phrase punitive damages was commented upon as follows in the Lusitania 
Award:23 
"The words 'exemplary,' 'vindictive' or 'punitive' as applied to damages were misnomers. 
The fundamental concept of 'damages' is satisfaction, reparation for a loss suffered; a judi-
cially ascertained compensation for wrong. The remedy should be commensurate with the 
loss. The superimposing of a penalty in addition to full compensation and naming it damages, 
with the qualifying word exemplary, vindictive or punitive, was a confusion of terms, inevita-
bly leading to confusion of thought." 
The confusion of thought to which the mixed commission refers appears to be the link made between 
the concepts of punishment and of damages. As follows from this quote damages are intended to 
provide redress to an injured party as a consequence of a wrongful act, whereas penalties are 
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conceived either as retribution for the wrongful act in question or as means to prevent, generally or 
specifically, the commission of similar wrongful acts While the grant of compensation presupposes 
the existence of ascertainable damage, the grant of punitive damages would amount to compensation 
for non-existent damage, that is, really a penalty. 
It is on this account that the mixed commission stated that " 
"( ) as between sovereign nations the question of the right and power to impose penalties, 
unlimited in amount, is political rather than legal in its nature, and therefore not a subject 
within the jurisdiction of this Commission." 
The reason that the imposition of penalties would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the commission 
is that the question of right and power to do so involves a political question, meaning of course that 
there did not exist any legal rule at the time providing for so-called punitive damages The fact, 
however, that there is, or was, no such rule of international law providing for the imposition of 
penalties on States should not obscure the additional fact that there has been a trend to grant com-
pensatory relief to injured States in excess of the ascertainable damages resulting from the interna-
tionally wrongful act of another State M The circumstance that the amount of compensatory relief 
granted is not reasoned by way of specified categories of damages likewise should not lead us to be-
lieve that therefore the idea of imposing a penalty in some sense is totally absent from the minds of 
those deciding the case 
It may be noted that a certain inconsistency appeared in the text of Arangio-Ruiz' proposed arti-
cle 10, paragraph 1, on satisfaction, which runs27 
"In the measure in which an internationally wrongful act caused to the injured State a moral 
or legal injury not susceptible of remedy by restitution in kind or pecuniary compensation, the 
State which committed the wrongful act is under the obligation to provide the injured State 
with adequate satisfaction in the form of apologies, nominal or punitive damages, punishment 
of the responsible individuals or assurances against repetition, or any combination thereof" 
Is it not strange that there would exist a moral or legal injury "not susceptible of ( ) pecuniary com-
pensation", but even more so that such injury would have to be remedied through the payment by the 
author State of "nominal or punitive damages'"7 Thus the award of punitive damages would appar-
ently not be based on the existence of ascertainable damage, and also would not be susceptible of pe-
cuniary compensation, but would nevertheless lead to the payment of money to the injured State(s)M 
The situation becomes even more confusing if one would consider the possibility of an author State 
having to pay punitive damages to an injured State by reason of the breach of obligations for the 
protection of human rights Such a breach does not inflict any material damage on any State, and one 
would venture to say that payment of punitive damages to one injured State ought to lead then also 
to the payment of punitive damages to all injured States (all those States bound by a multilateral 
treaty or by the rule of customary international law, article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (iii), Part Two of the 
ILC-draft) That however appears to be an untenable proposition The Commission appears to have 
avoided such a far-reaching position by stipulating that in cases of gross infringement of the rights of 
the injured State satisfaction may take the form of damages reflecting the gravity of the infringe-
ment w Before concluding the arguments regarding the alleged punitive traits of reparation some at-
tention has to be devoted to guarantees against repetition 
Often it is asserted that satisfaction serves to provide a remedy for the moral, political or juridical 
injury done to a State M If that is really the case there would be no sufficient argument for saying that 
reparation would involve punitive traits For the redress offered through the method of satisfaction 
would be directed towards the elimination of the wrongful act itself or its consequences, e.g. to the 
elimination ofthat which had happened in the past and which affected another State Therefore one 
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would be justified in claiming that reparation in the broad sense would only encompass functions of 
reparatory character. 
However, that would be jumping to conclusions. First of all it may be noted that most of the forms of 
reparation thus placed under the heading of satisfaction do not seem to address the issue of elimina-
tion of past actions and its consequences, but are rather intended to secure the performance of obli-
gations in the future.31 Thus it may be said that the declaration of illegality, whether or not by the 
author State's acknowledgement of responsibility or by an independent organ, and the expression of 
regrets by the author State, are clearly intended to strengthen the rule in the relations between the 
author State and the injured State. As to the prosecution and punishment of those nationals or agents 
of the State involved in the commission of the internationally wrongful act, that would seem to pres-
ent another example of deterrence of similar acts, rather than to undo the consequences of the 
wrongful act or to compensate the damage suffered by the injured State. While it may be admitted 
that on the level of domestic criminal law the prosecution and punishment of those agents must be 
seen as retribution for their past actions, the same cannot be said for the international sphere where 
the measures are rather directed towards prevention of similar acts by the nationals or agents con-
cerned. 
A second line of argument is the following. It is claimed that the purpose of satisfaction is to provide 
redress for the injured State's moral, political and legal damage.31 At the same time the claim is made 
that guarantees against repetition form part of the category of satisfaction,33 and a very specific ex-
ample is quoted by Arangio-Ruiz from the practice of the human rights committee.34 It is on that ac-
count that one may observe that in case of breaches of obligations for the protection of human rights 
no ascertainable damage is suffered by any of the injured States, nor is there for that matter any 
moral and political damage inflicted upon the injured States. What seems to be left is the statement 
by Anzilotti, and followed by Ago and the Commission, that:3* 
"Le dommage se trouve compris implicitement dans le caractère anti-juridique de l'acte " 
If therefore guarantees against repetition are to be given or taken in the context of breaches of obli-
gations for the protection of human rights, those could only be based on the notion of so-called legal 
damage. Such damage would exist rather on the basis of the existence of an internationally wrongful 
act (with no perceptible difference as to which States would be affected by the act) than on the basis 
that any damage would have been done to any specific State (leaving aside the case that nationals of 
other States would suffer from the act). The more natural meaning to be attached to the phrase 
"guarantees against repetition" is of course that they are intended to present a safeguard against fu-
ture commissions of internationally wrongful acts. In the broad sense they are to be considered a 
consequence of an internationally wrongful act, since guarantees could not be demanded in the ab-
sence of such an act. This should not deceive us however. Just like in domestic law acts may have 
both criminal law and civil law consequences,36 acts in international law can produce consequences 
of reparatory nature and consequences of a deterrent nature. 
It is for the above reasons that whenever there is question of the awarding of compensation going 
beyond the actually suffered material damage, it would be quite correct to speak of penalties, and 
thus of punishment, rather than to term them punitive damages. Furthermore, guarantees against 
repetition should not be seen as a remedy for undoing the moral, political or legal damage done, but 
rather as a form of reparation intended to prevent the commission of future wrongful acts, and 
therefore endowed with deterrent character. 
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3.3. Cessation of internationally wrongful acts 
The first form of reparation to be discussed concerns that of cessation of the internationally wrongful 
act In this context some arguments will first be devoted to the role of protest. 
3 3 1 The role of protest 
The Commission, arguing that cessation should be phrased by way of obligation for the author State, 
noted 
"Given the inorganic structure of inter-State society, the norms of international law developed 
by States themselves are vulnerable, being exposed to destruction as a result of breaches of 
those norms by States The significance of cessation of a wrongful act goes beyond the level 
of bilateral relations to the level of relations between wrongdoers and all the other States and 
members of the international community " 
As has been observed in chapter one, all States have an interest in the performance of obligations by 
other States, though, as has also been indicated, such an interest cannot provide the basis for con-
cluding that they are also in possession of a legal interest Nevertheless it may be asserted that it is 
possible for each and every State to protest against any conduct considered by it to amount to an in-
ternationally wrongful act3e Indeed, as is made clear by McCaffrey, such a protest may be imperative 
in two senses M 
"Satisfaction was a remedy against moral damage, but its most significant purpose was to 
reaffirm respect for the rule of law which had been breached It should be remembered that 
such a breach could be constitutive of practice In the absence of any protest it could ripen 
into permission or ultimately even into a custom It was therefore essential for it to be chal-
lenged by another State In that situation, satisfaction reaffirmed the existence of the obliga-
tion which had been breached and ruled out acquiescence " 
First, it may be deduced that protesting certain behaviour will prevent the establishment or modifica-
tion of a rule of customary international law By protesting States indicate their belief that there is no 
legal ground for considering the act to be part of a general practice accepted as a law Secondly, 
protest by a certain State may prevent a situation arising in which the author State could claim that 
that (injured) State had concurred in or accepted the act Thus protesting would prevent an injured 
State from any possible loss of right to demand reparation from the author State of an internationally 
wrongful act A distinction, however, has to be made as to whether the protesting State is an injured 
State under the relevant rules of State responsibility, or whether it does not possess that capacity *" 
Whenever a State is not an injured State, a protest by that State can only serve as a reminder to 
the author State of the state of international law as perceived by it. Arangio-Ruiz appears to take a 
broader view, as he states that cessation4l 
"( ) serves the interest of putting an end to a violation of international which is in progress 
Such an interest is not confined to the injured State or States and it acquires not infrequently, 
considering the organic structure of inter-State society, a very considerable dimension ( ) It 
increases, as shown by current examples, with the gravity of the delict or crime in progress " 
One could say, as far as delicts are concerned, that he apparently considers all States to have an in-
terest, but perhaps even a right to demand cessation notwithstanding that they are not injured States 
No State, which is not an injured State in respect of the same internationally wrongful act, may in-
volve itself in the relationship that exists between the author State and the injured State Therefore 
the protest should only be phrased in such a manner that it adequately reflects the position of the 
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protesting State on the existence, application or interpretation of the rule of international law at 
stake. A non-injured State's protest should not, moreover, amount to support for, or repudiation of, 
the demand, or lack of demand, for reparation made by any injured State. That would be tantamount 
to a prohibited intervention in the external affairs of the author and injured States, for the latter are 
free, subject to any consideration of jus cogens, to decide on any settlement diverging from the gen-
eral régime of State responsibility.42 
The situation is different whenever the protest originates from an injured State. In that case the pro-
test serves, first of all, to allege the existence of an internationally wrongful act on the part of the 
author State. Naturally such a protest by the injured State, taken in isolation, would suffice to estab-
lish its position as to the existence, application or interpretation of any relevant rule of international 
law. It would stand to logic that an injured State would have its protest accompanied also by a de-
mand for reparation. Whether or not the injured State merely protests against the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act, or has such protest accompanied by a demand for reparation, makes no 
difference as to the existence of a right to demand reparation. Because the right to demand repara-
tion, as is in fact the obligation to provide reparation, is created automatically on the basis of the 
secondary rules of State responsibility. The protest alone serves to reaffirm such a right, which, as 
has been pointed out above, comes into existence as soon as an internationally wrongful act is 
committed. Only with the passing of a considerable amount of time after the protest, and coupled to 
inaction on the part of the injured State, could one conclude to any loss of right for the injured State. 
While the foregoing holds insofar as international delicts are concerned, a different situation ob-
tains whenever an international crime is committed.43 Since all States are injured States in case an 
international crime is committed, it follows that their protests will also reaffirm their right to demand 
reparation. Apart from that their status of injured States means that they are under no strain to re-
strict themselves to merely stating their position as to the existence, application or interpretation of 
the rule in question. They can support any claim for reparation made by another State (especially a 
directly injured State) and repudiate the lack of claims by other States. Although it may be said that 
there is no rule of international law providing that States are under an obligation to exercise certain 
rights (leaving aside decisions of the Security Council; article 25 of the Charter),44 still other States 
may urge upon the exercise of such rights. Such action would not constitute a prohibited intervention 
in the external affairs of the author State or other injured States. Indeed, the obligation that is 
breached in case of an international crime flows from a peremptory norm of general international 
law, and that means that no State can either beforehand consent to such breach (article 29, paragraph 
2, Part One, of the ILC-draft), nor can they acquiesce in such a breach.45 
3.3.2. The obligation to discontinue internationally wrongful acts 
Any protest by an injured State will most likely be accompanied or followed by a demand to discon-
tinue the internationally wrongful act in those circumstances where it persists in time. The Commis-
sion has adopted article 6, Part Two, on "cessation of wrongful conduct":46 
"A State whose conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful act having a continuing char-
acter is under the obligation to cease that conduct without prejudice to the responsibility it 
has already occurred." 
With regard to this obligation the Commission has claimed that:47 
"(...) cessation is not a form of reparation but rather the object of an obligation stemming 
from the combination of wrongful conduct in progress and the normative strength of the pri-
mary rule of which the wrongful conduct is held in breach. (...) the obligation to discontinue 
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the wrongful conduct is to be considered not only existent but in actual operation on the mere 
strength of the primary rule, quite independently of any representation or claim on the part of 
the injured State " 
While being m full agreement with the Commission's assessment that no claim by an injured State is 
needed so that the author State is under the obligation to cease the wrongful conduct in question, the 
same cannot be said with regard to its opinion that the obligation to discontinue such conduct is 
based on the primary rule Although it is true that m the strict sense the obligation to cease the 
wrongful conduct is not apt to "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act", still it is possible to 
assert its basic reparatory character by pomting to the fact that it prevents further harm being done 
While of course, in the light of the aim of preventing further harm, cessation of wrongful conduct 
operates in regard to the future, it cannot but be acknowledged that its immediate concern lies with 
the present Clearly the return to legality by the author State means a renewed performance of the 
primary obligation, but its direct and immediate effect is the end of ongoing wrongful conduct Con­
trary therefore to what has been claimed the object of cessation is not a return to legality, but an end 
to illegality * The return to legality marked by the performance of the obligation to discontinue by 
the author State constitutes nothing more than a side-effect, or mirror-effect, of the prime object of 
the obligation to discontinue prevention of further damage by stopping to act wrongfully49 
That there is a marked difference between the two obligations may be shown also by reference to the 
differing object to be achieved by performing the obligation to cease the wrongful conduct For in­
stance, if one takes the rule which provides that diplomats are to be immune from any interference by 
the receiving State, it is clear that it imposes on the receiving State the obligation not to do some­
thing, that is, to abstain from engaging m certain conduct Now if that obligation is breached by the 
receiving State through the arrest and detention of a diplomat for a longer period of time, it becomes 
subject to the obligation to cease its wrongful conduct As long as the diplomat is detained the re­
ceiving State is in breach of its obligation not to interfere with the immunity enjoyed by diplomats, 
but it is also in breach of the obligation to cease any interference But while the first breach is 
brought about by action of the receiving State (detention of the diplomat), the second breach is 
brought about by inaction of the receiving State (non-release of the diplomat) Therefore the obliga­
tion to discontinue internationally wrongful acts is not based on the prolonged operation of any pri­
mary rule of international law, but on the basis of the secondary rules of State responsibility 
Arangio-Ruiz has indicated that the provision on cessation in case of delicts does not need to be 
altered to accommodate the regime of crimesM The obligation to discontinue internationally 
wrongful acts appears to take on importance especially if the internationally wrongful act constitutes 
an international crimeSI That is so because, as has been noted in chapter one, subsection 1 9 2, the 
commission of an international crime always implies the existence of wilful intent on the part of the 
author State Due to such intent an author State mostly will not be willing to depart from its wrong­
ful behaviour, and will tend to choose a recalcitrant stance with regard to those States protesting the 
behaviour and demanding a stop to i t и Clear examples of such a trend are the attitudes of Rhodesia 
and South Africa,53 but also that of Iraq after its invasion of KuwaitM In such cases the States in 
question would appear to be in breach of their obligation under the primary rule, as well as their ob­
ligation under the secondary rule to discontinue their first breach of obligation 
It might be objected that in cases of international crimes the acts in question do not constitute 
continuing internationally wrongful acts, but at the most represent a sequence of internationally 
wrongful acts which, although they have to be seen in relation to each other, nevertheless remain 
distinct 
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Such an argument could especially be made as regards the rule prohibiting a State to commit ag­
gression, as indicated in article 19, paragraph 3, sub (a), Part One of the draft articles, or to use 
military force against the territorial integrity and/or political independence of another State The 
breach of obligation would then be consumed as soon as a military attack by one State did no longer 
encounter any forceful opposition by the other State, even though the military forces of the first 
State controlled part or the whole territory of the second State Since it would no longer be using 
force against the other State, its breach of obligation would have come to an end 5 S The occupation 
that follows does not then constitute a breach of obligation of the primary rule prohibiting the use of 
force against the territorial integrity and/or political independence of States,56 but would rather rep­
resent a breach of the obligation to provide reparation to the injured State эт The occupation consti­
tutes a failure to "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed " It is in fact this failure 
which would seem to trigger the right of an injured State, and obligation of the author State, to cease 
the illegal occupation This right of the injured State (and the correlative obligation of the author 
State) is not grafted upon the obligation to discontinue internationally wrongful acts, but rests upon 
the secondary rule that stipulates the right of the injured State to claim (and the correlative obligation 
of the author State to provide) restitution in kind Only if one were to consider the failure to provide 
restitution in kind as a separate internationally wrongful act could one claim a renewed obligation to 
cease wrongful conductM At the same time it cannot but be noted that that same argument then may 
be made on and on again (ad infinitum) 
The situation is somewhat different with the other international crimes mentioned in article 19, para­
graph 3 Whether one follows the same argument as in the preceding paragraph really depends on the 
formulation of the primary rule of international law does the rule prohibit a State from breaching its 
obligations to respect certain specific human rights of its citizens, or does it prohibit a State from en­
gaging in a policy of breaching its obligations to respect such rights It is clear that it is the system­
atic and wilful character inherent in the commission of particular internationally wrongful acts which 
qualifies them as international crimes To some extent the gravity of the internationally wrongful acts 
is only marginal to that intent But it is submitted that in judging whether a breach of obligation must 
be discontinued one has to look not to the policy maintained by a State, but to the occurrence of ac­
tual conduct contrary to the primary rule 
Taking a look at the specific formulations adopted by the Commission, it cannot but be noted that a 
breach of the rule providing for self-determination of peoples, according to article 19, paragraph 3, 
sub (b), may come about also when colonial domination is maintained by force And as the commen­
tary makes clear the term "by force" means against the will of the people in question " Clearly 
therefore the breach of the obligation under the rule providing for self-determination of peoples is 
continuing in character, and is consequently capable of being discontinued 
A further criterion lies with the basic human rights character of some of the primary rules concerned 
Only when the human rights denial involves a permanent condition for the individuals concerned is 
there a possibility of discontinuance As to the examples mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3, sub 
(c), it is to be noted that slavery implies a permanent condition for the individual subjected to it, and 
therefore the obligation to cease the wrongful conduct would apply to any situation in which a State 
would breach the prohibition The same cannot be said with regard to the example of genocide which 
is based on the denial of the right to life Once that right is taken away from an individual the breach 
is consumed The same argument goes with regard to the rule prohibiting apartheid, which is based 
on the right of individuals to be free from discrimination on the basis of race 
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One issue needs to be discussed, and it concerns the observation of Arangjo-Ruiz to the effect 
that:60 
"(...) any more or less timely discontinuance of a wrongful conduct will have a bearing on the 
quality and quantity of reparation to be made in favour of the injured State." 
From this remark one may deduce that an author State which does not cease acting wrongfully will 
not necessarily aggravate its responsibility. But how about the limitation of responsibility due to dis-
continuance? There can be no doubt that ceasing the wrongful act will limit the quantity of repara-
tion extant upon the commission of an internationally wrongful act, basically because of non-
occurrence of damage.61 But the question is whether discontinuance also has some bearing upon the 
quality of reparation to be provided by the author State. Insofar as some forms of reparation are 
typically intended to restore international legality, to undo what has been done, it may be noted that 
there can be no mitigation of responsibility. Thus the reparation forms restitution and compensation 
may in no way be reduced because of cessation by the author State. It makes sense however to allow 
the other forms of reparation, satisfaction and guarantees against repetition, to be less strictly applied 
in case the author State in a more or less timely fashion recognizes the wrongfulness of its conduct, 
ceases it, and recognizes that it ought to make good for it. Nevertheless it would seem that there is 
no letting up with regard to the author State's obligation, based on the rule to provide satisfaction, to 
prosecute and try those responsible for acts which constitute crimes under the domestic laws in-
volved. 
The obligation to cease wrongful conduct appears to gain importance in case such conduct consti-
tutes an international crime. Yet that is not really so,62 since such belief is based on the confusion 
between the breach of the obligation under the primary rule and the breach of the obligation under 
the secondary rule which stipulates a return to the situation that would have existed had the wrongful 
act not taken place. This brings us to the next section regarding restitution. 
3.4. Restitution 
The second form of reparation to be discussed is restitution, or restitution in kind,63 regarding which 
the Commission adopted article7, Part Two:64 
"The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally 
wrongful act restitution in kind, that is, the re-establishment of the situation that existed be-
fore the wrongful act was committed, (...)." 
The first question concerns the scope of the concept. There is a tendency to equate the idea of resti-
tution to that certain part of the dictum of the Permanent Court in the Chorzów Factory Case which 
stated that reparation must "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed." That ten-
dency has culminated in the two definitions, formulated by the Commission, as proposed by Arangjo-
Ruiz, of restitution in kind. The first focuses on the so-called status quo ante:65 
"(...) restitution in kind would consist in re-establishing the status quo ante, namely the situa-
tion that existed prior to the occurrence of the wrongful act in order to bring the parties' re-
lationship back to its original state." 
The second one is grafted completely on the dictum of the Permanent Court, and would:66 
"(...) understand restitution in kind (...) as the establishment or re-establishment of the situa-
tion that would exist, or would have existed, if the wrongful act had not been committed." 
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This second formulation is more closely drafted on the terms used by the Permanent Court How­
ever, those terms were not in the first place concerned with the definition of restitution in kind, but 
with the content of the obligation to provide reparation It was reparation which had to be apt to 
wipe out all the consequences of the wrongful act, not restitution in kind as such This may be dem­
onstrated by quoting once more (the remainder of) the text ofthat dictum № 
"( ) reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear, the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it ( ) " 
It may be noted that payment of compensation is envisaged not only as a substitute for restitution in 
kind, but also in case restitution in kind would not cover loss sustained Apparently restitution in 
kind would constitute only a first attempt to eliminate the consequences of the wrongful act and to 
establish the situation that would have existed had the wrongful act not taken place If that first at­
tempt has been made and yet not all consequences of wrongful act have been eliminated as a result, 
the second step would be to provide pecuniary compensation for those consequences not eliminated 
as a result of restitution in kind to the injured State On this basis it may be safe to say that the first 
definition is in fact better suited to represent the gist of the Permanent Court's view of the matter " 
The Commission's text of article 7, Part Two, on restitution in kind, appears in line with that view 
An essential question to be answered is whether there exists any discretion, on the part of the 
author State or injured State, as to the choice of forms of reparation To put it differently, is it pos­
sible for either of them to opt either for restitution or compensation? Which one of them could exer­
cise such a right of option, and would the other State in the responsibility relationship be bound by 
it? 
Some of these questions were addressed by Arangio-Ruiz in his Preliminary Report70 He restricted 
himself to a discussion of the question whether the injured State could exercise a right of option 
between restitution and compensation The ratio for such a restriction would seem to be obvious, 
though it would not be superfluous to state it explicitly rather than leave it to implication If a right 
of option were given to the author State of an internationally wrongful act, it would of course 
choose that form of reparation which suited best its own interests71 To some extent already the idea 
of any new substantial right for the author State would be contrary to logic, considering that the sec­
ondary rules are generally intended to provide for rules laying down new rights of the injured States 
and new obligations for the author State As Arangio-Ruiz pointed out,72 the normal course of 
events has been changed by the author State, and it would not seem right if it were to benefit from its 
illegal behaviour (ex injuria jus non oritur). 
In its final remarks on the issue discussed here the Commission quite rightly points to the fact that7Э 
"Restitution in kind is the form of reparation which most closely conforms to the general 
principle of the law of responsibility according to which the author State is bound to 'wipe 
out' all the legal and material consequences of its wrongful act by re-establishing the situation 
that would exist if that act had not been committed, as such it comes foremost before any 
other form of reparation lato sensu and particularly before reparation by equivalent " 
While acknowledging the importance of restitution in the scheme of the forms of reparation, and 
stating that it "comes foremost before any other form of reparation", nevertheless the Commission 
does not grant it any precedence over the other forms of reparation It has claimed that it is unneces­
sary 7 4 ( ) to expressly provide for the injured State's freedom to choose between restitution in kind 
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and compensation." The text of article 8, Part Two, quoted infra at the beginning of section 3.5, 
does not appear to lay down a right to choose. Indeed, such a right would seem to be in contradic-
tion to the Permanent Court's stance in the Chorzów Factory Case,75 where it observed that repara-
tion had to consist of "restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding 
to the value which a restitution in kind would bear;" Apparently the Permanent Court envisaged 
compensation only if restitution would not be possible.76 
Arguing in favour of a right of choice for the injured State Arangio-Ruiz had pointed out further-
more that compensation is always possible, and that only the amount of damages to be paid might 
constitute a problem for the author State.77 Contrary to what has been claimed by Grotius,78 money 
is not the common measure of valuable things. Why admit that the injured State could opt for com-
pensation over restitution if the latter is perfectly possible, and the author State is willing, or at least 
not unwilling, to conform to an obligation in that respect. In the scheme of things such a rule would 
also provide security as to the order of forms of reparation to be accorded by the author State. Thus 
it would be liable to pay compensation only to the extent that restitution would not be possible, or 
not adequate, to provide full reparation to the injured State.79 
Another matter for discussion lies with the notion that the obligation to provide restitution in kind 
would not only involve material restitution but also legal restitution.80 The Commission observed 
that:8' 
"(...) one can hardly conceive a restitution to be effected by a State — whether of territory, 
persons or movable objects — which would involve purely material operations. To return an 
unlawfully occupied or annexed territory, to withdraw a customs line unlawfully advanced, to 
restore to freedom a person unlawfully arrested and detained, or to re-establish in their 
homeland a group of persons unlawfully expelled and expropriated, legal provision must be 
made at the constitutional, legislative, judicial and/or administrative level. From that view-
point restitutio will be essentially 'legal'. Material restitutio will merely be in such cases a 
translation into facts of legal provisions. (...) In practice, any international restitution in kind 
will be an essentially juridical restitutio within the legal system of the author State, accompa-
nying or preceding material restitutio." 
However, the fact that an author State will, for purely domestic reasons, be compelled to undertake 
certain changes in its domestic legal system in order that it be possible for it to comply with an obli-
gation to release and return persons,82 property,83 or territory,84 is irrelevant from the international 
point of view. As the Commission and Arangio-Ruiz point out, from the viewpoint of international 
law domestic legal provisions or decisions are considered to be mere facts.85 They conclude from this 
that the distinction between material and legal restitutio stresses no more than:86 
"(...) the different kinds of operations which the organs of the author State should cany out in 
order to achieve restitution in kind. (...) It follows that, as a rule, material and legal restitutio 
should be viewed not so much as different remedies but as distinct aspects of one and the 
same remedy." 
The point to be made here is that while it may be true that it is, or may be, practically impossible for 
an author State to provide restitution without some legal provision or decision in its domestic legal 
system, that does not mean that consequently there is a rule of international law that material restitu-
tion should necessarily be accompanied by legal restitution. 
This may be illustrated by the example, also mentioned by the Commission and Arangio-Ruiz, of the 
restitution of territory. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the Security Council demanded, by way of 
resolution 660, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops to the positions held at 1 August 1990. No reference 
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can be found in that resolution to the need of any legal decision or provision under Iraq's domestic 
legal system. Only after Iraq's decision to establish a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Ku-
wait did the Security Council, through resolution 662, decide that any annexation of Kuwait had no 
legal validity, and was considered null and void. Only on that basis, international invalidity it seems, 
did the Security Council then demand that "Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait".87 
There can be little doubt that it is perfectly possible to engage in the restitution of persons, property 
or territory without any effectuation of so-called legal restitution. Indeed, the argument can be made 
more forcefully to the extent that the commission of internationally wrongful acts need not be based 
on any legal provision within the domestic system. If one looks at the rules of attribution laid down 
in part one of the draft articles on State responsibility, it cannot be overlooked that a number of them 
concern the commission of acts by agents acting ultra vires their competence, or even the commis-
sion of acts by individuals acting on behalf of the State. If acts by such agents or individuals would 
involve the detention of nationals of other States,88 no domestic legal provision would justify the 
conduct in question (there may even exist rules of criminal law prohibiting the conduct in question) 
and no legal provision would need to be changed on account of such acts. Thus the so-called legal 
restitution should rather be seen in the light of guarantees against the repetition of wrongful acts (on 
which more in section 3.7). For if a legal provision were to remain into force, unmodified, even 
though it constituted the constitutive basis for the commission of an internationally wrongful act, 
repetition of the wrongful conduct in question could not be ruled out. Indeed, the domestic legal 
system of the author State might not even be such as to prevent its nationals or citizens from enforc-
ing such legal provisions as against the injured State or its nationals.89 
As to the régime of international crimes Arangio-Ruiz has proposed the deletion of some of the 
restrictions applicable to restitution in case of delicts.90 Those will be discussed in section 3.8, and at 
appropriate places. It may be convenient to start off here with the preceding subject, that of the 
question of choice by the injured State. For at this point it may be noted that Arangio-Ruiz claims, 
also as regards international delicts, that:91 
"Whenever restitutio was due by the author State for a violation of an imperative rule or, 
more generally, of a rule setting forth an erga omnes obligation, it could not be renounced (in 
favour of pecuniary compensation) by the directly injured State or States. In such a situation 
the only proper response should be to place upon the author State the obligation to provide 
full restitution in kind." 
It is not quite clear why it should not be possible for the directly injured State to opt for 
compensation in such cases. It is obvious that only a State which suffers any kind of damage or loss 
will be in a position to claim either restitution or compensation. The other (non-directly) injured 
States do not have any interest of their own, as such, in restitution or compensation, since they will 
not benefit in any way from either. The only interest they have, at that point, will be the restoration 
of legality through discontinuance of the wrongful act(s), as well as guarantees against repetition. 
Any interest they have as regards restitution, compensation or satisfaction boils down to the author 
State's performance of its obligations in that respect towards the directly injured State and the 
reaffirmation of the rule as a consequence of that performance. It is hard to see why the (directly) 
injured State would ordinarily have a free choice, but not so in cases of breaches of obligations under 
peremptory norms or breaches of obligations erga omnes. Of course it is hard to see anyway why it 
should have a free choice between restitution and compensation to begin with. The fact that 
restitution in kind has in actual practice mostly been displaced by compensation in favour of the 
injured State does not mean that the injured State would not have the option of insisting on 
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restitution in kind, and correspondingly that the injured State could refuse an offer of restitution in 
kind by the author State и An exception could at the most be made with regard to the restitution of 
property to the extent that such property would have been considerably reduced in value since the 
time the internationally wrongful act had been committed и But where restitution is possible without 
any significant decrease in value, it should be considered the basic obligation imposed on the author 
State as a consequence of its wrongful act 
While there would not seem to be any reason for claiming a different rule as to restitution appli­
cable in case of international delicts, the situation mainly differs because of the magnitude inherent in 
the commission of an international crime and the importance of the rules concerned м It is on that 
basis that one would insist, as a matter of principle, on an absolute obligation for the author State to 
release and/or return persons, property or territory ** That restitution in kind should be given prece­
dence over compensation may be demonstrated especially with reference to the international crime of 
aggression If hostilities cease and the State initiating the attack remains in control over (part of) the 
territory of the other State, all injured States obtain the right to claim a return of the territory con­
cerned to the directly injured State Any settlement between the author State and the directly injured 
State providing for a transfer of territory from the first to the second thus would seem to come up 
against the rights of the other injured States Generally such a transfer would be unacceptable also on 
the basis of the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur, and even an agreed amount of compensation be­
tween the two States, as a sort of quid pro quo, would not seem to be satisfactory considering that 
such an agreement would most likely fall under article 52 of the Vienna Convention 
As to the crime of aggression one may note that in the past peace treaties between the 
(previously) warring States have tended to include provisions on restitution "* However, generally 
such treaties have been imposed by the victor State on the defeated State ' 7 For that reason one can­
not regard them, at least not without hesitation, as an implementation of the responsibility of the ag­
gressor State Furthermore, the aggressor State may have been victorious in battle, and have 
imposed the treaty on the injured State To a large extent this possibility explains the creation in in­
ternational law of the rule prohibiting recourse to the use of armed force, as well as the corollary rule 
that imposes the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means only And equally for 
such reasons a collective peace and security system has been agreed to in the Charter, so that the 
military more powerful State could not impose its will on a weaker State 
A perfect example of the recent past may illustrate the point regarding restitution and it concerns the 
Iraq-Kuwait crisis In relation to that crisis the Security Council has taken the opportunity to claim 
restitution from Iraq as to territory, Kuwaiti nationals, third State nationals, Kuwaiti property, pris­
oners of war, as well as the remains of deceased Kuwaiti or third State nationals and prisoners of 
war
9 8 
With regard to the crime constituting a denial of self-determination, the primary goal of restitution 
will be the transfer of power, control or sovereignty to the people concerned Such transfer of terri­
tory should of course be complete In this regard complications are bound to occur and as an exam­
ple one may mention the way in which the people living in that part of the territory of Cameroon 
under British administration exercised their right While the people living in the southern part of the 
territory voted in favour of joining the Republic of Cameroon, the people of the northern part later 
on voted to join Nigeria The General Assembly finalized these elections by terminating the Trustee­
ship Agreement with the United Kingdom in resolution 1608 (XV) The Republic of Cameroon, 
voting against said resolution, then brought a case against the United Kingdom before the Court, 
claiming that the latter had breached the Trusteeship Agreement by administering the northern part 
of the territory as a part of the British Protectorate of Nigeria." Due to the fact that the breaches 
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claimed to exist had been consummated, so observes Cameroon, it could not claim restitutio in inte­
grum. For that reason it restricted itself to claim a finding by the Court that the Administering 
Authority had committed breaches of the Trusteeship Agreement.ιβ0 The Court found however that 
any judgment it might pronounce would be without object, since the only relief asked of the Court 
was a declaratory judgment. It therefore held that it could not adjudicate upon the merits of the 
claim."" 
The crimes of slavery, genocide and apartheid are generally not committed in any way within a bilat­
eral relationship of States. The factual victims of the crimes are the population of a State, and a claim 
for restitution will focus on the individuals suffering from the wrongful conduct. In the case of slav­
ery clearly the remedy of restitution is inapplicable, since remedying the situation involves a release 
of the individuals so held and constitutes cessation. However, it is obvious that genocide involves ir­
reparable damage for the individual, since a life taken away can never be returned. As to the crime of 
apartheid, restitution may take on a multitude of forms, depending on the kind of human rights obli­
gation breached. But again it is clear that some breaches cannot be remedied by restitution, such as 
those constituting the wrongful killing of individuals for their opposition to the policies of the State. 
In conclusion it may be said that restitution constitutes the primary form of reparation for any 
kind of internationally wrongful act, and as such takes precedence over compensation. With regard 
to international crimes, it may be said that it can be effected most easily in relation to the crimes tak­
ing place within a bilateral context. As to the crimes based on breaches of human rights obligations, 
it may observed that the possibility of restitution depends on the nature of the human right involved. 
3.5. Compensation 
The Commission has adopted article 8, Part Two, on compensation:1*2 
" 1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an interna­
tionally wrongful act compensation for the damage caused by that act, if and to the extent 
that the damage is not made good by restitution in kind. 
2. For the purposes of the present article, compensation covers any economically assessable 
damage sustained by the injured State, and may include interest and, where appropriate, 
loss of profits." 
It may be opportune, first of all, to start off by repeating the stance taken in the previous section, and 
which appears to be enshrined in the text, to the effect that the compensation form of reparation 
ought only to be seen as a complement to, or substitute of, restitution. Thus, as a matter of legal 
principle, compensation is due to the injured State only if restitution is not possible (or only partially 
so).103 On the other hand it may be noted that restitution need not adequately remedy all of the dam­
age done by an internationally wrongful act. For that reason, as paragraph 2 shows, the author State 
may also be under an obligation to pay compensation for lucrum cessans,104 and to pay interest on 
the sum due for reparation.105 
The only viable exception to the primacy of restitution in the scheme of reparation forms is when 
both the author State and injured State come to agree on a settlement involving compensation rather 
than restitution. In such a scheme neither State can impose its will on the other. The injured State 
can insist on restitution, which then could not be refused by the author State. But the author State 
could make an offer of restitution, which the injured State in rum could not refuse. Only their com­
bined will then can result in a choice for compensation as a means to put an end to the responsibility 
of the author State. 
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Regarding the definition and function of compensation the Commission has stated that the phrase 
"economically assessable damage" covers:106 
"(i) damage caused to the State's territory in general, to its organization in a broad sense, its 
property at home and abroad, its military installations, diplomatic premises, ships, aircraft, 
spacecraft, etc. (so-called 'direct' damage to the State); and 
(ii) damage caused to the State through the persons, physical or juridical, of its nationals or 
agents (so-called 'indirect' damage to the State)." 
And the Commission specified later on:107 
"The role of compensation is to fill in any gaps, large, small or minimal which may be left in 
full reparation by the noted frequent inadequacy of restitution in kind." 
At this point it becomes necessary to discuss the question whether injured States, in the presence 
of a directly injured State, can claim any form of reparation, notably compensation, or whether they 
can only claim cessation, restitution, satisfaction or guarantees against repetition.108 
Insofar as there exists a directly injured State this would seem to indicate that non-directly injured 
States are all entitled to support the claims of the directly injured State. But even if the directly in-
jured State does not press any claim, they could still claim from the author State that it provide repa-
ration to the directly injured State. Even a directly injured State's opposition would not suffice to 
take away the basis, their injured State status, for their claims of reparation.109 The argument for that 
stance may be found with the already noted principle (section 3.3.1) that no State can consent to the 
breach of obligations under a peremptory norm, nor acquiesce in it. It is not to be expected, how-
ever, that a directly injured State will object to the support given by non-directly injured States as 
against the author State. 
The situation is somewhat different when the breach of obligations does not lead to any State being 
specifically affected by it. The absence of any directly injured State is particularly obvious in case of 
breaches of human rights obligations. In such cases it might be said that the interest of the injured 
States lies with discontinuance of ongoing breaches, restitution in some instances, as well as with the 
prevention of future breaches. The question then is whether injured States are also in a position to 
claim substitute or complementary compensation, or satisfaction, in those cases where the breach has 
already been consumed, or where restitution would not be possible or sufficient to provide complete 
reparation. Again the answer appears to lie with the pronouncement of the Permanent Court to the 
effect that reparation "must wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act", and further that repara-
tion ought to consist of "restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum correspond-
ing to the value which a restitution in kind would bear". On this basis it is safe to say that the author 
State cannot escape its responsibility by merely discontinuing its wrongful conduct and the release, 
as a kind of restitution, of individuals. It will also be under the obligation, insofar as irreparable harm 
has been done, to provide compensation in case of breaches of human rights obligations.'10 The same 
example of arbitrary detention may be mentioned. In such a case compensation ought to be granted 
for the time spent by an individual arbitrarily detained. Damage may include loss of labour pay, 
physical abuse, etc. Such compensation should be paid, not to the injured States, but to the victims. 
It would be unnecessarily cumbersome to redirect any compensation through the injured States to 
the nationals of the author State. 
As a general observation regarding the compensation régime applicable to international crimes it 
may be noted that Arangio-Ruiz does not envisage any modifications of the consequences applicable 
to delicts.111 
With regard to the specific crimes it may be mentioned first of all that the crime of aggression may 
eventually lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty settling among others the amount of, or the 
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procedures for determining the extent of, compensation to be paid. In principle the obligation to 
compensate encompasses all damages caused as a result of the aggression, and not merely damages 
caused by internationally wrongful acts after the beginning of the armed conflict.112 Thus 
responsibility is incurred principally on the basis of the original internationally wrongful act, the 
crime of aggression, and it is extended to cover breaches of humanitarian law. But although an 
armed conflict may end with the conclusion of a peace treaty, that is by no means to say that a peace 
treaty is necessary in order to conclude to the existence of an obligation to compensate.113 But in 
general it can be said that some agreement would seem to be required for the determination of the 
scope and extent of the obligation to compensate. 
At this point attention needs to be drawn to a re-orientation114 with regard to the application of the 
rules on reparation as a result of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Indeed, by now it has become clear that 
the Security Council is in position to determine, by way of binding resolution,115 that reparation is 
due as the result of aggression. Thus the Security Council, in resolution 687, operative paragraph 16, 
made the following statement: 
"Reaffirms that Iraq, (...), is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, includ-
ing environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Gov-
ernments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait;" 
This statement as such does not present any novel feature with regard to the obligation to provide 
compensation. But the Security Council went on, in resolution 692, to create a Fund for compensa-
tion purposes and a Commission to administer that Fund.116 The novelty of all this lies with the man-
ner in which the Fund is to be financed. In order to ensure proper financing the Security Council 
determined that Iraq was to contribute to the Fund a certain percentage of its petroleum (products) 
export value.117 And in resolution 706 the Security Council authorized the purchase by States of pe-
troleum or petroleum products from Iraq up to an amount of 1.6 billion dollars, the amount of such 
purchases to be paid, directly, into an escrow account of the United Nations. In this manner the Se-
curity Council ensured that no evasion of paying the required percentage was possible, since pay-
ment into the account will be effectuated through the States in which the purchases are made.118 
Clearly such a procedure sets a powerful precedent for the effective enforcement of any compensa-
tion claim as a result of a committed crime of aggression. Resolution 687 will clearly be binding upon 
members of the United Nations generally, since it constitutes a decision in the sense of article 25 of 
the Charter. Consequently Iraq is also bound by the Security Council's decisions. Of course the Se-
curity Council, in its determination of Iraq's responsibility, acts, not as a judicial organ, but as a party 
to the dispute or at least, to some extent, as a champion for Kuwait and other States.119 Paraphrasing 
the Permanent Court's wording in the Mavrommatis Case,12' the Security Council, by taking up the 
claims of its members, is in reality asserting its right to ensure, in the person of its members, respect 
for the rules of international law. It may be noted that at the end of resolution 687, the Council 
conditioned the entry into force of a cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition forces on Iraq's accep-
tance of the provisions of resolution 687. Already earlier, in resolution 686, the Security Council had 
demanded that Iraq should: 
"Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising 
in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the 
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;" 
Nevertheless it is to be noted that the way in which the Fund is to be financed, though not directly 
imposed on Iraq, testifies to a highly creative and innovative manner of enforcement of compensation 
claims. 
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Insofar as the other international crimes are concerned, their end does not seem to be followed by 
any agreement on the settlement of compensation claims.121 Apparently greater importance is at-
tached to the cessation of the internationally wrongful acts concerned, restitution and guarantees 
against their repetition. One issue that arises in this respect is the claim of Graefrath that some States 
are under the obligation to provide compensation to the peoples of South Africa and Namibia for 
having been the accomplices of the apartheid régime.121 It is certainly undeniable that States com-
mitting an international crime are under an obligation to provide reparation to the injured subject. 
But such an obligation is in fact an impossibility when the international crime concerned escapes the 
bilateralism of inter-State relations, and consists of breaches of human rights obligations pure and 
simple. The acts of genocide committed in Cambodia gave rise to the responsibility ofthat State. At 
the most one could defend the view that other States could insist on the establishment of some fund 
to compensate the victims. It is more complicated to assert responsibility for complicity. In article 
27, Part One, of the draft articles the Commission has laid down the rule that a State rendering aid or 
assistance to another State which is acting wrongfully shall commit its own wrongful act only if such 
aid or support is rendered for the commission of the wrongful act. And it specified in the commen-
tary that:123 
"(...) the participation referred to in this article does not relate to cases in which the conduct 
of a State takes the form, not of actions or omissions intended to make it possible or easier 
for another State to commit an internationally wrongful act, but rather of action specifically 
intended to effect, with another State or other States, the breach of a given international obli-
gation." 
The burden of proof inherent in this stance would seem to require then that it is established that aid 
or assistance was rendered to another State with intent to commit a breach of a specific obligation.124 
Considering the notoriety inherent in the commission of international crimes, one would have to say 
that the criteria set by the Commission are too strict.125 One should establish therefore (especially 
with regard to those crimes which of necessity are committed through the use of armed force against 
another State or against the population, whether or not there is opposition to such acts) that aid or 
assistance in the form of arms or military materiel rendered to a State committing an international 
crime will constitute an act of complicity and may entail a complementary obligation to provide 
compensation to the injured subject(s). 
3.6. Satisfaction 
Of old there has been a tendency to describe satisfaction as reparation for the moral, political or legal 
damage caused as a result of an internationally wrongful act.126 At times it has also been considered 
to be apt to remedy breaches of obligation committed against the honour, dignity or prestige of 
States.127 As observed in chapter one, subsection 1.5.4, the terms moral and legal damage are quite 
inapt to be used as criteria to determine the legal interests of States. For the same reasons they are 
inapt to explain the existence of that category of reparation named satisfaction. Because in reality 
moral damage can only result from the breach of moral demands, and legal damage, since it is con-
sidered to be present upon the commission of any breach of obligation, cannot be distinguished from 
the illegal act itself. Also anything which is reparable in character and for which specific forms of 
reparation exist (chapter one, subsection 1.5.4) could be seen to constitute legal damage. Thus the 
ratio for the existence of the category of satisfaction is that an injured State will be gratified by ac-
knowledgement of the wrongfulness of an act, the expression of regrets or apologies, saluting of 
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flags, by seeing culprits punished, or by receiving money in excess of compensation due for the ma-
terial damages. But of course such satisfaction may result already from the fact that an author State 
discontinues its wrongful act, returns persons, property or territory, or provides compensation.128 In 
all those cases there is some form of acknowledgement, if only implicitly, of the wrongfulness of the 
acts.129 It would therefore be more accurate to adhere to the stance that all the specific manifesta-
tions of satisfaction, in one way or the other, serve as a guarantee against repetition. In a somewhat 
more limited way Graefrath explains with regard to satisfaction:130 
"I tend not to relate satisfaction only to moral or political damage. It seems to me that it 
would be more precise to understand as satisfaction all measures taken by the author State of 
an internationally wrongful act to affirm the existence of the affected obligation and to pre-
vent continuation or repetition of the wrongful act." 
The argument here may be extended to cover not only satisfaction, but also the other forms of repa-
ration, restitution in kind and compensation. In the event the author State provides reparation, leav-
ing aside here the question of ex gratia payments, this tends to affirm the existence of the obligation 
and thus offers a guarantee against repetition. Nevertheless the idea of the provision of guarantees 
against repetition warrants separate discussion, especially in the light of their importance in case of 
international crimes. 
Generally speaking three specific manifestations of satisfaction are known to exist. First of all the 
acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of the acts, the expression of regrets or apologies in their re-
gard, and sometimes salutes to the flag. In the second place has been mentioned the investigation as 
to the culprits of the acts, their prosecution and eventual conviction and punishment. Thirdly, of 
course, the highly controversial concept of punitive damages ought to be discussed. These manifes-
tations have been laid down in article 10, Part Two, on satisfaction in case of delicts, adopted by the 
Commission:131 
" 1. The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an interna-
tionally wrongful act satisfaction for the damage, in particular moral damage, caused by 
that act, if and to the extent necessary to provide full reparation. 
2. Satisfaction may take the form of one or more of the following: 
(a) an apology; 
(b) nominal damages; 
(c) in cases of gross infringement of the rights of the injured State, damages reflecting the 
gravity of the infringement; 
(d) in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the serious misconduct of 
officials or from the criminal conduct of officials or private parties, disciplinary action 
against, or punishment of, those responsible. 
3. The right of the injured State to obtain satisfaction does not justify demands which would 
impair the dignity of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act." 
The phrase "if and to the extent necessary to provide full reparation" is meant by the Commission to 
express the exceptional character of the remedy of satisfaction, since there may be circumstances in 
which there exists no basis for granting satisfaction.132 With regard to international crimes Arangio-
Ruiz has proposed, in a future article 16, paragraph 3, that the author State would not be entitled to 
benefit from the restriction envisaged in article 10, paragraph 3.133 
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3.6.1. Acknowledgement of responsibility and expression of regrets or apologies 
Primarily the obligation to express regrets or provide apologies is based on the notion that the author 
State of an internationally wrongful act ought to recognize the illegality of its conduct.1*4 That notion 
presents, in ordinary circumstances, the prerequisite for fulfilling all other obligations of reparation, 
because the recognition of illegality by the author State usually precedes the conclusion of an agree-
ment settling on restitution in kind or the payment of substitute or complementary compensation. 
Performance of the obligation to provide apologies may not lead to explicit recognition of the 
wrongfulness of the acts, since apologies may be phrased very generally. It is possible to apologize, 
for instance, by saying that one regrets the occurrence of the acts. One may wonder therefore if the 
draft article should not rather be based on an obligation of the author State to recognize that its acts 
were wrongful. That would seem to be in accordance with the often quoted dictum of the Court in 
the Corfu Channel Case to the effect that its declaration, that the acts of the British Navy violated 
Albania's sovereignty, constituted "in itself appropriate satisfaction."135 
As to the obligation of the author State to apologize, it may be noted that such an obligation only 
makes sense insofar as the internationally wrongful act affects a specific State or its nationals. Be-
cause in case of breaches of human right obligations the injured States would not seem to be inter-
ested as such in apologies. Furthermore, it might be more appropriate to speak of the expression of 
regrets or apologies, depending on the question whether or not the internationally wrongful act in-
volved intent on the part of the agents of the author State. Such a distinction could well be made if 
regard is had to paragraph 2 of article 10, Part Two, originally proposed by Arangio-Ruiz:136 
"The choice of form or forms of satisfaction shall be made taking into account the importance 
of the obligation breached and the existence or degree of wilful intent or negligence of the 
State which has committed the wrongful act." 
Thus apologies would be in order if there was such intent, while the mere expression of regrets 
would suffice in those cases where no such intent could be inferred, or where the acts concerned 
were committed by individuals in no way representing the State (though could engage in their activi-
ties through a lack of diligence on the part of the State authorities). 
With regard to international crimes recognition of illegality of the conduct in question does not 
seem to have played a major role. A quick look, for instance, through Security Council resolutions 
indicates that it rather relies on declaring the illegality, and the consequent responsibility of the 
author State, itself. Its primary objective after that is to obtain for the injured State or subject cessa-
tion of the wrongful conduct, restitution of persons, property or territory, compensation, and possi-
ble guarantees against repetition. 
3.6.2. Punishment of responsible individuals 
The second possible means of satisfying an injured State consists of the prosecution, conviction and 
punishment of the persons, whether they be State agents or private individuals, responsible for the 
acts committed. It would seem to be inherent in the idea of punishment that individuals will be tried 
or disciplined only for conduct constituting violations under criminal or administrative law.137 At this 
point a distinction will have to be made according to whether the individuals responsible for the acts 
were agents of the State and acted within their capacity as State organs, or whether they were 
private individuals. In the latter case the punishment of the individuals may be proceeded with by the 
author State, but also by the injured State should the individuals concerned come within its territorial 
jurisdiction (in that case it will still need to be in possession of an accepted basis of criminal 
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Jurisdiction). As much was established through the Lotus Case, in which the Permanent Court judged 
Turkey justified in prosecuting a French national for negligence during his watch duties on board a 
ship in international waters.138 The situation is different insofar as agents of the State are concerned, 
for their punishment by the injured State will conflict with the general rule that a State cannot punish 
the organs of another State.139 Their disciplinary sanctioning or punishment as a form of satisfaction 
therefore can be demanded by the injured State, but will have to be effected by the author State.140 
On the rule that State organs cannot be punished by another State there is only one exception, and 
that concerns the issue of crimes under international law. 
In cases of crimes under international law individuals may be punished by each and any State for 
those acts found to be criminal by a rule of international law. Ordinarily an individual within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of a State could only be prosecuted if an accepted basis of criminal jurisdiction was 
extant. Basically such a basis of criminal jurisdiction may be constituted by the link of nationality 
between the prosecuting State and either the culprit or the victim of the criminal act, or because the 
criminal act had taken place on the territory of the prosecuting State. In case of crimes under inter-
national law such a link between the prosecuting State and the individual culprit or victim, or its 
territory, is not required. What this in effect means is that universal jurisdiction has been established 
for crimes under international law. Thus any State is authorized to proceed with the prosecution, 
conviction and punishment of individuals engaging in piracy and slavery, notwithstanding the lack of 
a traditional basis of criminal jurisdiction. It is to be noted of course that such crimes under interna-
tional law could be committed by individuals of a certain State either with or without the knowledge 
of their national State. If the national State was indeed involved in the acts, that would mean that it 
acted wrongfully and had incurred responsibility. Yet in the absence of such responsibility of the na-
tional State all the other States could still proceed with the punishment of the individuals. Thus uni-
versal jurisdiction of States is not a consequence of the international responsibility of a State, that is 
on the basis of a secondary rule, but is based on primary rules. The ratio for the rules on crimes un-
der international law therefore lies with the punishment of individuals for acts universally con-
demned, and irrespective of the status of the individuals within the organization of their national 
State. 
A connected development, but of far greater importance, has occurred after the first and second 
world wars. It concerns the possibility of the prosecution by States of individuals which committed 
criminal acts in their capacity as State organs.141 It is this development, which led to the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials after World War IL141 that was invoked by the Commission as one of the prime ar-
guments in favour of recognizing the distinction between delicts and crimes.143 Yet the Commission 
at the same time indicated:144 
"(...) that it would be wrong to identify the right-duty of certain States to punish individuals 
who have committed such crimes with the 'special form' of international responsibility appli-
cable to the State in cases of this kind. The obligation to punish individuals who are organs of 
the State and are guilty of crimes against the peace, against humanity, and so on does not, in 
the Commission's view, constitute a form of international responsibility of the State, and such 
punishment certainly does not exhaust the prosecution of the international responsibility in-
cumbent upon the State for internationally wrongful acts which are attributed to it in such 
cases by reason of the conduct of its organs. Punishment of those in charge of the State ma-
chinery who have started a war of aggression or organized an act of genocide does not per se 
release the State itself from its own international responsibility for such acts." 
Obviously it is correct to assert that the punishment of individuals, which committed criminal acts in 
their capacity of State organs, does not release the State from all responsibility. Clearly the author 
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State will still be bound to provide restitution in kind or compensation to the injured State, at least 
where bilateral relations are involved. But that is not exactly the same as saying that the punishment 
of such individuals would not constitute, for the author State, a form of responsibility. To some ex­
tent it may be asserted that the punishment of culprits by the author State is necessary to have it 
perform its obligation to "re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed". The object desired by any prohibitive primary rule of international 
law is that certain acts would not take place. Ала the object sought to be achieved by the obligation 
to provide reparation (re-establishment of the situation that would have existed had the acts not been 
committed), the secondary rule, is that the acts would not have taken place in the first place. Yet the 
latter involves an apparent impossibility. Yet in order to pretend that the situation has in fact been re­
established, punishment of the culprits would seem to be in order. 
With regard to international crimes such punishment serves the additional, and in fact far more 
important, purpose of providing a guarantee against repetition of the criminal acts. The Commission 
recognized as much when it stated:M S 
"The need to prevent the breach of obligations which are so essential would indeed appear to 
warrant both that the individual-organ committing such a breach should be held personally li­
able to punishment, and that concurrently the State to which the organ belongs should be 
subject to a special régime of'international responsibility'." 
Thus the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those responsible for the commission of an in-
ternational crime constitutes an imperative as a kind of measure against repetition. For what is to 
prevent the responsible officials or organs of the State from repeating their acts if they are not sub-
jected to individual scrutinization for their role during the commission of the crime? As such, as will 
be seen in section 3.7, it has a close relation to another form of guarantee, that is a change of gov-
ernment. 
Since the obligations concerned are of fundamental importance to the international community, this 
not only gives rise to a rule endowing each and every State with so-called universal jurisdiction.'4* It 
also provides States with the possibility to set up an international tribunal for the prosecution, con-
viction and punishment of the individuals. The first examples of that kind were the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals, and the precedent has been slow to be repeated. Recently however the Security 
Council decided on the creation of an International Tribunal that is to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia after 1 January 1991, and on the creation of the International Tribunal for the sole pur-
pose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for geno-
cide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 
1994 and 31 December 1994.147 Again one may point to the innovative character of the measures 
decided upon by the Security Council. For even though the full implementation of such measures 
may be obstructed by the States concerned (especially Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Rwanda) in that they may refuse to surrender suspects, at the moment such sus-
pects would leave their country they become liable to arrest and surrender to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal.148 Although superficially one might conclude that what is concerned is the prosecution of 
war crimes, that is clearly not the case. Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal has 
laid down the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal over grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocidal acts, and crimes against humanity. 
Aside from acts contained in the second category (which mostly concern the so-called Hague Law), 
all the other acts concern the denial or violation of fundamental human rights. And as we all know 
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such acts have taken place on such a terrifying scale and on such an organized basis, that their char-
acterization as international crime(s) under article 19, paragraph 3 (c), cannot be called in question. 
3.6.3. Punitive damages 
Thirdly, as may be seen from the quoted article 10, Part Two, in the first paragraph of this section, 
the Commission supports the right of an injured State, in case of delicts, to claim from the author 
State damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement.149 The Commission has pointed to the ex-
ceptional nature of such damages by noting that they are only to be awarded in cases of gross in-
fringement of the injured State's rights, and that:150 
"They are given to the injured party over and above the actual loss, when the wrong done was 
aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud or wicked conduct on the 
part of the wrongdoing party." 
It is to be expected that the payment of punitive damages will be envisaged also in case of interna-
tional crimes. Arangio-Ruiz' proposal to delete the restriction contained in paragraph 3 of article 10 
seems to head in this direction.151 There are however grounds to deny the existence of any rule of 
State responsibility, even in case of delicts, stipulating the right to claim punitive damages. Primarily 
the argument to be made is that the State practice in this respect is confused, that there is no opinio 
juris that States are bound to pay punitive damages, that the jurisprudence does not unambiguously 
show support for them, and that authors tend to be against, or reluctant in recognizing, the institute 
of punitive damages. But there are more fundamental arguments against recognition of punitive 
damages as a form of satisfaction. 
First of all there is the matter that not all internationally wrongful acts necessarily cause moral or 
legal injury to another State. Breaches of human rights obligations by a State for instance do not af-
fect any other State, and consequently cannot be said to cause even a moral or legal injury to those 
States. It may be admitted of course that the proposed article 10 has been skilfully worded, as it 
provides that damages only have to be forwarded to the injured State in case of gross infringement of 
the rights of the injured State. However, if regard is had to article 5, Part Two, it is to be noted that 
paragraph 1 defines an injured State as a State whose rights are infringed by an act of another State, 
and all the categories established under paragraph 2 head off by mentioning "if the right infringed". 
Should damages be paid then to all the injured States in case of human rights violations, even when it 
cannot be said that they suffer any moral or other damage? Considering that certain human rights are 
protected by universal rules of customary international law, the provision of article 10 implies an ob-
ligation of the author State to pay damages to each and every State. 
A second argument against punitive damages lies in the indisputable fact that it does not function in 
any way to remedy the internationally wrongful act since it is not reparatory in character.152 What the 
payment of punitive damages by the author State amounts to in reality is an unjust enrichment of the 
injured State.153 Under domestic law there is of course always the possibility of imposing financial 
burdens on subjects which violate criminal law provisions. But the penalties so inflicted generally do 
not benefit the victims of the violations, but flow into the public financial funds of the State and are 
to be used for public purposes. In international law that option could be envisaged,154 but the pay-
ment of punitive damages will ordinarily constitute an unwarranted financial benefit for the injured 
State. 
Thirdly, it may be noted that some internationally wrongful acts may entail large scale damages, 
leading to substantial compensation claims. The typical example of these are of course international 
crimes. To the extent that an author State would already be under an obligation to pay a large 
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amount of compensation to the injured State, the award of punitive damages would not favour 
equality among States. An obligation to pay money as punitive damages can be more easily met by 
the economically sound or powerful States than by developing States. But it would not be just to im-
pose larger amounts of money as punitive damages on the first category of States than on the sec-
ond. 
Insofar as international crimes are concerned, there has been a tendency to deny the possibility of 
introducing into the draft articles any criminal responsibility or to attach any penal connotation to 
civil law orientated concepts such as reparation. Punitive intent is denied, sometimes, even in the 
case of satisfaction and guarantees against repetition.1SS Aside from that, punitive damages would 
not seem to be appropriate for the crime of widespread breaches of fundamental human rights obli-
gations, because there simply would not be any injury to other States. 
3.7. Guarantees against repetition 
Traditionally it has been the custom for the author State to provide the injured State with assurances 
that the wrongful act would not occur again. But a verbal guarantee might not always be completely 
satisfactory. For that reason it has also been accustomed for the author State, on demand of the in-
jured State, to take certain measures to assure non-repetition. In most cases such measures might 
include no more than the forwarding, through administrative channels, of appropriate instructions to 
officials in the lower or higher levels of the State's organization. They might also be directed towards 
those working for the government, or even to those politically responsible in the governmental 
echelons. Sometimes the demand of the injured State concerns the repeal of a domestic court judg-
ment. The more extreme case of measures against repetition, one would say, involves demands by 
the injured State that specific legislation be modified or repealed. Measures falling within the latter 
two categories normally require the co-operation of parliament. Ordinarily the executive branch of 
the State is responsible for foreign relations, and one can easily see the political difficulties that may 
arise from such demands. Nevertheless such measures have been demanded by injured States, and 
have been implemented by author States.156 The Commission consequently adopted the following ar-
ticle 10 bis, Part Two, on assurances or guarantees against repetition:1*7 
"The injured State is entitled, where appropriate, to obtain from the State which has commit-
ted an internationally wrongful act assurances or guarantees of non-repetition of the wrongful 
act." 
According to the Commission the phrase "where appropriate" is meant to indicate that assurances or 
guarantees constitute an exceptional remedy, to be granted only in circumstances to be determined 
by a third party. Such circumstances are the real risk of repetition and the seriousness of the injury.158 
The function of such assurances or guarantees lies, in the words of the Commission, with the pre-
vention of future wrongful acts, and presupposes a risk of repetition of the wrongful acts.159 Obvi-
ously such a risk will be present especially, to use the words of the Commission, in circumstances 
where a wrong is aggravated by violence, oppression, malice, fraud or wicked conduct on the part of 
the author State. Such will be the case especially if the internationally wrongful act committed consti-
tutes an international crime. 
The issue of guarantees against repetition in case of international crimes is of paramount impor-
tance, yet at the same time their implementation presents huge problems. Before going into these, 
there is the preliminary question who is to decide on the kind of measures adequate to prevent recur-
rence of a crime. Ideally such a decision on the adequacy of measures to prevent repetition would fall 
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to the Court, but this would not seem likely to happen in present day realities. At the same time it 
cannot but be noticed that in case of delicts any decision on reparation is subject to an agreement 
between the injured and author States.16* Considering however the far-reaching measures necessary 
in case of crimes, to be discussed in the following subsections, the adequacy of such measures cer-
tainly should not be a matter of discretion to be decided by the injured State(s). In the past there 
have been numerous instances in which measures against repetition were laid down in a peace treaty, 
the most notable examples being the peace treaties after the end of the first and second world 
wars."1 Yet though there can be no doubt regarding Germany's responsibility for starting World 
War II, not to mention the genocidal and other horrific acts, it can hardly be considered satisfactory 
that a limited number of States decided on the fate of an up till then sovereign State. Even the fact 
that such (peace) treaties were based on unconditional surrenders, and to some limited extent may be 
considered consensual in character, really cannot and does not change their essentially imposed na-
ture.162 
Some progress has been made in that the recent act of aggression by Iraq against has led, at least 
initially, to a Security Council response and eventually to the adoption of cease-fire resolution 687.ia 
That resolution can in many respects be considered the contemporary equivalent of a peace treaty, 
and will be used as a basis of discussion, if not exclusively, for the following subsections. 
Another preliminary issue concerns the question whether the Security Council possesses any legis-
lative competencies. The question needs to be answered especially in the light of resolution 687, 
since that imposes a number of obligations on Iraq which go far beyond what it was bound to under 
conventional or customary law rules. In this respect reference must be made to the matters discussed 
in chapter two as to the meaning and scope of the threat to the peace, and the competence of the Se-
curity Council thereto. As stated the notion threat to peace must be interpreted objectively and in a 
legal manner. Also article 39 does not lay down any independent obligation not to threaten the 
peace, and must be read in the light of existing obligations and their breach by members. The Secu-
rity Council's action must therefore be directed towards the mise en oeuvre of a member State's re-
sponsibility. Any action it takes must be geared towards the fulfilment by the author State of its 
obligations to provide reparation. If the Security Council must remain faithful already to the rules on 
responsibility and cannot go beyond the scope of such rules, one would say that a fortiori, since 
there would be no wrongful conduct by a member, it cannot impose conduct on a member which is 
not also prescribed by a primary rule of international law. 
In first instance the Security Council will of necessity be laying emphasis on the author State's obli-
gation to cease its wrongful conduct and will try to make it comply with its obligation to return terri-
tory, persons and property. But it is not restricted to the more reparatory obligations, and may also 
involve itself with the author State's obligations to provide satisfaction and guarantees against repe-
tition. There is however one operative condition for the Security Council's competence in this mat-
ter, and that lies with the necessity of a continued threat to the peace. The Security Council's 
competence does not amount to an unlimited power to enforce member States' obligations in what-
ever circumstances it thinks fit.164 Where the non-performance of specific reparation obligations 
would not lead to a threat to the peace, the Security Council should retreat and abstain from en-
forcement regarding such breaches. Whether such will be the case of course will depend on the 
specific circumstances of any particular situation. Additionally, measures desired of, or imposed on, 
an author State have to be scrutinized as to whether they are adequate to prevent repetition of simi-
lar wrongful acts. If they are not, such measures cannot be demanded or imposed. 
At this point it may be noted that Arangio-Ruiz has proposed, by way of an article 16, paragraph 
3, Part Two, to delete the restriction applicable to satisfaction and guarantees against repetition to 
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the effect that demands by injured States could not be made to the extent that they would conflict 
with the author State's dignity, or with rules protecting the author State's sovereignty and liberty l6S 
The deletion of that restriction would make it possible to demand "disarmament, demilitarization, 
dismantling of war industry, destruction of weapons, acceptance of observation teams, or change to 
a form of government not incompatible with fundamental freedoms, civil and political rights and self-
determination" (mentioned in the context of the crime of aggression),1*6 as well as the "abrogation of 
discriminatory, racial or segregational legislation, popular consular consultations such as free elec-
tions or plebiscites, restoration of fundamental rights and freedoms, dismantling of environmentally 
dangerous plants and compliance with the aut dedere aut iudicare principle with regard to individuals 
accused of delicta iuris gentium " (in the context of the other crimes of article 19, paragraph 3, Part 
One) '*7 A number of these measures, and others, will be discussed in the following subsections 
3 7 1 Guarantees regarding disputes lying at the basis of the crime 
The Security Council, in paragraphs 2 to 4 of resolution 687, put down the following 
"2 Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and 
the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the 
Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related 
Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 
and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 
7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964, 
3 Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and 
Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate mate-
rial, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back 
to the Security Council within one month, 
4 Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and 
to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations," 
That the Security Council is entitled to guarantee the inviolability of the international boundary be-
tween Iraq and Kuwait cannot be called in question Although article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter 
would seem to prohibit the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of States only, it may 
be argued, and will be (chapter five), that the prescription of article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter 
implies a prohibition of all cross-border uses of force Of course Iraq's actions fell squarely under ar-
ticle 2, paragraph 4, since it claimed Kuwait to be part of its territory and used force on the whole of 
Kuwait's territory Iraq's action was intentionally aimed at the destruction of the continued territorial 
existence of Kuwait, and therefore also at its very political independence 
However, the Security Council's intention was not merely to ensure inviolability of Kuwait's fron-
tiers, but also to have that frontier demarcated as between Iraq and Kuwaitl68 Now we all know that 
initially Iraq claimed part of Kuwait's territory Yet at the same time we know this claim, and others, 
to have been no more than a pretext for Iraq's aggressive and expansionist action To view the lack 
of demarcation as a, or the, cause of Iraq's crime would appear to be an unjustified exaggeration 
Especially so since by effecting the demarcation not only the factual status quo ante was changed to 
the benefit of Kuwait m Admittedly, it is possible to argue that the fixation of the border could 
function as a guarantee to prevent future aggressive acts Clearly Iraq will no longer be in a position 
to claim parts of Kuwait's territory as its own However, the demarcation of the border has, to some 
extent, changed the territorial status quo as it existed before Iraq's aggression The fact that this 
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change is in conformity with the, naturally desired, legal status quo would not seem to justify treating 
Iraq's continuing non-performance of its obligations under the 1963 Agreed Minutes as a threat to 
the peace.170 Indeed, by making these changes in the factual border line tensions are more likely to be 
perpetuated and may constitute a more severe threat to the peace.171 As a guarantee against repeti­
tion of the act of aggression it seems to fail in its purpose, since it is implemented in the face of Iraqi 
opposition to the demarcation. A far better alternative would have been to recommend any dispute 
regarding the frontier to be settled through arbitration or judicial channels. That would have been in 
accordance also with article 36, paragraph 3, of the Charter, since territorial disputes in essence are 
legal in character. In that way Iraq could have had its day in Court, and in the event of a negative 
decision might have given way gracefully.171 In this respect one may also point to the fact that the 
Security Council is not a judicial body, and though it has to apply legal rules at times this does not 
give it carte blanche to decide disputes between members. Its powers under chapter VI are of rec­
ommendatory character only, and its powers under chapter VII are to be exercised only for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. As a guideline the Security Council 
should therefore not concern itself with any unsettled disputes dating from before the commission of 
a crime. 
In the same line of thought one should reject any attempt to impose upon the author State of a 
crime disadvantages of any kind. Any change in contracts or agreements (between States, States and 
foreign nationals, or private individuals among themselves) validly concluded and executed before 
the commission of the crime is off-limits. In past peace treaties one may deduce a trend to impose 
modifications or abrogations.173 Basically the imposition of such burdens on the author State are in 
conflict with the obligation not to go beyond what is adequate to wipe out the consequences of the 
wrongful act and to re-establish the situation that would have existed without it. Being utterly un­
connected to the commission of a crime such burdens should be abjured as being inconsistent with 
the principle of sovereign equality of States as laid down in article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter. 
And since they are unconnected to the crime such burdens are clearly not apt to prevent the recur­
rence of the crime concerned and cannot be justified on that count. 
It has to be underlined, by way of conclusion, that by committing a crime an author State does not 
place itself outside the community of States. In this context a provision suggested by Riphagen could 
be considered a most valuable contribution, as it ran:174 
"A breach of an international obligation does not, in itself, deprive that State of its rights un­
der international law." 
It is submitted that an author State generally retains all of its rights, even if for the moment it would 
not be in a position to exercise them. That ought to be the case even when an internationally wrong­
ful act constitutes a crime. Although some rights of the author State may be put on hold, as it were, 
they will be revived once the basic goals of reparation are met. 
3.7.2. Guarantees regarding the commission of, or conduct during, the crime 
The Security Council elaborated quite extensively, in resolution 687, the specific measures which it 
expected Iraq to implement in the area of disarmament.175 This was done in order to restore interna­
tional peace and security in the area, apparently on the consideration that there existed a threat of the 
peace even after the end of hostilities. As it was put in the preamble, the Security Council needed "to 
be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Ku­
wait". When reading however the specific provisions of section С of resolution 687 (paragraphs 7 to 
14) one is struck by the fact that none of the measures recorded relates directly to reducing the size 
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of Iraq's army or to disarming members of its armed forces. Rather they are all directed towards 
the destruction of weapons of mass-destruction and related materials (including ballistic missiles with 
a reach of more than 150 kilometres). The disarmament measures set forth in resolution 687 in fact 
relate not so much to the commission of the crime, but rather to Iraq's conduct during the crime 
This conduct, as the Security Council records, mainly consisted of making threats to use chemical 
weapons It did include, however, the actual use of ballistic missiles against targets in Saudi Arabia 
and Israel While Saudi Arabia had joined the Coalition and could be considered a belligerent, the 
same could not be said as regards Israel The Security Council further took note of reports by mem-
bers that Iraq had obtained materials for the development of nuclear weapons In addition to its 
breaches of obligations by invading Kuwait, Iraq apparently had already previously breached its obli-
gations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,177 and subsequently breached its 
obligation not to use force against a non-belligerent State While it did not actually use chemical 
weapons against Coalition members, the Security Council observed that this would have entailed a 
breach of Iraq's obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol178 It also noted Iraq's earlier uses of 
chemical weapons, without denouncing those as breaches of obligations under the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
It comes as no surprise then that the Security Council required Iraq to co-operate in the destruction 
of all its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a reach of over more than 150 kilo-
metres, and manufacturing facilities regarding the foregoing (paragraph 9) Additionally it required 
Iraq to place all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under exclusive control, for custody and re-
moval, of the International Atomic Energy Agency (paragraph 12) Some of the obligations thus 
created go far beyond anything Iraq had been obligated to under treaty or customary law I79 Espe-
cially the obligation to allow the destruction of its chemical and biological weapons, as well as its 
ballistic missiles, did not exist previously under any primary rule of international law Clearly there-
fore their formulation in resolution 687 can be justified only to the extent that they can be seen as 
measures against the repetition of wrongful acts The aim of the disarmament obligations in resolu-
tion 687 envisages the prevention of further wrongful acts unrelated, as such, to the crime of ag-
gression The question is then whether these new obligations can at all be justified, since they appear 
all to be based on Iraq's unlawful invasion of Kuwait The answer must be affirmative 
First may be mentioned that ballistic missiles have in fact been used, and their further use will, in all 
likelihood, only take place during a situation of armed conflict As such the destruction of such mis-
siles appears justified, especially if one considers that they were aimed at areas with a dense civilian 
population The same argument goes for the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons potential, con-
sidering its earlier use, albeit in a previous armed conflict, of chemical weapons The argument, of 
doubtful character in itself, that the use of chemical weapons could lawfully be resorted to in situa-
tions of internal armed conflict, fails basically because such use by Iraq in the past amounted to an 
attempted genocide on its Kurdish minority While Iraq cannot be considered bound by a conven-
tional rule prohibiting the use of biological weapons,180 actual use can be said to conflict with well-
established principles of humanitarian law Those principles prohibit the use of weapons in circum-
stances where such use would cause superfluous suffering or where they could not be used indis-
criminately (that is, when they could not be used without substantially affecting non-combatants) On 
that basis one would have to say that there is hardly any situation in which biological weapons could 
lawfully be used As to the obligations regarding nuclear-weapons-usable materials, they are all based 
on Iraq's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty Their goals are not therefore to be seen in 
relation to the prevention of future wrongful acts, but rather in relation to Iraq's obligation to cease 
its wrongful conduct There can also be little doubt that Iraq's possession of chemical, biological or 
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nuclear weapons could create tension in the region, especially considering its previously exposed 
willingness to use such weapons. On that basis alone there are sufficient grounds to conclude to the 
existence of a threat to the peace. 
With regard to international crimes other than aggression, disarmament obligations as a means to 
prevent repetition of the wrongful acts do not necessarily provide a complete answer. Regarding the 
crime of denial of self-determination the adequate response would appear to be the transfer of 
authority, alongside the withdrawal of any foreign troops. To the extent that the arms of such foreign 
troops would have been financed out of the separate budget of the territory held in bondage, they 
would have to be transferred to the new State. As to the crimes of serious breaches, on a widespread 
scale, of basic human rights obligations, the remedy to be provided as a means to prevent recurrence 
lies with the re-organization of the police, paramilitary, and armed forces. If regard is had to quite a 
number of recent agreements between governments and its (armed) opposition, one will see that fre­
quently provisions are made for the re-organization of the police, paramilitary, and armed forces.181 
Sometimes the agreement even stipulates the integration, in one way or another, of the oppositional 
armed forces within the governmental armed forces. In some circumstances there may of course be a 
need to disband specific organizational units of the police, paramilitary, and armed forces. 
In conclusion it may be said that all kinds of measures related to the police, paramilitary, and 
armed forces may be demanded and imposed regarding international crimes in order to prevent 
repetition of wrongful acts. The proposals of Arangio-Ruiz in his seventh report support this.182 Yet 
whatever the specific measures envisaged in order to prevent the repetition of wrongful acts, they 
probably will all be ineffectual to the extent that they do not uproot the causes of the illegal conduct 
when the individuals engaging in specific criminal acts are not held accountable for their action or in­
action. This leads us to the following subsection. 
3.7.3. Guarantees affecting or changing the political structure of the State 
At the end of World War Π,183 and afterwards, legal and factual action was taken in order to ensure 
that those responsible for the commission of war crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against 
humanity, would be brought to justice.184 Eventually a number of the individuals concerned were 
prosecuted, tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
Though the trials constituted a moral and legal imperative, they cannot be seen in isolation from their 
essential objective: to prevent the defeated States from ever again committing acts of aggression 
against peace-loving States.18* They were not restricted to the prosecution of individuals for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, but were concurrently directed towards the prosecution of 
individuals for crimes against the peace. Defendants at Nuremberg were consequently accused of the 
"planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements, or assurances". Their capability to commit the original crime 
(planning and initiating the war of aggression), and the connected crimes during the war (war crimes 
and crimes against humanity), had come from the high ranking positions they had held in the 
government of their country. Apart from the unbearable thought of seeing these individuals walking 
around freely as if they had done nothing wrong,18* the Allies (the United Nations) quite rightly saw 
that nothing but a complete turnabout would suffice in order to prevent recurrence of the crimes. In 
that line of thought they ordered the arrest and surrender of all the principal Nazi political heavy 
weights.187 In the same vein they inserted into the Charter for the International Military Tribunal the 
possibility of the Tribunal declaring certain groups or organizations to be criminal organizations.188 
Previously a number of armistice agreements provided for the dissolution of fascist organizations, 
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and the prohibition of such organizations was established in peace treaties Article 17 of the Peace 
Treaty with Italy may be quoted as typical in this respect. 
"Italy, which, in accordance with Article 30 of the Armistice Agreement, has taken measures 
to dissolve the Fascist organizations in Italy, shall not permit the resurgence on Italian terri-
tory of such organizations, whether political, military or semi-military, whose purpose it is to 
deprive the people of their democratic rights " 
This provision steps beyond the mere suppression of criminal acts and organizations, but concerns 
the political structure of the State 
Not being content with the prosecution of those politically responsible as such, the allied powers 
adopted article 13 (b) of the 1945 Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany 
"The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, eco-
nomic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Ger-
many " 
By this they opened the possibility of imposing on Germany not merely a change of government, but 
a veritable power to dictate even constitutional requirements That such powers existed and could be 
exercised at the will of the occupying States may be seen from the 1949 Washington Accords,189 
which determined the powers and responsibilities of the governments of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France from the moment of creation of the Federal Republic of Germany In-
deed such powers amounted to a de facto veto power on constitutional changes, as may be seen 
from article 5 of the "Statut d'occupation" I9° 
"Tout amandement de la loi fondamentale devra être approuvé par les Autorités d'occupation 
avant d'entrer en vigeur " 
The Statut d'occupation was abrogated through article 1, paragraph 2, of the Convention on Rela-
tions between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany l91 These three States re-
served, in article 2, paragraph 1, their rights regarding the stationing of troops and their protection in 
Germany, regarding Berlin, and regarding Germany as a whole (including the unification of Germany 
and a peace treaty)192 
The Security Council did not in any way stipulate a change of government within Iraq,193 or even 
the prosecution of those responsible for the unleashing of the war Could such far-reaching provi-
sions nevertheless be adopted in a contemporary (peace) treaty7 The question needs to be answered, 
because article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter are designed to protect the political independ-
ence of States It may be admitted that such protection is envisaged through the stipulated peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and that such political independence is safeguarded only by prohibiting the 
use of military force Indeed, the rule prohibiting the use of military force against the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of States has been presented as the prime example of a peremptory 
norm The Court, for instance, noted the concurrence of views in that regard on the part of the 
United States and Nicaragual94 Could a treaty then be imposed, through the use of force, on a State 
that had committed aggression, considering that such a treaty might conflict with a rule of jus co-
gens^ A first observation could be that the prohibition contained in article 2, paragraph 4, only re-
lates to the first use of force and not to a reactive use of force The problem with this argument is 
that it does not take into account that there are many ways in which a State can breach the prohibi-
tion Clearly a minor violation could not justify an all out responsive use of force, and for that reason 
could also not justify an imposed treaty Some observations of the Court in the Nicaragua Case lend 
credibility to this argument19S 
"In the view of the Court, under international law in force today - whether customary inter-
national law or that of the United Nations system - States do not have a right of 'collective' 
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armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'armed attack'." 
Since it is not possible for States collectively to lawfully use force in reaction to acts not constituting 
an armed attack, a treaty imposed in such circumstances must logically be deemed invalid. 
The situation would seem to be different when there is Security Council involvement. The Security 
Council can take action with regard to acts that do not constitute an armed attack by one State 
against another. In appropriate circumstances it could even resort to the use of force on the basis of 
the (mere) existence of a threat to the peace. Yet could it impose a treaty on a State that had done 
no more than stress certain claims it makes on the territory of another State, publish maps showing 
part of the territory of another State as its territory, or showing some symbol on its flag claimed by 
another State to be its historical and cultural heritage? By doing all these things Macedonia certainly 
has caused tension with Greece and contributed to the existence of a threat to the peace, but could, 
or ought, the Security Council for that reason determine the outcome of this dispute by making Ma-
cedonia back down through threatening the use of force? Not likely, not really. Yet could it have 
used force, or authorized the use of force, to oust the government of Iraq on account of Iraq's act of 
aggression? Yes it could, and in fact did, given the broad goals contained in resolution 678, para-
graph 2, which included the restoration of peace and security in the area. The continued reign of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq prevents the institution of a more peaceable government. Account has to be 
taken, furthermore, of Iraq's earlier act of aggression, under the same leadership, against Iran. There 
is just cause to believe that there is a chance of repetition of Iraq's aggressive behaviour. The Secu-
rity Council would have been fully justified in determining an Iraq with an unaltered leadership to 
constitute a threat to the peace.19* In circumstances where the use of force (authorized) by the Se-
curity Council is justified, the imposition of a treaty to accomplish the goals of reparation consequent 
upon a wrongful act will also be justified. 
By arguing on this issue account has to be taken, naturally, of the Court's ruling in the Nicaragua 
Case on the principle of non-intervention:197 
"A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is 
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of 
a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Inter-
vention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must 
remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence 
of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses 
force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for sub-
versive or terrorist armed activities within another State." 
These observations on the freedom of choice regarding a State's political system may be said ade-
quately to reflect the position under existing primary rules of customary international law.198 But do 
they reflect the content of customary law with respect to the secondary rules on State responsibility? 
It is submitted that they do so only partially. First of all it may be noted that the Court apparently 
would have validated the actions of the United States if those could have been considered as an ex-
ercise of a right of self-defence, and it held:199 
"In the Court's view, however, if Nicaragua has been giving support to the armed opposition 
in El Salvador, and if this constitutes an armed attack on El Salvador and the other appropri-
ate conditions are met, collective self-defence could be legally invoked by the United States, 
even though there may be the possibility of an additional motive, one perhaps even more de-
cisive for the United States, drawn from the political orientation of the present Nicaraguan 
Government. The existence of an additional motive, other than that proclaimed by the United 
States, could not deprive the latter of its right to resort to collective self-defence." 
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In the event the Court found that the acts attributed to Nicaragua could not be considered an armed 
attack on El Salvador, or Honduras and Costa Rica20Л Yet these remarks by the Court seem to indi­
cate that the American support for the contras, whose avowed aim was to overthrow the govern­
ment of Nicaragua,201 might have been justified if there had been an armed attack. Furthermore, 
applying the maxim "qui peut le plus, peut le moins", it is possible to argue that a State, which may 
use direct military force in defence, could also resort to the indirect uses of military force. Judge 
Schwebel, in his dissenting opinion to the Nicaragua Case, commented on the argument, put forward 
by Nicaragua, that the exercise of self-defence and the overthrow of the government of the attacking 
State were incompatible, as follows2Ю 
"( ) if, arguendo, one assumes that the purpose of United States military and paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua is the overthrow of its Government, it does not follow that 
that necessarily is incompatible with, and constitutes an abandonment of, the argument of 
self-defence. In some, indeed most, instances, overthrow of the aggressor government might 
be an unnecessary and disproportionate act of self-defence, but in others it may be necessary 
and proportionate. It depends on the facts (...)." 
On the assumption that the indeterminate phrase "aggressor government" is meant to designate gov­
ernments resorting to an illegal use of force, it does indeed depend on the facts whether or not they 
would justify the overthrow of a government Judge Schwebel's reliance on the facts is dictated by 
his far more extensive interpretation of the concept of armed attack, which in his opinion includes aid 
to irregulars2<0 It is on that count that one ought to read his stance that the overthrow of the aggres­
sor government may be a(n) (unnecessary and (disproportionate reaction to the armed attack He 
seems to gradually scale down on the ladder of armed attacks. All out invasions establishing a right 
to necessary and proportionate overthrows of government, and aid to armed opposition against 
which one could not attempt the overthrow of the aggressor government In contrast to judge 
Schwebel's construction, it might be more appropriate to uphold the Court's view which amounts to 
distinguishing between "the most grave forms of use of force and lesser grave forms".204 Most grave 
uses of force are, according to the Court, armed attacks by regular forces, as well as the acts laid 
down in article 3 (g) of the Definition of Aggression (the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State) 
to the extent that their gravity amounts to "an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces"20S 
Such are the acts which ought to be considered to amount to an international crime under article 19, 
paragraph 3 (a), Part One of the draft articles on State responsibility 
Where a State has not initially engaged in the crime of aggression, but rather became the accom­
plice, after or before the act, the specific form of political guarantee of neutrality comes into play 
That is in fact the measure imposed on Austria after World War II. Nevertheless, generally speaking, 
imposed neutrality would seem to miss its mark as a measure against repetition. It would be rather 
more prudent to try and promote the integration of such a State into the wider community of peace-
loving States206 Additionally it may be said that imposed neutrality may hinder the State concerned 
in applying for membership in the United Nations. Thus a gap may be, and was, created insofar as 
participation in sanctions ordered by the Security Council is concerned As non-members they are 
not bound by decisions of the Security Council They are inhibited from providing aid or assistance 
to an author State by virtue of the rule laid down in article 27, Part One, of the draft articles But 
sanctions imposed by the Security Council may be of significantly wider scope than what a State 
would be under an obligation not to do under article 27. Luckily non-members have tended to adopt 
the same kind of measures as those ordered by the Security Council, while generally affirming their 
autonomy in doing so 2 0 7 
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International crimes generally ought to give rise to the additional obligation for the author State 
to change its government as a guarantee against repetition.208 An obligation like that could not be 
imposed in case of international delicts. With respect to crimes other than acts of aggression there 
may be some difference regarding the extent of the obligation. 
In the past the crime of denial of self-determination did not generally lead to the imposition of an ob-
ligation to change the government of the colonizing State. That was so especially because the colo-
nizing of territories, and all kinds of dominating structures, had not been considered unlawful in the 
past. Rather a government engaging in colonization had to put an end to its domination and surren-
der its authority to the people of the colonized territory. By now there are of course not that many 
territories left under the rule of a foreign State, and the peoples of such territories appear not to want 
to become independent. Since the entry into force of the United Nations Charter colonization or 
foreign domination can only come about through the threat or use of force. The crime of denial of 
self-determination will then inevitably be coupled to an illegal threat or use of force, and the Security 
Council will be competent regarding such acts. 
An interesting example, though by far not the only one,2*9 is presented by the Indonesian intervention 
in East Timor. At the time the Security Council adopted resolutions 384 and 389, deploring the In-
donesian invasion, stressing the territorial integrity of East Timor and the right to self-determination 
of its people, and called upon Indonesia to withdraw from the territory.210 It may not be too far-
fetched to say that the Security Council could have insisted on Indonesia to effect a change of gov-
ernment, considering the risk of possible repetition of similar acts on the part of Indonesia. And since 
the acts concerned imply a use of force, continued governance of Indonesia by the régime responsi-
ble for committing the international crime may be said to amount to a threat to the peace. 
However, foreign domination may perhaps also come about through infiltration, instigation of coup 
d'états, or support for armed opposition. Such acts need not involve a threat or use offeree. To the 
extent that such acts were supported or initiated by the government of a State, an obligation to re-
constitute the government may be necessary so as to prevent repetition. 
The crimes based on the breach, on a widespread scale, of fundamental human rights obligations 
certainly imply the need for an obligation to resort to a change or reconstitution of the government. 
Either the government will be instigating the breaches, adopting a policy to that effect, or it has lost 
control and cannot prevent other State organs (the police, paramilitary, or armed forces) from 
committing the breaches. Examples of the first category, among others, have been the massacres in 
Cambodia during the rule of the Khmer Rouge, and the imposition of apartheid in South Africa. In 
the second category one may find the situation(s) of lawlessness occurring in Somalia (and Rwanda). 
Many (more or less recent) agreements between governments and oppositional movements or forces 
in countries with a poor record on the protection of human rights have shown the relation between 
government implication in human rights violations and the absence of democratic rule.211 On that ac-
count they have provided for certain changes in the constitution and the holding of completely free 
and democratic elections.212 Going back into the more distant past, one may point to the provisions 
on human rights in the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania and Hungary.213 Appar-
ently a relationship was seen to exist between the protection of such human rights as freedom of 
thought and expression and the prevention of acts of aggression. But the basic premise of such an 
approach is that the human rights concerned will be guaranteed by the government. Yet it may be 
seriously doubted whether any government not established through democratic procedures will en-
sure implementation of those rights. And it is submitted that disregard for these political rights by a 
State could easily lead to the breach of its obligation to respect fundamental human rights. Conse-
quently a State which has been guilty of an international crime consisting of human rights violations 
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may be required to reconstitute its government through the holding of free and democratic elec-
tions.114 If necessary a State may be required to insert into its constitution safeguards regarding the 
implementation of human rights on the domestic plane. 
The conclusion must be that the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment of those indi-
viduals responsible for the commission of the crime may be demanded and imposed on a State which 
has committed an international crime. That State will further be under an obligation to change its 
government, to change its constitution to the extent necessary, and to hold free elections so as to 
prevent the recurrence of criminal acts. The only limit to such measures constitutes, as rightly pro-
posed by Arangio-Ruiz in his article 16, paragraph 3, Part Two, the continued existence of the 
author State as an independent member of the international community. 
3.7.4. Guarantees and territorial issues 
Primarily one has to ask whether it is possible to impose, as a measure against repetition, an obliga-
tion on a State which committed aggression to agree, or acquiesce, to a complete loss of territory.215 
Ordinarily, it has to be noted, this implies not merely a loss of sovereignty over territory or a loss of 
political independence, but the wiping out of existence of the entire State. A further remark may be 
made in that such a measure is not likely to be agreed to by any State, and would of necessity have to 
be imposed by the threat or, more likely, the use of military force. Naturally annexation would be ac-
companied by physical control over the subjugated territory. By its nature, therefore, annexation pre-
sents the most perfect example of a measure that is adequate to achieve the desired goal: prevention 
of further internationally wrongful acts. 
In a preliminary fashion it may observed that annexation, or indeed any acquisition of territory, could 
not be recognized or validated if it resulted from the first use of military force. That rule, which 
would seem to follow from the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur, has been affirmed time after time by 
the Security Council and the General Assembly.216 Their reliance on the rule may in rum be traced 
back to the Charter's basic article 2, paragraph 4, which prohibits the use of force against the terri-
torial integrity of States. That article, though it does not say so expressly, intends only to prohibit the 
first use of force by States. That is so because Charter articles 42 (principally)217 and 51 clearly en-
visage reactions by the use of force against a first use of force. It is not entirely clear whether state-
ments by the Council and Assembly on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force 
intend also to cover responsive uses of force, but precedents support an interpretation to that effect. 
Reference may be made to two precedents. The first concerns the Declaration regarding the De-
feat of Germany which stated, in the preamble, that the assumption of supreme authority over Ger-
many would not have the effect of annexing Germany.218 Logically this declaration can be taken to 
mean that Germany, as a State, would not be annihilated. Neither through complete or partial alloca-
tion of its territory to one or another State, nor through the dividing up of its territory among neigh-
bouring States. The second precedent relates to Iraq. The Security Council, after Iraq's defeat by 
Coalition forces, affirmed:219 
"(...) the commitment of all Member States to the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States co-
operating under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military 
presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the 
resolution," 
The argument which has to be addressed is whether a lawful use of force by States could lead to the 
annexation of another State. The lawful use of force can only be force in the exercise of a right of 
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self-defence, since a use of force by one State against another can only be justified if the latter had 
initiated an armed attack against the first.12' First of all one has to note the purpose of self-defence, 
which consists of repelling the attack. If the attack is repelled there would not seem to be any cause 
for "defence".221 That argument, though not entirely persuasive in itself, is buttressed by considera-
tions regarding potential misuse of the right of self-defence. While generally there does not appear to 
be any doctrine of abuse of rights in this respect, it may be pointed out that uses of force below the 
threshold of an armed attack do not give any right to self-defence. A State desiring to conquer an-
other State's territory could try to provoke an armed attack through uses of force falling below the 
scale required for self-defence. The State thus provoked might be tempted to consider an all out in-
vasion, and if it went on with it would trigger the right of self-defence of the provoking State. 
More importantly, General Assembly resolution 2625 contains some phrases which would suggest 
that States can never resort to annexation. First of all it contains the earlier mentioned rule on the in-
admissibility of the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force.222 The relevant paragraph 
ends with the observation that the foregoing shall not be construed to affect the provisions of the 
Charter,223 or the powers of the Security Council under the Charter. Apparently the principle is not 
susceptible of derogation by States. The same conclusion results from the rules in the resolution re-
garding the sovereign equality of States. It states the obligation that "each State has the duty to re-
spect the personality of other States" and in absolute terms the rule that "the territorial integrity and 
political independence of the State are inviolable". Reference may be made in this regard to the Ger-
man precedent. If the commission of the ultimate international crime, aggressive war, of this century 
did not lead to extinction of the German State, which other international crime could justify such ex-
tinction? 
These arguments are supported by virtue of the concept of jus cogens. The most conspicuous ex-
ample of a peremptory norm is the rule prohibiting the use of force.224 Any treaty derogating from 
that rule, according to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and its commen-
tary, is void. One might say of course that the Charter of the United Nations provides for deroga-
tions, since it envisages the use of force by the Security Council in article 42, and by States in article 
51. On the basis of such an argument one would either have to conclude that the peremptory norm 
prohibiting the use of force is not as absolute as one might think, or that because of the existence of 
articles 42 and 51 the Charter is void. This latter construction obviously would lead to an absurd re-
sult.225 The matter could be resolved if one were to assert that the peremptory norm enshrined in ar-
ticle 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, does not simply prohibit the use of force, but the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of States. One could claim then that the 
lawful uses of force in the Charter are in fact enforcement measures, whose object is the protection 
of the territorial integrity and political independence of States. At the same time the implication must 
be made that such enforcement measures should not only protect the territorial integrity of the de-
fending or injured State, but also the territorial integrity and political independence of the attacking 
or author State. This interpretation would have to be supplemented so as to avoid inconsistency with 
the position taken in the previous subsection. It was said there that one could demand a change of 
government, or even the introduction of constitutional safeguards on human rights and democratic 
rule. Why should these be possible as a guarantee against repetition, and not the annexation of a 
State? It is submitted that the protection afforded to the political independence of States lies not with 
the possibility to determine its own political system stricto sensu, but rather ought be read in relation 
to the rules on self-determination and the prohibition of foreign domination. For so long as the peo-
ple of a State are in a position to determine themselves the government they want and the status of 
their territory, their political independence will not be compromised. The contrary will only be the 
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case if they are ruled by a foreign State and are not free to determine their own political (and legal) 
status within the international community 
Could the Security Council decide upon, or force, an annexation m favour of another State or by 
imposing an international regime, with exclusive international control, for the territory of the van­
quished State7 It is submitted that it could not, and reference may be made here to the Vienna Con­
vention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations 2 2 6 In articles 52 and 53 the basic rules have been laid down that a treaty 
imposed by threat or use of force mconsistent with the principles of the Charter is void, and that a 
treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm By adopting these provisions the Commission 
observed that there existed the distinct possibility that an international organization would resort to 
an illegal threat or use of force, and that it might do so in order to coerce the conclusion of a 
treaty И 7 By virtue of the same argument tbs entails the conclusion that an international organization 
is capable of concluding a treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm Î M In applying the construc-
tion adopted in the previous paragraph, this means that it could not conclude any treaty imposed 
through the threat or use of force when such a treaty would result in the loss of territorial sover-
eignty and/or political independence of a State 229 And if an organization is prevented from achieving 
that result by imposing a treaty, it follows that it also cannot obtain the desired result by forcefully 
imposing it upon the State committing aggression The claim might furthermore be made that by an-
nexing a State, without providing its people with the possibility of choosing their political status, one 
would be committing a breach of the (peremptory) norm of self-determination 
Up till now the question was one of annexation of a complete State But what about taking away 
part of the territory of a State as a guarantee against repetition' Tunkin for instance supported this 
by reference to the amputation effected at the end of World War II1 M 
"L'amputation de certains territoires de l'Allemagne et du Japon a la suite de cette guerre se 
distingue radicalement des usurpations antérieures opérées en vertu de droit du vainqueur 
l'action des Allies a l'égard de l'Allemagne et du Japon se fondait sur le principe de la respon-
sabilité internationale de l'Etat pour l'agression commise par lui ( ) " 
At the end of many a war parts of the territory of the vanquished State have been severed from it and 
been ceded to another State,131 provided with an international status,231 placed under the authority of 
other States by virtue of mandate or trust agreements,233 or have become independent *** 
The question whether colonies or non self-governing territories may be taken away from the author 
State of an international crime need not bother us nowadays In the past it was possible to sever the 
ties between the mother country and the colonized territory, because there did not exist rales laying 
down the right of peoples to self-determination Through the enunciation of these rules after World 
War II, it has become impossible to lawfully acquire colonies By virtue of the rules on self-
determination the people of any non self-governing territory still existent has the right to determine 
its future, and it would seem that among its choices there should be one concerning the continuation 
of its ties with the mother country The international community might insist on independence for 
such territories, but it is hard to see how the choice would be free if they could not also freely de-
termine the available options 
Regarding territory forming an integral part, in the contiguous sense, of the author State itself, the 
guiding principles are those described above No part of the territory of a State committing aggres-
sion can be taken away from it The basic provision of the Charter on the prohibition of the threat or 
use offeree is not merely concerned with attempts to annex complete States, but also with attempts 
to disrupt the territorial "integrity" of the State Thus the disengagement of any part of the territory 
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of a State that has committed an international crime, whatever the size of it, should be rejected as 
being in conflict with the (peremptory) norm prohibiting the use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity of States. 
While there can be no question of any disruption of the territorial integrity of a State, that is not 
to say that certain specific measures against repetition could not take the place of a loss of territory. 
Especially where parts of the territory have been used to commit specific acts of aggression, the im-
position of complete or partial demilitarization may be in order. That would appear to be the case 
especially where overseas non self-governing territories are concerned. But the same goes for fron-
tier strips that may present ample opportunities for border incidents or acts of aggression,135 or for 
instance militarily strategic islands.13* 
If the international crime concerned related to acts of genocide on that part of the population of dif-
ferent ethnic origin and concentrated in specific areas, measures of demilitarization may be appro-
priate. Where the suppression of separatist activities involves direct intimidation and extermination of 
an ethnic minority more drastic action may be required. In such a case it may be appropriate to afford 
the people afflicted to exercise (once more) their right of self-determination. The situation regarding 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq may be mentioned as an example of this kind. 
Lastly in this subsection on guarantees and territorial issues there is the matter of partial or com-
plete occupation of the territory of an author State of an international crime. Precedents may be 
found in the occupation of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II,137 and the partial and 
temporary occupation of Iraq after being defeated.238 
Although occupation could be considered a completely autonomous form of guarantees against 
repetition, one ought rather see it as a kind of forced execution of obligations. As such it relates not 
to measures of self-defence or Security Council enforcement by the use of force, which both aim at 
the cessation of wrongful acts or prevention of future wrongful acts, but constitutes some sort of im-
posed performance of the other reparation obligations incumbent upon the author State. By occupy-
ing the author State of an international crime the most effective means of ensuring performance of 
obligations is resorted to. This means in effect that the regular options of the State, to freely deter-
mine whether to perform or not to perform its obligations, are taken away from it. Ordinarily, that is 
in case of delicts, such freedom could not be taken away from a State. Yet in case of international 
crimes, especially the crimes of aggression and genocide,239 such measure could be resorted to. The 
crime of denial of self-determination would not seem to lend itself to such a measure, since it would 
involve occupying the mother country. Possible occupation of the dominated territory would appear 
to be possible only to the extent that the crime has been accompanied by the international crime of 
aggression. Measures implying supervision by the international community of the dominated territory 
may be resorted to in order to achieve a free exercise of the right to self-determination. 
In conclusion it may be said that the commission of an international crime should, in general, not 
lead to any disruption of the territorial integrity of the author State. Arangio-Ruiz consequently cor-
rectly proposes that a future article 16, paragraph 3, Part Two, ought to safeguard the territorial in-
tegrity of a State committing an international crime. The only exception to this would be the case 
where the crime involves the targeting of a specific ethnic people, in which case the appropriate rem-
edy would be to allow the people concerned to exercise its right to self-determination. 
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3.8. Restrictions regarding the exercise of rights of reparation 
The restrictions applicable to the exercise of rights to demand reparation are of diverse dimensions. 
In the light of the topics under discussion, obligations erga omnes and international crimes, it is pos-
sible to envisage restrictions that would flow from the multiplicity of injured States or a legal interest 
on the part of an organization (subsection 3.8.1). Thus the absence of affected States, the presence 
of a directly injured State, and the influence of an organization's competence, need to be discussed. 
Others restrictions may flow from general concepts (subsection 3.8.2), such as the exclusion of 
specific forms of reparation on the basis of a treaty régime and jus cogens. Further restrictions are 
those which specifically apply only to the right to demand reparation (subsection 3.8.3). Among 
these one may find the restrictions, proposed by Arangio-Ruiz, of excessive onerousness and the im-
possibility of performance. Considering the arguments put forward in favour of those restrictions, the 
principle of proportionality will be discussed alongside that of excessive onerousness, and the con-
cept of domestic jurisdiction alongside that of impossibility of performance. 
3.8.1. Restrictions regarding reparation, multiplicity of injured States, 
and the organizational interest in reparation 
Restrictions based on the absence of specially affected States 
As may be seen from the categories covered by article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (ii) and (iii), Part Two of 
the draft articles, e.g. human rights, it may happen that a breach of obligation does not affect any 
State in particular.240 That is the case if a breach of obligation results in damage that is non-allocable, 
does not produce any damage at all, or leads to damage that is allocable to the author State. 
The first category involves damage that is done to that part of the environment not under any State 
jurisdiction. Damage in such a case produces multilateral injury to the States parties or the States 
bound by the customary rule. 
The middle hypothesis may occur, for instance, when a State does not introduce legislative provi-
sions it was bound to under a multilateral treaty, or stations nuclear weapons on the deep sea-bed or 
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in outer-space. 
The third category concerns an author State doing damage to its own nationals. This may involve 
breaches of its obligations under a multilateral treaty or a customary rule to respect the human rights 
of its nationals. Where these breaches flow from a universal rule of customary law, all other States 
are injured States. Thus they all have the right to demand reparation of the author State. This may be 
deduced especially from Arangio-Ruiz' proposal to add an article 5 bis, Part Two:142 
"Whenever there is more than one injured State, each one of them is entitled to exercise its 
legal rights under the rules set forth in the following articles." 
Contrary to what has been claimed,243 this means that all injured States can claim reparation,244 if not 
necessarily for themselves. 
The third category just mentioned is of special importance for international crimes. Besides the 
direct reference to protection of the human being in article 19, paragraph 3 (c), denial of self-
determination, apartheid, slavery, and genocide likewise involve breaches of human rights 
obligations. The only limit that applies to the rights of injured States to demand reparation for these 
breaches flows from the nature of the obligations. The obligations laid down by these rules impose 
on States the duty to treat all those under their jurisdiction, but especially their nationals, in a certain 
way. If such obligations are breached the basic damage will have been done to the author State's 
nationals. Consequently compensation cannot be claimed by injured States for themselves. At most 
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injured States can claim that the author State provides compensation, or an effective remedy at the 
domestic level, to the injured nationals. 
Restrictions based on the presence of a directly injured State 
Three possible hypotheses may involve a breach of obligation giving rise to a situation where there is 
a specially affected injured State and all the other injured States. 
The first one concerns a breach of obligations that causes damage to the environment. The conse-
quent multilateral injury to other States may be accompanied by specific injury to one of them. That 
is the case when the pollution reaches an injured State's national jurisdiction or affects its economic 
position. 
The second hypothesis covers the situation where a State's breach of human rights obligations not 
only affects the nationals of the author State, but also those of the injured States. It might be ob-
jected of course that such acts constitute separate internationally wrongful acts. They might be 
viewed respectively as breaches based on the Trail Smelter criterion,245 or as breaches regarding the 
protection to be afforded to aliens. That argument is to be rejected, since the specific damage results 
only incidentally from the original wrongful act. A specially affected injured State may of course 
claim cessation, restitution in kind, and compensation to the extent of the injury. That claim may be 
espoused by the other injured States. But claims for satisfaction and measures against repetition can 
only be based on the wrongful act itself. 
There is a third possibility of the existence a specially affected injured State among all injured 
States. That radically different hypothesis concerns a State being the victim of an armed attack. In 
such a case the status of directly injured State is not the result of it incidentally suffering damage, but 
because it was the target of the international crime of aggression. The status of injured State enjoyed 
by other States does not result from their being affected or being the victim. It results from the fact 
that aggression amounts to the breach of an obligation erga omnes.146 The status of injured State un-
der article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two, comes to them as members of the international community. 
Now Graefrath and Mohr note in respect to the distinction:247 
"Die abstrakte Mitteilung, bei internationalen Verbrechen gälten alle Staaten als verletzte 
Staaten, hebt zwar einen wichtigen Unterschied zu den internationelen Delikten hervor; 
zugleich aber verwischt sie, daß nicht alle Staaten gleichmäßig betroffen sind und keineswegs 
gleiche Rechte gegenüber dem Rechtsverletzer oder unabhängig von dem unmittelbar verletz-
ten Staat geltend machen können." 
At this point they make clear that the difference lies with the claim for compensation, which accrues 
only to those States that suffer any material damage.248 All other possible claims for reparation 
(cessation, restitution, satisfaction, and guarantees) may be formulated by all the other injured 
States.249 Injured States' support for a claim to compensation by the directly injured State is of de-
pendent nature.2" That is witnessed by the fact that they cannot insist on the payment of compensa-
tion once the directly injured State declares itself satisfied with the amount granted (subject of course 
to the appreciation that the directly injured State was not in any way coerced to accept a particular 
amount of compensation). The other rights of reparation are not at the discretionary disposal of the 
directly injured State, and it cannot renounce them in favour of the author State unless the other in-
jured States agree or acquiesce. 
Restrictions based on an organization's competence 
There are no inherent objections to international organizations invoking the responsibility of a State 
for breaches of international law. The one limitation applies that their exercise of a right to reparation 
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falls within the exercise of their functions as delimited by the constitutive treaty. As to the United 
Nations, the General Assembly can claim reparation on the basis of breaches of obligations under the 
Charter, but in doing so it acts as the representative organ of a subject of international law. By mak-
ing a claim it may become a party to a dispute with a State, and naturally it cannot impose its will on 
the other party. Since it is invested with recommendatory powers only,251 it also cannot direct other 
members to adopt specific measures other than non-recognition of the wrongful act.252 The situation 
that obtains with regard to the Security Council is not essentially different. In shaping its recommen-
dations it also cannot decide on countermeasures to be adopted by members towards the defaulting 
State. That changes only where it determines the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression.2S3 Yet at the same time this constitutes the basic limit to its powers. 
Where there is no such determination it is doomed to exercise its recommendatory powers only. 
Even where it does determine a threat to the peace, the measures it directs members to adopt in re-
gard to the author State must be geared towards the elimination of the threat to the peace. If meas-
ures for the enforcement of reparation claims cannot be said to contribute to the elimination of the 
threat, they ought not to have been taken. Some of the measures that the Security Council directed 
members to adopt in the wake of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict come under that heading. One may seri-
ously doubt whether the forced demarcation and the establishment of the compensation commission 
are apt to lessen the threat Iraq poses to neighbouring States. Especially so since the most efficacious 
means to destroy the threat would have been to topple the Iraqi régime, and to implement the indi-
vidual responsibility of its main leaders. After that Kuwait's claim to stable borders and the satisfac-
tion of compensation claims could have led to negotiations with Iraq on a less politicized basis. 
The question is whether Security Council's competence in the matter affects the individual exer-
cise of rights of reparation by (directly) injured States. A statement by Gowlland-Debbas may be 
taken as indicative:254 
"The Council in reacting to violations of fundamental norms of international law is not acting 
as an impartial arbitrator or third party, but in lieu and place of the injured States in matters 
which affect the interests of the international community as a whole." 
Previously the present writer took the statement of the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis Case 
(section 3.5) and observed that the Security Council by taking up the claim of its members, on their 
behalf, asserted its right to ensure respect for the rules of international law. That analogy, however, 
cannot be drawn to its full conclusion. An injured State not only may espouse the claims of its na-
tionals, it can in fact waive their claims against foreign States or decide not to pursue them. In such a 
case the injured individual, not being a subject of international law, is left without a remedy at the 
international level. The Security Council, on the other hand, cannot avail itself of a similar preroga-
tive. It cannot do away with the rights of its members, since it is bound by virtue of articles 1, para-
graph 1, and 24, paragraph 2, of the Charter to act in accordance with principles of justice and 
international law. 
3.8.2. Restrictions regarding reparation based on general concepts 
The exclusion of specific forms of reparation due ίο the existence of a treaty régime 
In the Diplomatic Staff Case the Court depicted the rules of diplomatic law as a self-contained ré-
gime which:255 
"(...) on the one hand, lays down the receiving State's obligations regarding the facilities, 
privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees 
their possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the 
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receiving State to counter any such abuse. These means are by their nature entirely efficacious 
С..)." 
These observations of the Court were directed against the argument of the Iranian government that 
the Court could not address the taking of hostages independently from the history of interference, by 
the United States, in the internal affairs of Iran.1*6 Iran's argument, although somewhat vaguely 
worded, amounted to a claim that its disregard of the American staffs immunities was justified, as a 
countermeasure, by the American breach of obligation not to intervene in the Iranian internal af­
fairs.257 Riphagen took on the issue and claimed the existence of subsystems which could, to the ex­
tent that they elaborated secondary legal consequences tailored to the subsystem, exclude the 
application of the general rules on State responsibility.258 And especially the faculty to resort to 
countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act might be excluded in such a case (on 
which more in chapter four). Yet the issue could be relevant also in regard to reparation.159 Espe­
cially so if one would exclude certain forms of reparation from the claims of States or organizations 
on the basis that they had not been regulated in an applicable treaty. 
Non-application of the secondary rules on reparation may be argued in three ways. First, the 
treaty does not provide for any rules on reparation and therefore the general rules would not apply at 
all. Secondly, the treaty provides special rules so that the general rules are excluded. Thirdly, the 
treaty rules on reparation, which are not complete, must be considered exhaustive and preclude the 
application of the general rules. 
As regards the first hypothesis, that a treaty does not provide any rules regarding reparation, one 
should adhere to the view of the Permanent Court in the Chorzów Factory Case that:260 
"It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation is therefore the indispensable comple-
ment of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the 
convention itself." 
By now there is a long standing practice that when a jurisdictional clause provides for the settlement 
of disputes regarding the interpretation or application of a treaty, the latter also includes jurisdiction 
to settle disputes over the responsibility for non-application of the treaty. 
The second argument is entirely persuasive and is based on the well-known maxim lex specialis 
derogat legi generalis (the special rule takes precedence over the general rule). Its principle has been 
laid down in article 2, Part Two, of the draft articles:2*1 
"Without prejudice to the provisions of articles [4] and 5, the provisions of this Part govern 
the legal consequences of any internationally wrongful act, except where and to the extent 
that those legal consequences have been determined by other rules of international law relat-
ing specifically to the internationally wrongful act in question." 
Only one remarks has to be made. The special rule must concern the same subject-matter and scope, 
if not the same content, as the general rule. Only where the two rules would both apply could one 
give precedence to the special rule. Naturally the maxim takes on meaning only if the two rules are 
different in content. That could be so, for instance, if the special rule would pose restrictions which 
the general rule would not. 
Thirdly a problem may arise if a treaty establishes an organ that is to settle disputes between the 
States parties, but at the same time fails to specify the remedies, or specifies only some, that may be 
applied by it. In the first case one would expect that the organ charged with settling disputes may 
apply all the remedies available under the secondary rules of State responsibility.262 As to the second 
one would think that it could only apply such remedies as are expressly provided. 
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The issue is relevant for the relationship between the specific international crimes and treaties on 
their subject-matterIO In the opinion of the Commission the international community of States as a 
whole is to designate (having regard to the importance of the rules and the kind of interests they 
protect) the specific conduct to be considered crimes, and the legal consequences flowing therefrom 
Would it not be strange that a treaty, with a limited number of States parties, could prevent the ap-
plication of the secondary rules on crimes established by the whole international community Apart 
from that the question to be answered is whether the States concluding the treaty concerned intended 
to provide for a completely autonomous régime of responsibility 
Talcing a look at the Charter shows us that it is completely silent on issues of reparation It is hard to 
imagine that the States, in concluding the Charter, would have wanted to deny any possibility of 
reparation for breaches of obligation under the Charter The Security Council itself has on numerous 
occasions, as has been seen in previous sections, stressed the obligation of members to provide repa-
ration for violations of the Charter And the Court held that the United States had breached its obli-
gation not to use force as against Nicaragua, and stipulated the former's duty to provide 
compensation therefor Its decision was based on the customary rules on the use of force Yet would 
the Court have given a different decision if it had had the chance of applying Charter rules'' Not 
likely 
As to the crimes other than aggression it cannot but be noted that all the relevant treaties provide for 
nothing more than supervision procedures and procedures for complaints by individuals The latter 
are subject however to the general consent of the State party concerned The organs established for 
such purposes are not intended to give binding decisions for the State party (allegedly) in breach of 
its obligations under the treaty They can only investigate on the basis of State reports and non-
governmental organization's reports, and on that basis can only note the existence of breaches and 
recommend the appropriate remedies Since that is the case an injured State would be hard put to it, 
if it had to accept that no more could be done than that in the matter of reparation Furthermore, it is 
suggested that the lack of provisions on sanctions in case of breaches of obligations under the treaty 
indicates that the treaty is intended to function only with regard to breaches that are committed by 
State organs without any wilful intent or premeditation on their part The latter kind of breaches, for 
that reason alone, could not be considered international crimes Thus jurisdiction over a crime ordi-
narily falling to the treaty organ would be transferred to the international community 
Peremptory norms and human rights 
Not much more need be said about the restrictions imposed by existing peremptory norms Espe-
cially the section on guarantees against repetition has shown that a State cannot be subjected to in-
voluntary loss of territory or foreign domination To that may be added that the population may not 
be held collectively accountable for the crime of the State,264 and only persons that are individually 
responsible for (ordering or not preventing) specific acts could be punished Clearly States could not, 
due to an international crime committed, take it on themselves to commit another crime towards the 
population or people of a State A State committing the crime of aggression or genocide could not 
be punished by its population being subjected to genocide Nor could the nationals of a State be de-
prived of their human rights, and they could not be discriminated against on the basis of their State's 
crime Generally the restriction regarding the exercise of rights of reparation to be imposed on the 
basis of respect for human rights must be that reparation must not affect the vital needs of the popu-
lation of the author State On that basis too mitigation of compensation payments ought to be envis-
aged 
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3.8.3. Specific restrictions regarding reparation 
Excessive onerousness and proportionality 
With regard to international delicts Arangio-Ruiz proposed the following restriction: an injured State 
can only claim restitution in kind to the extent it "would not be excessively onerous for the State 
which has committed the internationally wrongful act."265 The Commission followed up on this by 
posing the restriction that restitution in kind should not involve "a burden out of all proportion to the 
benefit which the injured State would gain from obtaining restitution in kind instead of compensa-
tion;" The Commission explains that this is based on:166 '{...) equity and reasonableness and seeks to 
achieve an equitable balance between the onus to be sustained by the author state and the benefit 
which the injured State would gain from obtaining reparation in that specific form rather than com-
pensation." However, the Commission claimed, with reference to the distinction between delicts and 
crimes, that:267 
"(...) the limit of excessive onerousness would assume a different weight according to the 
qualitative and quantitative dimension of the wrongful act for which reparation is sought. In-
deed in the case of the most serious wrongful acts such as aggression and genocide, it would 
be inequitable for the effort of reparation incumbent upon the author State - including the 
fullest restitution in kind - to be considered excessive in proportion to the violation committed 
by that State." 
On the basis of the agreement within the Commission Arangio-Ruiz has gone on to propose, by way 
of article 16, paragraph 3, Part Two, that the restriction of article 7 (c), Part Two, would not apply 
in case of crimes.268 
Since it is a general rule that reparation must adequately wipe out the wrongful act and its conse-
quences, there seems to be no letting up on the basic obligations of the author State to provide resti-
tution in kind and substitute or complementary compensation. Nevertheless, it may strike one as odd 
that the burden of reparation (restitution in kind) may be disproportional to the wrongful act and the 
injury sustained in the case of delicts.269 Yet at the same time the Commission and Arangio-Ruiz 
claim that there can be no question of excessive onerousness (disproportionality) in case of crimes. It 
is hard to see where the difference lies. The author State of an internationally wrongful act, whether 
that be a delict or a crime, has complete jurisdiction over its territory. It is perfectly capable of re-
turning persons, property, or territory, if it would want to. Certainly no injured State could waive its 
right to demand the release of persons wrongfully held prisoner, and therefore it could not claim 
substitute compensation. With regard to property the question is perhaps more complicated, since 
the title to it may have passed into private hands. But should that stand in the way of restitution? 
Even if the property concerned had come into the hands of private individuals that acted in good 
faith, one would still have to insist on restitution. Because in claiming that it could not be returned, 
due to domestic legal obstacles, one would be placing the domestic legal order above the interna-
tional legal order. In regard to territory the matter is even more straightforward. In that case what is 
at stake is transfer of factual control over the territory. This requires no more than timetables for 
withdrawal by the author State and the corresponding taking of control by the injured State. 
Concluding it may said that there should be no possibility at all to refuse restitution in kind, not in 
case of crimes and not in case of delicts.270 
The same conclusion is not valid for compensation. Since restitution in kind and compensation are 
both reparatory in character, the principle of proportionality cannot operate in respect of these forms 
of reparation. They are of necessity strictly proportional to the wrong committed. The amount of 
compensation to be paid by the author State of an international crime, however, should be mitigated. 
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Not because paying compensation might amount to any disproportional burden for the author State 
The reason for insisting on an extenuation of responsibility is that the consequences of crimes may be 
of such gravity that they would inequitably burden the population of the author State As Graefrath 
puts it, the obligation to pay compensation should not jeopardize the existence of a people271 That 
the amount to be paid as compensation could be reduced, on this ground, was already recognized by 
article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, in which the Allied and Associated Governments 
recognized that Germany's resources would not be adequate to make complete reparation272 Article 
14 of the peace treaty with Japan after World War II, while stipulating Japan's duty to pay compen-
sation, recognized that 
"( ) the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, 
to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its 
other obligations " 
As to the modalities of mitigation, it is submitted that two should be considered First, where the 
crimes of aggression and self-determination are concerned, costs incurred for the suppression of the 
crime should be excluded from the amount of compensation Examples regarding such limitation may 
be found in the pastI73 But the Security Council, far from excluding anything from the amount, has 
decided, in resolution 706, that Iraq ought to pay, in addition, for the costs incurred for the imple-
mentation of its disarmament obligations, the costs for the facilitation of return of Kuwaiti property, 
and half the costs of the demarcation of the boundary Apparently the Security Council intends to 
have Iraq pay everything related to its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait Nevertheless, it 
would be proper to insist that all losses suffered as a result of the Security Council imposed sanctions 
and the eventual use of force by Coalition forces against Iraq ought not to compensated by the lat-
ter274 
Another way of reducing the amount of compensation could lie with the setting of limits on compen-
sation claims put forward by individuals and corporations Thus a minimum might be set on the basis 
of the maxim de minimus non curat praetor A maximum should be set on the basis that paying full 
compensation inequitably burdens the author State of an international crime275 While paying lucrum 
cessans and interest does not as such amount to unjustifiable enrichment, one might consider these 
not to be appropriate in case of crimes Further mitigation could be imposed if the claiming individual 
is well-off, or if the claiming corporation has the necessary funds for dealing with set-backs A final 
obstacle for claiming compensation ought to be that the damage was covered by insurance276 
Impossibility ofperformance and domestic jurisdiction 
In his preliminary report Arangio-Ruiz discussed whether an author State would be relieved of its 
obligation to provide restitution in kind in case of impossibility of performance thereof277 Such 
would be the case when there was factual or material impossibility, for instance if the persons con-
cerned had been killed or the property had been destroyed27S In general territory would not seem to 
be subject to destruction,279 and thus may be left out in the discussion The Commission has pro-
vided, by way of article 7 (a), Part Two, that restitution would have to be provided only to the extent 
that it would not be materially impossible M0 
Real difficulties arise in regard to so-called legal impossibility of performance In this respect the 
Commission has stated 281 
"Any State which is well aware of its international obligations - secondary as well as primary -
is bound to see to it that its legal system, not being opposable to the application of interna-
tional legal rules, is adapted or adaptable to any exigencies deriving from such rules." 
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As the Commission observes a State's legal system is not opposable to the application of interna-
tional legal rules. That is so because by virtue of such rules the domestic jurisdiction of a State has 
been restricted. What remains, or not, under a State's domestic jurisdiction is dependent upon the 
existence and operation of international rules. Where the conduct of States is regulated by prohibi-
tive and prescriptive rules they can no longer on the basis of their sovereignty claim any remaining 
domestic jurisdiction. Any State of course ought to be aware of its obligations under primary rules of 
international law. And to the extent that there is a clash between rules of the domestic legal system 
and such primary obligations the latter must prevail. The same can be said in case of conflict between 
domestic legal rules and the secondary rules on restitution in kind. But this cannot be said of all sec-
ondary rules on reparation. Legal impossibility should be considered also in relation to satisfaction 
and guarantees against repetition. 
In respect to the claim for punishment of individuals a problem may arise to the extent that the 
criminal law of the injured State would not have prohibited the acts deemed to be internationally 
wrongful. In such a case post facto modification of the law will inevitably be insufficient, since 
prosecution of the individual will come up against the fundamental principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege. And it would seem that this problem can be generalized, since an individual could not be sanc-
tioned or punished for an act that is not in any way covered by the prohibitive rules of the injured 
State's administrative or criminal law. Since criminal laws are always published, indeed generally the 
operation of laws within the domestic legal system is dependent upon publication, any lacuna with 
respect to the prohibition of certain acts could have been known to the injured State. For these rea-
sons demands by the injured State for the punishment of individuals would seem to come up against 
the obstacle of legal impossibility, and since it might have known of this the injured State would have 
to restrict itself to claiming, as a guarantee against repetition, the introduction of legal provisions 
prohibiting the conduct in question. It might be objected of course that a State cannot invoke its le-
gal system in order to escape performing an international obligation. That argument is entirely per-
suasive with regard to a conflict between obligations under primary rules of international law and 
domestic legal provisions. But the same cannot be said if obligations under secondary rules conflict 
with the domestic legal system. Unless the primary rules could, of necessity, not be observed without 
the introduction of criminal prohibitions, one would have to say that the legal impossibility thus 
emerged falls within the injured State's domestic jurisdiction. The provision of article 6 bis, para-
graph 3, adopted by the Commission thus has been phrased too rigorously.282 
These issues are relevant for international crimes also. If acts of the author State come under the 
heading of international delicts, its domestic legal system should be respected if it presents obstacles 
to the prosecution of the suspects. Where the acts amount to international crimes, impossibility of 
performance due to domestic legal obstacles cannot be recognized. While one could not expect a 
State to adopt legislation derogating from the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, international law re-
quires that suspects should be brought under international jurisdiction. Where there is the possibility 
of prosecution under the author State's criminal law, international law offers an author State the op-
tion of either prosecuting or extraditing the suspects. However, if such prosecution is impossible, or 
not likely to be implemented in a serious way, international jurisdiction may well have to be asserted. 
Such jurisdiction could consist of demands for extradition, execution of universal jurisdiction, or the 
setting up of an international tribunal. In the past some specialized international tribunals have been 
set up, e.g. the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, and the International Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The creation of a general tribunal is under discussion by the Com-
mission. Punishment of individuals, as a form of satisfaction, would thus be taken away from the 
author State in case of international crimes. 
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The domestic jurisdiction of States generally ought to be preserved as much as possible. Guarantees 
against repetition in case of international delicts therefore should not include demands for modifica-
tion or repeal of legislation unless such legislation provided the constitutive basis for the interna-
tionally wrongful act If that is the case the author State perhaps would have to change legislation 
already because of an injured State's claim for restitution The situation is entirely different where 
international crimes are concerned The limit just mentioned does not apply,283 and a demand for 
guarantees may involve the modification or repeal of legislation unrelated to the wrongful act But 
the matter does not stop there. As has been elaborated in section 3.7, in case of crimes it is possible 
to demand a wide span of measures affecting the organization of the State itself. These include the 
re-organization of the police, paramilitary or armed forces, a change of government, but also the in-
troduction of specific provisions in the constitution The latter may relate to the observance of hu-
man rights, adherence to democratic principles, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-aggressive 
policies, and neutrality All these measures therefore touch upon the very sovereignty of the State 
and could clearly only be justifiably imposed on States which committed an international crime284 
3.9. Summary 
Performance of the obligation(s) to provide reparation, including cessation, constitutes the means for 
the author State to discharge the responsibility incumbent upon it as a result of its internationally 
wrongful act Such reparation must be adequate to wipe out the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which, in all probability, would have existed if that act had not been com-
mitted The obligation to provide reparation finds its basis in the responsibility incurred upon the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act Consequently it is established ipso jure upon the 
commission of the wrongful act, and a claim by the injured State is not necessary to establish the 
secondary legal relationships Generally reparation is, as the word indicates, of reparatory character 
only That goes especially for cessation of wrongful conduct, restitution in kind, and compensation 
The expression of apologies, the conviction and punishment of responsible individuals, and guaran-
tees against repetition in general, do not constitute punishment, but are to be considered of deterrent 
character Only the payment of compensation over and above the actual loss sustained must be con-
sidered to constitute punishment 
Since under article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two, all States are injured States in case an international 
crimes is committed, this means that all States can protest the behaviour of the author State A pro-
test will serve to reaffirm an injured State's right to demand reparation Injured States can claim 
reparation and support, or repudiate the lack of, claims for reparation by other (directly) injured 
States Such action will not constitute a prohibited intervention in the external affairs of the author 
State and/or other injured States Similarly all States can demand the cessation of wrongful conduct 
if that constitutes an international crime This as such does not constitute a special or supplementary 
consequence of the régime of crimes. However, more or less timely discontinuance of wrongful con-
duct must be taken into account in regard to matters of satisfaction and guarantees against repetition 
Restitution in kind constitutes the form of reparation which is most apt to wipe out the conse-
quences of a wrongful act and to re-establish the situation that existed before it had taken place As 
such, regarding both delicts and crimes, no right of choice exists for either the injured State or the 
author State to opt for compensation instead of restitution Only an agreement between the injured 
and author States can constitute the basis for a choice for compensation if restitution is perfectly 
possible Furthermore, the author State's performance of its obligation to provide restitution, that is, 
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the return of persons, property, or territory, can be effected without there being any need to change 
the author State's legal system. To the extent that such a change is demanded by the injured State it 
will function as a guarantee against repetition. No special or supplementary consequences of crimes 
need to be envisaged as to restitution in kind. 
Similarly no special or supplementary consequences apply in the field of compensation. However, 
recently the Security Council has taken it upon itself to ensure the payment of compensation by Iraq 
to all those States and their nationals which suffered damage due to its unlawful invasion and occu-
pation of Kuwait. For that purpose it has created a fund to which Iraq must contribute a percentage 
of its petroleum export value. In order to ensure the liquidity of that fund the Security Council has 
further decided that Iraq may sell oil, subject to the proviso that the buying States will pay the 
amount of the purchases into a United Nations' escrow account. By setting up these arrangements 
the Security Council has designed a highly innovating and creative manner to enforce compensation 
claims. 
The first manifestation of satisfaction, the expression of regrets or apologies, does not play any 
distinct role in case of international crimes. The second manifestation of satisfaction, the prosecution, 
conviction, and punishment of individuals responsible for the commission of the crime, constitutes an 
imperative in order to prevent recurrence of the crime. In case of delicts the implementation of indi-
vidual responsibility is left to the discretion of the author State. In case of crimes it may be taken on 
by States, individually, and by the Security Council. If such is the case the setting up of an interna-
tional tribunal functions both as a deterrent and as a guarantee against repetition. The third manifes-
tation of satisfaction, damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement of rights of the injured State 
or punitive damages, does not, and should not, have any place at all in international law. 
The scope of guarantees against repetition to be provided or implemented by the author State 
ought to be extended in case of international crimes, and this must be seen to constitute special or 
supplementary consequences of the régime of crimes. The two main categories of guarantees are 
those related to the police, paramilitary and armed forces, and those related to the State organiza-
tion. Appropriate guarantees within the first category may include obligations regarding disarma-
ment, dismantling of war industries, destruction of weapons, re-organization of the police, 
paramilitary or armed forces, and the admission of observation teams. Appropriate guarantees re-
lated to the State organization may include obligations for the prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible for the commission of the crime, the prohibition of specific political groups or parties, a 
change of government, constitutional changes, the holding of free elections, and respect for human 
rights. Guarantees against repetition which are either demanded or imposed should not amount, gen-
erally, to an imposed settlement of disputes or to the loss of territory or political independence. An 
exception regarding this latter position would be constituted by a situation in which the author State 
of an international crime targeted a specific ethnic people. In such a case the people concerned 
should be allowed, as a guarantee against repetition, to exercise its right of self-determination. 
With regard to restrictions to the exercise of rights of reparation it may be said that the absence of 
specially affected States leads to the conclusion that all the injured States can claim reparation. If 
there is a directly injured State, that is, in case of the crime of aggression, all the other injured States 
may demand cessation, restitution, satisfaction and guarantees. Claims for compensation, however, 
are of dependent nature, and the directly injured State may put an end to them. The Security Council 
may take up the case of one of its members regarding rights of reparation. However, it cannot do 
away with such rights, since it is bound by virtue of article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter, to bring 
about the settlement of disputes in conformity with principles of justice and international law. 
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No restriction regarding the exercise of rights of reparation exists on the basis of a treaty régime un-
less it can be established that the rules contained on that subject in the treaty are exclusive Neither 
the Charter, nor specific treaties in the field of human rights, testify to any intention to that effect 
Demands for reparation should not conflict with peremptory norms of general international law 
Consequently demands for guarantees against repetition should not lead to a complete loss of inde-
pendence for the author State, nor should they, generally, affect its territorial integrity Demands for 
compensation should not impose such a burden on the population of the author State as to put in 
jeopardy its vital needs 
The restriction of excessive onerousness proposed by the Commission in regard to restitution cer-
tainly should certainly not apply in case of crimes, and Arangio-Ruiz has rightly proposed its dele-
tion However, that restriction should apply to compensation, since the population of the author 
State may be inequitably burdened due to the extensive nature of the damage Again, the vital needs 
of the population must not be put in jeopardy 
Impossibility of performance in a factual sense will certainly constitute an obstacle to provide resti-
tution, but the same cannot be said regarding the so-called legal impossibility Any State ought to be 
aware of its obligations under primary and secondary rules of international law However, one ought 
to respect as much as possible the domestic jurisdiction of the author State with regard to satisfac-
tion and guarantees in case of delicts Changes in legislation should be demanded only if it formed 
the constitutive basis for the internationally wrongful act In case the internationally wrongful act 
constitutes an international crime the limit of domestic jurisdiction will not apply m the same way, 
since guarantees demanded or imposed in such a case may involve changes in the State organization 
itself 
It has been stated a number of times that specific forms of reparation may be demanded or im-
posed Clearly a mere demand for reparation by an injured State or the United Nations does not 
amount to imposing reparation True, imposition of reparation demands, though exceptional, may 
come about if injured States take, or if the United Nations orders members to take, measures within 
their territorial jurisdiction regarding the funds, property, or nationals of the author State which sat-
isfy the demands directly The ordinary and more likely scenario is that injured States or the United 
Nations (threaten to) impose or resort to measures detrimental to the author State or its nationals 
and so coerce it to perform its reparation obligations Such measures may amount to non-military 
countermeasures or to the actual use of armed force against the author State The following chapter 
is therefore devoted to the right of injured States or the United Nations to resort to non-military 
countermeasures in response to international crimes 
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nity as a whole " 
1 1 0
 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Publications PCU, 1924, Senes A, No 2, ρ 6, 12 
121
 Note from a general angle the 1978 Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement, 17 ILM 1978, pp 261-264, and the 
1979 Independence Constitution, 19 ILM 1980, pp 388-402, the 1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 31 ILM 1992, pp 183-188, the 1992 General Peace Agreement for Mozam­
bique, S/24635, the 1993 Agreement Liberia, S/26272 (Cotonou Agreement), the proposed 1993 Agreement relat­
ing to Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/26377/Add 1, see also the 1994 Framework agreement for the Federation 
(Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina), S/1994/255 
1 2 2
 Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages, 93 See also Wellens, К , Apartheid, An International Crime, in Heyde, 
L, Leuten, J, Mertens, Th , and Vermeulen, В (Eds), Begrensde Vrijheid, Opstellen over mensenrechten aange­
boden aan Prof Dr D F Schcltens bij zijn afscheid als hoogleraar aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 
Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1989, pp 288-311, 297-298 Past denials of self-determination may also give rise to the 
obligation of the author State to provide compensation for specific wrongs committed towards individuals during 
the period of domination Note Graefrath, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit, 106-107 
ш
 Text and Commentary Article 27, Part One, YBILC 1978, Volume II, Part Two, pp 99-105, 99 
1 1 4
 See chapter two, subsection 2 6 2, where reference was made to the observation of the Commission that such intent 
could not be presumed 
, и
 С f Graefrath, В , Verantwortlichkeit und Wiedergutmachung bei Apartheidverbrechen, 35 NJ 1981, pp 115-117, 
115-116 
1 2 4
 Generally Commentary Article 10, Part Two, 195-196 Originally Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, 5, 10-16, 79-82, 
87 See also Przetacznik, F, La responsabilité internationale de l'état a raison des préjudices de caractère moral et 
politique causes a un autre état, 78 RGDIP 1974, pp 917-974 
127
 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, 5, 11, and 79 
118
 See Donumce, La satisfaction, 94 
u
' Especially Dorruiucé, La satisfaction, 112-116, and 120-121 
REPARATION 179 
ш
 Graefrath, Responsibility and Damages, 85-86 
U 1
 Commentary Article 10, Part Two, 193-209 Originally Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, Addendum 1, 25 See also 
Gilbert, G, The Criminal Responsibility of States, 39ICLQ 1990, pp 345-369, 352-354 
ш
 Commentary Article 10, Part Two, 197 
ш
 Axangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 11-14, and Seventh Report, Addendum 1, 2 Subject of course, as noted earlier, to 
the safeguard of the author State's independent existence, its territorial integrity, and the vital needs of its people 
ш
 Riedel, E , Satisfaction, in Bernhardt, EPIL, Instalment 10, pp 383-384, 383 
ш
 Corfu Channel Case, 35 
ш
 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, Addendum 1, 25 
"
7
 Arangio-Ruiz' proposal appeared not to include disciplinary action against officials, as it only spoke of punishment 
of responsible individuals See Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, Addendum 1, 25 
"* The Case of the S S Lotus, Publications PCIJ, 1927, Senes A, No 10, ρ 4, 22-32 
° ' Eg Spinedi, The Legislative History, 138 
ш
 Note the opinion expressed within the Commission that "( ) in case of crimes, prosecution should be possible, 
( ), without the consent of Üie author State " See Commission Report 1994, 342 
141
 Graefrath, В , and Mohr, M, Völkerrechtliche und strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fur internationale Verbre-
chen, 35 SR 1986, pp 29-40, 31, 34, and 36, note that State organs cannot claim immunity on the basis that they 
acted on behalf of the State See also Drost, Ρ, The Crime of State, volume 1, Humamcide, A W Sijthoff, Leyden, 
1959, 290-297, on the necessity of avoiding the punishment of individuals for crimes committed by legal persons 
1 4 1
 Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal to be found in the 1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 39 AJIL 1945, Supplement, pp 257-264 Judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, 41 AJIL 1947, pp 172-333 
1 4 3
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 102-104 
1 4 4
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 103-104 Graefrath, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit, 100-103, views the 
implementation of individual responsibility as a specific sanction regarding serious violations of international law 
Also Hofmann, R., Zur Unterscheidung Verbrechen und Delikt im Bereich der Staatenverantwortlichkeit, 45 
ZAORV 1985, pp 195-231, 208 
145
 Commentary Article 19, Part One, 104 
144
 Which m fact is endowed on States more and more often with regard to all kinds of related criminal acts, such as 
terrorism, drugs connected crimes, torture, etc 
147
 Resolution 827 and 955 The establishment of the first tribunal was envisaged by the Security Council in resolution 
808 in which it requested a report on the matter by the Secretary-General, and effected by means of resolution 827 
Report containing the Statute of the International Tribunal to be found in 32ILM 1993, pp 1159-1205 
148
 Resolution 827, operative paragraph 4 m combination with articles 29 and 19, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the 
International Tribunal 
l4
' Arangio-Ruiz' proposal was far more straightforward, as he proposed a provision on 'punitive' damages, when 
compared to the Commission's diplomatic phrasing Generally Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, 79-112, and Aran-
gio-Ruiz, Second Report, Addendum 1,21-23, and 25 
180
 Commentary Article 10, Part Two, 205 Footnote omitted 
151
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 11-14, Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, Addendum 1, 2 See also Arangio-Ruiz, 
Fifth Report, Addendum 2, 20-21, footnote 51, and Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 5, where he investigates the ques-
tion as to whether reparation should be more burdensome in case of crimes, and where he states "A second dero-
gation might concern the prohibition of 'punitive damages', ( ) " It is not quite clear why he speaks of a 
prohibition on punitive damages considering that he envisages that possibility m case of delicts Note also the 
opinion by some members that punitive damages were a necessary element of any régime of crimes, reported in 
Commission Report 1994, 343 
152
 С f Jimenez de Aréchaga, E , and Tanzi, A, International State Responsibility, in Bedjaoui, M (Ed), International 
Law Achievement and Prospects, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, and UNESCO, Pans, 1991, pp 347-
380, 369 
153
 С f Annacker, С, The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 46 AJPTL 1994, pp 131-
166, 154, in the context of breaches of human rights obligations 
, S 4
 Although one may note the initiative taken by the arbitral tribunal m the second Rainbow Warrior Award, in 
which it recommended that the French government should pay some 2 million US dollars into a fund for the pro­
motion of friendly relations between the peoples of New Zealand and France Rainbow Wamor (New Zealand ν 
France), France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal (Jiménez de Aréchaga, Keith, Bredin), 30 Apnl 1990, 82 ILR 
180 CHAPTERS 
1990, pp 500-590, 578 
ISS
 The Commission observed, in Commentary Article 10, Part Two, 208, that it "( ) did not find it necessary to pro­
nounce itself on the question whether an afflictive nature should be attributed to satisfaction as a form of repara­
tion " Note also Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 29, footnote 147, who observed, after noting that the 
majority of the Commission did not ascribe any punitive function to reparation, that "Rather contradictorily, in 
our view, a punitive function would have to be excluded (in the form of punitive damages or otherwise) even from 
such obviously sanctioning forms of reparation as the various kinds of satisfaction and guarantees of non repeti­
tion" 
1 M
 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report, 113-125 
, S 7
 Text and Commentary Article 10 bis, Part Two, in Commission Report 1993, pp 210-215 
1S
* Commentary Article 10 bis, Part Two, 215 
"* Commentary Article 10 bis, Part Two, 210-211 
1 6 0
 С f Marek, К, Criminalizing State Responsibility, 14 RBDI1978-1979, pp 460-485, 478 
1 ( 1
 Part V (military matters demobilization, reduction of army, arms embargo, no compulsory military service, mobi-
bzation prohibited, dismantling fortified works, no warships or submannes, no military or naval air force) and Part 
XIV (guarantees occupation and withdrawal of German troops) of the 1919 Treaty of Peace with Germany Provi­
sions similar, though not always as far-reaching, to Part V may be found in the 1919 Treaty of Peace between the 
Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, 14 AJIL 1920, Supplement, pp 1-183, the 1919 Treaty of Peace be­
tween the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, and Protocol, 14 AJIL 1920, Supplement, pp 185-309, the 
1920 Treaty of Peace between the Albed and Associated Powers and Hungary, and Protocol and Declaration, 15 
AJIL 1921, Supplement, pp 23-151, the 1920 Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, 15 AJIL 
1921, Supplement, pp 179-295, the 1947 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy, 42 
AJIL 1948, Supplement, pp 47-142, the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, 42 AJIL 1948, Supplement, pp 179-
202, the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Finland, 42 AJIL 1948, Supplement, pp 203-223, the 1947 Treaty of Peace 
with Hungary, 42 AJIL 1948, Supplement, pp 225-251, the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Roumanie, 42 AJIL 1948, 
Supplement, pp 252-277, and the 1955 State Treaty for the Re-Establishment of an Independent and Democratic 
Austria, 49 AJIL 1955, Supplement, pp 162-191 See further the 1919 Treaty of Peace between the Principal Al­
lied and Associated Powers and Czecho-Slovakia, 14 AJJL 1920, Supplement, pp 311-323, the 1919 Treaty be­
tween the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Roumama, 14 AJIL 1920, Supplement, pp 325-332, the 
1919 Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Slate, 14 
AJTL 1920, Supplement, pp 333-342, and the 1951 Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, 46 AJIL 
1952, Supplement, pp 71-86 
1 0
 See for instance Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory, 56-61 
' " Generally Sur, S , La resolution 687 (3 avril 1991) du Conseil de Sécurité dans l'affaire du Golfe Problèmes de 
rétablissement et de garantie de la paix, 37 AFDI 1991, pp 25-97, Cottereau, G , De la responsabilité de l'Iraq 
selon la résolution 687 du Conseil de Sécurité, 37 AFDI 1991, pp 99-117 
164
 Which may be deduced also on the basis of an α contrario interpretation of article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter 
(chapter two, subsection 2 4 1) 
1 4 5
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, Addendum 1,2 On guarantees in the context of aggression, colonialism and 
apartheid see Graefrath, В, Oeser, E, and Steimger, Ρ, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten, 
StaalsverlagderDDR, Berlin, 1977, 132-137 and 151-152 
'" Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 12 Relevant footnote omitted 
147
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 12-13 Two relevant footnotes omitted 
><a
 A number of peace treaties have recorded the determination of boundaries and the renunciation of territory With 
regard to the Germany one may note that the following paragraph in the preamble of the Declaration regarding the 
Defeat of Germany stated that the Four Powers would "( ) hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any 
part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being a part of German territory " 
'" One should be well aware that due to this demarcation a substantial part of Urn Quasr now lies on Kuwaiti terri-
tory С f Mendelson, M., and Hulton, S , The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary, 64 BYBIL 1993, pp 135-195, 192-195 Note 
especially resolution 833 
1 7 0
 In the preamble of resolution 773 the Security Council claimed "Recalling in this connection that through the de­
marcation process the Commission is not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but it is simply carrying 
out the technical task necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise co-ordinates of the boundary set out in 
the Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of Friendly 
Relations, Recognition and Related Matters signed by them on 4 October 1963, and that this task is being earned 
REPARATION 181 
out in the special circumstances following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait ( ) " Repeated in the preamble of resolution 
833 
171
 Note the mention, m the preamble of resolution 806, of border incidents involving UNKOM 
171
 Recently the Libyan leader Khadaffi appears to have accepted his loss regarding the Aouzou stop, after a judgment 
by the Court in favour of Chad 
173
 E g articles 21, 23 to 26, 29, 40 and 43 of the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy, and articles 2, 3, 8 (b), and 10 of the 
1951 Peace Treaty with Japan 
174
 Riphagen, W , Second report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft 
articles), YBILC 1981, Volume II, Part One, pp 79-101, 100 The article was placed by Riphagen under the 
heading of 'general principles', and apparently applied also in case the breach of obligation constituted a crime 
That may be seen also by his comment to the article "But the point is that even the most serious 'international 
crime' ( ) does not in itself-i e automatically-deprive the author State of its sovereignty as such " Riphagen, Sec-
ond Report, 86 
175
 Generally Sur, La résolution 687, 50-68, Marauhn, Τ, The Implementation of Disarmament and Arms Control 
Obligations Imposed upon Iraq by the Security Council, 52 ZAORV 1992, pp 781-803, and especially 786 Ger­
many was subjected to complete disarmament after World War II See articles 2 (a) and 13 (a) of the Declaration 
regarding the Defeat of Germany Note also the French disarmament, imposed by Germany, under the 1940 Ar­
mistice Agreement (articles 4 to 9), and similar provisions imposed by Italy under the 1940 Armistice Agreement, 
ibid, 157-158 (articles 9-13 and 15) 
1 7 4
 Leaving aside here the continued application of the arms embargo against Iraq as laid down in paragraph 24 of 
resolution 687 
1 7 7
 See the 1968 Traité sur la non prolifération des armes nucléaires, 73 RGDIP 1969, pp 248-253 
17a
 The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, in Roberts, A , and Guelff, R. (Eds), Documents on the Laws of War, Claren-
don Press, Oxford, 1982, pp 139-140 
179
 The Court noted in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua ν Umted States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, ρ 14, 135, that "( ) in international law there are no rules, other 
than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments 
of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception " 
I M
 Iraq has only signed the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by way of General Assembly 
resolution 2826 (XXVI), reprinted in 11 ILM 1972, pp 310-314 The Security Council has only invited Iraq to 
ratify that treaty (paragraph 7, resolution 687) 
l n
 On El Salvador note the 1991 New York Agreement, reprinted in A/46/502, Annex, the 1991 Mexico Agreements 
(the Political Agreements Elaborating on the Constitutional Reform), reprinted m A/46/553, Annex, and especially 
the 1992 Peace Agreement, reprinted in A/46/864, Annex On Liberia see the 1991 Final Communiqué of the 
Fourth Meeting of the Committee of Five of the Economic Community of West African States on the Libertan Cri-
sis, reprinted in S/24815, Annex, the 1993 Agreement, reprinted in S/26272, Annex, the 1994 Akosombo Agree-
ment, reprinted in S/1994/1174, the 1994 Agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement, repnnted in 
S/1995/7, Annex II Regarding Angola note Annexes III to V of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, repnnted in 
S/1994/1441, Annex On Haiti see the 1992 Protocol between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Parliamen-
tary Negotiating Commission to find a Definitive Solution to the Haitian Crisis, repnnted in A/46/891, Annex I, 
the 1992 Protocol between President Jean-Bertrand Anstide and Prime Minister-Designate, Rene Theodore, under 
the Auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), repnnted in ibid, Annex II, the 1993 Governors Is-
land Agreement, repnnted in Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/975, 2-3, and the 1993 New York Pact, re-
pnnted in A/47/1000, Annex And on Rwanda see the 1993 Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, 
repnnted in A/48/824, Annex VI 
, M
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 11-14 Note also the conflicting views in Report 1994, 347-349 
m
 In article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of Peace with Germany, provision was made for the prosecution of the German 
Emperor on the basis of his "supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties" Note also 
that the peace treaties tended to lay down obligations for the State concerned to hand over individuals suspected of 
having violated the laws and customs of war 
1M
 С f Cassese, A, La communauté internationale et la genocide, in Le droit au service de la paix, de la justice et du 
développement, Mélanges Michel Virally, Éditions A Pedone, Pans, 1991, pp 183-194, 194 
182 CHAPTER 3 
'
и
 See especially articles 53 and 107 of the Charter Note also the condition, contained ш article 4, paragraph 1, of 
the Charter, for becoming a member of the United Nations a State applying for membership must be peace-loving 
See also the opinion of the Court on Admission of a State to the Umted Nations (Charter, Art 4), Advisory Opin­
ion, ICJ Reports 1948, ρ 57,62-63 
I N
 The more likely course of events if the Allies had decided to leave the prosecution of the responsible individuals to 
German courts 
l
" Article 11 (a) of the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany 
l n
 Article 9 of the Charter Article 10 of the Charter stipulated the final character of such a declaration The effect of 
a declaration was that proven membership of a criminal organization could lead to the imposition of penalties, in­
cluding the death penalty In its judgment the Tribunal first clarified that "criminal guilt is personal" and that 
"mass punishments should be avoided" According to the Tribunal therefore individuals should not be punished for 
membership of a criminal organization, when they "had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the or­
ganization", nor when they "were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in 
the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter ( ) " Nuremberg Judgment, 251 
' " The 1949 Accords de Washington sur l'Allemagne, in Colliard, С, and Manin, A (Eds), Droit International et 
Histoire Diplomatique, Documents choisis, volume Π, Europe, Éditions Montchrestien, Pans, 1976, pp 264-271 
See especially articles 1, 3, and 7 of the Aide-mémoire concernant les principes directeurs qui président a 
l'exercise des pouvoirs et responsabilités des gouvernements de la France, du Royaume Uni et des États-Unis après 
l'établissement d'une République Fédérale Allemande, 265, and article 5 of the Statut d'occupation définissant les 
pouvoirs devant être conservé par les autorités occupantes, 266-267 
"° Statut d'occupation, in Colliard and Manin, Droit International, 267 
1,1
 The 1954 Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, 49 AJTL 
1955, pp 57-69 
i n
 Which came about some 35 years later See the 1990 Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Matters Relating to 
Berlin, 30 ILM 1991, pp 446-449, the 1990 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic on the Establishment of German Unity (Unification Treaty), 30 ILM 1991, pp 463-498, and 
the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 29 ILM 1990, pp 1187-1192 
"
J
 As noted by Kawasaki, К, Crimes of State in International Law, 15 SLR 1993, pp 27-45,45 
1 9 4
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 100-101 The Court took those statements as evidence of the validity of the claim that the 
prohibition exists in customary international law 
1 9 5
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 110 
i H
 It is publicly known that the lifting of the sanctions against Iraq is barred to a large extent due to the avowed wish 
of some permanent members to see Saddam Hussein replaced See Sur, La résolution 687, 70-71 
'" Nicaragua Case, Merits, 108 Article 1, paragraph 1, of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 61 AJTL 1967, pp 870-887, stipulates "All peoples have the right to self-determination By virtue ofthat 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development " 
""Nicaragua Case, Merits, 130-135 The same cannot be said of conventional instruments Under certain human 
rights treaties States commit themselves to grant specific political rights to their citizens and to hold periodical, 
free, elections Eg article 10 of the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 45 AJIL 1951, Supplement, pp 24-39, article 3 of the 1952 Protocol I to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in Brownbe, I (Ed), Basic Documents on Human Rights, Third 
Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp 341-343, and articles 19 and 25 of the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 
1M
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 71 
200
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 119-120 The Court observed, in relation to Nicaragua's actions towards El Salvador, that 
the provision of arms to the armed opposition in another State did not constitute an armed attack In regard to 
Honduras and Costa Rica it considered that it was hard to determine whether the cross-border incidents with those 
States amounted to an armed attack by Nicaragua, and rejected such qualification on the basis that the States con-
cerned had not declared themselves to be under attack Ibid, 120-121 
201
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 124 The official policy of the Umted Slates was that its actions were not intended to 
overthrow the Nicaraguan government Ibid, 56-57 and 123-124 On the latter page the Court argues "The Court 
considers that in international law, if one State, with a view to the coercion of another State, supports and assists 
armed bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow the government of that State, that amounts to an inter-
vention by one State in the internal affairs of the other, whether or not the political objective of the State giving 
such support and assistance is equally far-reaching " 
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2 9 2
 Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Ments, 299-300 
2 0 3
 Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Ments, 332 
2 0 4
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 101 
1 , 5
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 103 
106
 Where Austria is concerned such integration, in this case in the European society, was prevented due to the politi­
cal animosity current after World War II Since the bi-polanty in world politics has come to an end, it cannot but 
be noted that Austria has joined the European Umon Note also article 4 of the 195S State Treaty for the Re-
Estabhshment of an Independent and Democratic Austria 
2 0 7
 Generally Bindschedler, R., Das Problem der Beteiligung der Schweiz an Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen, be­
sonders im Falle Rhodesien, 28 ZAORV 1968, pp 1-15, and Zemanek, К, Das Problem der Beteiligung des im­
merwährend neutralen Osterreich an Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen, besonders im Falle Rhodesiens, 28 
ZAORV 1968, pp 16-32 
™ C f Schermers, H, The Obligation to Intervene in the Domestic Affairs of States, in Delissen, A , and Tanja, G 
(Eds), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Essays in Honour of Fntz Kalshoven, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 1991, pp 583-593, 589-590, and Kawasaki, Cnmes of State, 43 and 45, who argues in favour of an ob-
ligation to effect a complete change in the governmental structures of the author State of an international cnme 
m
 Eg the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which ousted the Khmer Rouge government of Cambodia While that 
invasion put a stop to one of the worst massacres of this century, Vietnam was outcasted because it installed a 
Vietnamese controlled government, and remained in occupation of Cambodia for more than ten years 
210
 Observe that the Court has refused to entertain the case brought by Portugal against Australia, but noted that, for 
the parties, the territory of East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory and that its people has the right to 
self-determination Case concerning East Timor, Judgment, 30 June 1995, paragraphs 31 and 37 
211
 Note the General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, repnnted m S/24635 On El Salvador the 1990 Agreement on 
Human Rights, repnnted in A/44/971, Annex, the 1991 Mexico Agreements (especially the Political Agreements 
Elaborating on the Constitutional Reform, and the Commission on the Truth), and the 1992 Peace Agreement On 
Rwanda the 1993 Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese 
Patnotic Front on the Rule of Law, repnnted in A/48/824, Annex III, and the 1993 Protocols of Agreement be-
tween the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patnotic Front on Power-Shanng within the 
Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, in ibid, Annex IV On Guatamela see the 1991 Frame-
work Agreement on Democratization in the Search for Peace by Political Means (Querelare Agreement), repnnted 
in A/46/713 On Libena see the 1993 Agreement, and the 1994 Akosombo Agreement On Angola Annexes VI 
and П of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol On Haiti see the 1992 Protocols, the 1993 Governors Island Agreement, and 
the 1993 New York Pact 
2 1 2
 See the highly interesting studies of Franck, Τ, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJTL 1992, 
pp 46-91, and Crawford, J, Democracy and International Law, 64 BYBIL 1993, pp 113-133 
2 U
 Respectively article 15, article 2, article 6, article 3, and article 2 Attempts by certain Western States to ensure 
implementation of these provisions in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary through arbitral channels failed due to the 
existence of drafting errors in the relevant provisions See the following opinions in this respect Interpretation of 
Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, ρ 65, and Interpretation of Peace Treaties (second phase), 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, ρ 221 
2 1 4
 Note that the provision on the prohibition of fascist organizations has been inserted for the express purpose that 
such organizations should not be permitted to be able to take way the democratic nghts of the people 
2IÎ
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 9 
21<
 E g Security Council resolutions 242, 713, General Assembly resolutions 2625 (XXV) Note the remarks of Jen-
nings, The Acquisition of Temtory, 54 
217
 Article 42 entails the possibility of the Secunty Council resorting to a first use offeree, since such force need not 
relate to a breach of the peace or act of aggression, but may concern a (mere) threat to the peace 
215
 See also Jennings, The Acquisition of Ternlory, 52 
2
" Resolution 686 Repeated m slightly altered form in resolution 687 
220
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 103-104 and 108-111 
221
 Consider for example the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran, and the question whether Iran could continue to 
act in self-defence Discussed by Kaikobad, К, 'lus Ad Bellum' Legal Implications of the Iran-Iraq War, in 
Dekker, I, and Post, H (Eds), The Gulf War of 1980-1988, The Iran-Iraq War m International Legal Perspective, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992, pp 51-70, 64-65, Weiler, M, The Use of Force and Collective Se­
cunty, ibid, pp 71-90, 86-90, note also Siekmann, R., Comments, ibid, pp 91-94, 92-93 All three appear to 
184 CHAPTER 3 
come to the conclusion, although on different grounds, that Iran's right to self-defence had lapsed 
232
 Resolution 2625 (XXV), under the principle on the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
223
 Nor for that matter "any international agreement prior to the Charter régime and valid under international law," 
224
 Text and Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, YBILC 1966, Volume II, pp 247-249 
215
 Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, YBILC 1963, Volume II, pp 36-94, 39 
114
 Text in 25 ILM 1986, pp 543-589 Commentaries Articles 52 and 53, International Organizations, YBILC 1982, 
Volume II, Part Two, pp 55-56 
U T
 Commentary Article 52, International Organizations, 56 According to the Commission the expression 'group of 
States', used in certain General Assembly resolutions, covers international organizations International organiza-
tions therefore could, in theory (the Commission's language), unlawfully resort to armed force 
228
 The Commission held in Commentary Article 53, International Organizations, 56 "( ) it can hardly be main-
tained that States can avoid compliance with peremptory norms by creating an organization " It hereby implies that 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RIGHT OF INJURED STATE(S) OR THE UNITED NATIONS TO RESORT TO 
NON-MHJTARY COUNTERMEASURES IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
4.1. Introduction 
The Commission indicated in its commentary to article 1, Part One, that the new relations arising 
from a State's international responsibility might lead to giving l "( ) the injured State itself or other 
subjects of international law the right to impose on the offending State a sanction admitted by inter-
national law " The issue to discussed in this chapter concerns, in a strict sense, resort to that faculty 
called reprisals2 Then special rapporteur Ago, in his elaboration of the circumstances precluding the 
wrongfulness of conduct, had decided to name those sanctions3 The Commission in turn decided not 
to use the word "sanction", since there existed a tendency to reserve that word for 4 
"( ) reactive measures applied by virtue of a decision taken by an international organization 
following a breach of an international obligation having serious consequences for the interna-
tional community as a whole, and in particular for certain measures which the United Nations 
is empowered to adopt, under the system established by the Charter, with a view to the 
maintenance of international peace and security " 
In phrasing the provision on reprisals, article 30, Part One, the Commission instead resorted to the 
use of the words countermeasure (in the title) and measure (in the text) That provision consequently 
runs5 
"The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an obligation of that State to-
wards another State is precluded if the act constitutes a measure legitimate under interna-
tional law against that other State, in consequence of an internationally wrongful act of that 
other State " 
In the commentary no explanation was offered for that choice, but apparently use of the term coun-
termeasures was preferable because of the unfavourable connotations attached to the term reprisal * 
The subsequent special rapporteur, Riphagen, in his elaboration of Part Two on the content, forms 
and degrees of international responsibility, decided to split up the notion of countermeasures into 
measures adopted by way of reciprocity and measures by way of reprisal7 The first would involve 
the suspension of the performance of obligations identical to those breached by the author State The 
second would constitute measures that were directed to the suspension of performance of obligations 
other than those breached by the author State The present special rapporteur, Arangio-Ruiz, an-
nounced his dislike of the term countermeasures and spoke of measures instead8 Later on, as he en-
gaged in the study of countermeasures, though conforming to actual practice by speaking of 
countermeasures, he expressed a preference for the term reprisals ' At the same time he abandoned, 
and was followed in this by the Drafting Committee and the Commission, the distinction introduced 
by his predecessor Riphagen between measures by way of reciprocity and measures by way of repri-
sal ,0 
Over the years, as may be seen from the inclusion of article 30, Part One, into the ILC-draft,11 and 
the proposed article 11, Part Two,12 it has been generally recognized that an injured State may 
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acquire the right to resort to countermeasures. However, disagreement exists with regard to almost 
all aspects of the unilateral exercise of such a right. Questions regarding the basic requirements for a 
legitimate resort to decentralized or centralized countermeasures, as well as the restrictions 
applicable when such measures are implemented, have been extensively examined in the bulky 
literature on the subject.13 Such examination has not led to any real consensus on the legality or 
legitimacy of past or present countermeasures. Controversy will therefore most likely continue to 
rule with respect to any future resort to unilateral measures. The discussion has not been abated by 
the fact that some of the measures concerned had been adopted not by States individually but on a 
concerted basis. Indeed that could hardly have been otherwise considering that the controversies 
reigned during the Cold War. The measures adopted by the European Economic Community rather 
than the individual member States did not find general support with other States.14 
One area as to which the controversy appears to have been lessened somewhat concerns resort to 
sanctions by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter.15 The measures of article 41, l 6 
decided upon pursuant to a determination under article 39 that a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression exists, seem to have escaped the general disapproval reserved for unilat-
eral or group co-ordinated countermeasures. Yet there has been general recognition also of the fact 
that sanctions imposed by the Security Council, and implemented by member States, fall under the 
heading of countermeasures.17 The commentary to article 30 states:18 
"As has been seen, the terms 'countermeasures' and 'measure' used in the present article refer 
both to action by a State within the framework of sanctions ordered by a competent interna-
tional organization on the basis of the rules by which it is governed and to action that a State 
is authorized to take, under general international law, in reaction to an internationally 
wrongful act. In both cases, as the article states, the measures in question must constitute 'a 
measure legitimate under international law' against the State which has previously committed 
the internationally wrongful act." 
It is obvious then that any reigning controversy regarding the conditions and restrictions applicable 
to unilateral countermeasures will affect the discussion of sanctions. But the seemingly centralized 
decision making regarding resort to sanctions creates at least a presumption of legitimacy that ap-
pears to be lacking for decentralized resort. The foregoing quotation implies that all the conditions 
for a legitimate resort to unilateral countermeasures apply also to sanctions ordered by an interna-
tional organization. But it is added, a little bit later on, that:19 
"What is more, the conditions governing the various forms of reaction permissible under in-
ternational law are not necessarily the same in all cases. For example, the condition of prior 
submission of a demand for reparation, and even the principle of proportionality between the 
offence reacted against and the reaction itself, do not play the same role in the case of repri-
sals and in the case of sanctions adopted collectively in a competent international organiza-
tion." 
At appropriate places therefore the measures possible under article 41 of the Charter will be dis-
cussed alongside countermeasures. 
Three subjects will not be addressed in any particular manner in this chapter: measures by way of 
reciprocity (or reprisals in kind), the suspension and termination of treaties, and countermeasures in-
volving uses of military force. 
As to the first subject it may be observed that one of the more noteworthy features of countermea-
sures is that as a reaction against certain particular breaches of obligations they need not involve sus-
pension of the same or similar obligations towards the author State. To put it differently: there does 
not exist any rule that requires an injured State to respond in kind.2' 
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The second subject that will not be discussed, suspension and termination of treaties, has been codi-
fied in article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.21 At this place one may point to 
article 73 of the Vienna Convention which states that it shall not "prejudge any question that may 
arise from (...) the international responsibility of a State". Suffice it to say that the only question is 
whether countermeasures affecting treaty obligations may be adopted in response to breaches of ob-
ligations under a treaty which would not amount to material breaches, or in response to breaches of 
obligations under other treaties, customary international law, or otherwise. The answer must be in 
the affirmative.12 
The third subject excluded from this chapter, countermeasures involving the use of military force 
(armed reprisals), relates especially to the interpretation of Charter provisions and concomitant rules 
of customary law.23 Those will be discussed in chapter five and the subject examined here will only 
concern so called non-military or peaceful countermeasures. 
The following topics will be discussed in this chapter. The basis and nature of countermeasures 
will be discussed in section 2. It will examine such issues as the relation to reparation, punishment 
and punitive intent, coercion, collective responsibility, circumstances precluding wrongfulness, the 
denial of a right of the author State, and the exceptional or generalized nature of countermeasures. 
Section 3 will investigate possible preconditions for resort to countermeasures, namely the existence 
of an internationally wrongful act, reparation demands, dispute settlement, and additional require-
ments regarding Security Council measures under article 41 of the Charter. Finally section 4 will in-
vestigate possible restrictions regarding resort to countermeasures. It will focus first on restrictions 
due to the multiplicity of injured States, or the Security Council's exercise of powers, in case of in-
ternational crimes. In the second place it will discuss the exclusion of countermeasures due to the 
existence of certain treaty régimes, peremptory norms, or human rights obligations. Lastly in this 
section attention will be devoted to questions of necessity and proportionality. 
4.2. The function and nature of countermeasures 
4.2.1. The function of countermeasures 
Relation to reparation 
A basic issue with regard to resort to countermeasures concerns the function(s) they are to perform 
within the responsibility relationship between the author State and injured State^).24 Generally any 
resort to countermeasures by an injured State should be instrumental in the sense of putting pressure 
on an author State to acknowledge its responsibility and absolve itself therefrom.25 The first issue to 
be discussed therefore concerns the relationship between resort to countermeasures and the obliga-
tions of the author State in the field of reparation. 
If a breach of obligation is committed that is attributable to a State, the conditions for the existence 
of an internationally wrongful act are met, and such a State will engage its international responsibil-
ity. In essence, as the Commission observed, this means that the State internationally responsible will 
have imposed upon itself new obligations in the field of reparation. To make good for its wrongful 
act it must perform those reparation obligations, as the Permanent Court put it in the Chorzów Fac-
tory Case,26 suitable to "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed". 
Arangio-Ruiz pointed to the fact, as to the function to be assigned to countermeasures in the draft 
articles, that:27 
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"The study of international practice seems to indicate that in resorting to countermeasures 
injured States affirm that they are seeking and indeed appear to seek cessation of the wrong-
ful conduct (in case of a wrongful act having a continuing character) and/or reparation in a 
broad sense (possibly inclusive of satisfaction) and/or guarantees of non-repetition." 
Although the special rapporteur found it difficult to ascertain whether such a function would be the 
only admissible one under international law,28 it is submitted that, in a broad sense, such should be 
the case. Essentially the régime of responsibility is intended to ensure that the author of a wrongful 
act makes amends and so ensures an end to its responsibility. Contrary to the basic dichotomy estab-
lished by domestic legal systems, international law does not know of any separation between the civil 
and criminal consequences of a wrongful act. There is but the one unitary régime of reparation. 
Though some of the differing forms of reparation can be attributed with preventive or deterrent 
character, that does not affect the absence of any division, in international law, between civil and 
criminal responsibility. This unitary régime establishes the general rule for the author State to provide 
reparation, and the more explicit rules determining the specific forms, content and conditions for 
considering reparation granted. As soon as the author State has performed the substitute reparation 
obligations its responsibility will have come to an end. For that reason the measures resorted to must 
be reversible in character, since they are justified only for as long as the author State has not per-
formed its reparation obligations.29 In essence article 11, paragraph 1, Part Two, provisionally 
adopted by the Commission, reflects the basic goal to be attained by countermeasures:30 
"As long as the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act has not complied 
with its obligations under Articles 6 to 10 bis, the injured State is entitled to take countermea-
sures, that is, subject to the conditions and restrictions set forth in articles 12, 13 and 14, not 
to comply with one or more of its obligations towards the State which has committed the in-
ternationally wrongful act, as necessary in the light of the response to its demands by the 
State which has committed the internationally wrongful act in order to induce it to comply 
with its obligations under articles 6 to 10 bis." 
That text is also in accordance with Arangio-Ruiz' finding that international practice indicates that 
countermeasures going beyond the aim of reparation would constitute in themselves unlawful acts.31 
Questions of punishment and punitive intent 
Somewhat surprisingly the Commentary to article 30, following Ago in this respect, defined coun-
termeasures as:32 "measures the object of which is, by definition, to inflict punishment or to secure 
performance". As stated in the previous subsection the goal to be attained by an injured State impos-
ing countermeasures on an author State should be to obtain reparation. The question may neverthe-
less be asked whether international law, either in any explicit sense or in disguised manner, 
authorizes an injured State to inflict punishment on the author State. 
It is clear that international law does not know of any explicit power to impose punishment on a 
State for a breach of obligation. Underlying such absence of powers is the obvious fact that States 
are corporate personalities and as such cannot be subjected to physical punishment analogous to that 
existing under domestic systems of laws. That is not to say that international law could not in any 
way contain rules envisaging specific forms of punishment. However, although forms of punishment 
may be thought off, they have not, in any explicit manner, been laid down in rules of customary in-
ternational law.33 
While explicit rules on punishment do not exist, the rules on reparation contain some disguised 
forms. As much has been observed by Arangio-Ruiz in his fourth report: 
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"It is easy to presume, of course, that any State resorting to countermeasures against a law-
breaking State does not do so without some measure of punitive intent. In most cases such an 
intent will be so totally absorbed by the intent to seek cessation/reparation that it will not 
cross the threshold of distinct legal relevance. The situation may well be different in cases 
where the main concern of the injured State is to seek satisfaction and/or guarantees of non-
repetition. An intent to chastise may become in such cases more pronounced: and although 
satisfaction will be a self-inflicted penalty, the harm inflicted by the countermeasure aimed at 
obtaining satisfaction seems to be pretty close to a penalty inflicted by the injured State." 
Leaving aside for a moment the question of punitive intent, the obvious conclusion would have to be 
that some forms of reparation, notably satisfaction (the punishment of responsible individuals) and 
guarantees against repetition, could be characterized as punishment. However, as may be seen from 
the discussion in chapter three, subsection 3.2.2, those forms of reparation concern the prevention 
and deterrence of wrongful acts rather than that they constitute punishment. They also do not go 
very far, since their implementation is dependent on the consent and co-operation of the author State 
and any punishment or penalty flowing therefrom is consequently self-imposed. It should be noted 
though that the obligations of the author State in this respect may be enforced through countermea-
sures also in case of international delicts. The minimal importance adduced, by the injured State, to 
most international delicts committed may of course induce it to settle for restitution and/or compen-
sation. 
As to the issue whether any punitive intent lies behind an injured State's resort to countermea-
sures, that would appear to have relevance insofar as the measures resorted to are apt to do more 
than just put pressure on the author State to provide reparation. The question would remain relevant 
of course in those instances, noted by Arangio-Ruiz,34 where an injured State resorts to certain 
measures but does not demand any reparation. Yet even in those cases one could argue that there is 
an implied plea, manifested by the disapprobation of the wrongful act, for cessation or prevention of 
future acts. Arangio-Ruiz rightly comes to the conclusion that:35 "(...) it would be difficult to con-
ceive the presence of such an intent as more than a factual characterization of the function of coun-
termeasures." Evidence of the existence of punitive intent on the part of the injured State would 
appear to be present only to the extent that the injured State did not abide by the rules on 
(dis)proportionality (discussed in section 4.4). 
Coercion distinguished 
A necessary preliminary remark on terminology is in order here. Oddly enough the terminology of 
domestic systems of law and international law has drifted apart as to the meaning to be attached to 
the word "sanction". In domestic systems of law the imposition of sanctions on a subject of law does 
not refer to the use of coercion with regard to that subject. Instead sanctions concern the imposition 
of any of the specific forms of punishment the system envisages as a possible consequence of the 
commission of a crime or misdemeanour. Generally sanctions under a domestic system of law consist 
of such penalties as the death penalty, corporal punishment, imprisonment, and fines. Originally do-
mestic scholars and international arbitrators followed such terminology. Austin already, often enough 
quoted as to his opinion that international law constituted nothing more than positive international 
morality,36 in this regard led the way and pointed out that physical compulsion ought not to be con-
sidered a sanction.37 And the arbitrators in the Cysne Award discussed a Portuguese claim, for a 
special indemnity as a kind of sanction, as follows:38 
"Il résulte très clairement de cela qu'il ne s'agit pas, en réalité, d'une indemnité, de la répara-
tion d'un préjudice matériel ni même moral, mais bien d'une sanction, d'une peine infligée à 
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l'État coupable et inspirée, comme les peines en général, par les idées de rétribution, 
d'avertissement et d'intimidation." 
In international law nowadays, to the contrary, the use of the word sanction should be reserved for 
the coercion applied in respect of a State that has committed a violation ofthat law.39 And it is for 
that reason that confusion has obtained so as to ascribe to sanctions and countermeasures punitive 
character. 
Ago and the Commission certainly did not help, as the latter stated, in the commentary to article 
1, Part One, that:48 
"The term 'sanction' is used here to describe a measure which, although not necessarily in-
volving the use of force, is characterized - at least in part - by the fact that its purpose is to 
inflict punishment. That is not the same purpose as coercion to secure the fulfilment of the 
obligation, or restoration of the right infringed, or compensation." 
The confusion of thought underlying these matters may be traced back to the mistaken notion that 
the purpose of sanctions is to inflict punishment. Mistaken because what Ago and the Commission 
fail to realize is that, under domestic systems of law, sanctions are forms of punishment. Such forms 
of punishment naturally are accompanied by use or threat of physical compulsion. It is applied with-
out any reference to the will of the individual punished. However, physical compulsion is not an end 
in itself. It is applied only insofar as necessary to ensure that the ordained punishment will be under-
gone (suffered) by the responsible individual. Physical compulsion constitutes a means to an end. 
Similarly, in international law, coercion must constitute a means to an end. It is conceivable that 
countermeasures and sanctions would serve, besides constituting an attempt to have the author State 
perform its reparation obligations, the purpose of forcing an author State to undergo punishment. 
But the question would remain what the author State would have to do in order to escape the appli-
cation of coercive measures against it. Ordinarily one would expect a system of law to make clear to 
its subjects what it is they have to do in order to do away with their responsibility. By saying that the 
application of countermeasures or sanctions are punitive measures one is really saying that a State 
must suffer punishment without specifying what kind of punishment, or the manner in which coer-
cion could be avoided by the author State. Coercion becomes punishment. But if one assumes coer-
cion to constitute punishment, the injured State could persist with its measures indefinitely. At one 
time or another however, an end must come for applied coercion. 
An individual which does not oppose punishment under domestic law will not find itself confronted 
by physical compulsion.41 It may be noted also that physical compulsion resorted to under domestic 
systems of law is not reserved for the purpose of imposing punishment alone. It is also resorted to in 
order to have subjects perform their obligations in the field of reparation under civil laws. If such ob-
ligations are performed voluntarily there will be no question of resorting to compulsion towards the 
responsible individual. That again shows that physical compulsion under domestic law, or coercion in 
international law, constitutes a means to achieve an end, and not an end in itself. However, perform-
ance of reparation obligations or punishment will generally come about under the general threat of 
resort to coercion (in cases there is no voluntary compliance with these). 
This last remark leads to an argument concerning the correlation between rights and obligations. 
As was argued in chapter one, section 1.3, there exists, generally, a correlation between rights and 
obligations. At the same time it was indicated that one exception to that correlation would be dis-
cussed in chapter four. If a State possesses a right, so it was said, an obligation must exist on the part 
of other States to respect and not to hinder the exercise ofthat right. There are two aspects worthy 
of discussion. 
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The first and foremost observation is that the right to resort to countermeasures constitutes the 
exception spoken of. An author State, against which certain measures are taken, is not under any ob-
ligation to respect the injured State's exercise of its right to resort to countermeasures. This flows 
from the fact that coercive measures are applied without any reference to the will of the targeted 
State. Or, to put it more accurately, coercion is applied because the author State is unwilling to 
conform with its reparation obligations. It has manifested a will not to conform to the injured State's 
demands. The object of resort to countermeasures then is to force the will of the author State and 
have it perform its obligations.42 For that reason the right to resort to countermeasures is at times 
referred to as a faculty.43 Yet since any subject of law is free, in a psychological sense, to engage in 
breaches of obligations, the implication is that it is under no obligation to endure the application of 
coercion against it. And since it is under no obligation to co-operate in inflicting coercion upon itself, 
it can use all such lawful means in order to circumvent coercive measures. While this freedom is 
substantially limited under domestic laws (through the imposition of additional obligations), the same 
cannot be said of international law. In the context of the subject under consideration, non-armed 
countermeasures, this means that a targeted State can evade the application of economic measures 
by countering them or turning elsewhere. If an injured State for instance acts, as a countermeasure, 
in breach of its obligation to deliver goods to the author State, the latter can abstain from paying for 
the goods (if it has not already done so). Furthermore, the author State may, in such circumstances, 
try to obtain the goods from some other supplier. This latter remark brings us to the next issue, the 
relative effect of countermeasures. 
Since there does not exist any rule imposing an obligation on the author State to suffer under co-
ercive measures, a fortiori other States will also not be obliged to respect the injured State's exercise 
of the right to resort to countermeasures. Such States can undermine the effect of countermeasures, 
for instance, by providing substitute goods to the author State. The only general limit to circumven-
tion through other States is provided by the provision of article 27, Part One, of the draft articles on 
State responsibility. Only when another State has knowledge of the intention of the author State to 
use goods for committing a wrongful act should it abstain from delivering such goods. The same 
goes for services, since article 27 concerns not only aid but also assistance. This situation moreover 
does not change when circumvention takes place not through third States (a State that is not an in-
jured State under article 5, Part Two), but through other injured States. Since there does not exist 
any rule obliging States to exercise their rights, other injured States can still support the author State. 
As pointed out in chapter three, section 3.5, the conditions for application of article 27, Part One, are 
too strict in regard to those wrongful acts constituting crimes. The notoriety inherent in the commis-
sion of a crime, as witnessed by the scale of the wrongful conduct, should lead to a presumption that 
certain aid or assistance must necessarily contribute to the commission of the crime. That conclusion 
goes especially regarding aid or assistance in the form of deliveries of arms or military material, or 
the training of police, military or other personnel. For that reason injured States, in case of interna-
tional crimes, are not allowed, for instance, to circumvent another injured State's suspension of 
military aid or assistance programmes. The basis for such prohibited circumvention is not, however, 
a general rule stipulating support for other States' countermeasures, but the possibility of becoming 
the accomplice of the author State in the commission of its international crime. 
Regarding international law the question is whether it allows States, as the primary subjects, to 
enforce the law through application of coercion to other States. That question was discussed at 
length, and answered affirmatively, by Kelsen.44 As is well known he took the stand that any system 
of law must establish a coercive order,45 and in international law specific coercive measures, reprisals 
and war, could be resorted to as a consequence of another State committing a wrongful act.46 
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While international law does not know of any sanctions (punishment) in the traditional (domestic) 
sense, it does contain implicit ones, as discussed earlier, in the form of satisfaction and guarantees 
against repetition. More fundamentally one might ask whether it is conceivable that a system of law 
would focus completely on the reparatory consequences of a wrongful act and disregard the punitive 
ones. That question could be answered affirmatively if the system involved would ensure the effec-
tive enforcement of the reparatory consequences of wrongful acts. Effective enforcement encompass-
ing, in this instance, a high improbability of getting away with the commission of wrongful acts. 
Although such a system can be imagined, it is hard to see it confining itself completely to reparatory 
consequences. As a minimum the deterring forms assuring satisfaction for the injured party and guar-
antees against repetition of wrongful acts would be likely to enter such a system. That, at least, is the 
situation under international law. Furthermore, the more severe consequences that could attach to 
international crimes primarily relate to those forms of reparation endowed with preventive or deter-
rent character. 
4.2.2. The nature of countermeasures 
Collective responsibility 
As noted summarily in chapter three, section 3.2.2, the responsibility incurred consequent upon a 
breach of obligation by a State is collective in character. For that reason the fulfilment of reparation 
obligations, although effected by the organs of the State, burdens the entire population of the State. 
And that is especially the case when reparation has to be provided in the form of compensation. Re-
garding resort to countermeasures similar issues arise. 
There is a basic difference between collective responsibility imposing upon an author State new 
reparation obligations and collective responsibility as the basis for resort to coercive measures. While 
the collective character of the responsibility of an author State presses only indirectly upon the 
population ofthat State, the same cannot be said of countermeasures. Just as reparation obligations 
do not bear upon the organs of the State, so imposed countermeasures also do not touch those or-
gans. Kelsen observes in this respect:47 
"But the sanction stipulated by this law - (...) - war or reprisals, are not directed against the 
organs whose function it was to fulfil the obligations of international law and who have not 
done so. (...) The sanctions - war or reprisals - directly or indirectly affect the people of the 
state, i.e. the individuals belonging to the state, (...). That means that international law estab-
lishes collective responsibility for the violation of obligations imposed upon the states." 
However, the burden of reparation will generally bear quite evenly upon the population of the author 
State. But countermeasures tend to be directed at those of the author State's population which are, 
or come, easily within the injured State's grasp. 
Thus countermeasures will first and foremost affect nationals of the author State present within the 
injured State, or those engaging in commercial activities with the author State or its nationals. As the 
Court observed in the Barcelona Traction Case,48 a State is under the obligation to extend the pro-
tection of the law, and other obligations, to the foreign investments and aliens it allows into its terri-
tory. But those obligations are not immune to breaches by way of countermeasures. Consequently an 
injured State's resort to countermeasures may involve a change of status of foreign nationals, the an-
nulment of contracts, confiscation of goods, and nationalization of companies. In all such cases na-
tionals of the author State are directly affected and suffer the full brunt of coercive measures. 
Yet even when the injured State more generally resorts to the application of coercion directly af-
fecting the State, still the population, and especially the poorer and less well-off parts, will suffer. 
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An economic boycott, prohibitions of exports and imports, and freezing of assets of the author State 
will, if not always directly, affect the population. Generally the effects of such measures will not so 
soon be felt by those well-off or rich But especially those groups are the ones having influence 
within the political structures and organs of the State 4 9 Naturally these indirect effects will be felt 
only if the author State is in some way dependent on the injured State,58 or when the boycott and 
other measures do not allow for circumvention. 
The latter, no possibility of circumvention, will generally only be the case with sanctions imposed by 
the Security Council It has ordered sanctions in a number of instances, though generally not to the 
extent of creating the indirect effects It is debatable whether indirect effects, on powerful groups, 
have occurred with regard to Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti51 That is of course 
not to say that there could be no circumvention in a factual sense The main difference is that any 
such factual circumvention by States will constitute breaches of obligation, since members of the 
United Nations have agreed to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council (article 25 
Charter). At this point one may observe that the collective responsibility of an author State is 
matched by the mechanism of collective enforcement enshrined in the Charter 
Circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
In his examination of the origin of international responsibility former special rapporteur Ago lastly 
came upon the subject of certain circumstances which would, in his opinion, preclude the wrongful­
ness of conduct otherwise in breach of an obligation Ά Among these were consent, countermeasures, 
force majeure, fortuitous events, state of necessity and self-defence B For all these cases, so he 
says,54 notwithstanding the "apparent" fulfilment of the two conditions defined in article 3, the infer­
ence that an internationally wrongful act exists cannot be made Although he speaks of the apparent 
fulfilment of both conditions laid down in article 3, it is but the apparent existence of the breach of an 
obligation which concerns him Thus there can be no doubt that in all the circumstances laid down in 
Chapter V of Part One there will in fact be conduct attributable to a State However, Ago argues5S 
"The conduct in question cannot be characterized as wrongful for the good reason that, ow­
ing to the presence in that particular case of a certain circumstance, the State which commit­
ted the act was not under any obligation to conduct itself otherwise " 
This conception of Ago and the Commission appears debatable It assumes that in the presence of 
any one of the circumstances mentioned in articles 29 to 34, Part One, the obligation is not merely 
set aside,56 but that it is in fact obliterated the obligation simply no longer exists But if that is the 
case the provision of article 35,57 that preclusion of wrongfulness under articles 29 and 31 to 33 will 
not "prejudge any question that may arise in regard to compensation for damage caused by that act", 
becomes even more difficult to understand If there is no obligation, and still less therefore any ap­
parent or real breach of an obligation, why then should a State be considered liable to an obligation 
to pay compensation1? This would indeed constitute an arbitrary rule, since it amounts to an assertion 
that despite the fact that a State has not acted wrongfully at all, it nevertheless is bound to reimburse 
another State for damages 
But that is not the end of it A similar argument may be made in so far as resort to countermea­
sures is concerned Let us suppose State A has breached its obligation not to nationalize companies 
without payment of adequate compensation State B, an injured State under article 5, paragraph 2, 
sub (e) (i), Part Two, reacts to this internationally wrongful act by liquidating funds held by banks in 
State A's territory The dispute between States A and В is eventually settled by the payment of com­
pensation to State В The liquidation of funds is not to be considered wrongful, since it constitutes a 
legitimate countermeasure and State В was not under any obligation to refrain from liquidating the 
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funds. But the question is whether State В is entitled to keep the funds so liquidated even in the 
presence of full compensation by State A for its wrongful acts. In the present draft the answer would 
have to be in the positive, yet that would seem to be a rather unsatisfactory solution.58 The answer 
would not be any different if one was to claim that State В was not entitled to liquidate the funds but 
could only freeze the accounts. For then the question is whether State В could continue the freezing 
notwithstanding the agreement on compensation, and the answer, in strict logic, would have to be 
the same. Nor would it be sufficient to point to an obligation on the part of the injured State to end 
resort to countermeasures once reparation had been provided, or to the renewed operation of the 
primary rule as a result therefrom. Logic dictates the same answer. 
This example shows that while resort to countermeasures as a reaction to an internationally wrongful 
act may be considered lawful, their lawfulness does not result from the absence or obliteration of the 
obligation targeted. Rather their lawfulness ensues from a cause justifying non-performance of obli­
gations towards another State. It was, therefore, not without reason that Riphagen phrased his arti­
cles 8 and 9, on respectively measures by way of reciprocity and reprisal, in terms of the suspension 
of the performance of obligations.59 And similarly Arangio-Ruiz and the Drafting Committee phrased 
proposed article 11, Part Two, in a manner that countermeasures would amount to the possibility of 
the injured State not to comply with its obligations.6* Such a construction would then amount to a 
situation in which the injured State could oppose a new right or faculty towards the author State that 
would entitle it to resort to non-performance of certain obligations. At the same time such a new 
right would not be opposable to third States, and therefore any non-performance of obligations af­
fecting them would be wrongful. Technically speaking a construction like this would not be inconsis­
tent with the fundamental article 1, Part One, which stipulates that "every internationally wrongful 
act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State".61 At the most one could say it 
conflicts with the opinion of Ago and the Commission that:61 
"(...) it is difficult to conceive that international law could characterize an act as wrongful 
without attaching to it disadvantageous consequences for its author." 
Yet it may be countered that while the circumstance would not preclude the wrongfulness, it would 
also not preclude the responsibility of the injured State. What it would do would be to make it im­
possible for the author State to invoke the responsibility of the injured State. At the same time that 
might not preclude other, originally third, States from invoking the injured State's responsibility. The 
absence of disadvantageous consequences would therefore be relative, not absolute, since States 
other than the author State would obtain the right to invoke the injured State's responsibility. 
An example of such a line of reasoning may be found in judge Schwebel's Dissenting Opinion to 
the Court's judgment on the merits in the Nicaragua Case. The Court decided, in operative para­
graph (8), that the United States had breached its obligations under customary international law by 
not notifying the existence and location of mines laid by i t " Judge Schwebel claimed that the breach 
of obligation by the United States, to the effect that the latter had not notified the existence and lo­
cation of mines in the vicinity of Nicaraguan ports, although wrongful in connection to other States, 
could be opposable to Nicaragua as a self-defence measure.64 It may be noted that self-defence con­
stitutes a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under Part One of the draft (article 34). The conduct 
attributable to the United States, failure of notification, is the same in both instances. In the Com­
mission's proposal the same omission (and not merely identical conduct), failure to notify the exis­
tence and location of mines, would be both wrongful and lawful at the same time.65 It would be 
wrongful towards other States, but fully justified and lawful towards Nicaragua. 
The Cysne Award seems to have headed in the right direction as it denied the legality of a measure of 
reprisal, resorted to by Germany against Portugal, in the following terms:66 
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"Cette solution est la consequence logique de la règle suivant laquelle les représailles, consis-
tant en un acte en principe contraire au droit des gens, ne peuvent se justifier qu'autant 
qu'elles ont été provoquées par un autre acte également contraire à ce droit Les représailles 
ne sont admissibles que contre l'État provocateur." 
In this case the original act contrary to international law which provoked the German reprisal had 
been committed by Great Britain and not by Portugal Consequently the German acts could not be 
considered legitimate as against Portugal The award did not address the question whether the Ger-
man acts could have been lawful as against Great Britain 
It is submitted that the proper way would be to define circumstances justifying non-performance 
of obligations towards the author State The result would be a loss, in principle, for the author State, 
of its right to invoke the responsibility of the injured State That right might be revived to the extent 
that the injured State oversteps the limits set for the exercise of its right to resort to countermea-
sures, or breaches obligations that ought not to form the object of any countermeasure At the same 
time States other than the author State could invoke the injured States responsibility to the extent 
that they could be considered injured States under article 5, Part Two, of the ILC-draft 
Measures constituting a denial of a right of the author State 
In combination with the definition of countermeasures, stressing their punitive character, the Com-
mission observed that they also were *7 
"( ) measures which, under different conditions, would infringe a valid and subjective right 
of the subject against which the measures are applied " 
In connection to this comment it may be noted that it is this essential characteristic which distin-
guishes a countermeasure from measures of retorsion Arangio-Ruiz noted, in his third report,68 that 
the majority of the authors generally defined retorsion measures as "reactions of a State to an unlaw-
ful, unfriendly act, as are themselves unfriendly but not unlawful " The reactions mentioned would 
thus cover both measures taken against unlawful acts, as measures responding to unfriendly acts The 
correctness ofthat stance, including permissible reactions to unlawful acts in the notion of retorsions, 
is reflected in the references made by former special rapporteur Ago to the measures under article 41 
of the Charter As he points out, the use of the word sanctions is less strict in the Charter (the word, 
in fact, does not feature in the Charter), and the measures enumerated in article 41 may amount to 
both per se lawful acts as countermeasures *' At the same time one cannot but acknowledge, as 
Arangio-Ruiz does,70 that measures of retorsion, licit acts per definition, do not have any role to play 
within a future convention on State responsibility 
The definition offered, or characteristic defined, here is unsatisfactory in the sense that resort is had 
to the notion of subjective rights In chapter one, subsection 1 3 4, it was explained that there exists 
a correlation between rights and obligations And for the same reason that the Commission consid-
ered it expedient to choose for the breach of obligation (and not for the violation of rights) as the 
basis for the existence of an internationally wrongful act, it would be wise, in other articles and their 
commentaries, to proceed on the basis of obligations only As may be seen from the commentary to 
article 30, Part One, there is no need to refer to corresponding rights7I 
"( ) an act of the State, although not in conformity with what is required of it by a binding 
international obligation towards another State, is not wrongful if it constitutes the application 
with respect to that other State of a measure permissible in international law as a reaction to 
an international offence which the latter State has committed previously " 
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In view of the correlation between rights and obligations and the choice for breach of obligation as 
constitutive criterion for internationally wrongful acts one ought to make reference to breaches of 
obligations only. 
Exceptionally justified or generally applicable measures 
The Commission has had occasion to reflect on the notion of circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness, and considers that:72 
"When any one of these circumstances is present in a particular case, the wrongfulness of the 
act of the State is exceptionally precluded (...). The exceptional character lies precisely in the 
fact that the circumstance found to be present in the specific case in question renders ineffec-
tive an international obligation which, in the absence of that circumstance, would be incum-
bent on the State and would make any conduct that was not in conformity with the 
requirements of the obligation wrongful. There is an obvious difference between conduct that 
is generally lawful and conduct that is generally wrongful and will remain so unless there is a 
special circumstance which, in a specific case, removes its wrongfulness." 
The present writer would like to take exception to the proposition that resort to countermeasures 
would only exceptionally preclude the wrongfulness of conduct in response to an internationally 
wrongful act. The contrary is in fact the case: legally speaking (the possibility of) resort to counter-
measures is the rule, not the exception. Kelsen has correctly formulated the premise that law estab-
lishes a coercive order.73 As such, Kelsen observes, law is based on the idea that in the presence of a 
delict a sanction ought to be applied with respect to the subject responsible for the illegal conduct.74 
By saying that sanctions "ought to be applied" he only meant to indicate that in case a delict is 
committed application of the sanction is lawful.75 
But again that is not the end of it. The observation that the application of sanctions is lawful in 
cases of committed delicts suggests a large degree of generality. The obvious fact that in actual life a 
sanction is generally not applied to those responsible for a delict, does not warrant the conclusion 
that the application of sanctions is only exceptionally permitted. For these non-occurrences are due, 
not to the fact that the application of the sanction would not, intrinsically, be legally justified, but to 
circumstances which legally pre-empt the necessity to impose sanctions. Principal among these are 
the possibility of obtaining reparation through peaceful means and third party settlement of disputes 
(see generally next section). The Commission appeared to have had this in mind when it observed 
that there are cases in which:76 
"(...) international law, while not in principle ruling out the possibility of applying a sanction 
against a State which has committed a breach of a particular international obligation, requires 
the State that is the victim ofthat breach not to resort to such action until it has first sought 
adequate reparation." 
On that score one could claim, of course, that resort to countermeasures should be considered ex-
ceptional, because preconditions for such resort would not have been met.77 But that would be to ig-
nore the obvious fact that in all those cases where preconditions have been met, there exists the 
general option, for the injured State, of resort to countermeasures. In the end that option remains 
available to an injured State whenever it has not been granted adequate reparation by the author 
State. 
What is left is the Commission's argument on the difference between generally lawful and 
generally unlawful conduct. But that is hardly more convincing. Conduct that is generally lawful 
certainly does not need any separate special circumstance in order to justify it. On the other hand 
there is the strict logical necessity that conduct which is generally unlawful must be in need of a 
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special circumstance to justify it. Of essence things could not be otherwise This concerns, in 
Kelsen's words,78 the situation in which the employment of force constitutes either a delict or a 
sanction The special circumstance necessary to justify resort to countermeasures by an injured State 
resides in the earlier committed internationally wrongful act and a State's consequential status as 
injured State But the meaning of "special" is not to be considered identical to "exceptional" We are 
talking categories here (implying generality of application), not incidents The claim that resort to 
countermeasures is, or must be, exceptional would have to lead, moreover, to application of the 
interpretation rule that exceptions must be interpreted restrictively It is suggested that such 
application is not warranted as regards the generally accepted, and justified, means of coercion. 
4.3. Preconditions for resort to countermeasures 
4 3 1 The commission of an internationally wrongful act 
There is one essential condition that must, of necessity, be fulfilled in order to justify an injured 
State's resort to countermeasures against the author State the latter's commission of an interna­
tionally wrongful act 7 9 That position appears the only feasible one, and has been upheld, implicitly, 
in phrasing article 11, Part Two, by Arangio-Ruiz, the Drafting Committee, members of the Com­
mission, and the Commission itself80 Their language is implicit in the sense that a countermeasure 
will involve non-compliance of obligations by the injured State towards the State which has commit­
ted a wrongful act, but only if the latter has not complied with its reparation obligations Of course 
only a State which has committed a wrongful act may be confronted by new reparation obligations 
The assumption, then, must logically be that countermeasures are not justified in relation to States 
that have not committed any breach of obligation, whether primary or secondary That position has, 
to some extent, formed the substance of article 11, paragraph 2, Part Two, adopted by the Commis­
sion 8 I 
"Where a countermeasure against a State which has committed an internationally wrongful 
act involves a breach of an obligation towards a third State, such a breach cannot be justified 
as against the third State by reason of paragraph 1 " 
By such phrasing the Commission has done away with the argument that resort to countermeasures 
could be justified, against another State, by a State believing in good faith, but mistakenly, that that 
other State had committed a wrongful act.82 As has been noted earlier the Commission could not 
conceive a position where no disadvantageous consequences would be attached to wrongful con­
duct ю Even more difficult to conceive, one may submit, would be disadvantageous consequences (a 
breach of obligation) directed towards a State that had not acted wrongfully at all 
Since all States are injured States in case an internationally wrongful act constitutes an interna­
tional crime (article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two), all States possess the right, subject to the conditions 
discussed below, to resort to countermeasures against the author State of a crime M That is also the 
position of Arangio-Ruiz, who has in his latest report proposed an article 17, Part Two, stipulating, 
subject to a determination of the existence of a crime by the Court, that every State will be entitled to 
resort to countermeasures if its reparation demands are not met with an adequate response from the 
author State 8Ï 
As argued in the previous chapter, subsection 3 2 1, subjecting demands of reparation to a prior de-
termination by the Court will amount in fact to unreasonable delays regarding the exercise of rights 
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to invoke the author State's responsibility for an international crime. Such delays would be especially 
unjust in relation to the right to demand cessation of the crime and restitution. 
Although he similarly subjects the right to resort to countermeasures to a determination by the 
Court, his proposed article 17, paragraph 2, provides that that condition will not apply to:86 "urgent, 
interim measures as are required to protect the rights of the injured State or to limit the damage 
caused by the international crime." Explaining his proposal Arangio-Ruiz indicates that such meas-
ures would aim at:87 
"(...) securing immediate access to the victims for purposes of rescue and/or aid or preventing 
the continuation of a genocide, measures concerning humanitarian convoys, anti-pollution ac-
tion, passage facilities, etc." 
By putting it this way the suspension of an injured State's right to resort to countermeasures brought 
about by article 17, paragraph 1, would prevent the adoption of all kinds of trade, financial, and 
other measures regarding (nationals of) the author State. However, resort to countermeasures to 
limit the damage caused by a crime, whether that of aggression, denial of self-determination, or 
widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations, would involve, and indeed necessitate, far-
reaching countermeasures to coerce the author State to discontinue its wrongful acts and effect resti-
tution in kind. Since Arangio-Ruiz has proposed to maintain the prohibition on measures involving 
the threat or use of armed force,88 it is not quite clear just how injured States would secure immedi-
ate access to victims, prevent the continuation of genocide, etc. 
Furthermore, even though it may be admitted that cessation of conduct constituting a crime and 
restitution constitute imperatives, it has been found, in chapter three, that especially guarantees 
against repetition amount to special or supplementary consequences of the régime applicable to 
crimes. An author State of a crime, especially that of aggression, might thus be tempted to discon-
tinue its acts, or to put those on hold as it were, simply to avoid the imposition of the more far-
reaching guarantees against repetition. 
To deny the immediate enforcement of reparation obligations by way of countermeasures similarly 
does not reflect the idea that the aggravation of the régime applicable to international crimes is in-
tended to ensure more effective suppression of conduct constituting crimes. For reasons analogous 
to those expressed in relation to reparation, any enforcement by way of countermeasures should be 
allowed as soon as, and as long as, the author State of a crime continues, and does not adequately 
remedy, its wrongful conduct. 
Some words are necessary here regarding the so-called "principle" of auto-interpretation or auto-
determination.89 It has been claimed that each State can and may interpret the relevant rules of inter-
national law, and thus may determine its own legal situation vis-à-vis other States. Accordingly no 
State could impose its interpretation on another. For that reason it would not be possible to deter-
mine whether an internationally wrongful act had really taken place, since the interpretation of the 
one would stand against the interpretation of the other.90 Consequently it would also not be possible 
to conclude to the existence of new reparation obligations for the State that allegedly had committed 
the wrongful act." This in tum would imply that, in the absence of any (objective) determination of 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act by an international organ, no State would be justified 
in its resort to coercive measures.92 
A preliminary remark would be that those using the phrase "principle" of auto-interpretation 
incorrectly attach a legal connotation to something that primarily constitutes a matter of fact. What 
the idea of auto-interpretation really amounts to is a description of the situation prevailing within an 
overwhelmingly decentralized and badly organized community of States. It is the absence of 
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international organs endowed with jurisdiction and competence to determine, with binding force for 
the parties to a dispute, the existence of an internationally wrongful act,93 that accounts for the 
phenomenon of auto-interpretation It certainly cannot be accounted for by reference to the existence 
of a legal rule or principle of either conventional or customary origin 
It cannot be denied of course that each State tends to adopt some interpretation on the scope and 
content of a rule of international law And similarly there can be little doubt that one State's interpre­
tation cannot as such prevail over another State's interpretation As all States are subjects of interna­
tional law and equal before that law (note also article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter), the seemingly 
inescapable conclusion would have to be drawn that a stalemate exists when there are conflicting in­
terpretations on either the law or the facts Because of this stalemate the further conclusion would 
have to be drawn that there exists no possibility whatsoever to determine the existence of an interna­
tionally wrongful act 
That however constitutes an unwarranted and unacceptable conclusion In the absence of an 
authoritative determination, conduct allegedly in conflict with an international obligation must be as­
sessed in the light of all relevant rules of international law As to conflicts on the interpretation of the 
law it may be said that there are limits to interpretation 
The concrete result of these observations are adequately summed up by Arangio-Ruiz in his 
fourth report Correctly he denies, with regard to the existence of an internationally wrongful act, the 
necessity ** 
"( ) that the existence of such an act and the allegedly injured State's right to take counter-
measures should have been the object of a pnor determination by an arbitral or judicial proce­
dure or subject to any kind of action of a political or fact-finding body Nor does it seem that 
the presence of an internationally wrongful act should have the object of a pnor agreement 
between the allegedly injured State and the alleged law-breaker " 
A State may of course be wrong in its evaluation of the law or the facts For that reason countermea-
sures by a State (allegedly injured) will be resorted to under the presumption of a well-founded 
claim и Any resort to countermeasures therefore entails the nsk of being proved wrong Should that 
be the case, the logical consequence will be incurred responsibility for the State resorting to 
(counter)measures That is so because any countermeasure by definition concerns conduct in breach 
of an international obligation And such a breach can be justified only by virtue of the existence of a 
previously committed internationally wrongful act If there is no previously committed wrongful act, 
there also cannot be any justification for the (counter)measure ** 
It comes as some surprise then, in view of the quotation in the previous paragraph, that he proposes 
to subject the exercise of the right to resort to countermeasures in case of international crimes to a 
pnor determination of the existence of a cnme by the Court The main reason for his proposal lies 
with his assessment, based on the universalization of injured State status in case of cnmes, thatе т 
"The nsks of arbitrariness, inconsistencies and conflict involved in deciding on the existence 
of a cnme and its attribution and m subsequently implementing the consequences will be very 
high" 
Although there will certainly be conflicts regarding cnmes, it is not quite clear why there would be 
arbitranness and inconsistencies In contrast to delicts the existence of wrongful conduct constituting 
a cnme will be less difficult to ascertain due to the senousness of the acts involved and the generally 
uncontroversial status of the rules involved (peremptory norms) The only difficulty would he with 
establishing whether the threshold of senousness had been overstepped so that it would be possible 
to speak of a cnme rather than a delict Yet, as will be argued later on, if there is the possibility that 
States will qualify particular conduct of another State as a cnme, that other State could either 
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perform its reparation obligations or offer binding dispute settlement so as to prevent the imposition 
of aggravated measures under the régime of crimes. There does not therefore appear to be any 
higher risk of arbitrariness in case of crimes than there is in case of delicts. 
Here it may be expedient to devote some argument to the basis, in international law, of the meas-
ures under article 41 of the Charter. Under that provision the Security Council may order members 
to take certain measures. Such order generally does not contain any indication as to whether meas-
ures would constitute countermeasures, in need of separate justification, or whether they would 
amount to no more than retorsions. Irrespective of their nature is the fact that the decisions of the 
Council are binding upon members of the United Nations under article 25 of the Charter and imposes 
an obligation to carry it out. Although article 25 provides that members shall accept and carry out 
decisions of the Security Council, this does not imply an authorization as such for the latter to have 
members breach their obligations. Nor can such a conclusion be deduced from article 41,98 
Consequently there is a need for these articles to be reinforced:99 hence the inclusion in the Char-
ter of article 103. That article provides that obligations under the Charter prevail over conflicting ob-
ligations under other international agreements.100 The phrase "obligations under the Charter" covers 
both obligations under provisions of the Charter and obligations imposed by way of Security Council 
decision. However, article 103 is deficient to the extent that it omits any reference to obligations un-
der customary international law. It is possible to argue that there is no problem where an obligation 
under a treaty is matched, substantially, by a similar obligation established under rules of customary 
international law. The decision of the Security Council imposing an obligation to take certain meas-
ures would prevail over applicable treaty obligations, and simultaneously over identical customary 
international law obligations. One might consider it silly to claim that the Charter obligations would 
prevail over treaty obligations and could not lead to a claim by the author State, but that they would 
not prevail over the identical customary law obligations and that the author State could press a claim 
on the basis of their breach. 
But though the argument could be considered silly where there is a concurrence of conventional and 
customary law obligations, it increases its vigour when measures under article 41 affect obligations 
under customary law solely, or where members are not a party to the relevant treaty and yet are 
subject to a similar rule of customary law. In these cases article 103 provides no remedy and re-
course must be had to some additional ground to vest the authority of the Security Council under ar-
ticle 41.101 That ground can only reside in the circumstance that measures under article 41 may be 
considered to constitute countermeasures against internationally wrongful acts.102 This situation does 
not appear to have been considered by the Commission, which noted in a footnote:103 
"(...) it seems indisputable that under Article 103 of the Charter the Member State called 
upon to apply the sanctions could not claim to be debarred from doing so by a treaty binding 
it to the non-member State which was the subject of the sanctions." 
Which is true. But while it may be admitted that article 103 would be the basis for members of the 
United Nations, the justifying effect of sanctions against a non-member could only be based upon it 
having committed an internationally wrongful act. 
A related issue in this section concerns the relationship of the customary rules on international 
responsibility to the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Some have 
asserted that there exists no such relationship. For them the Security Council only marginally applies 
or enforces the international responsibility of its members. Such application or enforcement would, 
however, be incidental to the Security Council's true function, that is, the maintenance of 
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international peace and security The paramount importance ofthat function would account for 
granting it an unfettered discretionary power to determine threats to the peace, breaches of the peace 
and acts of aggression , o s The exercise of its power under article 39 of the Charter would not, 
moreover, be subject to any review whatsoever by the Court (on which more in chapter six),e* It 
may be submitted that these stances are inadequate, incorrect, and unacceptable as a matter of law 
In subsection 2 4 1 of chapter two it was noted that there existed an unbreakable link between an 
obligation, its breach, the obligation to repair, and the right to resort to countermeasures And it was 
observed just then that article 103 could not fully provide justifying effect for measures taken by 
members pursuant to a Security Council decision regarding breaches of obligation under customary 
international law or as against non-members. For that reason it was submitted that the power of the 
Security Council to decide on measures under article 41 of the Charter should be seen as a compe­
tence of the Security Council to impose upon member States the obligation to exercise their rights to 
have resort to countermeasures These considerations are buttressed by the fundamental postulate 
that only a breach of obligation may give rise to a justifiable reaction comprising a breach of obliga­
tion (sanction or countermeasure) Since the measures of article 41 may involve breaches of obliga­
tion by members (or non-members), the inference ought to be that a breach of obligation by the 
targeted State must have preceded it 1 0 7 
Arguments against this stance do not really convince It cannot but be admitted that article 39 of 
the Charter does not pose any such condition It merely provides that the Security Council may de­
cide upon the measures of article 41 in the presence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression The latter two qualifications, however, inevitably involve some breach of obliga­
tion under article 2, paragraphs 3 or 4, of the Charter Both of them will in fact amount to a use of 
force contrary to those paragraphs , o e The same cannot be said of threats to the peace A threat to 
use military force, in contravention of article 2, paragraph 3 or 4, will generally generate a threat to 
the peace This does not mean, on the other hand, that there cannot exist a threat to the peace with­
out a threat to use force by either a member or non-member A threat to the peace does not neces­
sarily involve a breach of obligation under article 2, paragraphs 3 or 4, of the Charter109 
Yet a contextual interpretation of the Charter shows that an unremoved or continued threat to the 
peace must lead to a breach of the peace Article 1, paragraph 1, states the purpose of the United 
Nations to maintain international peace and security, through effective collective measures, in order 
to prevent the occurrence of threats to the peace and to suppress breaches of the peace And article 
24 of the Charter accords the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna­
tional peace and security It specifies, in paragraph 2, that the powers for the realization of its tasks 
are laid down in chapters VI, П, VIII and XII One of those specific powers is laid down in article 
39 stipulating that the Security Council may determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression In the presence of any one of these it can then decide upon the 
measures of articles 41 or 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security That sentence 
implies that in a certain situation there is something to maintain or to restore Where there is a breach 
of the peace or act of aggression, measures under articles 41 or 42 necessarily aim at the restoration 
of international peace and security If there is a threat to the peace the aim of those measures must be 
to maintain international peace and security, that is, to prevent the occurrence of a situation that 
would require the restoration of international peace and security As the preamble underlines, the 
goal of the United Nations is to save future generations from the scourge of war Although stipula­
tions contained in a preamble do not possess binding force, one may use their words as a guideline 
for the interpretation of the treaty It is submitted that the Security Council could only deal with a 
specific situation as a threat to the peace if that situation could lead to a breach of the peace11Q 
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However, some authors claim that the Security Council, acting under article 39, need not determine 
the State thought to be responsible for the prevailing situation.111 This fails to convince. A State 
could, or should, not be considered to contribute to a situation constituting a threat to the peace if it 
is not acting contrary to its obligations.112 That argument is enhanced, necessarily, where a State is 
acting in the exercise of a right.113 In both these cases measures under article 41 could not be justi-
fied as against either members or non-members. 
A follow up to the remarks regarding the "principle" of auto-interpretation or auto-determination 
lies with the effect of so-called "authoritative" interpretation or determination.114 The Security 
Council possesses the power, under article 39 of the Charter, to determine threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, and can decide upon the measures of articles 41 and 
42. Such determination and especially the resultant imposition of measures against a State responsi-
ble for the situation, are binding upon Members of the United Nations by virtue of article 25 of the 
Charter. A member State against which measures are taken, even though bound by the Charter, will 
not implement such measures. Though this amounts to a breach of obligation under the Charter, no-
body in fact expects it to do so. Such a State can moreover dispute whether other members are really 
entitled (they are certainly under an obligation to do so) to resort to the measures of article 41 in the 
absence of a wrongful act on its part. That the Security Council has exercised its powers under arti-
cle 39 and in that relation, possibly, decided upon the existence of wrongful acts, is not decisive. For 
the Security Council is not a judicial organ."5 The object of the measures imposed by the Security 
Council under article 41 must be to "give effect to its decisions". Those decisions must be instrumen-
tal in maintaining or restoring international peace and security. 
But the Security Council is no legislator. It cannot create obligations off-hand for purposes other 
than enforcement under articles 41 or 42. In the exercise of its powers under articles 39 and 41 it can 
oblige members to impose measures against another member. At that point it has to specify what is 
required by that other member in order for those measures to be lined. In deciding on what is re-
quired the Security Council cannot create obligations: it can only declare them. Therefore it can only 
stipulate a course of conduct for the targeted member to the extent that such conduct already consti-
tuted the subject-matter of an obligation for that member. Basically two possibilities are open to the 
Council. One is to require a member to comply with its obligations under primary rules of interna-
tional law. The other is to require it to fulfil its obligations under the secondary rules of State re-
sponsibility. The operational condition for the Security Council's demands in the latter sphere 
constitutes the existence of an internationally wrongful act. If that condition is not satisfied any Se-
curity Council's imposition of sanctions in the form of countermeasures will be illegal and entails the 
United Nations' responsibility towards the targeted member State. Authoritative as determinations 
by the Security Council may be, they are not conclusive as to the existence of internationally 
wrongful acts.116 
In relation to the subject under consideration, international crimes, this fundamental precondition 
for resort to countermeasures does not pose any problems. Although States tend to deny the exis-
tence of an internationally wrongful act on the basis of legal argument or the facts, such denial is 
hardly possible for international crimes. That follows first of all from the nature of the rules involved 
which all concern universally accepted rules elevated to the rank of jus cogens. Even though inter-
pretations of such rules may vary, generally speaking their basic content is undisputed. As to the 
facts related to crimes, generally no evidential problems arise. That is so mainly because of the con-
stitutive criterion oí a serious breach of obligation. If one takes for instance the crime of aggression, 
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the State guilty of an armed attack can ordinarily easily be identified due to the offensive nature of its 
actions l17 Considerations similar to these pertain regarding the other international crimes 
More problematic, in evaluating the consequences of crimes in relation to countermeasures, is 
Arangio-Ruiz' claim that "" 
"No lawyer could fail to note, however, that the Security Council is empowered to assess dis-
cretionarily any situation involving a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act ag-
gression with a view to maintaining or restoring international peace or security The Council 
has neither the constitutional function nor the technical means to determine, on the basis of 
law, the existence, the attribution or the consequences of any wrongful act, whether 'delict' 
or 'crime' The Council's competence to decide discretionarily on the existence of one of 
those situations is in principle confined to the purposes of Articles 39 and following of Chap-
ter VII of the Charter That Chapter and the other relevant Charter provisions do not seem to 
cover the assessment of responsibility except for the determination of the existence and attri-
bution of an act of aggression " 
Apparently Arangio-Ruiz generally denies to the Security Council the possibility to determine, on le-
gal grounds, the existence of a wrongful act The result of this must be an incapacity for the Security 
Council of invoking a State's international responsibility and the consequences arising therefrom 
Yet, as may be seen from the last sentence of this quotation, the Security Council does possess the 
competence to assess responsibility arising from acts of aggression It is to be noted that examples 
taken from Security Council practice do not all relate to the main hypotheses covered by article 39 of 
the Charter, that is, uses of force constituting breaches of the peace or acts of aggression As noted 
above the phrases "threat to the peace" and "threat or use of force" are not interchangeable There 
need not be a threat or use of force under article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, for there to be a threat to the 
peace under article 39 That follows already from the fact that article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, concern 
mainly inter-State threats or uses of force It is clear, however, that purely internal national develop-
ments, as for instance civil wars, may have an impact on international peace and security 
It seems rather that Arangio-Ruiz' stance regarding Security Council competence in matters of 
State responsibility stems, maybe logically and certainly understandably, from this consideration l l 9 
"Be it as it may with regard to aggression, the propriety of relying too much on political bod-
ies for the implementation of liability for State crimes becomes highly questionable with re-
gard to the other hypotheses contemplated in paragraph 3 of article 19 The delinquencies of 
the kind described in subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) ofthat paragraph should be met - at least 
de lege ferenda - by judicial means " 
Regarding the undeniable political character of the Security Council's composition, the prime argu-
ment must be that there is no difference with States For ages States have been allowed to press 
claims and resort to countermeasures on the basis of their allegation that another State had breached 
international law And in doing so they have never been induced, as a matter of law, to have prior re-
course to a judicial body 120 So why should we deny the Security Council this possibility of invoking 
the responsibility of States and having recourse to countermeasures? Just because it is a political 
body? To say this should sooner be considered an ardent plea for universal compulsory jurisdiction 
for the Court m Yet even in the presence of a system of universal compulsory jurisdiction one would 
still need another, executive, body in order to take measures for the prevention of irreparable harm 
If there is any risk of irreparable harm, intervention by the Court, through the indication of provi-
sional measures, might still be so tardy as to warrant such a body taking action on its own initia-
tive m For purposes of preventing irreparable harm such a body would have to determine that 
wrongful acts are being committed 
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Arangio-Ruiz substantiated his position on the Security Council by reference to the "essentially po-
litical function of the maintenance of the peace".113 He then points out that the Council does not act 
necessarily or regularly and that selectiveness results; that it is not bound to use uniform criteria and 
consequently may treat similar crimes differently; and that the nature of its decisions or its actions 
seems to rule out a duty to motivate and that its choices are discretionary and possibly arbitrary.124 It 
cannot but be admitted that there are, and have been, striking differences of treatment by the Security 
Council of States (accused of) having committed international crimes. Part of the discrepancies in 
treatment flow from the degree to which States perceive threats to the peace. Others depend on the 
question to what extent powerful States or their former colonies are involved. Apart from these the 
exercise of the veto power by permanent members has, in the past, resulted in inaction. But there is 
insufficient ground to deny the legitimacy of the application of sanctions by the Security Council if 
the only argument is that they are not applied also in respect of a similar case. Double standards 
constitute regrettable recurring, but unavoidable, features in international relations, since States de-
termine courses of action on the basis of political expediency and are also not subjected to continu-
ous legal scrutiny. 
4.3 2. Reparation demands, dispute settlement and countermeasures 
It may be opportune to start off this section with the observation that there does not seem to exist an 
obligation for States to settle each and any of their disputes. That clear-cut position is weakened only 
to the extent that article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter stipulates: "Members shall settle their inter-
national disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and jus-
tice, are not endangered." It is obvious that the main purpose of this provision is that any settlement 
of disputes must be effected through peaceful means. It has been argued by Arangio-Ruiz that:125 
"If a meaning is to be given to the distinct provision of Article 2, paragraph 3 - namely, a 
meaning other than that of a mere redundancy of Article 2, paragraph 4 - one should perhaps 
admit that the Charter's condemnation is not really confined to the prohibition of armed 
measures (for which Art. 2, para. 4 is sufficient). It would seem to extend, by virtue of the 
letter and spirit of Article 2, paragraph 3 and the whole of Chapter VI (Arts. 33 to 38), to any 
unilateral measures which may endanger - if not 'friendly relations' and 'co-operation' - in-
ternational peace and security and justice." 
From these considerations he then went on to deduce the existence of an obligation for the injured 
State to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures before any resort to countermeasures.126 
Leaving aside here the argument of redundancy (see also chapter five, section 5.3), it seems proper 
to dispute his claim that resort to countermeasures by an injured State against an author State, with-
out prior recourse to dispute settlement procedures, would in effect amount to an attempt to settle a 
dispute in a manner that justice would be endangered. First of all it may be noted that before an in-
jured State resorts to countermeasures an injustice had already taken place: an internationally 
wrongful act by the author State. By saying that an injured State's resort to countermeasures without 
prior recourse to "peaceful means" could conflict with considerations of justice, Arango-Ruiz is 
really equating the author State's injustice to the injured State's faculty of doing justice for itself127 
True, resort to countermeasures amounts to "authorizing non-compliance with international obliga-
tions as a means of coercing a party in a dispute over cessation/reparation for a tort."128 But that is 
not the same as saying that for that reason dispute settlement obligations are put, if only indirectly, 
into question.119 Those can still be complied with by both the injured and author States. The author 
State may not like being coerced into compliance with its reparation obligations or to accept dispute 
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settlement procedures. But the fact is that it has brought this upon itself because, and as soon as, it 
committed an internationally wrongful act. Resort to countermeasures by an injured State has, on the 
other hand, always been considered lawful under generally accepted legal rules.130 And if there do 
exist obligations in the field of dispute settlement, the author and injured States are enjoined to per-
form such obligations irrespective of whether the injured State has resorted to countermeasures 
against the author State. 
Debatable also is Arangjo-Ruiz' observation, in the context of denying any difference between 
cessation and reparation for the purpose of prior exhaustion of peaceful means, that:131 
"It must not be overlooked that although one speaks, for the sake of brevity, of the 'injured 
State' and the 'State which has committed the internationally wrongful act' it would more 
correct always to speak - or at least to think - in terms of allegedly injured and allegedly law-
breaking States. As no certainty exists at the outset as to whether a wrongful act has been or 
is being committed by the allegedly law-breaking State, one should only speak, until the issue 
is resolved in one way or the other, of an alleged obligation to cease and an alleged obligation 
to provide reparation." 
However persuasive such reasoning may seem, it misses the point. A right to resort to countermea-
sures by an injured State exists only if there has been a previously committed internationally wrongful 
act by the author State. If there does not exist any such wrongful act, there also does not exist any 
right to resort to countermeasures. So if a State resorts to certain measures (which in its opinion 
constitute justifiable countermeasures) in the absence of a wrongful act by the targeted State, it will 
have incurred responsibility due to a non-justifiable breach of obligation(s). Where there is a wrong-
ful act on the part of the targeted State, resort to countermeasures by an injured State will be justifi-
able per se, unless it has failed to comply with the conditions (obligations) under conventional or 
customary law. Such a case would exist only if one could point to a rule stipulating an obligation for 
an injured State not to resort to countermeasures prior to an agreed dispute settlement procedure. 
Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter can only be regarded as such in a limited way. The obligation 
under article 2, paragraph 3, would come into operation only when countermeasures would reach 
such a scale that an author State might be tempted to end the effect of such measures through the 
threat or use of armed force. On the other hand it might be said that this obligation would apply also 
to the author State. One could expect it to do justice, considering it to be the source of an earlier in-
justice, by offering settlement of the dispute before it reached the proportions just mentioned. 
These remarks go a long way towards the position that there need not be any recourse to dispute 
settlement procedures before an injured State resorts to countermeasures. Yet it is essential to rec-
ognize that there must be some attempt, as a minimum, by the injured State to obtain reparation by 
means of the voluntary compliance by the author State of its obligations in that respect.132 That con-
clusion can be based, indirectly, on the findings of subsection 4.2.1 to the effect that any right to re-
sort to countermeasures should be considered obsolete once the author State has complied with its 
reparation obligations. Voluntary compliance by the author State is possible only if it has been given 
the opportunity of complying. In other words, it must be presented some leeway in order that it can 
comply. Such leeway must comprise also of some room for negotiations between the injured and 
author States on the specific forms, scope and content of the latter's reparation obligations. For the 
same reason it is necessary to insist that an injured State must give notice to the author State of its 
reasoned claim. That claim must include an evaluation of the circumstances and the applicable legal 
rules surrounding the alleged wrongful act, the allegation of incurred responsibility, and demands of 
reparation which include a specification as to form, scope and content. This position is based also on 
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the argument that what is not claimed by the injured State need not be granted by the author State. 
That is not the same as saying that the author State would not be under an obligation to provide 
reparation to the injured State. Rather it reflects the idea that the injured and author States are gen-
erally free, subject to considerations of jus cogens, to come to any agreement they consider politi-
cally expedient. Since the author State must be given the chance to comply voluntarily with its 
reparation obligations, the further conclusion must be that where there is no claim at all for repara-
tion, there also should not be recognized any right to resort to countermeasures. Arangio-Ruiz has 
correctly pointed out, in relation to article 11, paragraph 1, Part Two, proposed by the Drafting 
Committee (which is substantially identical to article 11, paragraph 1, provisionally adopted by the 
Commission (quoted supra subsection 4.2.1)), quite inadequately reflects such considerations.133 It 
stipulates that an injured State has the right to resort to countermeasures as long as the author State 
has not complied with its reparation obligations. That would mean that this right could be exercised 
even where the author State acknowledges its responsibility and expresses its willingness to provide 
reparation, but disputes the scope and content of its obligations. That constitutes an unacceptable 
solution, and Arangio-Ruiz rightly insists on improvement there. 
To some extent this undesirable effect of the Commission's draft could be avoided if the Drafting 
Committee's text on article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, would be adopted:134 
" 1. An injured State may not take counter-measures unless: 
(a) it has recourse to a [binding/third party] dispute settlement procedure which both the 
injured State and the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act are 
bound to use under any relevant treaty to which they are parties; or 
(b) in the absence of such a treaty, it offers a [binding/third party] dispute settlement pro-
cedure to the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act. 
2. The right of the injured State to take counter-measures is suspended when and to the ex-
tent that an agreed [binding] dispute settlement procedure is being implemented in good 
faith by the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act, provided that the 
internationally wrongful act has ceased." 
The combined effect of these paragraphs boils down to the possibility of the author State to have 
countermeasures suspended. Arangio-Ruiz argues against these proposals mainly because they allow 
resort to countermeasures prior to recourse to dispute settlement procedures.135 However, to require 
an injured State to exhaust all possible dispute settlement procedures before resorting to counter-
measures would place it under an unacceptable burden. To some extent this appears to have been 
realized by Arangio-Ruiz, because he has since dropped the criterion of exhaustion of all amicable 
dispute settlement procedures available under international law. His latest proposal on article 12, 
Part Two, stipulates in paragraph 1 that:136 
"The injured State shall not resort to countermeasures prior to the conclusion of: 
(a) a binding third party settlement procedure to which it is entitled to accede by unilateral 
initiative under a treaty or other dispute settlement instrument in force; 
(b) failing such title, a binding third party procedure offered to and accepted by the State 
which has committed the internationally wrongful act;" 
As a matter of sound legal drafting technique one would have to object to both the text adopted 
by the Drafting Committee and by Arangio-Ruiz. The argument against both of them lies with the 
fact that they place the burden of any resort to, or offer regarding, dispute settlement on the injured 
State. However, the onus should be placed on the author State.137 Admittedly it is the injured State 
which might want to resort to countermeasures. But the author State is the cause of the whole situa-
tion. By fulfilling its reparation obligations it could prevent the injured State's exercise of a right to 
210 CHAPTER 4 
resort to countermeasures. By failing to do so it opens the door towards the injured State's exercise 
of its right. Naturally it may wish to dispute the injured State's version of the facts or its interpreta­
tion of the law. Or it may object to specific forms of reparation or their extent. In both cases it 
should be the author State that ought to bear the burden of initiating dispute settlement procedures 
and place itself under the scrutiny of a third party. 
Another question is whether the author State could limit itself to offering legally non-binding third 
party dispute settlement, such as mediation or conciliation, and whether in doing so it could bring 
about a suspension of the injured State's right to resort to countermeasures. The answer to this must 
be in the negative. The purpose of mediation and conciliation is to bring States together and in that 
way promote the peaceful settlement of a dispute existing between them. But neither of these settle­
ment methods leads to a legally binding determination of the facts or the law. They are intended to 
appease the parties rather than to settle the dispute in any decisive way. For that matter, those 
charged to mediate or conciliate need not be jurists. So there is no guarantee at all for the injured 
State, or for the author State, that the conclusion they arrive at will conform to legal standards. It is 
rather clear that there does not yet exist any rule of international law which stipulates that an offer 
for legally binding dispute settlement, that is recourse to arbitration or an international court, ought 
to be made before resort to countermeasures. Similarly there is no rule stipulating that any such offer 
made by either the author or injured State ought to be accepted by the one or the other. One might 
even wonder, in the light of the Air Services Award,ш whether there exists any obligation to refrain 
from resort to countermeasures during negotiations or during proceedings of a dispute settlement 
procedure. The proposal by the Drafting Committee and especially Arangio-Ruiz' latest draft both 
appear to be heading, as a matter of progressive development, towards requiring such an offer, as 
well as acceptance by the other party to the dispute, in order that recourse to countermeasures may 
be avoided. The introduction of such a requirement would certainly have to be considered an im­
provement of the law in this field. 
In connection to the above considerations Arangio-Ruiz has proposed a paragraph 3 to article 
12:U9 
"Except in the case of urgent temporary measures envisaged in paragraph 2 (a) of the present 
article no countermeasures shall be resorted to by the injured State without appropriate and 
timely communication of its intention to the State which has committed the internationally 
wrongful act." 
A preliminary remark would be that by mentioning the word "intention", apparently the intention to 
resort to countermeasures is meant. This requirement now, which might be considered appropriate 
for the purpose of maintaining friendly relations between the injured and author States, is not in line 
with the nature of any measures contemplated. The whole idea of providing for countermeasures is 
that they offer an opportunity to coerce the author State into performing its reparation obligations. 
In some cases that object may be achieved already through an announcement that resort to counter-
measures is imminent. Or such object may be achieved indirectly by threatening or preparing for 
countermeasures unless recourse is had to dispute settlement procedures.140 The notion of coercion, 
typical for resort to countermeasures, would be lost somewhat if prior notification had to be given of 
an injured State's intention to that effect. Any surprise aspect will be lost and the author State will be 
given the opportunity to circumvent coercive measures, or try to mitigate the disadvantageous ef­
fects flowing therefrom.141 On this basis it is also possible to assert that, a fortiori, there need not be 
any specification of the kind of measures contemplated by the injured State.'42 Thus, whether or not 
the measures contemplated are of an urgent and temporary character, the injured State can exercise 
its right to resort to countermeasures without communicating to the author State its intention do so. 
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Such exercise is prevented only where the author State acknowledges its responsibility and offers to 
provide adequate reparation, or offers to have recourse to binding dispute settlement procedures. 
As to these same issues one might wonder whether the Security Council would be bound to 
stimulate the peaceful settlement of disputes between States before resorting to measures under arti-
cle 41 of the Charter. From the viewpoint of Charter interpretation the conclusion must be that once 
the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression, the peaceful settlement of disputes is a past station.143 That conclusion does not result 
from the fact that conditions set for the exercise of unilateral countermeasures necessarily would not 
apply to measures ordered by the Security Council.14* Rather it flows from the system of the Charter 
in which the Security Council possesses a broad discretionary competence to decide whether a cer-
tain dispute or situation could still be resolved by making use of its recommendatory powers under 
Chapter VI (labelled "pacific settlement of disputes"); or whether a certain dispute or situation has 
escalated to the point that the circumstances of article 39 exist, which call for the exercise of its 
power to decide on measures under Chapter VII (labelled "action with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression"). The Council's exercise of power to decide on 
the imposition of measures under article 41 does not exclude it from calling upon parties to negotiate 
on the settlement of their disputes. However, Security Council practice also shows that it does not 
feel itself bound, for which it has been criticized,145 to respect recourse by one of the parties to a 
procedure liable to lead to the settlement of the dispute. Be that as it may, the specially agreed con-
ventional rules of the Charter take precedence over any rule to have recourse to dispute settlement 
procedures under customary international law. That is mainly so because, in the system of the Char-
ter, the parties to a dispute have proved, or are considered, unable to solve their dispute through 
peaceful means as soon as the Security Council determines the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, Or act of aggression under article 39. Even then it can still opt for calming the 
waters through the indication of provisional measures under article 40. But as a matter of law it is 
not required to have any recourse to that provision. 
An instructive example of all this lies with the Lockerbie Case. As is well known the United States 
and the United Kingdom demand that Libya surrenders two of its nationals accused of having planted 
a bomb in the aeroplane which later crashed at Lockerbie.146 Libya refuses to surrender them on the 
basis that it has the right under the Montreal Convention to opt for the prosecution of accused indi-
viduals rather than to extradite them. The Security Council, by way of resolution 731,147 urged Libya 
to respond fully and effectively to the requests of the United States and the United Kingdom. Libya 
then chose to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under the relevant provision of the Montreal Con-
vention and asked it to settle the dispute over extradition. It also requested the indication of provi-
sional measures to safeguard its right to prosecute under the Montreal Convention.148 Before the 
Court delivered an order regarding these requests the Security Council adopted resolution 748 in 
which it determined that in particular Libya's continued failure to respond fully and effectively to 
earlier requests for surrender constituted a threat to international peace and security. For that reason, 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it decided that Libya must comply with the requests for sur-
render and that until it did comply States had to adopt measures in the fields of air transports, arms, 
Libya's diplomatic representation, and on the entry of Libyan nationals accused of terrorist activities 
into their territories. By taking this action the Security Council effectively prevented the Court to ex-
ercise its power under article 41 of the Statute.149 It remains to be seen whether the Court will also 
consider resolution 748 to constitute an impediment to delivering a judgment on the merits in favour 
of Libya. 
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One of the differing consequences that could be attached to crimes, envisaged by Arangio-Ruiz, 
concerns the lifting of any obligation to suspend resort to countermeasures prior to, or during, re-
course to dispute settlement procedures IS* In his proposed article 17, Part Two, he provides that all 
States could resort to countermeasures after the Court had determined the existence of a crime 
(paragraph 1), and before any such determination to the extent that urgent, interim measures are re-
quired to protect the rights of an injured State or to limit the damage caused by the crime (paragraph 
2). ,s ' 
The main reason for dispensing with any such obligation may be found in that an author State of 
an international crime is acting in a manner which shows the deliberate and intentional character of 
its acts Basically it possesses knowledge of what is happening and it wants what is happening to 
happen its actions are premeditated So a first observation must be that the obligations to cease any 
wrongful conduct and that related to restitution acquire especial importance in case of crimes Aran-
gio-Ruiz has pointed to the fact, discussing delicts, that there is no essential need to require an 
author State to cease its wrongful conduct in order for a possible suspension of the injured State's 
right to resort to countermeasures to come about on the basis of an obligation to have prior recourse 
to dispute settlement procedures l52 An (alleged) author State of a delict may have reasons to believe 
that what it is doing is not wrong (claim of non-breach), it may claim that it was unaware of what 
was going on (claim of non-attribution), or it may claim that there are circumstances precluding the 
wrongfulness of its conduct Similar claims cannot be forwarded by a State committing an interna-
tional crime they strain belief. 
Secondly, the gravity of the internationally wrongful acts being committed, coupled to the premedi-
tated character of such acts, provides a strong indication that urgent measures are necessary to in-
duce the author State to perform its reparation obligations The importance of cessation of acts being 
committed, to have the author State provide restitution in case of aggression, or to make it provide 
guarantees against repetition cannot be underestimated Any internationally wrongful act constituting 
an international crime would give rise to the application of, to use Arangio-Ruiz' formulation of ar-
ticle 17, paragraph 2, "urgent, interim measures as are required to protect the rights of an injured 
State or to limit the damage caused by the international crime "IS3 
Arangio-Ruiz foreshadowed, in his fifth report, and argued in his seventh report, that the aggra-
vated consequences of crimes could lie also with the relaxation of the conditions generally applicable 
to countermeasures 1S4 He agreed not only that there did not need to be any prior exhaustion of dis-
pute settlement mechanisms, but that even the prior notification requirement would not be applicable 
in case of crimes 1SS Of course he now proposes a prior determination of the existence of a crime by 
the Court, and he has argued that particularly severe measures which could have adverse effects for 
the author State's population must be communicated to the author State 1Si He did not fail to notice 
that the recent Iraq-Kuwait crisis bore witness of such relaxation, since a number of States, on their 
own initiative, adopted economic measures against Iraq without any attempt at dispute settlement1S7 
Having regard, again, to the existence of government policies and to the premeditated nature of 
crimes, insistence on the necessity of prior communication of claims and recourse to dispute settle-
ment does indeed appear superfluous 1S8 That is not to say that no specific demands of reparation 
should be made Generally States have their resort to countermeasures accompanied by demands for 
cessation and reparation in the broad sense IS9 
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4 3 3 Additional requirements for Security Council measures under article 41 of the Charter 
It has been asserted, earlier on, that the power of the Security Council to decide on the application of 
measures under article 41 should be considered to amount to resort to countermeasures under cus-
tomary international law Besides the conditions generally applicable to such resort, the question 
arises whether the Charter poses any others Two subjects need to be discussed. The first, on the le-
gal effect of recommendations and decisions, presents a preliminary character The second, on the 
relationship between articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, does not present any real difficulties 
General Assembly and Security Council recommendations and decisions: justification for otherwise 
wrongful acts? 
The Commission noted in its commentary on article 30, Part One, regarding countermeasures, that 
sanctions applied in conformity with the Charter would not be wrongful, and it continued 16e 
"This view would, moreover, seem to be valid not only in cases where the duly adopted deci-
sion of the Organization authorizing the application of a sanction is mandatory for the Mem-
ber States but also where the taking of such measures is merely recommended " 
A few preliminary observations need to be made on this position First of all it may be noted that the 
only organ with competence to decide on sanctions mandatory for United Nations members is the 
Security Council This follows from article 25 of the Charter which provides that members agree to 
accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council This means, a contrario, that members have 
not agreed to accept and carry out decisions of the General Assembly, nor for that matter decisions 
of the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, or the Secretariat The effect of deci-
sions of the Court is regulated specifically in the Charter Under article 94, paragraph 1, any member 
has undertaken to comply with decisions of the Court in any case to which it is a party (see also arti-
cle 59 of the Statute) 
A second remark is that the Commission expresses the view that measures recommended by the Or-
ganization would not be wrongful. The question is which organs could issue recommendations to 
members that they adopt countermeasures In the light of articles 39 and 41 of the Charter there can 
be no doubt as to the Security Council's competence to recommend countermeasures The position 
of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council is less clear In view of articles 10, 11 
(paragraph 2), and especially 14, of the Charter, one would have to acknowledge the General As-
sembly's competence in this respect The Economic and Social Council is authorized, under article 
62 (paragraph 2), to make recommendations for the purpose of "promoting respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all " It would seem that recommending the 
application of coercive measures by members goes way beyond the mere "promotion" of respect for, 
and observance of, human rights Provisions related to the other organs of the organization, the 
Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat and the Court, do not contain any reference to a power to make 
recommendations 
Before entering into discussion of the legal effect of recommendations, it may be asked whether 
the Assembly's competence is not restricted by virtue of the terms of articles 14, 12 (paragraph 1) 
and 11 (paragraph 2) Article 14 provides that the Assembly may recommend measures for the 
peaceful adjustment of situations, including those resulting from the violation of articles 1 and 2 The 
question is whether countermeasures can be considered peaceful means of dispute settlement That 
question should be answered in the affirmative Although they are certainly not prone to promote 
friendly relations between States, they are peaceful in the sense that they do not involve resort to 
inter-State armed force The competence of the Assembly is obviously restricted by article 12, 
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paragraph 1, which states that it shall not make recommendations with regard to disputes or 
situations with regard to which the Security Council is exercising its Charter functions. Finally the 
interpretation of article 11, paragraph 2, shows that the Assembly may recommend to States on 
issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security However, the final sentence of 
that paragraph provides that "Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the 
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion " Does "action" generally 
encompass countermeasures1? It would seem not Although the Charter makes numerous, seemingly 
interchangeable, references to "action" or "measures",161 the action mentioned in article 11, 
paragraph 2, can only be meant to cover Security Council enforcement action under Chapter VII1 6 2 
That indeed was the position of the Court in its Expenses Opinion 1 И 
"The word 'action' must mean such action as is solely within the province of the Security 
Council ( ) The 'action' which is solely within the province of the Security Council is that 
which is indicated by the title of Chapter VII, namely 'Action with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression' ( ) Accordingly, the last sentence of 
Article 11, paragraph 2, has no application where the necessary action is not enforcement ac­
tion " 
Such action can only relate to the maintenance of international peace and security if and to the extent 
that there exists, as a minimum, a threat to the peace. The Assembly will remain competent to rec­
ommend to States resort to countermeasures for so long as the Security Council is not exercising its 
functions under the Charter 
It may be said, with Kelsen, as to the Assembly's competence, that I 6 4 "Recommendations, by 
their very nature, do not constitute a legal obligation to behave in conformity with them " So a State 
which acts upon an Assembly recommendation to adopt countermeasures could not be said to be un­
der any obligation to do so The question is whether that State can invoke the General Assembly 
recommendation and claim that it provides a justification for a breach of obligation towards the tar­
geted State As with Council decisions under articles 39 and 41 or 94, paragraph 2, any breach of 
obligation pursuant to a recommendation can be justified only as a reaction against an earlier com­
mitted internationally wrongful act From a purely legal point of view, however, a wrongful act need 
not give rise to a right of any State to adopt countermeasures Minor breaches of obligations under 
the rules prohibiting intervention and the threat or use of military force for instance do not entail in­
jured State status for all States, but only for the State directly affected by those breaches (article 5, 
Part Two, of the draft articles on State responsibility) A decision by the Security Council that all 
States must impose countermeasures on an author State implies that in cases of minor breaches also 
States which do not possess injured State status are legally justified in their reaction independently 
from the customary rules on State responsibility. As States are not under an obligation to comply 
with any recommendation issued by the Assembly, one would have to conclude also that they cannot 
derive any rights therefrom l i S For that reason any State acting in response to a recommendation can 
only claim a justifying effect for their breaches of obligation towards an author State if it possesses 
injured State status under the customary rules on State responsibility 
To the extent that a State is not to be considered so, yet acts upon the recommendation to adopt 
countermeasures, it will be in breach of its obligation and will have incurred international responsi­
bility for its wrongful acts Such responsibility cannot be disclaimed by pointing a finger at the As­
sembly resolution recommending such action Since, as noted above, a recommendation cannot bind 
members to act in any specific way, it follows that any measures adopted pursuant thereto also can­
not be attributed to the United Nations and, consequently, does not engage its responsibility l 6 6 This 
issue is moot insofar as international crimes are concerned As all States are to be considered injured 
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States, countermeasures adopted pursuant to an Assembly recommendation will be justifiable on the 
basis of customary international law 
Should these findings be different, in regard to the Security Council, in view of its power under 
article 41 to decide on mandatory measures, that is, measures which in the light of article 25 must be 
accepted and carried out by members' Eisemann, for instance, commenting on article 41, states 
"Un Etat qui adopterait, à l'encontre d'un autre, des mesures de sanctions économiques en 
application d'une invitation de l'Assemblée (ou même du Conseil de sécurité n'agissant pas 
dans le cadre du Chapitre VII) ne ferait juridiquement qu'un acte unilatéral, et il ne pourrait 
invoquer la Charte pour justifier sa politique de sanctions dans l'hypothèse où elle serait con-
traire à des engagements internationaux antérieurs." 
On the basis of an a contrario argument one could assert that he apparently considered that a State 
could invoke the Charter if the Council had recommended it to adopt economic sanctions under 
Chapter VII (that is, under article 39 of the Charter) However, in the sentence immediately preced-
ing this stance he quoted the Court's statement in the Expenses Opinion to the effect that168 "Seul le 
Conseil de sécurité peut prescrire des mesures d'exécution par une action coercitive contre un 
agresseur " Now it is precisely this power of the Security Council which ought to lead to a negative 
answer Why should one accord justifying effect to countermeasures adopted pursuant to a recom-
mendation of the Council, when the Council could just as easily have required members to adopt 
those measures7 If the Council leaves any decision on resort to coercive measures to the members 
themselves, the conclusion must again be that measures adopted on the invitation of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII are in need of separate justification under the customary rules on State 
responsibility For the above reasons member States of the United Nations can only claim Charter 
justification for resort to countermeasures against another member, if such measures have been im-
posed upon them by way of Security Council decision under articles 39 and 41 ,69 
Article 41 measures and determinations under article 39 
There is general recognition that the Security Council must first determine the existence of a threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, before it can decide upon the measures of ar-
ticle 41 l7e Goodrich and Hambro, for instance, note in regard to article 41 171 
"It is clear from the wording of this Article, taken together with that of Article 39, that a de-
cision to use 'measures not involving the use of armed force' can only be taken following a 
determination, explicit or implicit, that a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression' exists " 
It is not quite clear how an implicit determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression could be considered sufficient for purposes of application of article 41 of the Charter 
If a determination under article 39 constitutes a (pre)condition for possible application of article 41 
measures, then explicit wording appears requisite Mere reference, by the Council, that it is acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter certainly cannot be considered adequate And similarly a mere in-
vocation of article 41 cannot be considered sufficient The imposition of measures, on the other 
hand, without any reference to article 41, would leave much to the imagination of the beholder 
Admittedly, use of interpretation rules could correct the more unlikely conclusions However, the 
Council not only has competence to decide on the measures of articles 41 and 42, but can also en-
gage in the formulation of recommendations and provisional measures The text of articles 39 and 
40, though, also appears to require a determination under article 39 for the adoption of recommen-
dations and provisional measures In this light, and since the Security Council only has the power to 
decide on mandatory measures in relation to articles 41 and 42 (and 94), it would not be too onerous 
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to require it to determine, in an explicit manner, the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression 
The competence of the Security Council to determine threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, 
or acts of aggression, should be seen in relation to the fundamental provisions of article 2, para-
graphs 3 and 4, of the Charter In this respect it should be noted that article 2, paragraph 4, not only 
prohibits members to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States, but 
also to use force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations Article 2, paragraph 4, read in 
conjunction with article 1 then leads to the conclusion that the threat or use of force by a member in 
denial of the self-determination of peoples, or against human rights and fundamental freedoms, con-
stitutes a breach of obligation under article 2, paragraph 4 "2 That conclusion would in turn provide 
a stronger argument for considering international crimes to come under the heading of threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace, or even acts of aggression Thus the competence of the Security 
Council in taking action under article 41 of the Charter would be established beyond doubt 
Yet these conclusions, and any enthusiasm resulting therefrom, must be tempered First of all it has 
to be mentioned that article 2, paragraph 4, only stipulates that members shall refrain from the threat 
or use of force in their international relations only Uses of force in denial of self-determination 
certainly need not fall under the heading of international relations And uses of force constituting 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms would, almost by definition, not take place m 
the international relations of members 
Secondly, one might wish to stress that the Security Council competence to determine threats to the 
peace does not require there to be a threat to "international" peace Reading on in article 39 of the 
Charter one finds that the Security Council may "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security " In conformity with 
interpretation canons the ordinary meaning to be given to these terms then is that the Security 
Council can only adopt the measures of article 41 if a threat to the peace, perhaps of domestic origin, 
necessitates measures to maintain or restore international peace and security In fact international 
peace or security must already be endangered or disturbed in a concrete sense m that article 37, 
paragraph 2, states that the Security Council may deem that the continuation of a dispute is "in fact" 
likely to endanger international peace and security A fortiori there must be a threat to international 
peace and security that would, if materialized, necessitate the restoration of international peace and 
security 
A third argument to be discarded relates to article 2, paragraph 7, which provides that "Nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter " The Security Council would be entitled to intervene in such 
matters by virtue of the last sentence of article 2, paragraph 7 '( ) but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII " Matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States are by definition not regulated by rules of international law Yet it is clear that 
such matters may still give nse to international tension, especially where for instance there are ethnic 
ties between the population of a State and a minority within another State Although the Security 
Council would thus have competence under article 39, especially where there is a threat of armed 
conflict between the two States, the measures of article 41 could still not be taken against a State 
that had not in any way committed any breach of obligations In relation to international crimes the 
issue is not whether there are internationally wrongful acts, but rather whether there is any threat of 
armed conflict between the author State and injured States In such a case, and in both respects, the 
domestic jurisdiction clause really has no relevance at all First, because the commission of 
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internationally wrongful acts removes the issue from the domestic jurisdiction, and secondly because 
if there is such a threat of armed conflict there will most likely, as a minimum, also be a breach of 
obligation under article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter. 
Interpretation of the Charter therefore shows that the measures under article 41, imposed on an 
author State committing the international crimes of denial of self-determination and widespread 
breaches of basic human rights obligations, still necessitate a prior determination by the Security 
Council under article 39 of the Charter. Such determination by the Security Council can only provide 
the basis for the measures of article 41 if imposition is necessary for the maintenance or restoration 
of international peace or security. 
4.4. Restrictions regarding resort to countermeasures 
4.4.1. Restrictions regarding countermeasures, multiplicity of injured States, 
and the organizational interest in countermeasures 
Restrictions based on the absence of specially affected States 
Breaches of obligations for the protection of human rights of individuals irrespective of nationality 
need not affect any State specifically. For that reason injured State status results for all those States 
bound by the relevant rule of conventional or customary law. To the extent that such breaches of ob-
ligations are the result of negligent behaviour of States, there would not seem to be any fears that 
they refuse to remedy their ways. Especially in case of breaches of human rights obligations States 
ought to have recourse to the supervision mechanisms contained in treaties to which they are parties. 
The same cannot be said where the breaches are intentional or premeditated and of a serious nature. 
In such cases all injured States can adopt countermeasures towards the author State. 
Other restrictions, to be discussed below, also would not seem to place any obstacles in the way 
of countermeasures. Arangio-Ruiz for instance observed, in the context of delicts, that proportional-
ity constitutes:173 
"(...) a general and flexible principle ensuring that the implementation of international respon-
sibility does not lead to inequitable results. Where measures are taken by several States as a 
consequence of one and the same breach, respect for proportionality should prevent the ag-
gregate effect of the unilateral measures to cause disproportion between the reaction and the 
breach or its effects." 
But proportionality, especially important for delicts, does not play the same role in respect of crimes. 
The fact that all States would obtain the right to invoke the reparation obligations of the author 
State, and all such States would exercise their rights to resort to countermeasures towards that State, 
would still not necessarily result in disproportional action. That is so, basically, because the gravity 
of the crimes, the severe fault on the part of the author State, and the importance of the rules 
breached, may all be taken into account in judging (dis)proportionality. 
Allegations of wrongfulness, incurred responsibility and demands for reparation still have to be 
made, but this does not seriously hamper the adoption of countermeasures in case of crimes. In the 
same vein it may be claimed that injured States ought to respect recourse to dispute settlement pro-
cedures by the author State and another injured State. In such a case they may claim the opportunity 
to be afforded to take part in, either directly or through intervention procedures, the proceedings. 
Nevertheless the suspension of countermeasures by injured States not taking part in the procedure 
cannot be demanded in case of international crimes. A final, and the most important, limit on resort 
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to countermeasures by injured States will concern the restriction that basic human rights will be safe-
guarded The conclusion, however, must be that no specific restrictions on resort to countermeasures 
can be posed because there would not be any specially affected State 
Restrictions based on the presence of a directly injured State 
Of the international crimes mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3, Part One, only the one under sub (a) 
on the rule prohibiting aggression can lead to a situation in which there truly is a directly injured 
State and where there are other injured States. The other examples of crimes could be said to involve 
more strongly affected States which gives them a more direct interest in the breaches at hand As 
noted before, chapter three, subsection 3 8 3, even then their status of specially affected State is inci-
dental to their true status flowing from breaches of obligations affecting all States alike Questions on 
directly injured States and other injured States will therefore only be discussed from the angle of the 
prohibition of aggression 
In chapter one and chapter three it has been noted that not all uses of force give rise to injured 
State status under article 5, Part Two. Only such uses of force as amount to an armed attack do so 
That, as has been noted before, is in accordance with the observations made by the Court in the 
Nicaragua Case In the context of the subject under consideration the Court emphatically stated 174 
"While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self-defence, a use of 
force of a lesser degree cannot, as the Court has already observed ( ), produce any entitle-
ment to take collective counter-measures involving the use of force The acts of which Nica-
ragua is accused, even assuming them to have been established and imputable to that State, 
could only have justified proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had 
been the victim of these acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica They could not 
justify counter-measures taken by a third State, and particularly could not justify intervention 
involving the use of force " 
This conclusion only concerns such uses of force falling below the level of an armed attack. When 
there is an armed attack by one State against another, all other States will also be considered injured 
States Such an armed attack may be countered through the exercise of a right of individual or col-
lective self-defence, and/or by the exercise of a right to have resort to countermeasures With regard 
to the exercise of the former right the Court has asserted the existence of two conditions a declara-
tion by the directly injured State that it is under attack, and a request by the directly injured State to 
other States calling for action in collective self-defence 17S The question then is whether these condi-
tions also apply with regard to the exercise of the other injured States' rights to adopt countermea-
sures Tomuschat answered in the affirmative, claiming that what applied to self-defence should 
apply to countermeasures as well.176 
So far the draft articles adopted by the Commission do not embody such conditions Article 5, Part 
Two, defines the injured States and, in the context of delicts, those are entitled to demand reparation 
from the author State or to resort to countermeasures as against the latter if reparation is not forth-
coming Arangio-Ruiz has gone even further and, after a thorough examination,177 proposed the in-
sertion of an article 5 bis, Part Two, which provides that "Whenever there is more than one injured 
State, each one of them is entitled to exercise its legal rights under the rules set forth in the following 
articles " Whether this principled position would apply also to international crimes is not altogether 
clear To the extent that injured States' nationals would be wronged by an author State's commission 
of an international crime, the position proposed by Arangio-Ruiz should be upheld This would be 
the case for instance if an injured State's nationals would be caught up in an attempted genocide, 
denial of self-determination or widespread human rights violations, or if intentional pollution of the 
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atmosphere or the seas would affect its special economic interests or would reach its national juris­
diction l 7 8 In such cases the injury done to an injured State would provide it with injured State status 
over and above the status it already enjoyed under article 5, paragraph 3, as a result of an interna­
tional crime I 7 ' Yet the other States also enjoy that status notwithstanding that they are not factually 
damaged by the crime 
Arangio-Ruiz seems to have denied, in regard to the international crime of aggression, any virtue 
in a distinction between directly injured States and non-directly injured States 18Q He refers in this re­
spect to 1β1 "( ) the nature and the gravity of the injury respectively sustained in fact " Proof of that 
he finds in that there are the target State of the aggression, States bordering the direct victim, States 
of the region, allies of the victim State, States depending on the victim State's vital exports, States 
participating in a collective security system, and all other States bound by the rule of general interna­
tional law prohibiting aggression18î Yet all of these examples are but the ratio for the existence of a 
collective security system Other States may suffer disadvantageous consequences as a result of an 
author State's internationally wrongful act towards the injured State However, it has been generally 
acknowledged that this does not entail injured State status for all those States affected The whole 
point of drafting the rules of article 5, Part Two, is to provide limits to such causation The idea is to 
provide which States are "legally" considered to be injured The stance of the Court in the Nicaragua 
Case shows that States will not be considered injured States where there is no all out armed attack 
Yet the lower levels of uses of force may certainly affect other bordering States, or impede exports 
of vital products Legally speaking such States will still not be injured States 18Э 
The crime of aggression provides injured State status to all States by virtue of its status as breach of 
an obligation erga omnes Were it not for the existence of that concept, all other States would lack 
such status The victim of an armed attack on the other hand derives its status as injured State from 
the fact that in accordance with traditional criteria it is affected by the author State's breach of obli­
gation The rationale for injured State status for all States in case of an armed attack can only lie with 
the need to ensure more effective responses to aggression Whether or not more effective responses 
are required ought to be left for decision by the directly injured State For that reason it is necessary 
to impose the conditions of a declaration and a request also with regard to the exercise of a right to 
adopt collective countermeasures The victim State of an armed attack may consider that it is ade­
quately countering the attack and that no further action is necessary Or it may try to obtain such 
help through adoption of countermeasures by other injured States as it deems helpful in hampering 
the author State's military operations Finally, though not necessarily in last resort, it may call upon 
other injured States to engage in collective self-defence actions 
Only one exception exists, which goes without saying, with regard to the conditions of a declara­
tion and request The conditions concerned can only be imposed if the directly injured State is in a 
position to make a declaration and to issue the request If as a result of an armed attack the compe­
tent officials of the victim State are not in a position to act, e.g. because they have all been taken 
prisoner, then the other injured States can exercise their right to adopt countermeasures without the 
"requisite" declaration and request In the case of Kuwait the government fled the country and con­
sequently the conditions of declaration and request had to be fulfilled 
Restrictions based on the exercise of Security Council powers 
In subsection 4 2 2 it will be explained that the existence of Security Council competence as such, 
without any exercise thereof, could not lead to the disappearance of an injured State's right to adopt 
countermeasures It has been asserted however, by Pellet,184 that there would no longer be any right 
to resort to unilateral countermeasures once the Security Council imposed sanctions, under articles 
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39 and 41, on the author State In framing the argument he referred to the, in his mind analogous, 
provision of article 51 of the Charter, which stipulates that the right of self-defence shall not be im-
paired until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security 
Against this it may be said that the Charter does not contain any such provision limiting the mem-
bers' rights to adopt countermeasures. The reason for that would seem to be that there is no prohibi-
tion on the use economic force in the Charter. Since the Charter does prohibit the use of armed 
force, under article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, the provision on self-defence constitutes a necessity. 
Similarly the limit to the right of self-defence, measures taken by the Security Council, is needed for 
optimizing responses to armed attacks and for review of the accuracy of the allegation of an armed 
attack As economic coercion is not as such prohibited by the Charter, a limit analogous to that of 
article 51 would have to be spelled out Why would States give up their right to adopt countermea-
sures by implication? 
Furthermore, article 51 only covers two of the hypotheses of article 39, that is, the commission of an 
armed attack as a breach of the peace or an act of aggression Is it conceivable that States have given 
up their right to adopt countermeasures considering that the Security Council was far less likely to 
act in cases of lesser gravity? And even if it did act, it might do so only by having resort to less co-
ercive measures Moreover, the restriction to the right of self-defence seems to have as a further ra-
tionale that the Security Council might consider that the situation could be remedied by having 
recourse to measures under article 41 only, or that action in self-defence should be substituted by 
action under article 42 The idea then would be to have unilateral or collective armed actions substi-
tuted by Security Council action of a lesser degree That would amount to review by the Security 
Council of the necessity and proportionality of unilateral or collective exercises of self-defence Of 
course the reporting requirement laid down in article 51 of the Charter is meant to enable the Secu-
rity Council to assess, first, whether an armed attack has occurred, and secondly, whether it ought to 
substitute the defending State's action by its own. 
The argument could be made that there is some inconsistency with regard to the position taken on 
the GATT and the Charter (infra section 4 4.2). While States parties to the GATT must seek authori-
zation by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in order to take countermeasures, States parties to the 
Charter would be able to go ahead with such measures independently from any authorization by the 
Security Council 
The difference can be explained by reference to article XXIII of the GATT This provision stipulates 
that in case of a breach of obligation under the GATT a State party shall make representations or 
proposals to the party so accused Should the matter not be satisfactory adjusted it may be referred 
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES They in turn could then decide that the situation is serious enough 
to warrant the suspension of concessions or obligations by the affected State party. The Security 
Council on the other hand has been given the task to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity In that context it must determine breaches of obligations by members or non-members The 
scope of the Security Council's competence is so general that virtually any breach of obligation 
might be considered to give rise to a threat to the peace However, the interpretation of Charter 
provisions in their context shows that the Security Council was not intended as a general law enforc-
ing body comparable to the police Rather it was to take on those situations involving members' 
breaches of obligation which provided a threat to the maintenance of order in international relations 
Yet since almost any situation might give rise to the exercise of Security Council powers, it is diffi-
cult to assume that States parties by becoming members have renunciated their right to adopt coer-
cive measures under customary international law. 
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The question as to whether members would be entitled to adopt further or more severe measures 
than imposed by the Security Council must be answered taking into consideration the injured State 
status under rules of State responsibility Under the GATT only a contracting party affected, or liable 
to be affected, by a breach of obligation, by measures whether or not in conflict with the GATT, or 
by any other situation, will be authorized to suspend concessions or obligations l8S In cases involving 
uses of force not constituting an armed attack the Court has denied any standing for States not af-
fected by such force 186 Even if the Security Council had taken measures under articles 39 and 41 in 
such circumstances, other States could not take further or more severe measures due to lack of in-
jured State status In case of the international crime of aggression, e.g. an armed attack by one State 
against another, all States are injured States and may invoke the responsibility of the author State To 
deny them the right to adopt countermeasures going beyond Security Council measures, would be to 
deny the taking of, supposedly, more effective measures The Security Council might, for instance, in 
its first response to an armed attack, impose upon members no more than a duty to severe diplomatic 
relations If members could from that moment no longer adopt countermeasures because the inter-
pretation of the Charter should lead to that conclusion, and if the Security Council would not go be-
yond diplomatic steps, members of the United Nations would be stuck to implementing no more than 
mere measures of retorsion All this notwithstanding their injured State status under the customary 
rules of State responsibility, and the need for effective responses to international crimes It is submit-
ted that States are prevented from having recourse to countermeasures only in the presence of a Se-
curity Council resolution imploring them to refrain from adopting any or specific measures 187 
4 4 2 Restrictions regarding countermeasures based on general concepts 
The exclusion of a right to take countermeasures due to the existence of a treaty régime 
The exclusion of countermeasures due to the existence of a treaty régime has been discussed mainly 
from the angle of self-contained régimes, and has attracted much attention from the two most recent 
special rapporteurs on State responsibility and authors on international law As to the former espe-
cially Riphagen, on the basis of self-contained régimes, resorted to the idea of so-called subsys-
tems m 
"( ) a system was an ordered set of conduct rules, procedural rules and status provisions, 
which formed a closed legal circuit for a particular field of factual relationships A subsystem, 
then, was the same as a system, but not closed in as much as it had an interrelationship with 
other subsystems." 
Among the latter Simma for instance observed, in reaction to Riphagen, that a self-contained régime 
would apply to 189 
"( ) a certain category of subsystems, namely those embracing, in principle, a full (exhaustive 
and definite) set of secondary rules A 'self-contained regime' would then be a subsystem 
which is intended to exclude more or less totally the application of the general legal conse-
quences of wrongful acts, in particular the application of the countermeasures normally at the 
disposal of an injured party " 
At the outset it should be clear that there are two angles to the question whether States would be 
prevented from having resort to countermeasures due to the existence of a treaty régime First there 
is the possibility that the existence of a treaty régime would exclude the possibility of resort to 
countermeasures suspending the obligations established under the régime And secondly there is the 
possibility that the existence of the régime would exclude any resort to countermeasures outside the 
régime Both possibilities will be discussed on the basis of the presumption that States parties to a 
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particular treaty will only have given up the right to resort to countermeasures in an express manner 
or by way of necessary implication 
An important matter for both categories of regimes is whether the regime involved provides for 
resort to countermeasures One may note that Simma claimed that a self-contained regime had to 
embrace a full set of secondary rules 19° Taking a look at the potential candidates in the field of self-
contained regimes, one will see that only the system of the Charter and that of the GATT are so 
equipped The Charter envisages Security Council imposition of measures under article 41 with re-
spect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression The GATT provides, in 
article XXIII, that the CONTRACTING PARTIES may authorize, if they consider a situation to be 
serious enough, the suspension of concessions or obligations under the GATT with respect to a 
breach of obligation under the GATT, any measure whether or not in conflict with provisions of the 
GATT, or any other situation The other likely examples of self-contained regimes, the system of 
diplomatic law and the law of human rights, do not provide for resort to countermeasures In view of 
the rather more complex questions arising in this chapter, compared to that of chapter three, separate 
discussion of potential regimes is necessary, beginning with diplomatic law, continuing with human 
rights law and Charter law, and ending with GATT law Any discussion of these issues must primarily 
be based upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the instruments concerned and of the 
concomitant rules of customary international law '91 
Exclusion of countermeasures under the regime of diplomatic law? The 1961 Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations provides, in article 9, paragraph 1, that the receiving State can declare any 
person persona non grata or unacceptable without stating the reasons for such a decision 192 The 
sending State is then under the obligation to recall that person or terminate its functions Articles 39, 
paragraph 2, and 44 stipulate that persons enjoying immunities shall be granted facilities and suffi-
cient time, even in case of armed conflict, to leave the country These provisions seem to provide the 
basis for the conclusion that a receiving State is not entitled, by way of countermeasure, to disregard 
the immunities of persons accredited to it 
In arriving at such a conclusion one has to take into account that the receiving State is under the 
obligation to grant diplomatic staff and their family free passage even in case of armed conflict, that 
is to say, even if the supreme international crime is being committed against it So even if the sending 
State is breaching its obligation not to use force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of the receiving State, the latter cannot react by breaching its obligation to respect the immuni-
ties of the former State's diplomatic staff Since that is the case an injured (receiving) State will also 
not be entitled, by way of countermeasure, to disregard the immunities as a reaction against other 
breaches of obligation against the author (sending) State That conclusion was reached also by the 
Court m the Diplomatic Staff Case,193 in which it rejected the justification claimed by Iran, namely 
that the United States had seriously breached its obligation under article 41, paragraph 1, not to in-
terfere in the internal affairs of Iran Such (alleged) interference, even if proved, could only be coun-
tered by way of declaring persona non grata those suspected thereof, or by breaking off the 
diplomatic relations with the sending State In both cases the interference would stop, and for that 
reason the Court observed that such means were "entirely efficacious" l94 That observation is cer-
tainly accurate, because, under article 9, paragraph 1, the receiving State would have the right to dis-
regard the immunities of any person who had been recalled, or whose functions had been terminated, 
by the sending State, and who nevertheless had not left the receiving State's territory within a rea-
sonable period of time It is on that basis that the Commission has formulated the provision of article 
14 (c) that countermeasures shall not amount to 19S "any conduct which infringes the inviolability of 
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diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents," For the reasons stated any coun-
termeasures affecting an author State's diplomatic or consular personnel are out of the question 
However, would the injured State be entitled to react to an author State's breach of obligation 
under the regime of diplomatic law by having resort to countermeasures affecting obligations outside 
that regime? According to the Court the rules of diplomatic law, which constitute a self-contained 
regime, foresee possible abuses by members of diplomatic missions, and specifies the, entirely effica-
cious, means to counter those l9i But the only remedies available under the treaty are the declaration 
of persona non grata, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations Such action will certainly put a 
stop to breaches and will also prevent repetition But that is not the same as saying that in that way 
full reparation has been granted to the injured State How about restitution in kind (if abuses would 
involve theft), compensation (if the abuses involve destruction of property), satisfaction (punishment 
of culprits), or guarantees against repetition? It may be noted first of all that the optional protocol 
envisages the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as to disputes regarding the interpretation or ap-
plication of the 1961 Vienna Convention w As found m subsection 3 8 2 of chapter three, generally 
the absence of provisions on reparation must be interpreted to mean that the general rules on State 
responsibility apply An injured State under the 1961 Vienna Convention, whether that be the send-
ing or receiving State, is not therefore restricted to claiming cessation, but can also demand other 
forms of reparation ,9e The observation of the Court that the rules of diplomatic law constitute a self-
contained regime only accounts for cessation and non-repetition and a prohibition of countermea-
sures affecting immunities The 1961 Vienna Convention, furthermore, does not in any way provide 
for resort to countermeasures in response to breaches of obligation under the treaty The claim by 
the Court that diplomatic law provides the "means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activi-
ties of members" surely cannot be considered fully justified Declaring members persona non grata 
and the breaking off of diplomatic relations constitute mere measures of retorsion and not counter-
measures For such reasons resort to countermeasures in fields other than that of diplomatic law 
must be considered lawfulI99 
Exclusion of countermeasures under the regime of human rights law A first examination should 
be directed towards the question whether a State could resort to countermeasures breaching human 
rights in response to the breach of human rights obligations in another State However, for reasons 
of economy discussion ofthat question stands postponed to later in this section 
It has been asserted on occasion that the multilateral treaties in the field of human rights provide 
their own machinery for monitoring, supervision, and implementation For that reason countermea-
sures, in reaction to breaches of obligation under such a treaty, could not be resorted to200 That 
stance appears to have been supported by the Court in the Nicaragua Case as it discussed the issue 
of human rights violations2QI 
"This particular point requires to be studied independently of the question of the existence of 
a 'legal commitment' by Nicaragua towards the Organization of American States to respect 
these rights, the absence of such a commitment would not mean that Nicaragua could with 
impunity violate human rights However, where human rights are protected by international 
conventions, that protection takes the form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensuring 
respect for human rights as are provided for m the conventions themselves " 
After noting that Nicaragua had ratified some human rights treaties, and the American Convention 
on Human Rights in particular,101 the Court observed that the mechanisms provided therein had 
functioned, that two reports had been issued, and that therefore the OAS had been in a position to 
take a decision on the basis of these reports203 It then stated2M 
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"In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to re-
spect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to 
monitor or ensure such respect " 
The Court's observation that the United States could itself appraise the human rights situation m 
Nicaragua was indispensable That is so because the Court was precluded from (interpreting or) ap-
plying multilateral treaties by reason of the American reservation to its jurisdiction29S Any evaluation 
of the question whether the United States could take countermeasures against Nicaragua had to be 
based on customary international law It is submitted that resort to countermeasures can indeed be an 
appropriate method to ensure respect for human rights Basically because such respect might not be 
forthcoming on the basis of representations alone Thus demands for reparation regarding breaches 
of human rights obligations may be enforced by way of countermeasures 
In this relation an examination of the most important treaty in the field, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, allows for no different conclusion Article 40 places States parties to 
the Covenant under the obligation to submit reports on measures to give effect to the rights under 
the Covenant to the Human Rights Committee (paragraph 1) Yet the only course of action open to 
the Committee is to submit such reports, and its general comments, to the States parties (paragraph 
4) A State party may, under article 41, accept the competence of the Committee to receive any 
complaint that it is breaching obligations under the Covenant But any such acceptance is subject to a 
condition of reciprocity Furthermore, any function the Committee exercises in this respect is limited 
to the provision of good offices to the States parties m dispute True, the idea of these provisions is 
to come to an "amicable solution to the matter on the basis of respect for human rights", but at the 
same time that is where it ends If the States parties do not reach an amicable solution to their dis-
pute, the only thing left for the Committee to do is to submit a report containing a brief statement of 
the facts206 Any dispute on the responsibility of a State under the Covenant will then not be settled 
through any procedure established under the Covenant Settlement could still be reached of course if 
the States parties concerned have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court through some general in-
strument with regard to this kind of disputes 
Moreover, the Covenant does not make any reference to possible resort to countermeasures To the 
contrary, article 44 stipulates that States parties may settle their disputes m accordance with other 
agreements As no reference to customary law is made that would not necessarily mean that injured 
States under the Covenant could resort to countermeasures But then again article 44 is concerned 
with the settlement of disputes only, and does not refer in any way to the enforcement of obligations 
Should a dispute between States parties on a breach of obligation under the Covenant and the result-
ing incurred responsibility reach a stalemate, resort to countermeasures to force the author State to 
fulfil its reparation obligations will be lawful 
If an international cnme would be committed by a State party to the Covenant, the rejection of a 
right to resort to countermeasures regarding such breaches, on the argument that Covenant 
procedures take precedence, cannot be accepted The procedure established under article 41 for 
instance requires that no communication shall be accepted unless it has been ascertained that all 
available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted Yet in a State where human rights 
obligations are being breached on a widespread scale it is hardly likely that the individuals concerned, 
will attempt, or will have the opportunity to attempt, to have recourse to the legal remedies, if any, 
that are available to them It would seem obvious that the effective functioning of the Covenant 
procedures is fully dependent on the good faith of the States parties But it is hardly imaginable that 
"an amicable solution to the matter on the basis of respect for human rights" will or indeed can be 
arrived at in a situation where a State party is wilfully engaging in premeditated breaches of human 
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rights obligations. Resort to countermeasures in response to the commission of an international crime 
would therefore, a fortiori, be fully justified under both the Covenant and customary international 
law207 
Exclusion of countermeasures under the régime of the Charter? The question may be asked 
whether an injured State would be entitled to suspend, as against the author State, performance of its 
obligations under the Charter Insofar as this would amount to a use of military force under article 2, 
paragraphs 3 and 4, the issue will be discussed in the next chapter It might be asked nevertheless 
whether resort to countermeasures could be considered to be contrary to article 2, paragraph 3, 
which stipulates that members shall "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered " First of all it may 
stressed that resort to countermeasures does not as such count as a means of dispute settlement It 
should be considered a peaceful means inasmuch as its purpose is to coerce an author State into ful-
filling its reparation obligations without any actual use of armed force against that State208 The ar-
gument here is that it is not meant to settle the dispute The object of countermeasures is to make the 
author State want to settle the dispute in the traditional way, that is, by means of negotiation, media-
tion, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement 
As already pointed out, section 4 3 2, resort to countermeasures furthermore cannot be said to be 
contrary to justice What is unjust is that the author State fails to acknowledge its responsibility and 
fails to take the necessary steps to absolve itself therefrom To the extent that an author State would 
suffer from extensive countermeasures (inclusive measures of retorsion) by the injured State, it might 
be tempted to have recourse to less peaceful means to ensure the survival of its population Indirectly 
then countermeasures could endanger international peace and security This kind of situation appears 
to be covered by the Commission's proposed draft article 14, sub (b), prohibiting countermeasures 
involving.299 "extreme economic or political coercion designed to endanger the territorial integrity or 
political independence of the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act," Of course 
such countermeasures could only be resorted to if the internationally wrongful act was of the utmost 
gravity Otherwise countermeasures would conflict with the rule of proportionality 21° It would seem, 
on the other hand, that the broad competences of the Security Council are adequate to handle ten-
sion as a result of such a situation As Bowett remarked the Security Council can oversee counter-
measures and indicate whether it considers them to be disproportionate2" For reasons stated non-
military countermeasures do not concern breaches of obligation under the Charter 
The other side of the question is whether States would be prevented from taking countermeasures 
in response to the commission of the international crime of aggression Preclusion of countermea-
sures would in such a case have to be based upon the competence of the Security Council to address 
the issue This issue is relevant only to the extent that the Security Council has failed to act under ar-
ticles 39 and 41 (or 42) even though an armed attack is taking place, or has taken place, against a 
member of the United Nations The decisive argument should be, in such circumstances, that States 
are free to act in conformity with existing rules of customary international law. The Court for in-
stance noted, in the Expenses Opinion, regarding the purposes of the United Nations under article 1 
of the Charter, that 
"These purposes are broad indeed, but neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate 
them are unlimited Save as they have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of these 
common ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action " 
As the Security Council would not have acted upon a situation (an armed attack) that clearly calls for 
action, the interpretation that States would not have the right to take countermeasures against an 
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aggressor State is not acceptable They might of course act in collective self-defence under article 51 
of the Charter On the interpretation suggested, and in the absence of a Charter provision enabling 
them to adopt countermeasures, they could not support their legitimate self-defence actions by 
refusing, for instance, to provide the development aid promised by treaty to the author State If they 
choose not to aid the injured State by resorting themselves to armed force against the author State, 
and if the injured State has already been vanquished, the same interpretation prevents recourse to 
countermeasures on their part In such a case, and assuming that the Security Council would remain 
passive, the result is that the directly injured State would be completely incapable to resort to 
countermeasures or the use of force The other injured States, having relinquished their right to act 
in collective self-defence, would be precluded from taking countermeasures because an inactive 
Security Council possesses competence over the situation Such an interpretation would be both 
absurd and unreasonable 
Exclusion of countermeasures under the régime of the GATT? Finally the rules of the GATT must 
be discussed This issue is especially important due to the wide scope of the obligations accepted by 
States parties to the GATT If one were to conclude that the GATT constitutes a régime excluding 
possible resort to countermeasures, this would imply, for a considerable number of States, the ab-
sence of any real power to put pressure on States breaching their obligations 
Important and complicated is the issue whether a contracting party could resort to countermea-
sures affecting GATT obligations in response to another contracting party's internationally wrongful 
act in fields other than the GATT 2 U First it may be observed that the CONTRACTING PARTIES do 
not possess any power to authorize countermeasures with regard to breaches of obligation lying 
outside the scope of the GATT Superficially one might form that impression by reading that com-
plaints under article ΧΧΠΙ by a contracting party may concern "any other situation", and that if the 
situation is serious enough the CONTRACTING PARTIES could authorize the suspension of conces­
sions or obligations under the GATT However, the complaint by a contracting party must concern a 
claim that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT is being nullified or impaired, or that the attain­
ment of the objectives of the GATT is being impeded Any authorization by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES can only concern, and respond to, matters coming within the functional scope of the 
GATT 
The provisions of articles XX and XXI also do not concern any power of the States parties to adopt 
countermeasures responding to internationally wrongful acts extraneous to the GATT They consti­
tute general exceptions to the scope of the GATT The exceptions under article XXI could lead to 
the adoption of countermeasures under other treaties or customary international law Yet measures 
adopted would not involve any breach of obligation under the GATT ί 1 3 It would not be too far­
fetched to consider measures taken in response to international crimes to relate to an "emergency in 
international relations" (article XXI (b) (iii)) Any action taken under that heading must, however, be 
necessary for the protection of essential security interests1 U Article XXI (b) (iii) expressly mentions 
action taken in time of war, but an emergency in international relations would probably relate also to 
lesser grave uses of force, and to breaches of the prohibition on intervention21S Other conduct con­
stituting international crimes (genocide, denial of self-determination, and serious human rights viola­
tions) cannot be considered, inherently, to relate to essential security interests, though of course the 
repercussions flowing therefrom might 
The report of a GATT panel on the dispute between Nicaragua and the United States is relevant 
h e r e 2 l 6 As a result of the situation in Central America the United States imposed a cut in sugar 
quotas on Nicaragua The latter took action under GATT procedures and claimed that this 
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constituted a violation of articles II, XI, XIII, paragraph 2, and Part IV, of the GATT The United 
States limited itself to claiming that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the GATT It 
motivated this by saying that the cut-back in quotas restricted Nicaragua's capability of financing its 
arms build-up, which, the United States claimed, threatened peace in the region The panel 
established that the cut m quotas was incompatible with article XIII, paragraph 2, and noted that the 
United States had not invoked any exception under GATT rules United States action was thus 
considered incompatible with the GATT A second panel report on the other hand had to refrain from 
review of United States acts because its mandate did not authorize such review As Mavroidis points 
out panels are not courts and their concern is first and foremost to achieve a settlement of the dispute 
and the balancing of mutual interestsîl7 The silence of the GATT on countermeasures affecting it 
may also be taken into account Would not States parties, by now, have taken the opportunity to 
clarify the situation and amended the GATT by introducing a reprisal prohibition?218 It is submitted 
that the GATT also cannot be seen as a regime excluding countermeasures, and that consequently the 
States parties can legitimately claim a right to take unilateral countermeasures affecting obligations 
thereunder 
Some discussion is necessary whether States parties would be prevented from taking countermea-
sures affecting obligations outside the GATT in response to a breach of obligation under the GATT 
In this respect article XXIII, paragraph 1, of the GATT provides that a contracting party may com-
plain if it considers that any benefit accruing to it under the GATT is being nullified or impaired, or 
that the attainment of objectives of the GATT is being impeded, as a result of a breach of obligation 
by a contracting party, a contracting party's application of measures whether or not those are in 
conflict with the GATT, any other situation The CONTRACTING PARTIES may authorize, under 
paragraph 2 of the same article, a contracting party to suspend concessions or obligations under the 
GATT towards another contracting party if it considers the situation to be serious enough The use of 
the verb "authorize" implies that without authorization of the CONTRACTING PARTIES a State 
could not resort to countermeasures affecting obligations under the GATT in response to any of the 
three situations envisaged under article XXIII 
Moreover, one would have to say, in such a case, that a State could also not take countermeasures 
affecting obligations outside the GATT2I9 First of all because complaints on any of the three situa-
tions of article XXIII clearly fall under the exclusive competence of the GATT procedures Secondly, 
because the determination whether or not the circumstances are serious enough to warrant resort to 
countermeasures is subject to a decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES Resort to countermea-
sures affecting obligations outside the GATT without authorization of the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
prejudges any decision it could make as to whether the circumstances are serious enough Though 
measures by one contracting party against another would lie outside the GATT, their cause and ra-
tionale may be traced back to the situations envisaged under article XXIII For those a dispute set-
tlement procedure exists, coupled to a possibility of resort to countermeasures Any resort to 
countermeasures without having recourse to the procedure under article XXIII should be considered 
inadmissible 
The situation changes somewhat if the CONTRACTING PARTIES determine that a situation is seri-
ous enough to warrant non-compliance with concessions or obligations under the GATT Any coun-
termeasures adopted in excess of those authorized could not be said to prejudge the competence of 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES For resort to such measures the ordinary conditions and restrictions 
would have to be obeyed In the context of international crimes the hypotheses envisaged, conduct 
falling under GATT competence, are not relevant 
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Peremptory norms and human rights 
Two prohibitions envisaged by the Commission concern conduct derogating from basic human rights 
and conduct in contravention of a peremptory norm of general international law. In the light of the 
more restricted scope of the latter prohibition that one will be discussed first. 
Countermeasures in contravention of peremptory norms. In article 14, Part Two, the Commission 
states that an injured State shall not resort, by way of countermeasures, to220 "(e) any other conduct 
in contravention of a peremptory norm of general international law " It has been asserted, in subsec-
tions 3 7 3 and 3 7 4 of chapter three, that the peremptory norm on the use of force only applies if it 
is directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. Similarly it has been 
stated, in subsections 19 2 of chapter one and 2 6.1 of chapter two, that the crime of aggression can 
only concern armed attacks As the subject under consideration in this chapter concerns the faculty 
of resort to peaceful or non-armed countermeasures, it is hard to see how resort to this faculty could 
be said to contravene the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of the author State Other considerations might prevail with regard to resort to forceful 
or armed countermeasures As such measures concern rather the scope of the prohibitions of the use 
of force under the Charter and under customary international law, discussion is postponed until 
chapter five 
The second hypothesis, an injured State's resort to countermeasures contravening the peremptory 
norm on self-determination of peoples, is also not easily envisaged The only example that might be 
considered would lie with the situation sketched in section 3 8 2 of chapter three where a State 
would have ceded part of its territory, populated by a people claiming the right to self-determination, 
to another State, with transfer of the territory to be effected at a certain set time and date If the first 
State would then refuse to effect the transfer, it could be considered to have committed an interna-
tionally wrongful act The latter State, superficially speaking an injured State under article 5, Part 
Two, might then exercise its right to resort to countermeasures to induce the author State to perform 
its obligation of restitution in kind (specific performance in this case) The latter State could only su-
perficially be considered an injured State, because the agreement concluded between the two States 
would be void due to conflict with a peremptory norm Therefore it would seem that 
(counter)measures by an "injured" State could not legitimately be resorted to, because there would 
not be any valid treaty, no valid obligation to effect a cession, nor any valid obligation to provide 
restitution in kind As a consequence there could not exist any right to resort to countermeasures and 
a State having recourse thereto would breach its obligations towards the State refusing transfer It 
becomes clear from this example that almost any resort to countermeasures could only indirectly 
conflict with a peremptory norm 
As to the peremptory norms prohibiting genocide, slavery and apartheid, it can be said that those 
could be breached by way of resort to countermeasures by an injured State That situation might oc-
cur especially when an injured State would take countermeasures, for whatever reasons, against the 
nationals of the author State, for instance by killing them, imposing forced labour upon them, or by 
taking action discriminating against them All these examples concern the breach of (basic) human 
rights of nationals of the author State For that reason it may be appropriate to discuss the issue in 
the next paragraphs 
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Countermeasures in contravention of human rights obligations The Commission has proposed, 
in article 14, to ban countermeasures which would involve221 "(d) any conduct which derogates 
trom basic human rights," That text reflects the observations of Arangio-Ruiz in this respect and the 
discussion which took place in the Commission222 
A first and very general remark must be made here The whole movement for the protection of 
human rights started more or less with the reprisal prohibitions in the field of the protection of the 
victims of war and prisoners of war Before that an arbitration tribunal had already stated, in the 
Nauhlaa Award,223 that reprisals are limited by the experiences of humanity Also the Institute of In-
ternational Law had laid down, m article 6, paragraph 4, of the 1934 resolution on reprisals, that 
States must224 '( ) s'abstenir de toute mesure de ngeur qui serait contraire aux lois de l'humanité et 
aux exigences de la conscience publique " After World War II the protection of human rights was 
enhanced through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the (European) Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and other instruments The whole thrust of this development has been devoted to 
limit the freedom of action of States with regard to their own nationals Of course the rights con-
tained in such instruments generally apply equally to non-nationals As to the restriction that coun-
termeasures should not amount to breaches of basic human rights obligations, the observation 
imposes itself that there is no logic whatsoever to be found in an injured State taking countermea-
sures affecting its own nationals It is obvious that an author State will not feel any compulsion as a 
result of such measures being taken by the injured State For that reason the question of countermea-
sures is relevant only to the extent that the injured State would resort to countermeasures affecting 
the author State's nationals225 
Any discussion as to whether countermeasures may affect human rights obligations should take 
account of the provision of article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which stipulates 
"1 In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their 
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the 
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin 
2 No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11 ,15, 16 and 18 may be made 
under this provision " 
Prohibited derogations under paragraph 2 concern the rights to life, not to be subjected to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, not to be held in slavery or servitude, not to 
be imprisoned solely on the basis of the inability to fulfil contractual obligations, not to be held guilty 
of acts or omissions that did not constitute criminal offences, under national or international law, at 
the time they were committed, and not to be imposed heavier punishment than was applicable at the 
time the offence was committed, to be recognized as a person before the law, and to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion Under paragraph 1 States parties obtain the right to take measures 
derogating from all the other obligations under the Covenant subject to the proviso that there is an 
officially proclaimed public emergency that threatens the life of the nation, that the measures are 
strictly required by reference to the exigencies of the situation, and that they do not mvolve discrimi-
nation Whatever may be said with regard to countermeasures affecting the human rights of the 
author State's nationals as to the latter condition, there appears to be no doubt possible that resort to 
countermeasures would not fulfil the other conditions Does this mean that an injured State party to 
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the Covenant cannot exercise its right to resort to countermeasures affecting the human rights of 
another State party's nationals? On the basis of a very formalistic kind of argument one could assert 
that an injured State would be able to suspend, as a countermeasure, its obligations under article 4, 
and after that suspend other obligations under the Covenant. However, in light of the object and 
purpose of the Covenant, that appears a rather extensive interpretation of a State's competence to 
have recourse to countermeasures under customary international law. 
A State may of course be under the obligation to take measures affecting human rights obligations by 
reason of a Security Council decision. In view of the operation of article 103 of the Charter such ob-
ligation of members would necessarily prevail over the obligations of States parties under the Cove-
nant. Whether the Security Council could take just any decision to impose measures infringing the 
human rights of a targeted State's nationals remains to be seen (infra this subsection). 
Within the Commission some supported the position that only resort to countermeasures affecting 
basic human rights would be prohibited.226 Others were less enthusiastic, and appeared to favour a 
comprehensive ban on countermeasures affecting human rights.227 The argument could be made that 
the Covenant does not include any reprisal prohibition. In contrast the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
stipulate expressly that States parties are not allowed to take reprisals against the individuals pro-
tected under the subject-matter of the Conventions.228 The silence of the Covenant could then be in-
terpreted to mean that resort to countermeasures affecting the human rights of an author State's 
nationals would not be prohibited.229 Also there exists a certain well known interpretation rule that 
treaty rules may be interpreted in the light of customary international law (or "all relevant rules of 
international law", as article 31 of the Vienna Convention puts it). Since there did not exist any repri-
sal (countermeasure) prohibitions under rules of customary international law (at least no others than 
those similar to the 1949 Geneva Conventions) at the time the Covenant was adopted, this would 
indicate the freedom left to States (parties). As the Permanent Court noted in the Lotus Case, re-
strictions on the independence of States cannot be presumed.230 
For these reasons it is believed that resort to countermeasures should be possible as regards the 
author State's nationals. However, such resort should be restricted to human rights that are not of 
fundamental character. That may be deduced also from the fact that the Covenant specifically stipu-
lates, under article 4, paragraph 2, that some "basic" human rights may not be derogated from. 
Arangio-Ruiz was obviously aware of this, and he noted, in this third report, as to the specific obli-
gations for the protection of basic human rights, that:231 
"Whatever the seriousness of the violation involved, the injured State's measures could not be 
such as to tread upon certain fundamental principles of humanity to the detriment of the of-
fending State's nationals in the injured State's territory: by violating, for example, their right 
to life, their right not to be subjected to physical or moral violence, notably to torture, slavery 
or any other dignity." 
He also discussed the question what human rights could indeed legitimately be breached by way of 
countermeasure, and especially the question whether the property of the author State's nationals 
could be taken away.232 At that time he did not reach any conclusion on the issue. In his fourth re-
port he took the view that property rights did not fall under the category of basic human rights.233 He 
also came to the conclusion that countermeasures could not be resorted to insofar as the core or fun-
damental human rights were concerned.234 At the same time he indicated that the draft did not need 
to enumerate which human rights were so essential that they could not be breached as a countermea-
sure, since that issue was to be left to the evolution of human rights law.23* As may be seen from the 
quoted article 14, sub (d), at the beginning of this subsection, the Commission, quite correctly so, 
has taken over Arangio-Ruiz' proposals in this respect. 
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On the basis of this discussion it may be said that basic human rights are: the right to life, the right to 
physical and psychological integrity (prohibition of torture), the right not to be subjected to cruel and 
degrading treatment, and possibly also the right to a fair trial. It is also possible to mention, following 
the Barcelona Traction Case,236 the right not to be subjected to slavery or racial discrimination. Not 
to be considered basic human rights are: the right to property and the right to freedom of movement. 
The latter may lead to entry or leave prohibitions. As to the former, there appears to be a trend, 
which should be supported, that resort to countermeasures affecting the right to property of the 
author State's private individuals should only be of temporary character.237 Noteworthy is that the 
right to property has been denied protection under both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
One can be very brief as to the question whether the Security Council could impose upon its 
members disrespect for the basic human rights of a targeted State's nationals. Article 24, paragraph 
2, of the Charter stipulates that the Security Council, in the discharged of its duties, shall act in ac-
cordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. One of the purposes of the United 
Nations, laid down in article 1, paragraph 3, is to achieve international co-operation in "promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion;" The Security Council must by virtue of these provisions respect 
the human rights of a targeted State's or entity's nationals. Naturally this does not mean that the Se-
curity Council could not impose any measures affecting the human rights of a targeted State's na-
tionals. As an example on may take resolution 942, paragraph 14, in which the Security Council 
severely restricted the freedom of movement of Bosnian Serbs and others by ordering members not 
to allow the entry, into their territories, of specific categories of individuals. It may be said, generally, 
that an international organization can invoke the same rules as States can. The other side of that ar-
gument is, as has been noted in chapter two, that an international organization cannot engage in ac-
tivities which are prohibited to its members. The Security Council, in deciding on measures under 
article 41, is basically limited in the same way as States are. 
It is possible to be even more brief as to the question whether a relaxation of this restriction 
should be contemplated in case of international crimes. The answer is: certainly not. Arangio-Ruiz 
has quite rightly indicated that the prohibition on countermeasures involving violations of basic hu-
man rights should be applicable also in case of crimes.238 Considering the essential background of the 
related developments of fits cogens, obligations erga omnes and international crimes, it would be 
surprising if the humanitarian goals underlying those concepts would be deserted with regard to in-
nocent nationals of an author State of an international crime. The only manner in which nationals of 
the author State can be affected through countermeasures lies with the exercise of criminal jurisdic-
tion not ordinarily conferred on an injured State by virtue of either national or international law. Ex-
amples of such exercise may be found in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan Tribunals set up by the Security Council. 
4.4.3. General restrictions regarding countermeasures 
Under customary international law two conditions have traditionally been imposed regarding the in-
jured State's exercise of its right to resort to countermeasures: the conditions of necessity and pro-
portionality. From the temporal perspective the first condition hinges on an evaluation whether 
measures were necessary at the point in time at which countermeasures were resorted to. The second 
condition must concern an evaluation between the two basic elements involved: the internationally 
wrongful act(s) and the countermeasure(s). 
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The requirement of necessity 
It should be recognized that a State should not exercise its right to resort to countermeasures unless 
this is necessary to achieve the object intended by such resort From the purely theoretical point of 
view the existence of the internationally wrongful act alone already paves the way for the adoption of 
countermeasures From the legal point of view, considering that an author State becomes subject to 
the obligation to provide reparation instantaneous with the commission of its wrongful act (chapter 
three, subsection 3 2 1), the adoption of countermeasures would be justified straight away The text 
of article 11, paragraph 1, Part Two, adopted by the Commission perfectly illustrates the point "As 
long as the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act has not complied with its obli­
gations under Articles 6 to 10 bis, the injured State is entitled to take countermeasures, that is, sub­
ject to the conditions and restrictions set forth in articles 12, 13 and 14, not to comply with one or 
more of its obligations towards the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act, as 
necessary in the light of the response to its demands by the State which has committed the interna­
tionally wrongful act in order to induce it to comply with its obligations under articles 6 to 10 bis" 
Although such non-compliance will most likely be subjected, in one way or the other, to the condi­
tions proposed by the Drafting Committee in article 12, paragraph 1, on dispute settlement, strictly 
speaking the conditions of that article would seem to constitute progressive development The arbi­
trators in the Air Services Agreement Award for instance came down hard in favour of the freedom 
of the injured State in this respect They claimed that international law did not prohibit countermea­
sures during negotiation, nor while arbitral or judicial proceedings were under way H 9 That claim 
was restricted only by their observation that the injured State's right to initiate countermeasures 
might disappear if a tribunal possesses the necessary means, that is a power to indicate interim meas­
ures of protection, to achieve the objectives justifying countermeasures 24° 
Arguments in favour of an immediate right to adopt countermeasures are apparently warranted by 
reference to international practice Compelling reasons nevertheless exist to moderate this doctrinal 
stance 
Logically one could assert that a necessity to adopt countermeasures can never be said to exist, 
since States are not under any obligation to exercise their rights (leaving aside Security Council de­
cisions) Moreover, subject to any consideration of ум* cogens, they are free to waive any right they 
might possess as the result of an author State's wrongful act This logical argument fails because the 
injured State would not get what it wants reparation For that reason the requirement of necessity 
must be seen m relation to this objective sought to be attained by adopting countermeasures The 
continued justification and necessity of countermeasures can only lie with the failure of the author 
State to provide reparation to the injured State(s) 
In section 4 3 2 it was noted that an injured State should not be allowed to adopt countermeasures 
without it having attempted to obtain its due from the author State It was stressed that voluntary 
compliance is preferable in any system of law, and that therefore the author State should be given the 
opportunity to comply This required representations by the injured State regarding the 
circumstances and applicable legal rules and specific demands of reparation If the author State 
would not deny its responsibility this might also require some negotiations Before any such point in 
time resort to countermeasures should be considered inadmissible for failure to conform to the rule 
of necessity Should the author State prove recalcitrant from the start, denying any responsibility, 
countermeasures could at once be resorted to The only exception to tbs would be the author State's 
co-operation, in good faith, in implementing dispute settlement The principle of good faith in this 
respect would require its demonstrable genuine wish to solve the substantive dispute with the injured 
State Such would not be the case if the author State would, for instance, raise objections to the 
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jurisdiction of the tribunal or to the admissibility of the claim (insofar as those would be manifestly 
unfounded) As long as, and to the extent that, the author State would partake in good faith in any 
procedure, any necessity to take countermeasures would ordinarily have vanished 
The discussion of necessity is relevant also in regard to the powers of the Security Council under 
Chapter VII The wording of articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Charter indicates a wide measure of dis­
cretion for the Security Council in deciding the kind of action necessary for the maintenance or res­
toration of international peace and security Article 39, first of all, provides a choice for the Security 
Council to recommend or to decide on the measures of articles 41 or 42 Secondly, the location of 
article 40 between articles 39 and 41 implies a further element of discretion for the Security Council, 
since the indication of provisional measures is possible if it considers this necessary or desirable Yet 
the Security Council is not bound to call upon compliance with such measures, though it will duly 
take account of any failure to comply (article 40, third sentence). It could just as well go straight on 
to impose measures under article 41, or take action under article 42 As pointed out (subsection 
4 3 2) the Security Council has also resorted to the measures of article 41 in order to put pressure on 
Libya to surrender two of its nationals to the United States or the United Kingdom Libya had earlier 
initiated proceedings against those States before the Court But as noted earlier the Security Council, 
once it determines the existence of a threat to the peace under article 39, is no longer bound to the 
imperative of dispute settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter. 
Similarly one could assert that States reacting to international crimes could, and in fact should, 
not be prevented from taking countermeasures The element of wilful intent and premeditation on the 
part of the author State establishes the presumption that it will not be willing either to accept or to 
implement in good faith any dispute settlement procedure The example diverging from general ex­
perience in this respect constitutes the proceedings between Ethiopia and Liberia against South Af­
rica, on the introduction of apartheid in Namibia, before the CourtM l South Africa, unlike certain 
other States in later periods, showed up before the Court and pleaded its case fully. None of the ob­
jections it raised to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the claims could be said to be 
manifestly unfoundedгп Though this latter aspect of the cases may be said to reflect the problemati­
cal character of the Court's jurisdiction in this particular case, as well as the unfamiliarity with human 
rights issues at the time of conclusion of the mandate agreements The only other example seem 
rather typical for the attitude of (author) States in general towards peaceful dispute settlement the 
Nicaragua Case The United States did its best to have none of its disputes with Nicaragua settled by 
the Court Action comprised the filing of a reservation to its declaration under article 36, paragraph 
2, of the Statute, some days before Nicaragua instituted proceedings, the filing of preliminary objec­
tions, and withdrawal from proceedings after the Court had established its jurisdiction and the ad­
missibility of the Nicaraguan claims243 That is not to say that the American objections were 
manifestly unfounded 
In conclusion, and on the basis of the preceding arguments, it can be said that the requirement of 
necessity presents few difficulties in case of international crimes 
The requirement of proportionality 
That a condition of proportionality applies to countermeasures adopted has been generally recog­
nized 2 4 4 The underlying ratio for this condition lies with the conviction that a committed interna­
tionally wrongful act may justify resort to countermeasures, but that it does not justify just any kind, 
any scope, or any number of measures24S In that sense Riphagen's proposal may be quoted, once 
more, t h a t u e "A breach of an international obligation does not, in itself, deprive that State of its 
rights under international law " It might be possible to assert that countermeasures were sufficiently 
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restricted by means of the express reprisal prohibitions. Yet that would still mean that resort to 
countermeasures might result in devastating effects for the author State in contrast to none, minor or 
moderate effects for the injured State It is on that account that the general legal principle of propor-
tionality is imposed as a condition for resort to countermeasures And it is on that basis that the 
Commission has provisionally adopted article 13, Part Two, in the following terms247 
"Any countermeasure taken by an injured State shall not be out of proportion to the degree of 
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the effects thereof on the injured State " 
As may be shown by this provision the whole idea of proportionality rests on a comparison between 
two parts of a relationship the internationally wrongful act and the countermeasures adopted in re-
sponse thereto The only question is which elements should be taken into account in judging whether 
there is proportionality or whether there is disproportionality As such have been mentioned, by 
Arangio-Ruiz, the wrongful act committed, the effects thereof, the injury suffered, the importance of 
rules infringed, and the aim of the measures adoptedI48 
A preliminary remark is that any element inherent in the wrongful act must of necessity be evalu-
ated in relation to the same element contained in the measures adopted Thus damage done to the 
injured State by reason of the wrongful act must in first instance be compared to the damage done to 
the author State by way of countermeasure(s) Similarly the importance of the rule under which an 
author State has breached its obligation should be put against the importance of the rule(s) affected 
by the countermeasure(s) And if one takes into account the seriousness of the wrongful acts, then 
the seriousness of the countermeasures must also be evaluated Only when an element is not at the 
same time inherent in both parts, wrongful act and countermeasure, should one compare unequal 
elements 
Secondly, it may be noted that evaluating the response in relation to the wrongful act may be ef-
fected easily if the response affects the same obligations as the wrongful act that is, when the coun-
termeasures constitute reciprocal measures or reprisals in kind To the extent that countermeasures 
concern the suspension of obligations of other rules than those initially put in question, judging the 
proportionality of the responding measures becomes more complicated The Commission's formula-
tion that countermeasures should not be "out of proportion to the degree of gravity of the interna-
tionally wrongful act and the effects thereof on the injured State" appears to be based on the fact that 
there often is a lack of symmetry between the wrongful acts of the author State and the measures 
adopted by the injured State U9 
As yet there are no commentaries available to this provision The terms therefore have to 
interpreted by reference to their natural meaning Starting with the effects of the wrongful act on the 
injured State, that seems to refer to the issue of quantifiable damage, or in the words of article 8, 
paragraph 2, Part Two, to "any economically assessable damage" As countermeasures, in view of 
their object, ought to be reversible in character, the damage done to the injured State must be 
compared to the actual or potential damage for the author State However, the effects of a wrongful 
act on the injured State need not only consist of economically assessable damage Should a national 
of the injured State for instance not get the treatment due to it under international law and die as a 
result ofthat, the economically assessable damage lies with the contribution that national provided to 
its relatives and the injured State's economy And, as a matter of principle, the degree of fault must 
be taken into account in judging an injured State's response2S0 Another consideration is that an 
internationally wrongful act does not necessarily have effects on the injured State This all leads in 
fact to the following criterion, the element of the degree of gravity of the internationally wrongful 
act 
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The degree of gravity of the internationally wrongful act provides the basis for two criteria First 
of all there may be taken into account the scale on which wrongful acts have taken place2S2 Thus for 
instance an isolated act of nationalization or expropriation cannot be evaluated in the same way as a 
full scale nationalization of complete industries. Similarly an isolated act affecting one injured State's 
national cannot be judged the same way as acts tending to cause damage to all of the injured State's 
nationals A second criterion constitutes the degree of fault on the part of the author State There 
may exist on the part of the author State mere negligence, wilful intent, or even premeditation2S3 
This can be weighed also by reference to the previous criterion, namely the scale on which acts have 
been committed Yet the scale is not decisive as such That may be shown by the response of the 
Netherlands, suspension of its large scale development aid to Surinam, to the killing of some 15 in-
dividuals of the opposition254 In suspending such aid the predominant consideration was that the 
acts of the Surinam government could not have been accidental or negligent, but had been intentional 
and maybe even premeditated 
A final issue to be discussed as to the elements relevant forjudging the proportionality of a response 
to the original wrongful act concerns the aim of the countermeasures. In that regard Arangio-Ruiz, 
and apparently also the Drafting Committee, was of the opinion that proportionality should not be 
measured15S "( .) on the basis of the aptness of the reaction to attain a particular aim " Whether the 
reaction would be apt to accomplish the aim sought to be achieved, obtaining of reparation, is 
something that can only be ascertained by reference to whether or not the aim is achieved If the aim 
is not achieved, the reaction was apparently not apt to achieve it. If the aim is achieved, the reaction 
clearly was apt to obtain reparation So judging the proportionality in relation to the aptness of the 
reaction might lead to a spiral of more numerous or more severe countermeasures It appears to 
amount to little less than saying that the end justifies the means 
Taking into account so-called positions of principle similarly does not seem to help The arbitrators 
in the Air Services Agreement Award observed that in judging the proportionality of the American 
response to the French acts account had to be taken of the general air transport policy of the United 
States as evidenced by agreements concluded by it with numerous other States256 There is no indi-
cation, however, that they took into account the general air transport policy of France. Surely the 
importance of positions of principle cannot be established in relation to one party's attitude alone 
The importance of the rules concerned, on the other hand, does provide guidance as to the propor-
tionality of the response257 Establishing the importance of rules must be done by pointing to the de-
monstrable opinions of the international community of States As such may count the conclusion and 
widespread ratification of multilateral treaties prohibiting specific conduct or derogations from stan-
dards, the elevation of certain rules to peremptory norms of general international law, as well as the 
recognition of certain State conduct as an international crime. 
Under the Charter the Security Council has been empowered, under article 41, to decide that 
members shall impose measures on a recalcitrant State to give effect to its decisions The only judge 
as to whether such measures are necessary, as well as apt to attain the objective of such decisions, 
would appear to be the Security Council itself To the extent that it concerns itself with the enforce-
ment of the prohibitions of the use of force, slavery, genocide and racial discrimination, denial of 
self-determination, and breaches of basic human rights, the criteria for judging proportionality be-
tween wrongful acts and responses thereto seem to provide more than enough leeway to justify even 
the imposition on a State of a complete trade embargo. Although States cannot dispute the judgment 
of the Security Council as to the necessity and proportionality of such embargoes by refusing to 
comply with their obligation under article 25, this does not necessarily mean that issues of propor-
tionality could not be reviewed by the Court One might wonder for instance whether the continued 
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trade embargo towards Iraq has not, by now, reached disproportional features considering that the 
only remaining alleged breaches of obligation seem to be based on a perception, rather than on proof, 
that Iraq is not fully performing its disarmament obligations under resolution 687 An even more 
potent argument is that the effects of the embargo, in view of health reports on the Iraqi population, 
appears to be leading to intolerable impairment of the basic human rights of that population The 
latter argument, however, strictly speaking does not concern proportionality 
In respect to international delicts the Commission has adopted article 14 (b), Part Two, in which it 
has formulated the prohibition of countermeasures that would involve2SS "extreme economic or po-
litical coercion designed to endanger the territorial integrity or political independence of the State 
which has committed an internationally wrongful act," It is not clear what is meant by political coer-
cion and to what extent such coercion could jeopardize the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of States Resort to extreme economic measures, on the other hand, might have the effect of 
threatening the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. Yet it is not quite obvious 
that this prohibition ought to be formulated in the context of international delicts Because any con-
duct likely to have such effects, adopted in response to an international delict, will amount to dispro-
portional, and hence unlawful, countermeasures To the extent that such coercion would not consist 
of countermeasures but in acts of retorsion, it is even more doubtful that it would be unlawful Gen-
erally States are not under any obligation to engage in trade with other States, or to continue to 
provide voluntary development aid to them259 Furthermore, a threat to the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a State could only come about if that State would be almost exclusively 
dependent on the State resorting to coercion, or if coercion is effectively resorted to by a great num-
ber of States If such coercion consists of acts of retorsion and is singularly directed towards the goal 
of having the target State perform its reparation obligations, there also would not be any breach of 
the prohibition of intervention 
Could the same, disproportionality, be asserted if extreme economic coercion would be adopted in 
response to an international crime? Arangio-Ruiz stated that in relation to crimes one might conceive 
of attenuation regarding the admissibility of extreme economic or political measures, measures affect-
ing the independence, sovereignty, or domestic jurisdiction, measures affecting third States, and 
punitive measures2<s* In his latest report he indicated that the prohibition of extreme economic coer-
cion should remain applicable in case of crimes261 If all such measures could be resorted to, the 
question would arise whether this would still conform to any traditional conception or applicable 
standard of proportionality Obviously extreme economic coercion might be out of proportion, from 
a quantitative point of view, even in response to an international crime Yet taking into account the 
degree of gravity of the wrongful acts, the fault on the part of the author State, and the importance 
of the rules concerned, which have all been elevated to the rank of jus cogens, one would have to 
claim that even the application of extreme economic coercion would not be disproportional 
Moreover, the formulation of article 14 (b), Part Two, adopted by the Commission stipulates that 
the coercion must be "designed" to threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of the 
targeted State Yet, as shown in chapter three, the general rule is that reparation does not include 
any obligation to cede territory to other States Nor should it lead to a loss of political independence 
in the sense that one or more States would dominate the author State Countermeasures must, as 
noted in section 4 2, be instrumental in obtaining reparation The adoption of countermeasures in-
tended to pressure the author State of an international crime to provide guarantees against repetition, 
such as the introduction of military, political, and humanitarian safeguards under domestic law, 
would not be precluded 
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4.5. Summary 
The goal to be attained by an injured State having resort to countermeasures is to ensure the per-
formance by the author State of its substitute reparation obligations Furthermore, international law 
does not know of any power to impose punishment Even satisfaction and guarantees against repeti-
tion do not constitute punishment, but relate to the prevention and deterrence of wrongful acts gen-
erally Factually a State resorting to countermeasures may do so with an intent to punish However, 
such intent can be proved only to the extent that the measures resorted to go beyond that which is 
necessary to obtain reparation or if they are disproportional to the wrongful act 
Resort to countermeasures is therefore intended to coerce the author State into performing its repa-
ration obligations However, the author State is not under any obligation, unlike the situation under 
domestic law, to put up with countermeasures It is allowed to evade the effect of such measures, for 
instance through third or other injured States The latter are only inhibited from providing aid and 
assistance to the extent that they have knowledge that it will be used for the commission of further 
wrongful acts In case of crimes injured States should generally not provide aid or assistance, e g 
arms, which can be used to sustain the commission of the crime 
International responsibility is collective in character, and the burden of countermeasures, more 
than that of reparation, will be felt especially by the nationals of the author State However, even the 
most comprehensive trade embargo decided on by the Security Council will affect the well-off and 
the neh, groups that are influential within the State organization, the latest 
An internationally wrongful act of an author State should not be considered a circumstance preclud-
ing the wrongfulness of measures adopted by the injured State Rather it should be considered to 
justify the non-performance of obligations and a corresponding impossibility of the author State to 
invoke the injured State's responsibility Other States suffering from the breach of obligation could 
still invoke the responsibility of the original injured State In view of the correlation between rights 
and obligations (chapter one), there is also no need to define countermeasures as involving a denial 
of a right of the author State It ought to be recognized further that countermeasures do not consti-
tute exceptional measures, but that they can be resorted to, generally, against States that have 
committed a wrongful act 
The prime precondition for an injured State's or the Security Council's recourse to countermea-
sures is to be found in the commission of an internationally wrongful act As all States are injured 
States in case of the commission of an international crime, all States will be entitled to resort coun-
termeasures against the author State Any resort to countermeasures, whether by an injured State or 
by the Security Council, is based on a presumption that a wrongful act has been committed If that 
presumption is rebutted an injured State or the United Nations will have incurred responsibility for a 
non-justifiable breach of obligation 
Generally an injured State is not under any obligation to resort to dispute settlement procedures prior 
to any recourse to countermeasures However, its nght to adopt countermeasures will be suspended 
if the author State acknowledges its responsibility and offers reparation, or if it proposes resort to, 
and co-operates in good faith with, binding dispute settlement procedures The Security Council is 
likewise, as a matter of Charter interpretation, not under any obligation to refrain from adopting 
measures under article 41 prior to dispute settlement by the parties to the dispute With regard to 
international crimes it may be said that an injured State's nght to resort to countermeasures will not 
be suspended upon an author State's verbal recognition of responsibility, nor upon an offer to have 
recourse to a binding dispute settlement procedure 
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Recommendations of the General Assembly or the Security Council cannot justify the adoption of 
measures which a State could not lawfully take itself as an injured State The Security Council's re-
course to the measures of article 41 of the Charter must furthermore be preceded by a determination 
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under article 39, and must be aimed 
at the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security 
No restriction ensues regarding resort to countermeasures because there would not be any spe-
cially affected States in case of breaches of human rights obligations The presence of a directly in-
jured State in case of the crime of aggression entails the restriction that countermeasures by other 
injured States can only be resorted to if there is a declaration of armed attack and a request to take 
such measures The fact that the Security Council has adopted measures under article 41 in response 
to an international crime does not restrict the injured States from adopting any or more far-reaching 
countermeasures Only a decision of the Security Council to refrain from adopting measures impairs 
the right to adopt countermeasures 
Resort to countermeasures may be excluded due to the existence of a treaty regime Under diplo-
matic law countermeasures are excluded which deny the immunity of diplomats, consular agents, or 
the inviolability of the premises Under human rights law countermeasures cannot be adopted in de-
nial of fundamental or basic human rights It is possible, however, under the law of the GATT/WTO 
to adopt countermeasures affecting obligations under the GATT/WTO No provision in the Charter 
prevents States from adopting countermeasures in response to either a delict or a crime 
Due to the existence of wilful intent and premeditation on the part of the author State the require-
ment of necessity does not present any difficulties in case of international crimes It is not to be ex-
pected that the author State will, in good faith, co-operate with attempts to have any dispute on its 
responsibility and reparation obligations settled In the light of the various elements which may be 
taken into account for judging the proportionality of countermeasures adopted m response to an in-
ternationally wrongful act, the requirement of proportionality would not appear to pose any prob-
lems in case of crimes Those elements include the degree of gravity (scale of the acts, effects, 
damage or injury done), degree of fault (negligence, wilful intent, or premeditation), and the impor-
tance of the rules (established by reference to widespread ratifications of multilateral treaties, eleva-
tion to the rank of peremptory norm, and recognition of conduct as an international crime) 
The Commission in its commentary to article 1, Part One, mentioned the possibility that the new 
responsibility relationship might give injured States or other subjects the right to apply a sanction to 
the author State That possibility has formed the subject of the present chapter It may be noted that 
the Commission did not address the issue whether that relationship might also lead to the use of 
armed force by an injured State or another subject against an author State However, it is precisely 
this issue that lies at the basis of article 34, Part One, on self-defence as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness The following chapter will therefore address the question whether an injured State or 
the United Nations could resort to armed force against a State which has committed an international 
crime 
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under national law One may note, however, that he refers to the 'usual' definition (without indicating approval or 
disapproval) of reprisals as being exceptionally permitted Ibid, 23 
" Note Arbitrage entre le Portugal et Г Allemagne, Sentence arbitral du 31 juillet 1928 (de Mcuron, Fazy, Geux), Re­
sponsabilité de l'incident de Naulilaa, in Umted Nations, RIAA, volume II, pp 1013-1033, 1027 "La première 
condition - sine qua non - du droit d'exercer des represailles est un motif fourni par un arte préalable, contraire au 
droit des gens " Emphasis in the original The Cysne Award, 1056-1057, repeated that stance In agreement also 
Elagab, О , The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, 
47-51 and 52-55 
w
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 40, Drafting Committee, 5 EJIL 1994, 118-119, discussion reported in YBILC 1992, 
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Volume 1,69-91, 126-181, and 185-190, and Commission Report 1994, 365, footnote 362 
81
 Commission Report 1994, 365, footnote 362, originally Drafting Committee, 5 EJIL 1994, 118-119 Delbrück has 
argued that in cases where a State reacts to the breach of an obligation erga omnes and the reaction would consti-
tute a breach of obligation towards a third State, that should not lead to the conclusion that the countermeasure is 
unlawful vis-a-vis thai third Slate That conclusion is based on the fact that the third State is interested in, or even 
obliged to support, the enforcement measure Delbrück, J, International Economic Sanctions and Third States, 30 
ADV 1992, pp 86-100, 95-96 See also Reed, К, Reviving the Doctrine of Non-Forcible Countermeasures Re­
solving the Effect of Third Party Injuries, 29 VJIL 1988, pp 175-209 
" The Air Services Award appeared to support that position Case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 
March 1946, Umted States ν France, Arbitral Tribunal (Riphagen, Ehrlich, Reuter), 9 December 1978, 54 ILR 
1979, pp 303-349, 336 Discussed by Arangio-Ruiz, Third Report, 18-19 See also his Fourth Report, 2, and also 
Elagab, Legality, 47-51 The question whether resort to countermeasures is possible with regard to minor breaches 
should be answered in the affirmative С f Elagab, The Legality, 51-52 The question whether there is any room 
under international law for resort to anticipatory countermeasures should be answered in the negative С f Elagab, 
ibid, 52-55 
8 3
 Commentary Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, 107 
м
 С f Graefrath, В , Ausschluß der Völkerrechtswidngkeit-Selbstverteidigung-Sanktion, in Durchsetzungsprobleme 
des Völkerrechts, Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe der Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 1983, pp 13-26, 25, and 
Cassese, А , La Communauté internationale et le genocide, in Le droit au service de la paix, de la justice et du 
développement, Mélanges Michel Virally, Editions A Pedone, Pans, 1991, pp 183-194, 186-187, in relation to 
the crime of genocide Some base the right to adopt countermeasures in case of armed attacks on the idea that who 
can do more, can do less Kuyper, Ρ, Community Sanctions, 162, and Frowein, J, Die Verpflichtungen erga om­
nes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung, in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, 
Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, 1983, pp 241-262, 254 and 258 
85
 Arangio-Ruiz, G, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, 24 May 1995, A/CN 4/469/Add 1, 4 pp, 2 Malanczuk, 
Countermeasures and Self-Defence, 747 (more broadly 742-747), claims that measures can only lawfullv be 
adopted on the basis of an authorization of an international institution Cassese, A, International Law in a Divided 
World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 244, asserts that measures, to be legitimate, must rest upon an authoritative 
pronouncement by a representative body In a similar sense Quigley, J, The International Law Commission's 
Cnme-Dehct Distinction A Toothless Tiger?, 66 RDISDP 1988, pp 117-161, 150, and Dupuy, Ρ -M, Implica­
tions of the Institutionalization of International Crimes of States, in Weiler et al. International Crimes, pp 170-
185, 182-183 
8 6
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, Addendum 1, 3 
8 7
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report on Slate Responsibility, 9 May 1995, A/CN 4/469,49 pp, 17 
8 8
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 20-21, article 17, paragraph 1, in Seventh Report, Addendum 1,2 
ю
 Commented upon elsewhere in Hoogh, A de, Comments, in Post, Η (Ed), International Economic Law and 
Armed Conflict Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994, pp 43-46 
w
 С f Leben, Les sanctions privatives, 41-44, who argues that countermeasures cannot be considered 'sanctions', 
though subjectively they might constitute reactions against wrongful acts 
" Kelsen for instance observes that "It is, however, possible that in a concrete case the obligation to make repara­
tion, stipulated m abstracto by general international law, cannot come into existence For an obligation to make 
reparation exists only if an international delict has been committed, and there is, under general international law, 
no objective authority, especially no court, competent to ascertain the existence of a delict This function is left by 
general international law to the states concerned Consequently a state may consider itself to be under an obligation 
to make reparation only if it admits that is has committed a delict, that is to say, if there is an agreement of the 
states concerned in this respect, and such agreement might not be reached Even if it has been reached, it does not 
suffice to establish the concrete obligation to make reparation The state responsible for a delict is not obliged to 
comply with any unilateral demand for reparation made by the injured State " Kelsen, Principles, 21 
9 2
 Oddly enough Kelsen seems to hold inconsequential positions on reparation and sanctions He observes (quoted in 
previous note) that a State may consider itself not to be under any obligation to repair the damage unless it admits 
that it has committed a delict At the same time he stipulates the existence of a delict as condition for the applica­
tion of a sanction On the one hand therefore a State has to admit to having committed a delict for purposes of 
reparation, while on the other hand an injured State may apply a sanction to a State irrespective of its having ad­
mitted committing a delict Kelsen, Principles, 20-23 
" Kelsen, Principles, 22, notes with regard to the necessity of unilateral enforcement by States "For this legal com-
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munity, constituted by general international law, being completely decentralized, has no special organs for the 
creation and application of the law " 
** Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 2 
" Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 2, and Hoogh, Comments, 45 
M
 As Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 2, observes, a good faith belief of another State's wrongful conduct may be taken 
into consideration in determining the degree of responsibility incurred by a State's wrongful resort to 
(counter)measures 
" Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 26 
* A contrary conclusion might be reached on the basis of an interpretation of article 42 This provision foresees ac­
tion by the military forces of members which might be seen as breaches of obligation under article 2, paragraphs 3 
and 4, of the Charter However, any such action is not action by members, but action by the Security Council And 
the prohibitions under article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, apply to members, not to the United Nations itself 
" Dissenting Opinion Weeramantry, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aenal Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahinya ν Umted Kingdom), Provisional Measures, 
Order, ICJ Reports 1992, ρ 3, 67 
1 0 0
 Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 13 The Court's order seems to give precedence to the obligations 
(established under resolution 748) over the rights of Libya "( ) the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal 
Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures " And 
it added (ibid ) "( ) an indication of the measures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights which 
appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the Umted Kingdom by virtue of Security Council resolution 748 (1992)," 
These Umted Kingdom rights amount to the negation of ils obligations to respect Libya's exercise of rights under 
the Montreal Convention 
101
 Note the remarks of Gowlland-Debbas, V, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibil­
ity, 43 ICLQ 1994, pp 55-98, 78, in this respect 
1 0 2
 Note that Kelsen, Pnnciples, 46, with respect to article 41 of the Charter, observes "The enforcement measures not 
involving the use of armed force have the technical character of reprisals " 
ш
 Commentary Article 30, Part One, 119, footnote 599 
1 0 4
 Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement, 61-63, Sinclair, I, State Responsibility and the Concept of 
Crimes of States, in Weiler et al. International Crimes, pp 223-225, 224 
'
№
 On discretion see Gaja, G, Reflexions sur le role du Conseil de Sécurité dans le nouvel ordre mondial, A propos 
des rapports entre maintien de la paix et crimes internationaux des Etats, 97 RGDIP 1993, pp 297-320, 306 
IM
 Again the view of Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement, 72 and 74 
107
 In agreement Starace, V , La responsabilité resultant de la violation des obligations à l'égard de la communauté 
internationale, 153 RDC ADI 1976-V, pp 263-317, 294-296 Contrary Kelsen, H , The Law of the Umted Nations, 
A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1951, 724-730 But see also 
732-737 At 725 he observes "The Charter, however, does not prescribe that the enforcement actions provided for 
in Chapter VII shall be taken exclusively against a Member which has violated its obligations," See also Gaja, Re-
flexions, 300-301 
, M
 С f Frowein, J, Article 39, in Simma, В (Ed), The Charter of the Umted Nations, A Commentary, Oxford Uni­
versity Press, Oxford, 1994, pp 605-616, 609-610 Generally Goodrich, L, and Hambro, Ε, Charter of the Umted 
Nations, Commentary and Documents. Second and Revised Edition, Stevens & Sons Limited. London, 1949, 262-
272, Cohen Jonathan, G Article 39, in Cot, J -P, and Pellet, A (Eds), La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire 
article par article, 2e édition, revue et augmentée. Economica, Pans, 1991, pp 644-666, 658-662, Kelsen, The Law 
of the Umted Nations, 930-931 
1M
 Generally Cohen Jonathan, Article 39, 655-658, Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 724-730, and 930-931 
110
 Note especially Gaja, Reflexions, 301, who claims "Il ne semble pas que la notion de menace à la paix puisse être 
dissociée de l'existence du risque d'un conflit armé international II est vrai que les causes de ce nsque peuvent 
être appréciées de manieres différentes, on ne peut donc pas exclure que la violation d'une obligation d'une cer-
taine importance entraîne une menace contre la paix Encore faut-il que le nsque d'un conflit soit véntablement 
pns en consideration par le Conseil et qu'il ne soit pas un prétexte invoqué pour lui permettre d'exercer des pou-
voirs qui ne 1ш auraient pas été attribues " He goes on to examine the specific resolutions of the Sccunty Council 
on Rhodesia (217, 221, 232, 253, 277), South Africa (418), Iraq (688), Somalia (794, 733), Libya (731, 748) Ibid, 
302-307 
111
 Eg Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 729, observes that the Charter "( ) does not even presenbe that the 
enforcement measures shall be directed only against a Member guilty of a threat to, or breach of, the peace " In a 
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similar sense McDougal, M, and Reisman, W, Rhodesia and the United Nations The Lawfulness of International 
Concern, 62 AJIL 1968, pp 1-19, 8 
l u
 Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 730, claims that the Security Council "( ) might consider it to be just to 
direct enforcement action against a Member which legally, that is, from the point of view of international law, is 
not wrong, since it has not violated any obligation expressly imposed upon it by the text of the Charter " In the 
footnote attached to these lines he observes "According to the wording of Article 39, the Security Council is not 
bound to determine the aggressor But if the enforcement measure to be taken under this Article shall have the 
character of a sanction it must not be directed against a state which is not guilt)· of a violation of its obligations If 
the violation consists in an act of aggression, the enforcement action as a true sanction must be directed against the 
aggressor If Article 39 is interpreted to provide for sanctions, the Security Council is bound to determine who is 
the aggressor " 
1 1 3
 Resolution 748 is problematical to the extent that it relates to Libya's involvement in acts of terrorism as a threat to 
the peace and because the remedy sought therefore constitutes a denial of Libya's right to choose for the prosecu­
tion of its nationals 
1 1 4
 Note Leben, Les sanctions privatives, 270, on organizations as judex m causa чиа, and Hoogh, Comments, 43-46 
1 1 5
 Note that Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 372-450, discusses the Security Council's quasi-judicial settle­
ment of disputes 
" ' Contrary Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement 73-74 "Second, whilst collective responses are to be 
preferred to the more arbitrary, anarchic and possibly more destabilising unilateral ones, the problem is that whilst 
the qualification of an act as a prior condition to the application of unilateral countermeasures by a State may 
eventually (though not necessarily) be opened to challenge by the judge or arbitrator, those taken by the Council in 
connection with its primary responsibility m peace maintenance are authoritative and binding and when linked to 
determinations under Article 39 not subject, as iuch, to judicial review " Emphasis in the original Footnote omit­
ted 
1 1 7
 That is not to say of course that there may not be any such problems In the context of Security Council action un­
der Chapter VII see Gaja, Reflexions, 300-301 
"" Arangio-Ruiz. Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 14 Similar observations have been made within the Commission See 
Commission Report 1994, 350 
" ' Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 17 
1 2 0
 Leaving aside here Covenant provisions (articles 12, 13 and 15) stipulating that war could only be waged by one 
State against another if the latter refused to implement an award or recommendations in a Council report The 
1919 Covenantor the League of Nations, 13 AJTL 1919, Supplement, pp 128-140 
1 2 1
 And one may note his stance to the effect that "The only existing permanent body possessing, in principle, the 
competence and technical means to determine the existence, attribution and consequences of an internationally 
wrongful act - including possibly a enme of State - is the International Court of Justice " Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Re­
port, Addendum 3, 15 
1 2 2
 Arangio-Ruiz acknowledges this "In such hypotheses, where a timely reaction is indispensable, one can accept to 
sacrifice, in a measure, objective assessment of any guilt and liability to the compelling necessity of safeguarding 
the peace, reducing bloodshed and destruction and maintaining a minimum degree of order One is very close here 
to that function which is typical of self-defence ( ) and one can accept, for lack of a better solution, that the politi­
cal body's yjs be employed without the guarantees of a judicial process, which is inevitably problematic and mainly 
too slow " Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 17 
ш
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3,16 
1 2 4
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 17-18 
1 2 5
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 25 Underlining in the original Generally ibid , 20-39, Arangio-Ruiz, G, Sixth Re­
port on State Responsibility, 19 April 1994, A/CN 4/461, 28 pp, 3-28 (especially 21), and Sixth Report on State 
Responsibility, 14 June 1994, A/CN 4/461/Add 2, 5 pp, 2-5 
1 2 4
 His originally proposed article 12, paragraph 1 (a), Part Two, ran "Subject to the provisions set forth in para­
graphs 2 and 3, no measure of this kind shall be taken by an injured State prior to (a) the exhaustion of all the 
amicable settlement procedures available under general international law, the United Nations Charter or any other 
dispute settlement instrument to which it is a party," Text to be found in Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 40 
1 2 7
 Note that it is stated in the Naulilaa Award, 1026, that "La represaille est un acte de propre justice 
(Selbsthilfehandlung) de l'Etat lese, ( ) " Emphasis m the original 
u
' Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, 8 
1 2 9
 Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, 8 
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"° Note the very pertinent remark by Simma, В , Counter-Measures and Dispute Settlement A Plea for a Different 
Balance, 5 EJIL 1994, pp 102-105, 102-103, to the effect that "We have to keep in mind that recourse to counter-
measures not involving the threat or use of force is in itself a peaceful means of settling a dispute arising from an 
internationally wrongful act " Emphasis in the original 
1 3 1
 Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, 9 Underlining in the original 
ш
 The Naulilaa Award, 1026, states that an act of reprisal is an "( ) acte répondant - après sommation restée in-
fructueuse - a un acte contraire au droit des gens de l'Etat offenseur " Emphasis in the original See also especially 
Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 19 To say that there must be some attempt to obtain reparation before adopting 
countermeasures is not the same as saying, as Hakenberg does, that they can only be adopted as a last resort Hak-
enberg, M , Die Iran-Sanktionen der USA während der Teheraner Geisclaffäre aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht, Verlag 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, 206-207 and 245-247 
ш
 Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, 25-26 He originally voiced such criticism in relation to the draft proposed by the 
Drafting Committee Note also Fourth Report, 6-19, on the requirement of prior demands of reparation 
ш
 Text in 5 EJIL 1994, 118-119 
"* Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, 3-28, Sixth Report, Addendum 2, 2-5 
1 3 4
 Arangio-Ruiz, G, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, 21 July 1994, A/CN 4/461/Add 3, 2 pp , 2 His proposed 
paragraph 2 to the same article provides that the conditions of paragraph 1 do not apply to '{ ) urgent, temporary 
measures as are required to protect the rights of the injured State or limit the damage caused by the internationally 
wrongful act,", and also not if the author State does not accept the offer for dispute settlement, does not co-operate 
in good faith in the implementation thereof, fails to honour a request or order emanating from the procedure, or 
does not comply with a decision rendered by the procedure Paragraph 3 (discussed below) stipulates that the in­
jured State must communicate its intention to resort to countermeasures to the author State 
1 3 7
 Tomuschat С, Are Counter-Measures Subject to Prior Recourse to Dispute Settlement Procedures?, 5 EJIL 1994, 
pp 77-88, 87, observes "It is submitted that it would be better to require the (alleged) wrongdoer to take the ini­
tiative in instituting dispute settlement procedures It is the State author of the initial act that has stirred up the 
conflict The burden should therefore be incumbent on its government to take steps to avert the negative effect of a 
counter-measure " And Simma, Counter-Measures, 104, stated "As a matter of principle, to require the (alleged) 
wrong-doer to take the initiative in instituting dispute settlement procedures, is more equitable and just than to put 
the burden upon the injured State " Note also Dominici. С, Die internationalen Verbrechen und deren rechtliches 
Regime, in Völkerrecht und Rechtsphilosophie. Internationale Festschrift für Stephan Verosta zum 70 Geburstag, 
1980, pp 227-248, 247-248, who observes that countermeasures could be taken if an author State of a crime would 
refuse to accept dispute settlement 
"* Air Services Agreement Award, 338-341 
, 3
' Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, Addendum 3, 2 Earlier Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 18-19, had observed as to 
Riphagen's proposals regarding notifications "A less cumbersome solution might be to impose upon the allegedly 
injured State the duty to submit its protest or demands to the alleged law-breaking State together with the indica-
tion of the essential facts and any suitable warning of possible countermeasures " 
140
 Or by preparing for resort to countermeasures without actually implementing them Consider the measures pre-
pared by the United States with regard to its dispute with France regarding changes of gauge in third countries Air 
Services Agreement Award, 325-326, and also 339-340 
141
 Arangio-Ruiz indicated with regard to this issue "A State which has committed or is committing a wrongful act of 
the degree of gravity of the crimes singled out in article 19, presumably involving a measure of wilful intent, 
should not be entitled to a warning that might reduce the effectiveness of countermeasures " Arangio-Ruiz, Sev-
enth Report, 17 
142
 In agreement Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 19 
Note however the pause of goodwill in resolution 678, and the delays regarding the time of imposition of sanctions 
expressed in resolutions 748, 820, 841, 864. 873, 883, and 917 
In that sense Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement, 62 "Moreover, the Security Council is not ham-
pered by any of the conditions which, debatedly, are said to govern unilateral countermeasures There is no re-
quirement for prior exhaustion of peaceful settlement mechanisms of Chapter VI, or for a prior demand for 
reparation There is no need for a graduated or proportionate response " Two footnotes omitted 
Eg Dissenting Opinion El-Koshcn, Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 105-106 
146
 See the statements in A/46/827 See also A/46/425 and A/46/828 
Resolution 731 also mentions the attack against the "Union de transports aérens" flight and the request made by 
France in connection therewith See A/46/825 
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ш
 For history sec Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 4-8 
" ' The 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 39 AJIL 1945, Supplement, pp 215-229 
1 5 0
 Note the conflicting opinions expressed within the Commission Commission Report 1994, 343 
l s l
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, 16-17, and Seventh Report, Addendum 1, 2-3 
1 0
 Arangio-Ruiz, Sixth Report, 9 
'° Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, Addendum 1, 3 С f Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 20 In that context 
he made the argument that crimes related to a state of necessity or détresse situation 
154
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 19-20, and Seventh Report, 16-17 
155
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 19-20, and Seventh Report, 16-17 Discussing notification demands in 
case of delicts (Fourth Report, 6-19) he pointed out, at 10, that "( ) the fact that a protest or intimation to cease 
seems to be lacking, may well be justified by the urgency of a remedy and the persistence of the injurious conduct " 
154
 Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh Report, respectively 40 and 17, and article 19 in Seventh Report, Addendum 1, 4 
IS7
 Arangio-Ruu, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 20 
ls
" Note the remarks by Graefrath, В, Mohr, M, and Ocser, E, Rechtsfolgen bei völkerrechtlicher 
Verantwortlichkeit, 31 SR 1982, pp 1073-1086, 1083-1084 
1S
' Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, 2-A Also Third Report, 24-26, and Fifth Report on State Responsibility, 8 June 
1993, A/CN 4/453/Add 2, 35 pp , 24 
160
 Commentary Article 30, Part One, 119 Apparently supported by Malanczuk, Countermcasures and Self-Defence, 
747-753, and Skubiszewski, К, The Application of Non-Military Measures by the General Assembly of the Umted 
Nations, 1 PYTL 1966/67, pp 110-135, 117, as he observes "In cases where the breach of the law results from 
compliance with the Assembly's request, the measure involved is exceptionally permissible and does not constitute 
an international tort " At 134 he observes "The collective and non-military action recommended by the General 
Assembly arc not enforcement action of the Umted Nations Enforcement measures remain, ( ), within the sole 
competence of the Security Council The application of coercion is neither the prerogative nor the function of the 
General Assembly " Footnote omitted 
1 , 1
 Action articles 5, 37 (paragraph 2), 42, 48, 53 (paragraph 1), 56, 106 and 107 Measures articles 39, 50, and 53 
(paragraph 1) 
ш
 С f Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 204-205 (see generally 198-211) At pages 269-270, on self-help, he 
uses the phrase 'enforcement action' as synonym to 'use efforce' At page 98 he mentions the existence of obliga­
tions with respect to enforcement action only in relation to articles 43, 44, 45 and 48 In his chapter on sanctions, 
on the other hand, enforcement action is defined in relation to articles 41,42 and 45 (at pages 724-725) 
' ° Certain expenses of the Umted Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1С J Reports 
1962, ρ 151, 165 
, M
 Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 195-196 Relevant footnote omitted 
'"The Court observed in the Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 15, that, on first sight, article 25 applied to 
resolution 748, and that "( ) an indication of the measures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights 
which appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the Umted Kingdom by virtue of Security Council resolution 748 
(1992)," 
' " It may be noted that the Commission has refrained from considering the instigation to commit wrongful acts as 
implication in the commission of wrongful acts Text and Commentary Article 27, Part One, YBILC 1978, Vol­
ume II, Part Two, pp 99-105, 99-101 
"
7
 Eisemann, Ρ, Article 41, in Cot and Pellet La Charte, pp 691-704, 704 
"* Expenses Opinion, 163 Emphasis added Quoted by Eisemann, Article 41, 704 The English equivalent for 
'prescrire' was 'require' 
" ' See also Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 95-98 and 444-450 He states (445-446) "However, under Article 
39, the Security Council may consider non-compliance with its recommendation a threat to the peace and resort to 
enforcement action against the recalcitrant state If such enforcement action is interpreted to be a sanction, a rec­
ommendation of the Security Council may constitute the obligation to comply with the recommendation, that is to 
say, the so-called recommendation may have the same character as a 'decision' of the Security Council, binding 
upon Members under Article 25 " Two footnotes omitted To this one may counter that it is not intrinsically a 
member's non-compliance with the recommendation that constitutes the threat to the peace Rather it is the tar­
geted State's conduct itself which contributes to the existence of a threat to the peace 
1 7 0
 Eg Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 439-440 and 728 Inconclusive Eisemann, Article 41,696-697 
1 7 1
 Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, 277 
1 7 1
 Note Quigley, The International Law Commission's Distinction, 134-137 (especially 136) 
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Arangio-Ruiz, G, Fourth Report on Slate Responsibility, 1 June 1992, A/CN 4/444/Add 2, 37 pp, 36 Footnote 
omitted 
Nicaragua Case, Merits, 127 The Court considered the trade embargo, imposed by the United States on Nicaragua 
as of 1 May 1985, to amount to a violation by the Umted States of the obligation not to defeat the object and pur-
pose of the 1956 FCN Treaty and a breach of obligation under article XIX It rejected the American claim that the 
measures could be taken on the basis of article XXI, that is, as measures for the protection of essential security in-
terests Nicaragua Case, Merits, 135-142 The Court did not examine specifically whether the embargo might be 
justified under the heading of resort to non-armed countermcasures The conclusions of the Court can only be 
based on either one of two arguments first, that there had not been any internationally wrongful act committed by 
Nicaragua, secondly, that the Umted States did not possess injured State status In view of the text accompanying 
this note the arguments by the Court seem to tend towards the latter view 
Nicaragua Case, Merits, 104-105 
Tomuschat, YBILC 1992, Volume I, 167 Bowett, ibid , 82, seemed to take the opposite position "( ) an injured 
State could not be denied the right to take countermeasures simply because a State which was more directly or 
more seriously affected did not do likewise " His formulation appears more apt to describe the situation in which 
all States are affected by a breach of obligations and some more than others Note also Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Re-
port, Addendum 2, 35, footnote 303, and Domimcé, Die internationalen Verbrechen, 245 Mohr, M, The ILC's 
Distinction between "International Crimes" and "International Delicts" and its Implications, in Spinedi and 
Simma, Umted Nations Codification, pp 115-141, 131, acknowledges the right of 'third' States to adopt counter-
measures, but notes that this is dependent on the consent of the victim State or people Contrary Annacker, С , The 
Legal Régime oí Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 46 AJPIL 1994, pp 131-166, 161 
Arangio-Ruiz, Third Report, Addendum 1, 2-7, Fourth Report, Addendum 2, 20-37 
Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, Addendum 2, 24-26 
The situation of the American hostages in Iran presents some odd features The issues at stake had to do, primarily, 
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standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
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pute, under article 42, may go one step further and submit a report containing findings of all relevant tacts and its 
views on the possibilities for reaching an amicable solution After that States parties are expected to notify, within 
three months, whether or not they accept the report 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RIGHT OF INJURED STATE(S) OR THE UNITED NATIONS TO RESORT TO 
ARMED FORCE IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
5.1. Introduction 
A first clarification regarding the scope of the present chapter relates to the meaning of the word 
"force" as employed in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.' The neutral formulation ofthat provi-
sion could open the way to an interpretation that threats or uses of force other than military in char-
acter are covered by the prohibition. Thus the threat or use of economic coercion would constitute a 
breach of obligation under that article. Such kind of coercion may certainly threaten the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a State,2 but a contextual reading of the Charter militates 
against such an interpretation. 
The preamble for instance notes the aim to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". 
Paragraph 3 of article 2 stipulates that: "All members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endan-
gered." Article 24 of the Charter bestows the task of maintaining international peace and security 
primarily on the Security Council. The main powers of the Security Council in that field are laid 
down in Chapter VII under which it can opt to "decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed" (article 41), or to have resort to "action by sea, air or land forces" 
(article 42). Article 43 in tum stipulates that members "undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assis-
tance and facilities, (...)." Finally article 44 mentions that the Security Council may have "decided to 
use force".3 
The interpretation of "force" in article 2, paragraph 4, as meaning armed force is to some extent 
confirmed by the preparatory works of the Charter. In this regard authors generally refer to the re-
jection of a Brazilian amendment intended to have the prohibition cover economic force.4 
The circumstances preceding and surrounding the conclusion of the Charter likewise point to this 
interpretation. Almost the whole of the first half of the 20th century has been devoted to restricting 
the prevailing freedom of States to resort to military force. The 1907 Hague Convention (II) respect-
ing the Limitation of the Use of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts (Porter-Drago Conven-
tion) was the first treaty ever to impose a restriction regarding the legitimate causes to use armed 
force. Its parties were bound not to use force for the recovery of contractual debts.5 The Covenant 
on the League of Nations proceeded, in articles 12, 13 and 15, to put procedural limits on resort to 
war.6 War by one State against another could only be resorted to, at the earliest, three months after 
the failure ofthat other State to honour the outcome of Council of the League of Nations or arbitral 
procedures. Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact finally provided that:7 
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the name of their respective peoples that 
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it 
as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." 
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For such reasons this chapter will only discuss the actual use of armed force in response to the 
commission of an international crime 
An important aspect of article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is that it not only prohibits the actual 
use of armed force, but also threats to use armed force One might argue that there does not exist 
any necessity for such an explicit rule By way of logical implication the threat to engage in certain 
particular conduct could be considered illegal if actually adopting the conduct in question is prohib­
ited Others might say, on the basis of an α contrario argument, that if a rule only prohibits the use of 
force, the threat to use force remained lawful That claim would be bolstered by reference to the 
Lotus Case, in which the Permanent Court noted that restrictions to the independence of States 
could not be presumed8 Opponents might be tempted to argue that the object and purpose of a rule 
prohibiting the use of force would be defeated if threats were considered lawful The weaker States 
would then be liable to being coerced into accepting certain demands by the stronger States The 
draftsmen of the Charter clearly were foresighted to include a prohibition of threats to use force 
Question is of course what may constitute a threat to use force9 On this count the clearest example 
will naturally constitute the outright verbal assurance or promise, with or without an ultimatum, that 
force will be used But such blunt behaviour will undoubtedly not be the rule but the exception The 
disguised threat will be more typical, necessitating reading between the lines of diplomatic inter­
course Besides verbal threats the outright military kind are frequently made A State might for in­
stance direct its troops or crafts to certain areas, or it might hold large scale manoeuvres in the 
vicinity of the targeted State 
Though article 2, paragraph 4, prohibits the threat to use force this does not necessarily mean that 
any display of military force will constitute an illegal threat Preparation for self-defence, for in­
stance, is perfectly legitimate The decisions of the Court in the Corfu Channel Case and the Nicara­
gua Case show that not just any display of force amounts to a breach of obligation under article 2, 
paragraph 4 The incidents related to the first case concerned the United Kingdom sending ships at 
action stations through the Corfu Channel, an international straight, in order to affirm its right of in­
nocent passage Such action was considered not to amount to a violation of Albanian sovereignty10 
In the second case the Court was not satisfied, considering the circumstances, that the military ma­
noeuvres held by the United States near the borders of Nicaragua constituted a prohibited threat of 
force " 
In the context of international crimes it is not to be expected that an author State will be impressed 
by mere verbal rhetoric In the nature of things it is engaging, wilfully and with premeditation, in acts 
of such seriousness that it will not likely be deterred from continuing to commit the crime Even a 
display of military power might not suffice to put an end to the crime The end result will most likely 
be that armed force will be necessary if the commission of the crime is to be stopped The author 
State, in turn, may be tempted to resist by all the means at its disposal For this reason the present 
chapter will concern only the actual use of armed force against a State committing an international 
crime 
Subject to the foregoing the following issues will be addressed in this chapter Section 2 will ex­
amine the scope of the prohibition of the use of armed force in international law In section 3 certain 
arguments regarding the function and nature of resort to armed force will be discussed The pre­
conditions for resort to armed force will form the subject of section 4 In derogation from previous 
chapters sections 5 and 6 will examine the use of force in response to particular international crimes, 
or at least separate the crime of aggression from the other crimes The necessity for this is dictated 
by the explicit regulation of the use of armed force in the Charter of the United Nations Section 7 
finally will discuss certain possible restrictions regarding resort to armed force 
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5.2. The scope of the prohibition of the use of armed force in international law 
5.2.1. The scope of article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter 
It is generally recognized that the Charter of the United Nations prohibits members to threaten or 
use force against any State, and reliance is placed, for the most part, on the text of article 2, para-
graph 4, which runs: 
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 
There is no need to examine all problems of interpretation arising from this text. At this point the 
only object is to ascertain the scope of the prohibition of the use of force as applicable between 
States.12 The major differences of opinion relate to whether "against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence" reduces the scope of the prohibition of the use of force, and what interpretation 
should be given to "or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 
The interpretation of "force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state " 
As a preliminary the issue arises whether, as has indeed been claimed,13 this text conveys some ambi-
guity, or leaves the meaning obscure. For if that were the case this would certainly justify recourse to 
the preparatory works of the Charter (article 32, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).14 It is 
submitted that such is not the case, and that the ordinary meaning to be attached to the first part of 
article 2, paragraph 4, is that only force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
States is prohibited. That is not the same as saying that force which is not against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of States would be permissible. Rather this means that any such use 
of force is not covered by this specific part of the prohibition of article 2, paragraph 4, and that it 
consequently would not on that count entail a breach of obligation under that provision. 
That conclusion cannot be set aside, moreover, by making references to conflicting texts found in the 
preparatory works.IS That smaller States wanted more specific safeguards, and that the phrase was 
not therefore intended to have any qualifying effect,16 is irrelevant from the viewpoint of treaty inter-
pretation. It is the intention of the States parties as manifested in the text which must take prece-
dence.17 What remains to be examined, then, is the meaning that must be attached to "territorial 
integrity" and "political independence". 
As to the former it has been asserted that this is equivalent to territorial inviolability.18 That stance 
is inspired, once more, by the desire to argue the comprehensive nature of the ban on the use of force 
under article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. If the two terms were identical in meaning any cross-
border incursion by military or paramilitary elements would amount to a breach of obligation under 
article 2, paragraph 4. In support of such argument one could refer to General Assembly resolution 
2625 (XXV) which proclaimed that:19 
"Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing in-
ternational boundaries of another State (...)." 
Though this appears to lend credibility to the argument, it is submitted that the Declaration in fact 
goes beyond an authoritative interpretation of article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.2" It may be 
noted for instance that all the principles elaborated upon start off by stipulating that "States" shall do, 
or not do, something. The text is clearly intended to reflect rules of customary international law. 
A State's threat or use of force to violate international boundaries will not, generally, lead to a loss 
of territory or disrupt the territorial "unity" of another State. Only if it could have such an effect, and 
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irrespective of the size of the territory thus endangered, is there a breach of obligation under article 
2, paragraph 4, of the Charter The decisive criterion, however, does not lie with the intention of the 
State threatening or using force, but with the actual or even potential effects of such threats or uses 
of force Yet even if a State's use offeree could not be said to entail, potentially, a loss of territory, 
still such use of force would not on that count become lawful under international law " The prohibi­
tion of the use of force rests on more broad foundations than that 
The prohibition to use force against the "political independence" of a State is linked to the pro­
hibition of intervention in international law и That this is so may be deduced especially from the ob­
servations of the Court in the Nicaragua Case u 
"( ) the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in 
internal or external affairs of other States A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one 
bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to 
decide freely One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, 
and the formulation of foreign policy Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coer­
cion m regard to such choices, which must remain free ones The element of coercion, which 
defines, and indeed forms the essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious m the 
case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the 
indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State " 
By reference to this text it seems appropriate to define the adjective "political" in the sense that the 
independence of a State, against which States may not use force, concerns the freedom to order 
one's internal affairs (the political, economic, social, and cultural system) and external affairs 
(formulation of foreign policy)24 Once certain choices can no longer be made in freedom due to the 
existence of an international obligation, the subject-matter on which that choice turns has left the 
realm of domestic jurisdiction In such a case, to paraphrase the Permanent Court in the Lotus Case, 
a restriction has been placed on the independence of a State 2 5 The use of armed force will not neces­
sarily in every case be directed against the political independence of a State Force used to pressure a 
State into compliance with its international obligations will therefore not of necessity constitute a 
breach of obligation under article 2, paragraph 4 But again this does not entail the conclusion that 
the use of force in pursuit of another State's compliance with its obligations becomes lawful by 
definition It remains to be considered to what extent uses of armed force are illegal due to inconsis­
tency with the purposes of the United Nations 
The interpretation of "force ( ) m any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations" 
A first remark concerns the stance that some uses of force are lawful because they further the reali­
zation of the purposes of the United Nations Such an argument obviously misconstrues the text of 
article 2, paragraph 4 The text of this article clearly deals only with illegal uses of force The argu­
ment turns the ordinary meaning of the words around It is not possible to claim that a use of force is 
lawful under article 2, paragraph 4, because it enhances the realization of a purpose of the United 
Nations The phrase "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" can only be taken to 
mean a broadening of the scope of the prohibition26 
A second observation relates to the already noted circumstance that the members are under the 
obligation to abstain from the use of force m their international relations "Their" in this context can 
only refer back to members of the United Nations Since membership in the United Nations is only 
open to entities that are States (articles 3 and 4), the obvious deduction ought to be that article 2, 
paragraph 4, only covers inter-State threats or uses of force 
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Taking a look at the purposes of the United Nations laid down in article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, it 
seems hardly likely that any use of force inconsistent with those purposes will, or even can, take 
place in the members' international relations. Denying a people the exercise of its right to self-
determination appears to be possible only within one and the same State. It is possible, yet somewhat 
difficult, to imagine a State going into the territory of another State in order to frustrate, militarily, 
the exercise of a right of self-determination of a people living there.17 Similarly it is hard to envisage 
a State engaging in cross-border military incursions with the purpose of breaching human rights obli­
gations in another State. A denial of self-determination, or human rights violations, could of course 
take place as a side-effect of a cross-border use of force. With regard to the prohibition of force in­
consistent with the purpose of article 1, paragraph 1, it must be said that that seems to coincide al­
most completely with the obligation under article 2, paragraph 3, that members must settle their 
disputes peacefully (discussed in the next subsection). Only the purpose of the United Nations to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace appears to 
have some added value in this respect. It might be interpreted to rule out any unilateral recourse to 
armed force. 
However, account must be taken of the interpretation rule that a provision, or even part of it, 
should not be construed in such a way as to deprive it of all meaning. The more literal interpretation 
must therefore be abandoned in favour of one more in accordance with the spirit of the text. As a re­
sult one should consider the threat or use of armed force in denial of the right to self-determination 
of peoples or human rights to fall under the scope of the prohibition of article 2, paragraph 4.28 To 
what measure it is possible to use force to uphold the right to self-determination and human rights 
will be discussed in section 5.6. 
5.2.2. The scope of article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter 
Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter requires that: 
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." 
The most striking feature of studies on the subject of peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance 
with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, is that they tend to focus on the peaceful means to settle 
disputes.29 Hardly ever does one find a discussion οι non-peaceful means to settle disputes, that is, in 
which circumstances one could say that there is a breach of obligation in this respect. This lack of 
attention by scholars is noteworthy also considering that the principle (obligation) involved is often 
claimed to be the complement of the prohibition of the use of force.30 An explanation for this might 
be the argument that the two rules substantially cover the same ground and that therefore the nega­
tive aspect of the rule of peaceful settlement of disputes might be regarded as being redundant in re­
lation to the prohibition of force.31 However, that view is based on the partly erroneous belief (as 
shown in the previous subsection) that article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter prohibits any kind of 
threat or use of cross-border armed force. 
As to the content of this specific obligation placed on members of the United Nations, that may be 
divided into two categories. As a positive duty members are required to make attempts to settle their 
international disputes peacefully if, and to the extent that, an unsettled dispute would be likely to en­
danger the maintenance of international peace and security. That conclusion flows from the com­
bined effect of articles 2, paragraph 3, and 33 of the Charter.32 The negative duty of the provision of 
article 2, paragraph 3, is that members must refrain from all acts which are not peaceful in character. 
Basically then members are enjoined to refrain from any kind of armed action.33 The prohibition of 
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armed reprisals, so often founded on article 2, paragraph 4,34 could more confidently be based on ar-
ticle 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter35 Paragraph 13 (I) of the Manila Declaration, adopted by the 
General Assembly, quite accurately states.36 
"Neither the existence of a dispute nor the failure of a procedure of peaceful settlement of 
disputes shall permit the use of force or threat of force by any of the States parties to the dis-
pute " 
A final issue in this subsection lies with the text of article 2, paragraph 3, which is confined to the 
settlement of "international disputes". Would it be possible to argue that a particular dispute is not 
international in character or that there is no dispute, and that therefore the obligation to settle 
through peaceful means is not relevant? 
Regarding the first issue it may be said that what is international and what is not depends on the de-
velopment and state of international law37 Any matter which is not regulated by international law 
will fall, essentially, within the domestic jurisdiction of States.38 When a State uses force to settle a 
particular matter falling essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, any dispute resulting therefrom 
with another State will not be international in character if the first State was not required to act oth-
erwise If the second State makes claims on such matters and applies coercion to the first State, it 
will be in breach of its obligation under the prohibition of intervention Nowadays the issue is less 
crucial since many matters previously falling within the domestic jurisdiction of States have been 
regulated through the conventional and customary rules on human rights 
As to the second question it may be said that any cross-border use of armed force in the absence of a 
pre-existing dispute must be considered, prima facie, a breach of obligation under article 2, para-
graph 3 The fact that a State has not pronounced itself as to its position on the facts or the law can-
not be taken to mean that therefore another State can use force against it Indeed the non-existence 
of a dispute between two States may be due exactly because the State resorting to force did not at 
any time take any precise position on the situation39 Adhering to such a stance would imply that 
surprise uses of force would not be contrary to the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means It 
is submitted that such an interpretation would defeat the object and purpose of article 2, paragraph 3, 
or even the whole Charter, and cannot be admitted. 
5 2 3 The prohibition of the use of armed force, customary international law, andyi« cogens 
The use of armed force and customary international law 
In the Nicaragua Case, due to the operation of the multilateral treaty reservation, the Court had to 
judge the conduct of the United States almost exclusively in terms of customary international law40 
The Court did indeed find that the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any State had been enshrined in customary international law41 Its 
examination on these matters focused on the rule prohibiting armed force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of States It did not distinguish between uses of force generally 
breaching article 2, paragraph 3, and those specifically against the territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of States violating article 2, paragraph 4 4 1 However, the Court extensively discussed 
the prohibition of intervention, and as already noted, in subsection 5 2 1, that concerns the "political 
independence" of States ** 
The absence of any particular argument devoted to breaches of obligation under the rule stipulating 
the settlement of disputes by peaceful means may be explained also by reference to the constellation 
of facts underlying the case The United States' attacks and acts of intervention involving the use of 
force were part of a scheme to put pressure on Nicaragua to change its policies on militarization, 
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human rights, and democracy ** Nicaragua did not claim that the United States acted contrary to ar­
ticle 2, paragraph 3, but only against article 2, paragraph 4, and it did not distinguish between any 
such uses of force under customary international law ** For obvious reasons the Court did not 
therefore address the alleged uses of force from the viewpoint of the forcible settlement of disputes 
Although the Court therefore did not address the question whether there had been any breach of the 
obligation to settle disputes peacefully, it observed that it had to recall another principle involved ** 
"( ) respect for which is essential in the world of today the principle that the parties to any 
dispute, particularly any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte­
nance of international peace and security, should seek a solution by peaceful means En­
shrined m Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, ( ), this principle has also the status of 
customary law " 
It is submitted that the rule of customary international law not merely imposes the positive duty to 
settle disputes peacefully, but also the negative duty to refrain from forcible action intended to settle 
a dispute A further argument may be advanced in that the obligation applies equally where there is a 
dispute and where there is none It even applies in the absence of mounting tension between States 
In sum, a breach of the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, or to act peacefully, occurs whenever 
a State uses armed force wilfully as against another State 
The use ofarmedforce and jus cogens 
The Commission, m its commentary to draft article 50 on the law of treaties (now 53), claimed41 
"( ) the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes 
a conspicuous example of a rule m international law having the character οι jus cogens " 
This statement was quoted by the Court, m the Nicaragua Case, so as to validate the customary law 
nature of the principle laid down in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter * In chapter three it has 
extensively been argued that the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial in­
tegrity or political independence of States constitutes a peremptory norm of general international 
law As a result the reparation obligations resulting from a committed internationally wrongful act, 
whether a delict or a crime, could not involve any loss of territory or downgrading of the political in­
dependence of any State The latter would have to be understood in the sense that, notwithstanding 
certain limits flowing from the rules on guarantees against repetition, (the population of) a State 
would be free to determine its own future 
Yet the quoted part seems inevitably to lead to the conclusion that the rule prohibiting the use of 
force, generally, constitutes a peremptory norm That would mean that any treaty, for example the 
Charter, contemplating the (lawful) use of force, eg articles 42 and 51, would be void for conflict 
with a rule of jus cogens As already noted such a conclusion would be manifestly absurd A further 
text of the Commission also does not testify to any such intention Article 33, Part One, of the ILC-
draft on State responsibility, stipulates that a state of necessity cannot be invoked as a ground pre­
cluding wrongfulness if the obligation anses out of a peremptory norm Yet the commentary to that 
article makes clear that there may be 4 9 "( ) doubt on the question whether all international obliga­
tions concerning respect for territorial sovereignty of States have really become obligations of jus 
cogens, ( ) " 
In relation more specifically to the rule prescribing the peaceful settlement of disputes the obvious 
claim, enunciated by Charpentier, must be thatΜ 
"On ne saurait toutefois aller au-delà, et lui reconnaître, a la difference de ce qui est 
généralement admis pour l'article 2, paragraphe 4, la valeur imperative d'un principe de jus 
cogens," 
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In certain cases the Charter clearly allows the Security Council (article 42) or (a) (group of) State(s) 
(article 51) to have resort to the use of force in order to impose a return to a previously existing 
status quo In such cases it is possible to argue that such use of force may be justified under the rules 
of State responsibility notwithstanding the rule stipulating the peaceful settlement of disputes 
Whether there exist any other possible justifications, besides the two mentioned, will be seen later 
on Preliminary to that issue is the question whether the Charter based derogations or exceptions 
would be, legally speaking, the only ones admissible under either the Charter or customary interna-
tional law 
5 2 4 Exclusiveness of Charter based derogations and exceptions 
to the prohibition of the use of armed force' 
The Charter leaves room for the justifiable use of armed force by either the Security Council or 
members acting individually or collectively. Article 42 is noteworthy in this respect because it is the 
only provision that refers in a more explicit manner to the possibility of armed action Other provi-
sions suffer, to some extent, from obscurity Article 51 limits itself to affirming the inherent right of 
individual or collective "self-defence", article 53, paragraph 1, notes that regional arrangements or 
agencies shall not resort to "enforcement action" without authorization of the Security Council, ar-
ticle 94, paragraph 2, confers on the Security Council the power to decide on "measures" to give 
effect to a judgment of the Court,51 in article 106 it is said that the Four Powers and France shall 
consult with one another and, as required, with other members of the United Nations, pending the 
coming into force of the agreements of article 43, with a view to such "joint action" as may be nec-
essary for the purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security, and article 107 finally 
states that nothing in the Charter shall invalidate or preclude "action" in relation to enemy States 
(defined in article 53, paragraph 2) taken or authorized by governments, having responsibility for 
such action, as a result of the Second World War Can it be said that the Charter limitatively pro-
vides for derogations or exceptions to the prohibition of the use of military force' Or is it possible to 
infer other such derogations or exceptions under either the Charter or customary international law? 
In relation to these questions an interpretation of the Charter would not seem to open up to any 
use of armed force other than that in application of the provisions mentioned Two issues tend to 
qualify an absolute stance in this respect 
First there is the occurrence of peace-keeping operations Military forces established under such op-
erations are stationed on the territory of a State only with its consent52 The legitimacy of establish-
ing such forces has been questioned mainly insofar as they were created by the General Assembly 
and not by the Security Council Any doubts in relation thereto were, however, authoritatively dis-
pelled by the Court Troops acting under a peace-keeping operation are allowed to use force only to 
the extent that such force operates within the bounds of the consent given ö It should be noted 
though that force can always be resorted to in the exercise of a right of self-defence Regarding the 
subject under review, whether the Charter allows for the use of force other than based on specific 
provisions, the example of peace-keeping operations does not provide an answer Although there has 
been a trend to have such operations based upon specific Charter provisions or the Charter generally, 
it is submitted that their existence can in addition be based on the customary rule allowing States to 
consent to the stationing of armed forces on their territories 
Secondly attention may be drawn to the practice of the Security Council by which it grants an 
authorization to use all necessary means in order to reach certain goals Such authorization was first 
granted by way of resolution 678 to the "Member States co-operating with the Government of 
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Kuwait", and has been granted on a number of occasions since. The phrase '4o use all necessary 
means" had been intended, and therefore interpreted, to include resort to armed force. Any specific 
Charter basis for such authorizations to States cannot be found. The question of their legal basis will 
be explored more thoroughly in subsection 5.4.3. 
Does, or even can, customary international law contain rules derogating from the prohibition of 
the use of force? 
A preliminary question is whether the rights of States under customary international law pertaining 
to the use of force have survived the conventional limitations imposed upon members by virtue of the 
Charter. The guiding principle, to quote the Court in the Expenses Opinion, is that:54 "Save as they 
have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of these common ends, the Member States re-
tain their freedom of action." Fundamentally there does not exist, therefore, any objection to recog-
nizing the possibility of the continued validity of a rule of customary international law providing for a 
right to use military force. However, as Bowett quite correctly observes:55 
"We must presuppose that rights formerly belonging to member states continue except in so 
far as obligations inconsistent with those existing rights are assumed under the Charter." 
It follows that any use of armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a 
State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or contrary to the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, cannot be justified by reference to any customary law right predating 
the introduction of the basic Charter obligations under article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 s 6 
While this argument does away with the stance that there would be room for the continued exer-
cise of customary law rights predating the Charter, the question whether any such right could come 
into existence considering the broad Charter prohibition of the use of force remains to be answered. 
The answer may be in the affirmative. In the Nicaragua Case the Court discussed not only whether a 
right of self-defence existed in customary international law, but also whether there existed a right to 
intervene, without or with the use of force, in support of the opposition within a State.57 Similarly it 
considered whether force could be used, collectively, against a State which itself used force falling 
below the threshold of an armed attack.58 It denied the existence, in law, of either of those justifica-
tions, but noted in respect of a potential right to intervene that:59 "For such a general right to come 
into existence would involve a fundamental modification of the customary law principle of non-
intervention." The Court followed through on this by saying that:60 "Reliance by a State on a novel 
right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend 
towards a modification of customary international law." Clearly then the conclusion must be drawn 
that customary international law might develop a rule justifying the use of force in situations other 
than those justifying the use of force by States under Charter provisions. If the existence of such a 
rule could be established it would constitute a defence against charges of breaches of obligation un-
der the Charter in relation to States against which force is used, against other States, and in relation 
to the United Nations. 
S.3. The function and nature of resort to armed force 
With regard to this section most of the considerations related to countermeasures contained in 
chapter four, section 4.2, will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the function and nature of resort to armed 
force. 
The goal to be attained through recourse to armed force will be, as with resort to countermeasures, 
to obtain reparation. Any idea of punishment or punitive intent, other than in the "minds" of the State 
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resorting to armed action or the State targeted by it, lies with the nature of the specific forms of 
reparation The author State's psychologically (rrus)perceived punishment or punitive intent on the 
part of the injured State, as a consequence of the application against it of armed force, rests on the 
setting aside of an obligation by the injured State The coercive element thus inherent in an injured 
State's recourse to armed force does not constitute an end in itself, but a means to obtain reparation 
To the extent that recourse to armed force might be resorted to in particular circumstances, those 
circumstances would justify, m international law, the suspension of the mjured State's obligation not 
to resort to force against the author State 
Though the observations on the function and nature of countermeasures apply for the most part to 
resort to armed force, some additional remarks are necessary on the relation between reparation and 
armed force and on the issue whether armed force would involve exceptional measures 
The object to be attained by an injured State's resort to countermeasures or armed force will gen-
erally be to obtain reparation However, in case of resort to countermeasures this objective can be 
reached only with the co-operation of the author State That conclusion would be different only if 
one accepted the notion, rejected earlier, that countermeasures could involve irreversible acts such as 
nationalization or the confiscation of assets and property 
Resort to armed force by an injured State against an author State for the purpose of enforcing the 
latter State's international responsibility will not necessitate the co-operation of the author State In 
such circumstances the goal of the injured State by having resort to armed force will normally be to 
impose upon the author State respect for its reparation obligations The imposition, by way of armed 
force, of respect for reparation obligations may be effected either in the absence or in the face of 
armed opposition by the author State For that reason resort to armed force by an injured State 
against an author State takes away the choice the latter might have had in the matter which would 
have been either to accede to reparation demands or to refuse them The use of armed force to im-
pose respect for reparation obligations by an mjured State therefore constitutes forcible implementa-
tion of the international responsibility of an author State, and, as such, amounts to the forced 
settlement of reparation disputes between the injured and author States 
The object of an injured State by using force against an author State of an international crime will be, 
in first instance,61 to effect the cessation of the conduct constituting the crime and also, in case of 
continuing occupation due to aggression, to impose restitution of territory Whether or not the per-
formance of other reparation obligations (compensation, satisfaction, and guarantees against repeti-
tion) may be enforced through the use of armed force will be discussed separately m sections 5 5 to 
5 7 6 i 
In regard to self-defence it has been claimed by Ago that state of necessity and self-defence are 0 
% ) expressions that connote a situation or defacto conditions, not a subjective right " He contin-
ued on the next page M 
"It would be quite wrong to think that self-defence can also be defined as a kind of sanction, 
even if it were described as a sanction applicable to a specific kind of wrong 'Self-defence' 
and 'sanction' are reactions relevant to different moments and, above all, are distinct in logic 
Besides, action in a situation of self-defence, is as its name indicates, action taken by a State 
in order to defend its territorial integrity or its independence against violent attacks, it is ac-
tion whereby 'defensive' use of force is opposed to an 'offensive' use of comparable force, 
with the object - and this is the core of the matter - of preventing another's wrongful action 
from proceeding, succeeding and achieving its purpose Action taken in the form of a sanction 
on the other hand involves the application ex post facto to the State committing the interna-
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tional wrong of one of the possible consequences that international law attaches to the com-
mission of an act of this nature " 
A first remark here would be that is difficult to see why it would be wrong to think of self-defence in 
terms of rights Assuredly action taken by a State in response to an armed attack is defensive in char-
acter Yet a State need not necessarily act in self-defence if it is attacked, that is, it may refrain from 
exercising its right States are under the obligation not to use armed force against other States, which 
includes an obligation not to initiate an armed attack. Against a breach of obligation in the form of an 
armed attack is then set the right to take cross-border action in self-defence 
In the second place it is not clear what distinguishes (aside from a possible temporal difference) self-
defence from sanctions Self-defence action by definition involves a reaction against a continuing 
breach of obligation by the attacking State In that sense the use of force is intended to effect a ces-
sation of wrongful conduct To the extent that a State is attempting to regain occupied territory, 
notwithstanding that hostilities had come to an end (if only temporarily), such a use of force is gen-
erally regarded as self-defence Yet at that point in time the action is no longer, strictly speaking, 
defensive in character Consequently, it would not be inappropriate to consider such action as a 
sanction 
As to the nature of use of armed force the question arises whether this kind of enforcement con-
stitutes a generally applicable means to ensure an author State's compliance with its reparation obli-
gations, or whether it would only exceptionally be justified to resort to armed force for such 
purposes 
The reparation obligations established in consequence of the commission of an international delict 
cannot ordinarily be enforced through use of armed force ß Article 14 (a), Part Two, provisionally 
adopted by the Commission, provides ** "An injured State shall not resort by way of countermea-
sure, to (a) the threat or use of force as prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations " Since the 
use of force for the settlement of disputes, including disputes related to reparation obligations, is 
prohibited under article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, the Commission's proposal confirms the 
prohibition of armed reprisals 
In relation to international crimes Arangio-Ruiz put forward the question, first of all67 "( ) 
whether armed measures are not admissible also in order to bring about the cessation of crimes other 
than aggression ", and secondly ** 
"( ) whether this would constitute the 'typical' sanction of a crime ( ), or whether it would 
correspond to a different ratio We have in mind, for example, the ratio underlying the 'state 
of necessity' or 'distress' - circumstances which do indeed rule out illegitimacy but, unlike 
self-defence, are not characterized by the fact of authorizing a direct reaction against the per-
petrator of a particularly serious international breach " 
It is clearly possible to, and it is submitted that one should, envisage the use of armed force as the 
"typical" response to an international crime In that sense there would be nothing exceptional about 
making the general statement that the commission, and perpetuation, of an international crime ought 
to be prevented or suppressed through the use of armed force Within the Commission there is, how-
ever, a trend which would extend the prohibition of countermeasures involving the use of force ap-
plicable to delicts to international crimes " Arangio-Ruiz has proposed, apparently on that basis, that 
the prohibition of countermeasures involving the threat or use of armed force applicable in case of 
delicts should apply also in case of crimes70 In the event that such a trend, and his proposal, would 
be laid down in a text adopted by the Commission, it would follow that the only permissible unilat-
eral or concerted reaction involving the use of force would be self-defence against an armed attack 
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In a factual sense then justifiable uses of force by way of self-defence would certainly be exceptional 
However, the right of self-defence as an exceptional right flows not from the fact that there exists a 
general prohibition of the use of armed force as such Rather it is the competence of the Security 
Council to act against uses of force generally, and by the use of force if necessary, that accounts for 
the exceptional and temporary character of the right of self-defence7I 
It is not possible to claim, as to military action by the Security Council under article 42 of the 
Charter, that armed force would only exceptionally be permitted for the restoration of international 
peace and security72 For the Security Council is entitled to initiate such action not only if it considers 
that the measures under article 41 have proved to be inadequate, but also if it considers, from the 
start, that they would be inadequate73 Furthermore, such action may be taken not only to maintain 
or restore international peace and security in consequence of a breach of the peace or act of aggres­
sion, but also in circumstances where there is a (mere) threat to the peace A very wide measure of 
discretion is thus granted to the Security CouncilΊΑ To the extent then that it determines the exis­
tence of a threat to the peace substantially unrelated to the use of force, it certainly possesses the 
competence to resort to military action under article 42 in response to international crimes other than 
that of aggression 
5.4. Preconditions for resort to armed force 
5 4 1 The commission of an internationally wrongful act, reparation demands, 
dispute settlement and armed force 
The arguments forwarded in relation to resort to countermeasures in regard to the basic precondition 
of an internationally wrongful act apply also in relation to resort to armed force and need not detain 
us for long Clearly the existence of an internationally wrongful act is fulfilled in case of committed 
international crimes As pointed out in relation to countermeasures the basic content of the rules un­
der which international crimes can take place is not disputed As to the existence of the wrongful 
acts constituting crimes, the criterion of "serious" breaches of obligation under such rules makes any 
assessment as to their existence an easy task 
The international crime of aggression warrants some additional remarks in view of the fact that 
article 51 of the Charter stipulates that nothing will impair the right of self-defence against an armed 
attack until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security The implication resulting from the text of this provision must be that if there is no armed 
attack there does not exist any right of self-defence, and if there is an armed attack a right of self-
defence exists7S It follows also that from the moment of attack a right of self-defence may be exer­
cised until the Security Council has taken measures76 In case the Security Council does not take any 
measures the exercise of the right of self-defence may be continued for as long as the objects of self-
defence have not been accomplished (see infra subsection 5 5 1) 7 7 
The conclusion must be that for as long as the Security Council has not taken measures any individ­
ual, or group of, State(s) may judge whether an armed attack has taken place78 Since an armed at­
tack by one State against another will of necessity be inconsistent with the obligations under article 
2, paragraphs 3 or 4, this amounts to a competence, for purposes of self-defence, to determine the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act A right of self-defence will exist only in the presence of 
an internationally wrongful act constituting an armed attack (on which more in subsection 5 5 1) 
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Whether the assessment of a State claiming the existence of an armed attack is correct, and conse­
quently whether its use of force constitutes self-defence, again depends on the interpretation of the 
legal rules and the verification of the facts by the Security Council and all States concerned alike79 
It has been argued, by Dallai, that m 
"However, because the Security Council is a political body and not a court of justice, its ac­
tions are of necessity political and not judicial While the UN Security Council's decision to 
condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait may have been unavoidable politically, such condemna­
tion was probably premature and perhaps unjustified legally It would have been justified le­
gally only if it were coupled with an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was in fact an act of aggression " 
These propositions are legally insupportable Article 39 of the Charter clearly confers the power on 
the Security Council to determine that an act of aggression has taken place One cannot find any 
provision in the Charter restricting that competence Article 36, paragraph 3, which states that "legal 
disputes should as a rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice", cannot be 
seen to curtail the Security Council's powers That provision belongs to Chapter VI on the peaceful 
settlement of disputes The determination of an act of aggression by the Security Council under arti­
cle 39 presupposes that a dispute between certain parties has resulted in such tense relations that the 
use of its recommendatory powers under Chapter VI would not suffice to deal with the situation If 
that is the case the Security Council may judge it opportune to resort to measures under articles 41 
or 42 against one, several, or all, of the parties to the dispute Furthermore, article 36, paragraph 3, 
concerns the peaceful settlement of disputes between the parties only, not the settlement of a dispute 
between the Security Council and one of the parties as to whether an act of aggression has taken 
place The provision of article 96, paragraph 1, moreover, clearly establishes only the right of the Se­
curity Council to request advisory opinions There is no indication whatsoever that an obligation to 
do so, whether general or specific, would exist 
As to the political nature of the Security Council's actions, that is no different than the nature of 
State actions A State is no more than a political (and legal) entity However, decisions on State ac­
tions are made not by the legal but by the political organs of a State On the international plane a 
State under attack clearly can defend itself notwithstanding the fact that the existence of such an 
armed attack has not been verified by the Court Such an armed attack may eventually be judged by 
the Court to be non-existent8I Yet in first instance the political organ of a State provisionally de­
termines the existence of an armed attack Could the Security Council do less? Certainly not 
As to the question whether any obligation to demand reparation or to have recourse to dispute 
settlement can be imposed on an injured State before it resorts to armed force, the answer must 
again, as with resort to countermeasures, be in the negative The intentional, wilful, and clearly pre­
meditated character of international crimes destroys any hope of voluntary compliance by the author 
State with its reparation obligations or that any peaceful settlement of disputes could be effected K It 
is for those reasons that one ought to view resort to armed force as the "typical" reaction to interna­
tional crimes Such response to international crimes, that is, use of armed force, is the only totally 
and completely efficacious means to effect cessation of, and restitution in regard to, wrongful con­
duct ю That is not to say that no settlement at all ought to be effected Eventually one would at least 
expect the conclusion of a treaty of some kind related to the troops occupying territory (if there are 
any) of the author State, a cease-fire, and possibly on withdrawal of troops 
In regard to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis it has been alleged that the failure by the Security Council to have 
recourse to the peaceful means of dispute settlement under article 33 amounted to a violation of the 
CharterM A contextual interpretation of the Charter must lead to the conclusion that once the 
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Council determines a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression under Chapter 
П of the Charter, procedures under Chapter VI need no longer be applied by i t B While such a 
conclusion could arguably be assailed where the Council determines a "mere" threat to the peace, it 
certainly cannot be opposed in case of breaches of the peace or acts of aggression M The fact that the 
Security Council, in resolution 660, operative paragraph 3, called upon Iraq and Kuwait to "begin 
immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences" is similarly beside the point 
First, because it is placed after operative paragraph 2 which "demands that Iraq withdraw immedi­
ately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 
1990" The call for negotiations is thus clearly subordinated to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces Sec­
ondly, because the call for negotiations does not concern the disputes on withdrawal or sovereignty 
over Kuwait,87 but the frontier disputes and differences over oil and debts between the two States on 
which negotiations had broken down just before the Iraqi invasion 
The situation is certainly different if a party to a dispute has already initiated recourse to dispute 
settlement. The United States, for instance, brought its dispute with Iran regarding the American 
hostages in Tehran before the Court After the indication of provisional measures by the Court,88 but 
before its judgment on the merits, the United States attempted to free the hostages by way of armed 
force ю The Court in this respect felt *° "( ) bound to observe that an operation undertaken in those 
circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial 
process in international relations," In addition to the provisional measures indicated (mainly the re­
lease of hostages, facilities to leave Iran, and no action which might aggravate tension) the circum­
stances referred to concerned the request by the United States to the Court to obtain an early 
judgment However, the Court noted that its findings on the conduct of the Iranian government six 
months earlier were not affected by United States' actions9I The conclusion appears justified that 
the fact that armed force is being used during arbitral or judicial proceedings does not prejudge the 
legality of such armed force An obligation to abstain from such force consequently cannot be pre­
sumed 
5 4 2 Armed action by the Security Council under article 42 of the Charter 
Article 42 of the Charter provides 
"Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members 
of the United Nations " 
A number of issues arises with regard to this provision the relationship to article 39, the relationship 
to article 41, and the relationship to article 43 
The relationship to article 39 of the Charter 
The first question is whether the Security Council could take action under article 42 without first 
having determined, under article 39, the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression In regard to the analogous question on measures under article 41 the answer was 
in the negative, and so it must also be in regard to action under article 42 и 
The contrary position, adopted by Fischer,93 does not convince He claims that under article 39 the 
Security Council only determines threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression 
Article 42 on the other hand speaks about the maintenance or restoration of "international" peace 
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and security Accordingly, so he claims, the differing formulations militate in favour of the separabil­
ity of the texts ** That stance neglects that article 39 provides that the Security Council "shall decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna­
tional peace and security " Essentially this means that the Security Council's competence regarding 
threats to the peace should be exercised in order to maintain or restore "international" peace ** 
Whatever meaning ought to be attached generally to "threats to the peace", clearly any threat to 
"international" peace will generate a threat to the peace 
Another argument mentioned by Fischer to support his position, that article 94, paragraph 2, allows 
for action under article 42 in the absence of a threat to the peace,9* is even less convincing Action by 
the Security Council under article 42 must be "necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security" The measures decided on under article 94, paragraph 2, on the other hand must be "to 
give effect to the judgment" The objectives to be reached through the exercise of the competencies 
under the two provisions are obviously not cognate Measures under article 94, paragraph 2, may be 
similar to the measures under Chapter П, but recourse to them is not subordinated to the proce­
dures of Chapter VII 
A more difficult question is whether the Security Council could resort to armed force with regard 
to each and any of the situations envisaged under article 39 The construction and formulation of the 
provisions under Chapter VII do not support a restrictive view on the matter Breaches of the peace 
and acts of aggression can surely be addressed through action under article 42 It is less easy to con­
ceive of armed action with regard to just any kind of threat to the peace 
One may consider, as an example, the case of Libya By way of resolution 748 the Security Council 
determined that Libya's continued failure to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of ter­
rorism constituted a threat to the peace It then decided (paragraphs 1 and 2) that Libya had to 
comply with requests by France, the United States and the United Kingdom (basically the handing 
over of suspects),97 that it had to commit itself to cease all forms of terrorist action and assistance to 
terrorist groups, and that it must demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism through concrete actions 
In the event that Libya did not comply with these paragraphs by 15 April 1992, all States were to 
take certain measures against Libya (operative paragraphs 3 to 6) Although Libya has not complied, 
until now, with the requests of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, it is hard to 
imagine the Security Council taking action under article 42 of the Charter (or authorizing armed 
force by those States) for the purpose of going into Libya and taking hold of the suspects It might 
not be too farfetched to claim that the measures imposed on Libya by way of resolution 748 have 
proved to be inadequate to maintain international peace and security Yet not many would argue that 
armed force could now be used against Libya It may be submitted that the basis for denying the 
possibility of using force against Libya would lie with the perceived disproportionality of using force 
in relation to Libya's conduct, which has been determined to constitute no more than a threat to the 
peace 
The relationship to article 41 of the Charter 
Another issue is whether the Security Council ought to proceed to take action under article 42 only 
after having attempted to enforce its decisions through measures under article 41. The text of article 
42 does not support such an interpretation the Security Council may take action if it considers that 
measures under article 41 would be inadequate98 Consequently a large measure of discretion has 
been endowed on the Security Council In this respect one may note that the Court, in the Nicaragua 
Case, distinguished between treaty provisions related to "necessary measures" and "measures con­
sidered necessary", and it observed" 
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"( ) whether a measure is necessary to protect the essential security interests of a party is not 
( ) purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party, the text does not refer to what 
the party 'considers necessary' for that purpose." 
Apparently a provision stipulating that a State party may consider measures to be necessary allows 
for a subjective appraisal, and it is unlikely that the Court would easily substitute that by its own The 
Security Council, then, has been given the competence to evaluate, subjectively, whether or not the 
measures of article 41 would be adequate A decision to the effect that they would not be adequate 
evidently could not easily be censured 
It has been observed, however, by Eisemann , β β 
"Mais on peut également soutenir avec quelque légitimité que, hormis des situations excep-
tionelles dans lesquelles la force doit répondre à la force, c'est recours à des mesures non 
militaires qui politiquement s'impose en premier lieu " 
Political expediency as to what kind of measures ought to be resorted to always imposes itself, 
though such considerations necessarily do not qualify as legal restrictions For reasons similar to 
those expressed in the previous paragraph the question whether or not action under article 42 may be 
taken, either with or without previously imposed measures under article 41, ought to depend on 
considerations of proportionality 
Another hypothesis covered by article 42 lies with previously attempted enforcement by the Se-
curity Council of its decisions through the imposition of measures against a State under article 41 In 
such a case, article 42 states, the Security Council may take action should it consider that such 
measures "have proved to be inadequate" Here too, one would say, the Security Council enjoys a 
wide measure of discretion. 
In relation to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis it has been suggested, by Weston, that the decision to forego re-
liance on the non-military measures of article 41 in favour of military confrontation was premature 1βι 
Admittedly the sanctions of resolution 661 had only been in place a bare three and a half months 
when resolution 678 was adopted At the same time it has been conceded, seemingly also by Weston, 
that the sanctions probably would not have produced any decisive results for at least another year102 
It might be pointed out that the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, even though consummated, 
could have led, immediately, to the use of military force against Iraq in the exercise of a right of col­
lective self-defence Seen in this light the Security Council unquestionably could have adopted a de­
cision to resort to armed action at once That it decided that armed force could be used some four 
months later cannot then, in the light of the circumstances, be called in question 
The relationship to article 43 of the Charter 
It was said just now that the Security Council could have resorted to armed action at once in relation 
to Iraq's attack on Kuwait That surely constitutes an accurate assessment of the facts of the case 
and of the Security Council's competence under article 42 There is, however, one problem the Se­
curity Council generally cannot take action under article 42 due to the absence of the special agree­
ments contemplated by article 43 of the Charter l 0 3 To put it simply it does not hold or control any 
air, sea or land forces with which to take action 
The view has been put forward, by Franck and Patel, that there has been armed action by the Secu­
rity Council under article 42 in relation to the situations in Korea and Kuwait,<M That view appears 
incorrect On the legal level the interpretation of article 42, and its context (especially articles 46 and 
47), clearly shows that it must be the Security Council which initiates and controls action under arti­
cle 42 l 0 5 The military operations against North Korea and Iraq assuredly were not under Security 
Council control True, the forces in Korea were authorized by the Security Council to use the United 
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Nations flag, members providing military forces and assistance were recommended to place these 
under the unified command of the United States, and the United States was requested to designate 
the commander of the forces 10* In spite of these indications the action agamst North Korea cannot 
be seen to have been transformed into Security Council action under article 42 1 0 7 For similar reasons 
the action taken in regard to Iraq cannot be considered Security Council action under article 42 of 
the Charter | И 
Although the Security Council cannot currently take action under article 42 (given the absence of 
the agreements envisaged in article 43), there is nothing to prevent it to utilize such forces put at its 
disposal, by members, in an ad hoc fashion , e 9 That has not happened so far Another option presents 
itself This concerns the possible transformation of a peace-keeping force into forces by which the 
Security Council takes action under article 42 Certainly, the Court held in the Expenses Opinion that 
peace-keeping forces did not imply enforcement action under Chapter VII1 1 β There are, neverthe­
less, some Security Council resolutions which testify, to a limited degree, to this possibility The 
mandates of some peace-keeping operations have thus been expanded to cover the use of force in 
circumstances going beyond, strictly speaking, self-defence I H 
5 4 3 Recommendations and authorizations to use armed force 
Though the Security Council presently cannot act under article 42, that does not necessarily mean 
that no action at all can be taken by members The competence of the General Assembly to recom­
mend armed action and the competence of the Security Council to authorize, or recommend, mem­
bers to use all necessary means, needs to be discussed 
In chapter four it was claimed (subsection 4 3 3) that the General Assembly could recommend the 
adoption of countermeasures for as long as there would not be any cause for action by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter The question is whether the Assembly should be held 
competent, generally, to recommend to members the use of armed force The Assembly itself ap­
peared to think so, as it resolved in resolution 377 that ш 
"( ) if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in 
any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag­
gression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a 
breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain 
or restore international peace and security " 
Under this resolution the General Assembly claims the competence to recommend to members the 
use of armed force in case of breaches of the peace and acts of aggression Apparently it does not 
claim any competence to recommend the use of armed force in respect of threats to the peace or 
situations which would not even qualify as such The Court, in the Expenses Opinion, noted that the 
sentence "Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council 
either before or after discussion" contained in article 11, paragraph 2, refers to coercive or 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the CharterIU Such action is, indisputably, within the 
province of the Security CouncilIM However, when read m conjunction to article 12, paragraph 1, 
the conclusion will remain that as long as the Council is not exercising its functions the Assembly can 
recommend members to use armed force in regard to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression 
For if there truly was a situation amounting to a breach of the peace or act of aggression one would 
expect the Council to exercise its functions under Chapter VII It may be noted that the Security 
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Council itself has called for the emergency sessions of the Assembly under Uniting for Peace 
resolution 377 in order for the latter to make the appropriate recommendations.115 
The Assembly can also express its support for the exercise of any specific right to use armed force, 
for instance as an exercise of the right of self-defence Should the Assembly however recommend the 
use of armed force, action taken in pursuit of such recommendation can be justified only if there is 
some other legal basis either under the Charter or customary international law11β 
In resolution 678 the Security Council demanded Iraq's compliance with its resolution 660 and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions, and.117 
"Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or 
before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing 
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area," 
The discussion in the Security Council meeting surrounding the adoption of resolution 678 makes 
clear that the phrase "all necessary means" included the use of armed force u e The initiation of the 
action by Coalition forces against Iraq on January 16th, 1991, was fully covered by the terms of 
resolution 678 " 9 Whether all the separate military actions can be legally justified under this heading 
rather depends on the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as well as compliance with rules 
of international humanitarian law. 
The term "authorizes" raises more difficult issues, since it does not as such feature in the Charter It 
has been claimed that the Security Council, not being able to take action itself, also is not competent 
to authorize members to use armed force This has aroused disquiet as to the legal basis of resolution 
678,12° and more so because the Security Council has since granted a number of authorizations m 
Any discussion of Security Council powers ought to proceed on the basis of the Court's dictum, 
in the Expenses Opinion, that the argument that measures for the maintenance of international peace 
and security had to be financed through the agreements of article 43 ш 
"( ) would seem to exclude the possibility that the Security Council might act under some 
other Article of the Charter. The Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the 
Security Council under the Charter It cannot be said that the Charter has left the Security 
Council impotent in the face of an emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 
have not been concluded Articles of Chapter VII of the Charter speak of 'situations' as well 
as disputes, and it must lie within the power of the Security Council to police a situation even 
though it does not resort to enforcement action against a State " 
The Court suggests that the Security Council could act under some other article of the Charter With 
due caution, considering the context of peace-keeping operations, the Court envisages action by the 
Security Council on some basis other than article 42 (and article 43) The problem is that such a 
Charter basis cannot even be found for peace-keeping operations, let alone for armed action by 
members At first glance such a basis might be thought to exist in article 48, paragraph 1, of the 
Charter 
"The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by 
some of them, as the Security Council may determine " 
This provision seems to endow the Security Council with the competence to determine that action 
shall be taken by all the members or by some of them This article must, however, be read in its con­
text There appears to be general recognition that the Security Council cannot require a member to 
contribute armed forces in the absence of the agreements of article 43 l u If that interpretation is ac­
cepted, as it should, then any argument based on the text of article 48 would circumvent the meaning 
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and scope of article 43. For that would place members under an obligation to take action directly, by 
way of their military forces, even though they would not be under an obligation to do so in the ab­
sence of an agreement based on article 43. The power of the Security Council under article 48 to 
determine which members shall take action applies only in relation to the armed forces, assistance, 
and facilities made available by members to the Security Council on its call. Since there are no such 
forces made available to the Security Council, article 48, paragraph 1, functions only in regard to the 
measures of article 41.1 2 4 Moreover, not one of the resolutions authorizing the use of force requires 
a member to take action.125 As it is the Security Council cannot be said to have determined that any 
member shall take action. 
Naturally article S1 of the Charter was discussed in regard to the legal basis of the authorization 
of resolution 678. Whatever the arguments on that count (next section), they cannot have any rele­
vance in situations other than armed conflict. For authorizations such as those related to Somalia, 
Rwanda and Haiti, the Charter does not offer any provision that could stand at the (legal) basis of 
military operations. However, it may be submitted that the requisite basis ought to be found in the 
Council's power to delegate its powers, under its authority, to its members. The provision of article 
53, paragraph 1, specifically testifies to that possibility:126 
"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agen­
cies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken un­
der regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council, (...)." 
It may be deduced from this that regional arrangements or agencies may take "enforcement action" 
upon authorization of the Security Council. The phrase "enforcement action" is generally interpreted 
to mean Security Council measures under articles 39, 41 and 4 2 . ш It must be stressed that article 
53, paragraph 1, allows the Security Council to authorize regional arrangements or agencies to resort 
to armed force. Analogously to this provision the Security Council ought to be considered compe­
tent also to authorize individual members, or members acting collectively, to resort to armed force. 
Should one insist on a specific legal basis it is submitted that by now a customary rule has developed 
within the United Nations validating the Council's competence to grant authorizations to mem­
bers.118 
An important observation on authorizations is due, and that concerns the scope and meaning of 
the word. Regional arrangements and agencies do not require any authorization to resort to armed 
force if their action constitutes the exercise of a right of collective self-defence. States, acting in self-
defence under article 51 of the Charter, also do not need any authorization to react by way of armed 
force to an armed attack. The interpretation of a resolution in which an "authorization" (or the word 
"authorizes") to use all necessary means features must be in accordance with the ordinary meaning of 
the word, that is, that those "authorized" would not otherwise be entitled to resort to armed force. 
The authorization granted by the Security Council must then be seen as a basis for precluding the 
wrongfulness of the conduct of a member using force contrary to its obligations under article 2 of the 
Charter. In the absence of such a basis the use of armed force would constitute an internationally 
wrongful act. A prime example of such a basis constitutes resolution 678, because Kuwait's and the 
Coalition's rights of self-defence had been suspended due to the imposition of sanctions in resolution 
661. 
Penultimately to be discussed in this section are Security Council resolutions which "call" upon 
members to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances. This poses a problem to 
the extent that the Security Council appears to call for the use of force in circumstances which would 
not, under the Charter or rules of customary international law, justify unilateral action. The Security 
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Council has done this so far particularly in order to provide for the maritime enforcement of meas­
ures imposed by it under article 41 of the Charter l29 
The Security Council possesses the general competence to recommend the use of armed force by 
members 1 3 e Article 39 provides that the Security Council shall make recommendations, or decide 
upon the measures of articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security 
Contrary to what has been suggested the recommendations of article 39 are not confined to the ac­
tion contained in Chapter VI of the Charter ш That chapter only deals with disputes the continuance 
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security The recommenda­
tions of article 39 on the other hand concern situations in which the maintenance of international 
peace and security is not merely endangered, but has in effect proven to be unsuccessful Such situa­
tions call for either measures or recommendations to restore international peace and security 
Furthermore, the use of the words "call upon" rather than "to authorize", or even "to recommend", 
suggests that the Council wants certain specified action to take place While the latter phrases clearly 
leave the States addressed free to take or not take action, the former expresses the will of the Secu­
rity Council that such action actually takes place Similarly it might be remarked that the words "call 
upon" feature in article 41 and are commonly interpreted as indicating the mandatory character of 
measures decided upon 132 However, since members are not under any obligation to provide military 
contingents m the absence of article 43 agreements, they also cannot be under an obligation to take 
the action "called upon" ш It would seem then that resolutions which call upon States to take cer­
tain action ought to be seen to embody an implicit authorization l 3 4 
Finally it may be noted that there is a certain lacuna regarding the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness enumerated in Chapter V, Part One, of the ILC-draft And this is not remedied by the 
Commission's observation that the list of such circumstances is not absolutely exhaustive 135 In the 
commentary to article 30 the Commission has indicated that measures adopted pursuant to a decision 
of the Security Council under article 41 of the Charter fall within the category of countermeasures 136 
In consequence the wrongfulness of such measures will be precluded However, if a State resorts to 
force upon authorization of the Security Council, or in application of a Security Council decision un­
der article 42, no comparable circumstance precluding wrongfulness is provided for in Chapter V, 
Part One, of the ILC-draft l 3 7 Only unilateral resort to armed force is covered, m article 34, under the 
heading of self-defence One would think therefore that either countermeasures would be defined 
anew, excluding measures adopted pursuant to a decision of the competent organs of an international 
organization, or that another circumstance precluding wrongfulness is added covering resort to 
armed force pursuant to a Security Council authorization or decision 1 3 8 
5.5. Resort to armed force in response to the international crime of aggression 
In the previous section it has been noted that the existence of the basic precondition for the use of 
armed force could easily be verified in case of international crimes Earlier (chapter one, subsection 
1 9 2, and chapter two, subsection 2 6 1) it had been noted that the international crime of aggression 
ought to be seen in terms of an armed attack by one State against another That conclusion is bol­
stered by the requirement that there must be a serious breach of an international obligation essential 
for the maintenance of international peace and security The dividing line between serious and non-
senous breaches is not an easy one to draw Similarly it is hard to find any kind of hard and fast rule 
as to what constitutes an armed attack Since the latter is apparently the only type of use of force to 
give rise to a right to take armed action, individually or collectively, in self-defence (article 51 Char-
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE 273 
ter, article 34, Part One, ILC-draft), it will be discussed first In this connection will be discussed 
some conditions, under customary international law and the Charter, for a lawful exercise of the 
right of self-defence Observations regarding immediacy, necessity and proportionality, requests for 
assistance and "until the Security Council has taken measures" will be postponed until section 5 7 
Lastly some of the issues surrounding past authorizations in this field by the Security Council will be 
dealt with 
5 5 1 The exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
The interpretation of armed attack ("agression armée ") 
A preliminary observation is in order regarding the divergence in the English and French texts of ar-
ticle 51 While the English version mentions self-defence against an "armed attack", the French text 
stipulates the right of defence against "une agression armée" This discrepancy has in the past been 
interpreted to justify the use of force in circumstances other than an all out armed attack Proponents 
of a broad right of self-defence have been able to point to the Definition of Aggression which defines 
that term in such a manner as to include, for example, any kind of attack on the military forces of a 
State '3 ' Whatever may be thought of this, it is possible to assert that the right of self-defence laid 
down in article 51 generally must be interpreted restrictively due to its exceptional character Sup-
port for this may be found in the Nicaragua Case Thus the Court noted that 14° 
"( ) it will be necessary to distinguish between the most grave forms of the use of force 
(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms " 
As a follow-up the Court observed that some of the rules contained in the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law referred to aggression, while others concerned only less grave forms of the use 
of force U l Obviously then only the most grave forms of the use of armed force are considered an 
armed attack and give rise to a right of self-defence This latter proposition must be qualified how-
ever 
As to the kind of uses of force which constitute armed attacks the Court observed ^2 
"( ) an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed 
forces across an international border, but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regu-
lar forces, 'or its substantial involvement therein' " 
And it continued 143 
"The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks 
may apply also to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if 
such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed 
attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces 
But the Court does not believe that the concept of 'armed attack' includes not only acts by 
armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the 
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support Such assistance may be re-
garded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs 
of other States" 
The Court thus establishes a dichotomy between uses of force or acts of intervention which consti-
tute armed attacks and those which do not The former comprises action by regular forces across 
international borders and the sending of armed bands which carry out acts of armed force of such 
particular gravity as to amount to an armed attack (or a State's substantial involvement therein) The 
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latter consists of uses of force or acts of intervention amounting to assistance to rebels in the form of 
the provision of weapons and/or logistical or other support The one kind does give rise to a right of 
self-defence, while the other kind would not,44 
However, matters are complicated due to the Court's claim that ,4S 
"While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self-defence, a use of 
force of a lesser degree cannot, as the Court has already observed (paragraph 211 above), 
produce any entitlement to take collective counter-measures involving the use of force The 
acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to have been established and imput-
able to that State, could only have justified proportionate counter-measures on the part of the 
State which had been the victim of these acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica 
They could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State, and particularly could not 
justify intervention involving the use of force " 
A few conclusions can be drawn from this statement First, that an armed attack gives rise to a right 
of collective self-defence Secondly, that a use of force of a lesser degree than an armed attack does 
not give rise to a right to take collective counter-measures involving the use of force Thirdly, that 
such uses of force of a lesser degree do in fact give rise to a right of States to take, for themselves, 
proportionate countermeasures 
What is meant by "proportionate countermeasures" is not defined by the CourtI4S The term 
"countermeasure" is generally reserved for measures not involving the use of force, but the conclu-
sion seems inescapable that the Court acknowledges the right of a directly injured State to use force 
in regard to uses of force and/or acts of intervention which do not constitute an armed attack If that 
is truly the case it is difficult to see how such an entitlement could be characterized other than as a 
right of individual self-defence It cannot be denied that a right of individual self-defence exists also 
with regard to frontier incidents and isolated attacks on the military forces of a State One would 
think that such defence could be carried out also, under certain circumstances, on the territory of the 
State whose forces first attacked l47 To name such acts of defence proportionate countermeasures 
would be a misnomer Countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act generally need 
not be resorted to immediately Reactions to frontier incidents on the other hand, involving a cross-
border use of force, must take place at once Should the fighting have stopped and no foreign troops 
remain on the territory, an injured State can no longer invoke a right to use force across the interna-
tional border Ultimately the Court appears to make a distinction between uses of force of a lesser 
degree that give rise to a right of individual self-defence, and uses of force constituting an armed at-
tack which give rise, over and above the right of individual self-defence, to a right of collective self-
defence l4e The right laid down in article 51 of the Charter would then by definition only concern the 
latter category of uses of force, since it provides for a right of collective self-defence 
That a right of individual self-defence would exist in response to uses of force falling short of an 
armed attack does not come as a surprise The Court, however, in the consideration quoted at the 
beginning of the previous paragraph, spoke of the alleged acts imputable to Nicaragua conceivably 
justifying proportionate countermeasures on the part of the victims of such acts, notably El Salvador, 
Honduras or Costa Rica To the extent that such countermeasures could involve a cross-border use 
of force on the part of Honduras and Costa Rica, this could be viewed as the exercise of a right of 
individual self-defence 149 
The same cannot as easily be said in relation to the alleged Nicaraguan acts regarding El Salvador In 
the abstract the Court had stated that the concept of an armed attack does not include "assistance to 
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support" IS0 In this particular 
case the Court only discussed the alleged, though subsequently proven as between July 1979 and 
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early 1981, provision of arms by Nicaragua to the opposition in El Salvador ' As to the kind of 
breaches of obligation such support (provision of arms, logistical or other) would amount to, the 
Court, again in the abstract, noted that they could be considered uses of force or intervention in the 
internal or external affairs 1SI The Court nowhere elaborates which kind of support would amount to 
a use of force, and which kind ought to be considered intervention However, it may be deduced that 
the arming and training of irregular forces or armed bands, if the purpose is incursion into the terri-
tory of another State, would constitute a threat or use of force1H The Court claimed that support in 
the order of financing, intelligence, logistics, and even humanitarian assistance if rendered on a dis-
criminatory basis, constitutes intervention in the internal or external affairs IS4 
It may be wondered whether the arming and training of irregulars or armed bands should be consid-
ered a use of force It may reasonably be argued that this may amount to a threat to use force One 
may hesitate to conclude that such acts would give rise, by themselves, to a right of individual self-
defence That would open the door, for instance, to allow a State to engage in air strikes against 
training camps in another State The situation changes, one would think, where the irregulars or 
armed bands are caught crossing the border In such cases a right of individual self-defence, involv-
ing a cross-border use of force, may be exercised, subject however to requirements of necessity and 
proportionality 
Taking the issue back one would have to say that the Court's construction of the customary rules 
related to the use of armed force appears to accord with the Commission's view that injured State 
status accrues to all States only on the basis of the international crime of aggression And the Com-
mission has advocated this example only in relation to a serious breach of an essential obligation for 
the maintenance of international peace and security The serious breach mentioned m article 19, 
paragraph 3 (a), Part One, of the ILC-draft, must involve a transgression of the prohibition of ag-
gression It stands to reason then that the need for a serious breach is tantamount to posing the re-
quirement of an armed attack If such a serious breach occurs all States would be endowed with 
injured State status entitling them to resort to countermeasures and, since there is an armed attack, 
to take military action as an exercise of collective self-defence Should a use of force fall below the 
threshold of an armed attack, only the State affected by the use of force in question will be entitled to 
react thereto by means of countermeasures and armed force as an exercise of individual self-
defence 155 
The object of self-defence 
It has been argued, notably by judge Schwebel,15* that the overthrow of an aggressor government 
may be a necessary and proportionate act of self-defence This raises the question of the object of 
self-defence The text of article 51 of the Charter may usefully serve as a starting point for remarks 
on this score Nothing in the Charter, so it stipulates, shall impair "the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" The right 
of self-defence, as noted earlier, exists only in relation to an armed attack Furthermore, the use of 
force resorted to as an exercise of the right of self-defence must be directed against the armed at-
tack The justification for any use of armed force under the Charter or customary rules lies with the 
necessity of defence against attack Nothing more, nothing less Any use of force must have as a goal 
to obtain reparation Yet the goal to be reached by resorting to force as an exercise of the right of 
self-defence is limited by the ordinary meaning of the word 'defence" In essence then resort to the 
use of force as an exercise of the right of self-defence must be guided towards the cessation of 
wrongful conduct, that is, it must counter the armed attack Should the attack have stopped, there is 
276 CHAPTER 5 
no longer any necessity to defend oneself, and consequently the right of self-defence will have been 
extinguished. 
However, it is tempting and to some extent unavoidable to link the right to self-defence to the 
substantial right of territorial integrity possessed by the injured State. To the extent that the injured 
State's territory, or any part thereof, remains occupied by the State that initiated the armed attack, 
the right to self-defence is left unimpaired. 
Certainly it would be an absurd and unreasonable interpretation of the law to state that a State's right 
to self-defence would have lapsed on the basis that hostilities had ended and the injured State no 
longer possessed the means to fight on Practically the consequence of such a situation would be an 
impossibility for the injured State to continue any defence Legally on the other hand the injured 
State's right of individual defence is matched by the complementary right of collective defence If the 
injured State finds (an)other State(s) willing and capable to continue its defence measures, those may 
be undertaken as an exercise of the right of collective self-defence. This was of course the position of 
Kuwait after Iraq's invasion and occupation of its territory.157 Its defence was immediately taken 
over by the United States and others. 
The right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attacks constitutes a power to take 
such military measures to impose upon the author State a withdrawal of its occupation forces It thus 
amounts to the right of the directly injured State and others to forcibly effect restitution in kind and 
impose upon the author State respect for this specific reparation obligation This argument is but-
tressed by the consideration that the circumstances under which a right of self-defence can be exer-
cised only constitute circumstances precluding wrongfulness in relation to measures which would 
otherwise be considered wrongful. Since every State has a force monopoly regarding its own terri-
tory, any force resorted to against invading or occupying forces on the injured State's territory 
would not need any separate justification under international law Only force resorted to on the terri-
tory of the author State is in need of the justification of self-defence ise 
It is frequently argued, though not without limitations, that the right to self-defence may be exer-
cised by the injured State also to ward off future attacks by the author State That claim is surely 
correct insofar as the cross-border use of force by the injured State would be directed towards fend-
ing off impending attacks by the author State in cases in which it could not be said that hostilities had 
ended ,59 
What should be understood by "future" attacks?'60 Would the goal of prevention of future attacks 
include, for instance, forced execution of the reparation obligations to provide guarantees against 
repetition? If that were the case an almost unrestricted right to use force would exist for a State act-
ing in self-defence against an armed attack As noted in chapter three the author State of an interna-
tional crime is under an obligation to change its government In such a light the State under attack 
would be entitled to continue measures for as long as the government of the author State had not 
stepped down and made way for another that was both more peace-loving and bore no blame for the 
attack in the first place Similarly the right to continue self-defence measures for the purpose of im-
posing respect for the obligations to provide guarantees against repetition would involve the right of 
the injured State to impose measures of disarmament. 
Although there exists a legitimate concern of the injured State to obtain assurances or guarantees 
against repetition, indeed it has the right to obtain those, it may be suggested that the use of force by 
a State in the exercise of a right of self-defence is not the appropriate means to execute the author 
State's obligations in this respect.161 It must be kept in mind that the right of self-defence constitutes 
an exception of a temporary nature to the otherwise existing near exclusive competence of the Se-
curity Council to resort to armed force. And exceptions must be interpreted restrictively. Indeed if 
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one were to claim the right to continue self-defence measures against future attacks generally, the 
limitless temporal sense of such an assertion could imply a right to use force even though the author 
State of the attack was in no position to contemplate further attacks. 
On the same level any right of the injured State to occupy, in whole or in part, the territory of an 
author State of the international crime of aggression, as a measure of self-defence, must be rejected. 
Naturally this does not mean that a defending State could not temporarily take hold of the territory 
of the attacking State as may be strictly necessary for purposes of self-defence. Similarly, but a forti-
ori, annexation of territory would, and could, not be justified as a measure of self-defence.161 
In conclusion it can be said that the objects of measures of self-defence must be defence against 
ongoing attacks, impending attacks in case hostilities have not ended, or the restoration of territorial 
status quo ante. This amounts, under the law of State responsibility, to the right to effect cessation 
and restitution in kind. Although the injured State may demand from the author State of an armed 
attack the performance of other reparation obligations, it does not possess the right to use force in 
order to effect or obtain such performance. 
Conditions under the Charter and customary international law 
The Court examined, in the Nicaragua Case, which conditions had to be fulfilled for the right of 
(collective) self-defence to be lawfully exercised. The basic condition for a lawful exercise of the 
right to self-defence, an armed attack, has been discussed above (subsection 5.5.1). The conditions 
of immediacy, necessity and proportionality will be addressed in subsection 5.7.1. The request for 
assistance, in case of collective self-defence, and the phrase "until the Security Council has taken 
measures" will be argued on in subsection 5.7.3. This leaves the discussion of the requirements of a 
report and the declaration of an armed attack for present consideration. 
The right of self-defence exists, and can be exercised, only in the presence of an armed attack. 
The Court added to this that:163 
"It is also clear that it is the State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and 
declare the view that it has been so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law 
permitting a State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own as-
sessment of the situation. Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected that 
the State for whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an 
armed attack." 
A few remarks are in order. In subsection 5.4.1 it has been argued that article 51 confers the power 
on an individual, or group of, State(s) to judge whether an armed attack exists. These observations 
of the Court provide a limit in the sense that the State under attack must form and declare the view 
that it is under attack. In the absence of such a declaration other States cannot exercise any right of 
collective self-defence. That proposition would appear to be unassailable. However, should this 
condition be fulfilled even if the attacked State had been overrun in such a short time that it had no 
opportunity to declare the existence of an armed attack? Ideally the Security Council would deter-
mine the existence of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, and would proceed to take meas-
ures for the restoration of international peace and security. However, the Council might be blocked 
by virtue of a permanent member's veto against such action. If that were to be the case the right to 
self-defence would not be impaired, since the Council would still not have taken measures in the 
sense of article 51. It is submitted that in such circumstances other States might assess the situation 
independently from the attacked State and exercise their right of collective self-defence. In the world 
today, considering the manifold communication channels, such a situation is luckily not likely to oc-
cur. 
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Following up on the preceding observations it may be noted that the Court held that, under cus-
tomary international law, the lawfulness of the use of force in self-defence does not depend on meas-
ures of self-defence being reported to the Security Council.164 It may be submitted that this is the 
case even insofar as the Charter is concerned. Thus the use of force in self-defence will not become 
unlawful merely because it has not been reported to the Council. The purpose of the requirement in 
article 51 is to enable the Council to assess for itself the existence of an alleged attack, and whether it 
should adopt measures under articles 39, 41 or 42. If there is an armed attack failure to report meas-
ures of self-defence may well constitute a breach of obligation under the Charter, but this will not 
render the use of force in self-defence unlawful. The decisive criterion of the lawfulness of the use of 
force in self-defence must lie with the existence of an armed attack. Additionally it may be noted that 
the Court treated the absence of a report to the Security Council as one of the factors indicating 
whether the State claiming to have acted in self-defence was itself convinced that it was acting in 
self-defence.165 
5.5.2. Security Council action under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter 
In the scheme of the Charter the Security Council is the organ which has been conferred the power 
to take military action in respect of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. 
In addition it possesses the power to authorize individual States, or regional arrangements or agen-
cies, to use of force. Individual States and regional arrangements or agencies have the right to use 
cross-border force only, autonomously, in cases of self-defence against armed attacks. The Security 
Council on the other hand can resort to, or authorize, force where there is only a threat to the peace, 
that is, in the absence of armed incidents or hostilities. As such it has been given the power to use 
force not only in case of a serious breach of an obligation essential for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, but also in regard to minor breaches, the threat of such breaches, or 
breaches of other obligations that might lead to such breaches. In relation to issues of State respon-
sibility this means that the Security Council's competence is not restricted to the international crime 
of aggression, but extends to all kinds of breaches of obligation to the extent that those affect the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
As reactions against illegal uses of force the Security Council can be said, first, to have taken 
military action itself; secondly, to have endorsed the use of force in self-defence; or thirdly, to have 
authorized the use of force. 
An example of the first category is that in which the Security Council has authorized peace-keeping 
forces to use force in circumstances going beyond self-defence in the strict sense. In resolution 161, 
paragraph 1, the Security Council urges the United Nations to take all appropriate measures, includ-
ing the use of force (if necessary, in the last resort) to prevent the occurrence of civil war in Congo. 
Resolution 169, paragraph 4, could arguably viewed as such, because it authorizes the Secretary-
General to use requisite force for the apprehension, detention and deportation of foreign military and 
paramilitary personnel in Congo. More recently UNPROFOR has been authorized to use force acting 
in self-defence against bombardments of, or incursions into, safe areas; against deliberate obstruction 
regarding its freedom of action in and around those areas; against the deliberate obstruction of pro-
tected humanitarian convoys; and to ensure its security and freedom of movement.166 
The only clear example of the second category is resolution 83 by which the Security Council rec-
ommended members to furnish such assistance to South Korea as necessary to repel the armed at-
tack by North Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. 
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE 279 
In a broad sense all the resolutions on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and on the former Yugoslavia authoriz­
ing States or regional arrangements or agencies to use force fall in the third category l 6 7 However, 
those concerning the former Yugoslavia need not detam us, since most of them are geared towards 
establishing humanitarian relief and cannot be regarded as responses to illegal uses of force Resolu­
tions providing for a limited use of force to ensure the effective application of embargo measures 
adopted under article 41 also need not be taken into account The only true examples of authoriza­
tions to use force in response to an illegal use of force lie with resolutions 678, 686 and 687 
It is noteworthy that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provides an example of the commission of the 
supreme international crime aggression It should not have come as a surprise then that resolution 
678 did not confine itself to authorizing the use of armed force for purposes otherwise associated 
with self-defence, but that the object for which force could be used was to uphold and implement 
earlier Security Council resolutions (especially 660) and to restore international peace and security in 
the area In effect the members co-operating with Kuwait could impose upon Iraq all those measures 
which could be considered necessary for the restoration of international peace and security in the 
area, provided of course that such measures would relate, and amount, to the implementation of 
Iraq's responsibility As argued in chapter three, on reparation for international crimes, the author 
State's secondary obligations regarding guarantees against repetition could include the reconstitution 
of government and of armed, paramilitary or police forces, disarmament, and the conviction and 
punishment of those responsible for the commission of the crime As rightly noted by some the terms 
of resolution 678 would have justified a "march on Baghdad" to overthrow Saddam Hussein's re­
gime,168 as well as the imposition of a regime of military occupation so as to ensure the effective im­
plementation of Iraq's responsibility in the field of guarantees against repetition 
In the event neither the Coalition forces, nor the Security Council, did go as far as that Resolution 
686, in the preamble, noted Iraq's agreement to comply fully with all previous Council resolutions, 
the suspension of all offensive combat operations by the Coalition forces, and the intention of the 
States of the Coalition to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent 
with the objectives of resolution 678 In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the former resolution the Council set 
out a number of demands with which Iraq had to comply These were that it had to rescind its ac­
tions to annex Kuwait, accept its responsibility, release Kuwaiti and foreign nationals and any re­
mains, return Kuwaiti property, cease hostile and provocative acts, designate military commanders in 
order to arrange for military aspects of a cessation of hostilities, provide access to and release pris­
oners of war and remains, provide information on mines, booby traps, explosives, and chemical and 
biological weapons in territory occupied by Coalition forces Paragraph 4 importantly recognized 
that as long as Iraq had not complied with paragraphs 2 and 3 the authorization to use all necessary 
means remained valid 
Resolution 687 contained a number of additions with regard to the demands made of Iraq under 
resolution 686 These concerned mostly measures of disarmament In paragraph 33 the Security 
Council decided that once Iraq officially notified its acceptance of the provisions of resolution 687 a 
formal cease-fire would be effective between Iraq and the Coalition forces It is to be noted that 
resolution 687 does not contain any paragraph similar to paragraph 4 of resolution 686 Paragraph 1 
comes closest in that it affirms "all thirteen resolutions above, except as expressly changed below to 
achieve the goals of this resolution" It might conceivably be argued that the authorization to use 
force has survived the adoption of resolution 687 1 № It is submitted that such is only partly the case, 
that is, only until Iraq communicated its acceptance of the terms of the resolution It is not unlikely 
that the effective implementation of Iraq's responsibility, especially on compensation, might take 
decades 17° It would be unreasonable to claim that the Coalition forces might for instance ten years 
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later invade Iraq to pressure it into fulfilling its compensation obligations Furthermore, it may be ar-
gued that since the establishment of the formal cease-fire between Iraq and the Coalition forces the 
Charter provisions on the peaceful settlement of disputes have regained their efficacy So the original 
disputes between Iraq and Kuwait and those arising directly from the crisis, or their settlement by 
way of Security Council resolution 687, must be solved through peaceful means Individual States 
can therefore only use force against Iraq if it launches another armed attack, or if the Security 
Council decides anew that an authorization to use force is necessary 
5.6. Resort to armed force in response to the international crimes of 
denial of self-determination of peoples and widespread 
breaches of basic human rights obligations 
5 6 1 The scope and content of the right of self-determination of peoples and the necessity of a 
connection to some of the other crimes of article 19 
Article 19, paragraph 3 (b), Part One, of the ILC-draft confirms that there is an international crime 
when there exists "a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safe-
guarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or 
maintenance by force of colonial domination" This formulation raises a number of difficult ques-
tions The first relates to the scope of the right of self-determination of peoples what is a people1? 
The second concerns the specification made "the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial 
domination" Does this mean that there would not be an international crime where the domination 
could not be said to be colonial in character? Thirdly, what is a people entitled to by virtue of the 
right of self-determination, that is, what would constitute a breach of obligation? In the fourth place, 
what should be considered a "serious breach" and what reach should be given to the words "by 
force"? The fifth question would be by what means can a people itself attempt to effect the realiza-
tion of its right? And finally, in the context of the use of force, by what means could States further 
the cause of a people unjustly denied the exercise of its right to self-determination This latter issue 
will be addressed in the following subsection Not all of these questions can be treated in depth 
Some pertinent remarks will be made though 
As to the definition of "people" no attempt is made in the commentary, or elsewhere, to identify 
characteristics in order to arrive at the conclusion that a certain group of individuals would constitute 
a people In the literature a number of elements are mentioned m a common historical tradition, ra-
cial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity, territo-
rial connection, and common economic life For a group of individuals to constitute a people some 
or all of those elements would have to be present 
As a follow-up one has to observe that the right to self-determination is said to apply to all peo-
ples The example mentioned of colonial domination has illustrative value only. The commentary 
makes clear that neither the categories of crimes listed, nor the specific examples mentioned in rela-
tion to any particular category, are meant to be exhaustive '71 
The third question concerns the content of the right of self-determination of peoples What obli-
gation would a State be under if a people lived on its territory? Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states on self-determination that173 "By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development " But what does it mean that peoples "freely determine their political status"? 
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Does this include the right to choose for independence and the creation of a new State? In other 
words does a people have the right to secede? 
The language of article 1 of the Covenant is reminiscent of resolution 1514 regarding self-
determination for colonial countries and peoples.174 There the goal was independence. However, by 
reason of its title already the Declaration only applied to colonial situations. Steps were to be taken 
(paragraph 5) in Trust Territories, Non-Self-Governing Territories, and other territories which had 
not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples and enable them to enjoy com-
plete independence and freedom. The operative word here is "territories". Only peoples living in a 
specific territory, under colonial domination, had to be enabled to freely determine their political 
status. In effect the Declaration, in paragraph 6, significantly stated that: 
"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations." 
Within the context of the Charter it may be a reasonable inference that a State which becomes a 
member of the United Nations does so as a territorial unit, and the fact that a people lives on a spe-
cific part of the territory may not lead to loss of such territory. It would seem rather inappropriate to 
allow a people to attempt to do what States themselves could not attempt to do. Some other resolu-
tions adopted by the General Assembly seem to lead to the same conclusion.175 
However, the picture is rather less clear, and in fact becomes muddy, if one reads the relevant sec-
tions of resolution 2625 on Principles of International Law.176 Under the heading of "The principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples" one may find the following: 
"The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration 
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people." 
By virtue of this provision a people is apparently entitled to make a free choice for the establishment 
of a new State. It must be noted that this implies, necessarily, that the creation of such a new State 
would take part on that part of the territory on which the people lives. That observation is bolstered 
by one of the subsequent paragraphs: 
"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus pos-
sessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without dis-
tinction as to race, creed, or colour." 
The obvious deduction must be, on the basis of a very strong a contrario argument, that if a State 
does not act in accordance with the principle of self-determination its territorial integrity may be put 
in jeopardy.177 The criterion for deciding whether such could justifiably be the case constitutes the 
absence of a "government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinc-
tion as to race, creed, or colour." It cannot but be noted that there appears to be a discrepancy be-
tween the two paragraphs quoted above. The first envisages the exercise by a people of its right to 
self-determination by means of a choice for, among others, the establishment of a sovereign and in-
dependent State. Under the second such a result could only come about if the whole people, includ-
ing especially the people that may claim the right to self-determination, is not adequately represented 
in the government. 
There are strong objections to this approach, and these bring us to the next questions. The crite-
rion of a "government representing the whole people" insufficiently takes into account that there may 
282 CHAPTER 5 
be, and are, differing degrees of seriousness characterizing denials of self-determination. Under arti-
cle 19, Part One, of the ILC-draft, only a serious breach of an obligation essential for safeguarding 
the right of self-determination will constitute an international crime. Can it really be said that the lack 
of a representative government would entail a serious breach of that obligation? In the past there 
have been, and in the present there still are, many governments which could not really be said to rep-
resent the people, let alone the "whole" people. It is therefore suggested that the absence of repre-
sentation in the political organs of a State alone should not be considered a serious breach of the 
obligation. Indeed, the essence of a denial of self-determination consists by definition in the denial of 
political rights for the people concerned. It is possible to go even further than that. The fact that such 
a lack of representation is due to discriminatory practices still would not entail the conclusion that a 
serious breach of the obligation to promote self-determination had taken place. Again, a denial of 
self-determination by definition involves discriminatory practices, on the political plane, in regard to 
the specific people. 
In this context the words "by force" featuring in regard to the establishment or maintenance of 
colonial domination deserve attention. As noted before (chapter two, section 2.6.1) the use of those 
words create the impression that the domination has to take place by way of armed force. The com-
mentary to article 19, however, has indicated that:178 
"The expression 'by force' should be understood as meaning against the will of the subject 
population, even if that will is not manifested, .or has not yet been manifested, by armed op-
position." 
It may be assumed that this explanation applies equally to the category of denials of self-
determination of peoples generally. This comment then makes it impossible to determine the differ-
ence between "ordinary" breaches and "serious" breaches of the obligation to promote a people's 
right to self-determination. To refer to the need of (colonial) domination similarly does not help. It 
may be assumed that domination takes place against the will of those dominated. If that were not so 
it would not be possible to speak of domination. In that sense the word "domination" has the same 
meaning as the meaning attributed by the Commission to the words "by force". It is submitted that in 
order to be able to distinguish between ordinary and serious breaches, and to do justice to the idea of 
international "crimes", the words "by force" should be understood to involve the application of 
armed, military, or physical force in regard to the people concerned.179 
These observations are reinforced by reference to considerations regarding the next question: by 
what means can a people attempt to realize its right to self-determination? To put it differently: un-
der which circumstances could one assert a people's right to armed resistance against authorities? 
The above quoted part of the commentary to article 19, Part One, notes that by force means against 
the will of the people "even if that will is not manifested, or has not yet been manifested, by armed 
opposition." Again: there is no indication that the words "by force" would not apply to denials of 
self-determination generally. So it seems, in the light of the commentary, that a people could have 
recourse to armed opposition whenever there is a denial of self-determination. In this context refer-
ence may be made once more to resolutions of the Security Council recognizing the legitimacy of 
struggles by peoples or liberation movements,180 and the urges to members to render moral and ma-
terial support regarding such struggles.181 Pertinent to this issue is again General Assembly resolution 
2625, in which it is noted that: 
"Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples (...) of 
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and 
resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, 
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such peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter." 
It is not too farfetched to claim that this provision only confirmed a people's right to resist against 
"forcible action".182 Clearly then there is no right to resist against non-forcible action. The central is-
sue is what should be considered "forcible action". Following in this respect the previous paragraph, 
this ought to be seen as resort to armed, military, or physical force only, affecting, by its very nature, 
individuals belonging to the people that is denied self-determination. That is not, however, where it 
ends. 
If a right to armed resistance does not exist generally for peoples suffering a denial of self-
determination, this implies that in a general sense the laws applicable within the territory must be 
obeyed.183 This does not mean that a people denied self-determination would have to stand idly by. 
But in the choice of means to effect the realization of self-determination they are limited to peaceful 
alternatives, such as campaigns of civil disobedience and the organization of demonstrations. This 
limitation would naturally not take away the right to defend oneself, in the individual case, against 
unlawful violent acts committed by authorities. 
Furthermore, a connection should be made specifically to breaches of basic human rights obliga-
tions. If armed opposition is legitimate only in response to the use of armed, military or physical 
force against individuals of a people, this implies that the acts of organs of the author State amount 
to breaches of basic human rights obligations. It is submitted that only breaches of obligation such as 
violations of the right to life, and of the right to physical and psychological integrity, ought to give 
rise to a right of resistance.184 Mere denial of political rights, such as the right to vote, to be elected, 
to express one's opinions, and to peaceful assembly, does not entail a right to armed opposition if 
such a denial is not coupled to resort to armed, military or physical force.185 It cannot but be noted 
that none of these rights are non-derogable under article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Admittedly derogable rights are subject to suspension only in cases of emergency 
which threaten the life of the nation. But the fact already that a distinction is made shows that some 
rights are considered more important than others. 
In addition, and in relation to the observation that a crime must involve elements of intent and 
premeditation, one would have to say that such breaches of basic human rights obligations in respect 
of individuals of a people ought to take place pursuant to government policies. Consequently they 
must be widespread and systematic and testify to government involvement in them or an unwilling-
ness or inability to do anything about them. If such is the case a right of armed opposition cannot be 
denied to a people targeted by an oppressive government or State. Where the breaches of basic hu-
man rights obligations in respect of a people are decidedly widespread and systematic and allow for 
the conclusion that a genocide is either attempted or in effect committed, the right to self-
determination includes the right to opt for the creation of a new State. Naturally such could only be 
the case if the geographical and demographical circumstances are such that a specific part of the 
territory is inhabited, in large majority, by the people concerned. The example of the Kurds in North-
ern Iraq imposes itself. 
5.6.2. Widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations and humanitarian intervention 
The question whether a State can intervene to put a stop to human rights violations has been dis-
cussed over and over again. Though most people would agree that something ought to be done 
about such situations, States themselves appear to have been reluctant to intervene for such pur-
poses. And if they did intervene they have tended to rely, exclusively or mainly, not on a right of 
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humanitarian intervention, but on other justifications (mainly self-defence). First some arguments will 
be devoted to issues under the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. In the 
second place a few observations will be made on proposed conditions. 
Under article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter members are prohibited in their international relations 
to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States, or inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations. That provision is complemented by article 2, paragraph 3, which 
stipulates that members shall settle their disputes peacefully in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice, are not endangered. The Charter, read in its entirety, clearly does not pro-
vide States with a unilateral right of humanitarian intervention. The only (unilateral) rights to use 
force come under the headings of self-defence, joint action by the permanent members for the pur-
pose of maintaining international peace and security (on behalf of the United Nations), or action 
against former enemy States. No other right is provided for under the Charter.186 There is no need 
here to present extensive argument on stances claiming that force used under the heading of humani-
tarian intervention would not be a prohibited use of force under article 2, paragraphs 3 or 4, of the 
Charter.187 Suffice it to say that humanitarian intervention in fact amounts, at the very least, to the 
forced settlement of disputes contrary to article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter. It is not redundant to 
note that any use of armed force across international frontiers, for whatever purposes,188 endangers 
international peace and security (if not necessarily justice). Since the Charter does not recognize any 
right of humanitarian intervention the existence of any such right could only be based on a rule of 
customary international law. As noted above (subsection 5.2.4) the rules of customary international 
law existing prior to 1945 have not survived the coming into force of the Charter.189 Whether it is 
possible to say that such a rule has come into existence since will be discussed next. 
In subsection 5.2.4 it has been observed that the Court did not deny that, in principle, a rule of 
customary international law might develop allowing a State to intervene by the use of armed force 
within the territory of another State. But it noted that for such a rule to develop would constitute a 
fundamental modification of the customary law principle of non-intervention.190 In applying the law 
to the facts of the case it further held:191 
"In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to re-
spect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to 
monitor or ensure such respect." 
It is not quite clear why the use of force could not be an appropriate method to ensure respect for 
human rights obligations. Indeed, should armed force be resorted to, and operations carried out in 
compliance with rules of humanitarian law, it could constitute the most effective means to bring 
about an end to human rights violations. Perhaps the Court made this statement exclusively in the 
light of the facts of the case. In that context it claimed that the humanitarian objective of protection 
of human rights could not be considered compatible with: '(...) the mining of ports, the destruction 
of oil installations, or again with the training, arming and equipping of the contras"191 
Be that as it may, it is difficult to see much in recent State practice that would allow for the conclu-
sion that a rule of customary international law exists, or is in the process of being created,193 justify-
ing unilateral humanitarian intervention. The most recent intervention by the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands in Northern Iraq for the protection of the Kurds, in the 
aftermath of the Gulf war, must be disregarded in view of the special circumstances surrounding that 
particular intervention.194 In addition to the insufficiency of State practice, opinio juris that such a 
practice could be based on an (allegedly) existing rule justifying humanitarian intervention appears to 
be lacking.195 Last but not least the already earlier mentioned trend within the Commission may be 
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recalled to the effect that the unilateral use of force would be restricted, even in case of crimes, to 
individual or collective self-defence l96 
However, the Commission, in its commentary to article 33, Part One, has hinted at the possibility, 
though not in so many words, that a state of necessity might be invoked in order to justify the cross-
border use of force in cases where there was a.197 
"(. ) grave and imminent danger to the State, to some of its nationals or simply to human be-
ings - a danger of which the territory of the foreign State is either the theatre or the place of 
origin, and which the foreign State has a duty to avert by its own actions, but which its unwill-
ingness or inability to act allows to continue." 
This has led some to assert that a State's use of force might be justified, under the heading of state of 
necessity, in order to protect its nationals in a foreign State,198 or to protect the author State's na-
tionals 199 
A preliminary remark would be that the Commission itself observes that after the Second World War 
(up to 1980) only one example of State practice existed, the 1960 Congo crisis, regarding which a 
State (Belgium) had claimed to be acting "in a situation of absolute necessity" 20° Although the state 
of necessity, as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, constitutes an open-ended category, it may 
be suggested that some more evidence of a "general practice" might be required to show that these 
kinds of cross-border incursions would come under the heading of a state of necessity 
Furthermore, in article 33, paragraph 1 (a), the Commission stipulates that a state of necessity cannot 
be invoked unless "the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State 
against a grave and imminent peril," In its commentary the Commission specifies that the essential 
interest at stake does not have to relate to the "existence" of the State M1 It also considered that it 
did not have to spell out, in the abstract, categories of essential interests202 It is not hard to imagine 
that violent attacks on a State's nationals in the territory of another State could constitute an essen-
tial interest2<a It is much more difficult to conceive that an essential interest of the State would relate 
to attacks by a State on its own nationals and on its own territory2M The fact that all States are in 
possession of a legal interest regarding such breaches of basic human rights obligations cannot be 
taken to mean that therefore an essential interest of a State is at risk By definition a State is not af-
fected by such breaches of obligation, and any interest it has in the matter flows from the nature of 
the rules concerned Of course certain obligations are essential for the protection of the fundamental 
interests of the international community But this does not signify that therefore States themselves 
are in possession of an essential interest which would warrant a use of force on their part to ward off 
any grave and imminent peril to such interest Certainly the current trend within the Commission 
testifies against any such possibility 
In conclusion it may be said that there does not exist, under customary international law, any jus-
tification, whether in the form of humanitarian intervention or state of necessity, that would validate 
a cross-border use of force for the protection of basic human rights of the nationals of the author 
State It may be opportune, nevertheless, to devote some argument to the conditions allegedly appli-
cable to intervention for the protection of the basic human rights of the author State's nationals 
Humanitarian intervention by a State allegedly would be justified if a number of conditions were 
met a relative disinterest on the part of the intervening State, the existence of an emergency situation 
in which especially the right to life is (about to be) violated on a massive scale; exhaustion of peace-
ful means, that is, intervention only as a last resort, the impact of the intervention upon the target 
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State would have to be confined to a minimum; and proportionality. Only some of these conditions 
will be discussed. 
A first remark concerns the alleged requirement of exhaustion of other means, including for in-
stance recourse to the mechanisms of human rights treaties and the Charter.2M It may be submitted 
that this by far constitutes the most unrealistic condition suggested by the proponents of a right of 
humanitarian intervention. If a situation develops in which there is a risk that the rights to life of in-
dividuals will be violated on a widespread scale, recourse to other means will most likely not lead to 
averting the risk. The situation in Rwanda in 1994 is typical in this respect. France, with the authori-
zation of the Security Council, intervened at the end of a massacre lasting already two and a half 
months at a point in time that most of the country had been taken over by the RPF. By that time, it 
has been estimated, over 500,000 people had been killed. If a situation of this magnitude develops, 
the obvious reaction would be to engage in a full-scale military intervention within a matter of days. 
Recourse to other procedures cannot be awaited. Although it might be possible to attempt to obtain 
a Security Council resolution authorizing the operation, the example of Rwanda again does not in-
spire much hope in this respect. After the outbreak of massacres on April 6th, 1994, the Security 
Council did not take any decisive action until June 22nd,207 when it adopted resolution 929 in which 
it authorized France to go ahead with its proposed intervention. By then, it cannot but be noted, it 
was too late. 
A second observation relates to the conditions of disinterest on the part of the intervening 
State,208 and the minimum impact on the target State. The goal of the intervention, so it is said, 
among others by Duke, is to protect human lives, and it is not to go beyond that purpose:209 
"Humanitarian intervention is however a response to the immediate needs of people and not 
an answer to the longer-term stability of a regime or country. The political solutions to human 
rights abuses are beyond the scope of humanitarian intervention and fall into the realm of 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. This is an important distinction, since, 
the moment humanitarian intervention is perceived to be part of a political solution, claims of 
neutrality and impartiality may be forfeited." 
Here we have the underlying cause of much misunderstanding: the idea that those applying and en-
forcing the law must remain neutral and impartial. It has to be understood that the law itself remains 
neutral only for as long as it is not transgressed. As soon as there is a (threat of) violation of the law, 
it provides the law enforcers with an authorization to do something about it: the threat or use of 
force against the author of the violation. There can be no doubt that it might be wise to remain neu-
tral. In national societies police forces generally may command overwhelming force that can be ap-
plied as against individuals. In the international community, in contrast, there is no equivalence of 
such overwhelming force that can, in a general sense, be applied to States. It is suggested, neverthe-
less, that those engaged in humanitarian intervention could not be expected to stand idly by while 
those responsible walk away from them, or even worse, prepare themselves to start off where they 
left. To impose conditions of neutrality and impartiality, minimum impact upon State structures, in-
tervention for the shortest time possible, and with as few troops as possible, implies that those re-
sponsible remain in power, that they continue to control the military command structures, in short, 
that no guarantees whatsoever exist that the crime(s) will not be repeated.210 
It has been argued, in chapter three, that the main difference between international delicts and in-
ternational crimes, insofar as reparation is concerned, should lie with the requisite guarantees against 
repetition. For the reasons stated those should include, in case of crimes, disarmament, implementa-
tion of individual responsibility, a change of government, and possibly also certain changes in the 
State's legal structures. Obviously, none of these will be forthcoming merely because they are de-
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manded. The threat of force alone will most likely not be sufficient. Only the actual use of force 
against, and subsequent occupation of, the author State will do. The tasks of peacekeeping, peace-
making and peace enforcement must be taken up by the intervening State(s), and taken over by the 
international community. 
5.6.3. Security Council action under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter 
In the recent past the Security Council has authorized the use of all necessary means in response to 
some crises which did not involve any cross-border use of force: Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.211 
Preliminary is the observation that the threats to international peace are not altogether obvious in 
those instances. 
In resolution 794 regarding Somalia the Security Council determined a threat to international peace 
and security on the basis of the magnitude of the tragedy (exacerbated by obstacles created to the 
distribution of humanitarian assistance). That alone, one would think, would not have threatened in-
ternational peace and security. The Council also recognized the unique character of the situation 
which required an immediate and exceptional response. The humanitarian tragedy was due, at least in 
part, to the fact that a civil war was raging and that there was a threat that Somalia might disinte-
grate. That prospect by itself could already be said to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. 
The situation in Rwanda would also not seem to qualify, at first sight, as a threat to international 
peace and security. However, an indication against any hasty conclusion in this respect would be that 
renewed fighting broke out, after the outbreak of massacres on a massive scale, between the Rwan-
dese Patriotic Front and government forces. Another circumstance is that the situation caused ex-
treme tension in Burundi, where the population is also divided in Hutus and Tutsis, with the latter in 
control of the army. Furthermore, at the time of adoption of resolution 929 a massive flow of refu-
gees, of Hutu origin, existed towards the bordering countries causing unrest and chaos. The French 
intervention to some extent calmed emotions and high strung nerves. 
The Security Council based its determination of a threat to international peace and security in reso-
lution 940 mainly on the breaches of the Governors Island Agreement and the Pact of New York,212 
the systematic violations of civil liberties in Haiti, and the plight of Haitian refugees. One would 
guess that the latter circumstance tended to cause international tension, as most of the refugees tried 
to reach the United States. It may not be farfetched to speculate that eventually the United States 
would have been tempted to intervene in Haiti, in disregard of its obligations under the Charter and 
customary international law, to put a stop to the refugee flow.213 This of course might constitute the 
basis for a Security Council determination that there exists a threat to international peace and secu-
rity. To some extent this is a twisted argument, since the measures would be taken against the refu-
gee creating State, even though the actual threat of armed intervention originated in another State. 
Nevertheless Security Council competence has to be recognized in such circumstances. 
One final observation needs to be made regarding the Security Council's punctilious tendency to-
wards neutrality and impartiality. In the heat of the crisis, with the Rwandese Patriotic Front fighting 
government forces and massacres being carried out by the Interhamwe, the Security Council de-
manded, by way of resolution 912 (paragraph 6), an immediate cessation of hostilities between these 
two parties and, admittedly, an end to the mindless violence and carnage. That demand is to be found 
also in later resolutions.214 Yet, as noted above, a people or the civilian population which is the target 
of widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations possesses a right of armed resistance. 
Similarly the armed opposition force, the Rwandese Patriotic Front, consisting mainly of Tutsis, 
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could not be denied the right to attempt to end the genocidal acts being committed against its people. 
The Security Council's demand for a cessation of hostilities, in addition to its demand for an end to 
the carnage, was therefore inappropriate. It may be suggested that instead it should have supported 
the Front's armed struggle and called upon States to provide material support to that effect. 
5.7. Restrictions regarding resort to armed force 
5.7.1. Restrictions regarding resort to armed force, multiplicity of injured States, 
and the organizational interest in armed force 
Restrictions based on the absence of specially affected States 
In chapter four, subsection 4.4.1, it was noted that breaches of obligation constituting a denial of 
self-determination and violations of human rights need not affect any State specifically. For that rea-
son the faculty of resort to countermeasures ought to be recognized to all States. However, as re-
corded in section 5.6, there does not exist any right of unilateral humanitarian intervention under 
international law, nor can the circumstance precluding wrongfulness "state of necessity" be invoked 
to justify the use of force in this respect. Clearly that is not because States would not be in posses-
sion of a legal interest regarding the breaches of obligations committed by the author State. Rather 
this is due to the Charter's harsh prohibitions regarding the use of force, and the fact that those have 
not been moderated by rules of customary international law providing for the possibility of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. Should a right of humanitarian intervention be established under custom-
ary international law it will accrue to all States individually, though doubtless the collective exercise 
of such a right will be preferred. In the meanwhile we are witnessing State practice inconsistent with 
the basic Charter prohibitions, and an opinio juris consistent with those prohibitions. While this 
writer would personally support, or even advocate, an intervention in particular instances, the legal 
justification for such an intervention will be found, still, to be lacking. 
Restrictions based on the presence of a directly injured State 
The international crime of aggression is the only one that always involves a directly injured State, 
which will by definition be the State that is the victim of an armed attack. The question arises 
whether States other than the directly injured State can exercise a right of collective self-defence in 
the absence of a request to that effect. The Court concluded in the Nicaragua Case, assuming the 
presence of an armed attack and a report by the victim State to the Security Council of its measures 
of self-defence, that:21* 
"(...) the requirement of a request by the State which is the victim of the alleged attack is 
additional to the requirement that such a State should have declared itself to have been at-
tacked." 
That statement by the Court was a logical follow-up to the Court's earlier observation that a State 
wanting to use force in collective self-defence could not do so on the basis of its own assessment.216 
If it could exercise a right to collective self-defence without any specific request to that effect by the 
State that is the victim of the attack, this would be tantamount to allowing it to assess the situation 
autonomously. The Court's remarks bear out that the right to collective self-defence constitutes an 
accessory right. It can only be exercised in a situations of armed attack by one State against another 
State and then on the latter's request only. 
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In the specific context of State responsibility for the commission of the international crime of ag-
gression, some observations by judge Jennings on collective self-defence are pertinent:217 
"It seems to be based almost upon an idea of vicarious defence by champions: that a third 
State may lawfully come to the aid of an authenticated victim of armed attack provided that 
the requirements of a declaration of attack and a request for assistance are complied with. But 
whatever self-defence means, it does not mean vicarious defence; for that way the notion is 
indeed open to abuse. The assisting State is not an authorized champion, permitted under 
certain conditions to go to the aid of a favoured State. The assisting State surely must, by 
going to the victim State's assistance, be also, and in addition to other requirements, in some 
measure defending itself. There should even in 'collective self-defence' be some real element 
of'self involved with the notion of defence. This is presumably also the philosophy which 
underlies mutual security arrangements, such as the system of the Organization of American 
States, for which indeed Article 51 was specifically designed. By such a system of collective 
security, the security of each member State is meant to be involved with the security of the 
others;" 
As a matter of Charter interpretation this proposition appears untenable. It may be acknowledged, 
and it is widely reported, that the reference to collective self-defence was inserted in the Charter to 
safeguard the mutual security arrangements in the Americas. At the same time it has to be noted that 
the provision on collective self-defence was not placed in Chapter VIII, on regional arrangements, 
but in Chapter VII. Yet inclusion in Chapter VIII would have sufficed to validate the collective 
"self-defence provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States. Moreover, the 
Charter of the United Nations itself constitutes a global collective security arrangement. Clearly the 
whole idea behind it is that each and every State has an interest in the security of any other State. 
True, for that reason States parties have conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security on the Security Council. The latter has been given the 
power to act on their behalf and to bind them legally to take action irrespective of whether they con-
sider their security to be in jeopardy.218 However, the inclusion of the provision on collective self-
defence in Chapter VII rather than Chapter VIII testifies to the possibility of vicarious defence. 
If one were to insist on a pre-existing link between the defending State and (an)other(s) coming to its 
rescue, the result would be that any State which had not in the past joined a mutual security ar-
rangement would not be entitled to receive assistance in self-defence.219 Such an outcome would be 
even less acceptable if the Security Council could not act under Chapter VII due to the exercise of a 
veto. The whole scheme of the Charter would fall to the ground, and a vanquished State would be 
obliterated because of the absence of a right to accept assistance in defence. 
Furthermore, the adoption of article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two of the ILC-draft, points in the same 
direction.229 It provides that, in addition, if the internationally wrongful act constitutes an interna-
tional crime, all States are injured States. That surely points to an interest of such States to respond 
to the crime by all lawful means open to them. Whether collective self-defence in the absence of a di-
rect and personal interest would constitute a lawful means is another matter. Yet within the Com-
mission it is often claimed that States can only resort to armed force as an exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence. It does not therefore seem that other injured States would be 
prevented from taking part in defence actions merely because they had not beforehand agreed to 
mutual assistance.221 
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Restrictions basedon the exerase of Security Council powers 
Article 51 of the Charter states that the right of individual or collective self-defence against an armed 
attack will not be impaired until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security The ordinary meaning of this phrase must be that the right of self-
defence will be impaired once the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security The right of self-defence will be impaired, so article S1 states, but this 
does not necessarily mean that the adoption by the Security Council of necessary measures will ter-
minate the right to self-defence It may be supposed however that the adoption of necessary meas-
ures will, as a minimum, lead to a suspension of the right to use force in self-defence222 What 
remains to be seen then is what should be considered necessary measures taken by the Security 
Council 
A preliminary remark concerns Greig's opinion that "necessary" measures must mean "effective" 
measures123 A relation is perhaps seen to exist with the purpose of article 1, paragraph 1, that the 
United Nations ought to "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats 
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" Equating 
necessary measures to effective measures would open the door to an interpretation that the right of 
self-defence would not be impaired for as long as the objectives set by the Security Council,224 or the 
objectives held by the State acting in self-defence, would not have been accomplished It may be as-
sumed that the objectives set by the Security Council will substantially match those held by the de-
fending State in particular the cessation of hostilities, the restoration of the territorial status quo 
ante, and the absence of any threat of further attacks Should one consider that the measures taken 
by the Security Council must be effective, this amounts to saying that the State defending itself can 
prolong its use of force in self-defence for as long as its objectives have not been accomplished 
However, as soon as the objectives of self-defence have been accomplished the right to self-defence 
lapses22S Requiring Security Council measures to be effective in order for the right to self-defence to 
be impaired, amounts, realistically speaking, to posing no restriction at all2I6 Only if the Security 
Council would set less far-reaching objectives would the right to self-defence be impaired before it 
could be terminated due to the accomplishment of objectives It would seem, in consequence, that 
one ought to reject any interpretation to the effect that Security Council measures must be effective 
in order to impair the right to self-defence 
Rather more important is the question what kind of Security Council measures would impair the 
right of self-defence A first remark would be that the mere adoption of a resolution by the Security 
Council does not qualify as a measure Secondly, it may be pointed out that a decision of the Secu-
rity Council requiring the attacking State to effect a withdrawal of its forces also could not be con-
sidered as such M7 Thirdly, in the light of the observations in the previous subsection, one would 
have to say that even if a demand for withdrawal by the Security Country was coupled to a demand 
for cessation of hostilities (the latter addressed to both States), this would still not impair the right of 
a State to use force in self-defence in order to restore the territorial status quo ante Such a demand 
for cessation of hostilities may constitute a decision of the Security Council which, in the words of 
article 25, members have agreed to accept and carry out Flouting a demand for cessation of hostili-
ties by the Security Council will constitute a breach of obligation under the Charter Yet it is submit-
ted that such a demand does not ipso jure entail an obligation to end resort to the use of force m 
self-defence Such an obligation could be said to exist only where there is no longer any attack, the 
absence of any territorial gains by the attacking State, and no threat of imminent future attacks 
Furthermore, any interpretation of the word "measures" in article 51 must take account of the fact 
that other Charter provisions mention this word on a number of occasions in a very specific manner 
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First there is of course article 39 which authorizes the Security Council to decide on the measures of 
articles 41 or 42 Secondly article 2, paragraph 7, makes a cross-reference to Chapter VII and its 
"enforcement measures" Thirdly article 50 mentions "preventive or enforcement measures" And 
fourthly there is article 94, paragraph 2, which authorizes the Council to decide on measures to give 
effect to a judgment of the Court Additionally it may be noted that the latter part of the second sen­
tence of article 51 provides that measures of self-defence taken by members "shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security " 
The action referred to must be read m conjunction with similar terms featuring m other provisions128 
All this points to an interpretation that Secunty Council measures capable of impairing the right of 
self-defence must be either measures adopted under article 41 or action resorted to under article 
42 И 9 
With regard to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis it has been claimed that resolution 678, which authorized 
the States co-operating with Kuwait to use all necessary means to implement earlier resolutions and 
to restore international peace and secunty in the area, was not necessary to justify the use of force 
against Iraq The Secunty Council had not taken the necessary measures, and the nght to self-
defence, so they say, could therefore still be exercised M 0 It has already been pointed out that the 
cntenon of effectiveness cannot serve as a guide for deciding whether the Council has taken the nec­
essary measures in the sense of article 51 It is hard to see how the measures adopted by the Council 
m resolution 661 would not be necessary measures They formed the basis of an almost complete 
isolation of Iraq If such measures did not constitute necessary measures, which would? One would 
have to say then that the measures adopted by way of resolution 661 led to the suspension of Ku­
wait's nght of individual or collective self-defence M 1 
That position is not affected by the fact that resolution 661 affirms, in the preamble, the nght of in­
dividual or collective self-defence in response to the armed attack by Iraq against KuwaitM1 Provi­
sions in preambles cannot give nse to either obligations or nghts If Kuwait could not exercise its 
nght of self-defence on the basis of Charter provisions, it certainly also could not do so on the basis 
of a preamble provision of a Secunty Council resolution It is possible to argue that the intent of the 
Secunty Council is relevant in deciding whether there have indeed been "necessary measures" ^ 3 
However, the terminology of article 51 does not contain any indication that the Secunty Council 
must express its opinion on whether the measures taken by it are necessary measures in the sense 
used in article 51 If the word "measures" is interpreted consistently as measures under articles 41 or 
42, the suspension of action in self-defence ensues automatically unless the Secunty Council decides 
that such action can still be taken The Secunty Council taketh, the Secunty Council giveth Such a 
decision, however, cannot be considered present on the basis of a mere preambular paragraph, but 
would have to be contained in one of the operative paragraphs 
Subsequent practice supports this interpretation Resolution 665, paragraph 1, called upon States co­
operating with Kuwait to use such measures commensurate to the circumstances to halt mward and 
outward shipping for purposes of implementation of resolution 661 Apparently a separate resolution 
was required to justify such force While this would not as such be decisive, resolution 678 
"authonzes" the States co-operating with Kuwait to use all necessary means to implement earlier 
resolutions and to restore international peace and secunty in the area As noted above the word 
"authonzes" implies that those authorized would not be authonzed to take action in the absence of 
such an authonzation In addition resolution 678 authonzes States to resort to force for purposes 
other than self-defence The object of self-defence is to defend against continuing or impending 
future attacks or to restore the terntonal status quo ante A use of force for purposes of 
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implementation of Security Council resolutions already would not qualify as self-defence. The use 
of all necessary means for the restoration of international peace and security in the area, quite 
arguably encompassing such measures as the overthrow of the Iraqi government, disarmament, and 
the prosecution of persons accused of crimes, could certainly not be justified under the heading of 
self-defence. 
In conclusion it may be said that the phrase "until the Security Council has taken measures neces­
sary for the maintenance of international peace and security" refers to the measures of articles 41 and 
42 If measures thereunder have been taken by the Council the exercise of the right to self-defence 
will be suspended unless the Security Council decides otherwise 
In relation to the other crimes, denial of self-determination and widespread breaches of human 
rights obligations, the question arises whether action by the Security Council will preclude unilateral 
action The answer will have to be in the affirmative It has been argued that States do not possess 
any right of unilateral intervention in respect of those crimes Whether or not the Security Council 
has in fact resorted to enforcement action makes no difference then Should the Security Council 
have authorized the use of all necessary means to achieve a certain purpose, that means that force 
cannot be used for other purposes Of course the Security Council provided Kuwait and member 
States co-operating with it with an almost blanket authorization to use all necessary means not only 
for the implementation of the twelve antecedent resolutions of the Council, but also to restore inter­
national peace and security in the area All the other Council authorizations to use force, for States, 
peacekeeping forces, or the Secretary-General, were less sweeping M S 
The relevance of such Security Council action lies in the circumstance that while the authorized party 
can resort to force, all those not so authorized cannot join in Thus, to use once again the example of 
resolution 678, only those member States co-operating with Kuwait could use force against Iraq 
Others, which had not offered any assistance, consequently were barred from taking forcible action 
against Iraq In the same line of thought it is to be noted that some authorizations are granted to 
member States,236 while others are conferred generally on StatesU 7 Obviously non-member States 
can partake in armed action only if the authorization relates to "States" 
5 7 2 General restrictions regarding resort to armed force 
Necessity and immediacy 
The condition of necessity assumes the utmost importance in relation to the question whether there 
is any need to envisage the use of force for the suppression of continuing international crimes Z№ In 
chapter four it was claimed that the right to resort to countermeasures could be exercised immedi­
ately in case of international crimes The basis for that observation lay with the intentional and pre­
meditated nature of the acts committed by the author State, and the resultant inability to obtain 
compliance with those reparation obligations most wanted It may not be exaggerated to claim that 
even the most comprehensive set of trade, communication, travel and diplomatic measures will not 
be sufficient to achieve the primary objective sought to be attained cessation of wrongful conduct It 
may be admitted such a claim cannot be absolute In the long run economic and other measures 
might result in discontinuance of crimes being committed Yet to pose a requirement to sit out a pe­
riod of time in order for economic and other sanctions or countermeasures to kick in would be to 
neglect that in the meanwhile irreparable harm will be done That such is the case may be illustrated 
especially by reference to the crime of widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations 
(especially genocide) But the argument may apply also regarding the crimes of aggression and de­
nial of self-determination if those are coupled to breaches of obligation under the basic rules of hu-
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manitarian and/or human rights law intended for the protection of the population (in occupied terri-
tories). 
It has been seen however, in the previous section, that international law does not allow for the uni-
lateral use of force to enforce reparation obligations based on the international crimes of denial of 
self-determination and widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations. It certainly is one of 
the most undesirable features of international law that even though the necessity of the use of force 
cannot be denied with regard to the suppression of those crimes, the state of the law does not allow 
such use of force. The crime of aggression, not by definition the most heinous one, on the other hand 
can be countered by way of individual and collective self-defence, and lesser uses of force by way of 
individual self-defence. 
With regard to the right of self-defence the argument has been made that its exercise is condi-
tioned by the requirement of immediacy.139 In a sense such a condition amounts to no more than 
saying that whenever an armed attack or use offeree has stopped there no longer exists any neces-
sity to use force in response.240 That stance cannot remain unqualified. First of all it implies that the 
only lawful purpose of self-defence is to repel the attack. As has been seen above the objects of self-
defence include the restoration of the territorial status quo ante and the fending off of impending at-
tacks.241 Whether the use of force is necessary depends on the circumstances,242 and especially on 
whether any foreign troops remain on the victim State's territory, whether actual fighting is going 
on, and whether there are indications that the author State intends to renew its aggressive policies. 
In the end the necessity of the use of force also depends on whether the injured State is capable of 
acting in self-defence but refrains from doing so. Eventually a claim to be acting in self-defence loses 
its credibility if no action has been undertaken for a considerable period of time. The example of the 
Falklands shows that it may take quite some time to organize action in self-defence.243 But clearly no 
condition of absolute immediacy could have been imposed regarding the British actions to regain the 
Falklands.244 
To the extent that an injured State is no longer capable of resisting the attack and (part of) its terri-
tory remains occupied, other States may come to the rescue. The logistical side of collective self-
defence operations may require time, yet the right to collective self-defence does not lapse merely 
because it is not exercised immediately. In this respect one would have to say that especially prepa-
ration for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, if announced within a reasonable period 
of time after the attack and occupation, prevents termination of the right. Suspension of the right of 
individual and collective self-defence may come about as a result of the Security Council adopting 
measures under articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. 
In chapter four, subsection 4.3.2, it was noted that the Security Council is not bound to pursue 
the Charter provisions on the peaceful settlement of disputes once it determines the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Similarly it was noted above in subsec-
tion 5.4.2 that the Security Council is not legally bound to pursue the non-military measures of arti-
cle 41 before taking or authorizing armed action. The Security Council's discretion as to whether 
specific action is necessary to achieve a certain goal cannot easily be challenged. One would think 
that a decision of the Council could not be assailed on the basis of necessity considerations, since any 
appraisal of necessity hinges on an evaluation not only of the present but also the future state of af-
fairs. Hypothetically speaking a decision of the Security Council to authorize the use of force against 
an aggressor State might conflict with considerations of necessity if that State was, at the time, ac-
tively withdrawing its forces from occupied territory, taking positions well off the frontier, and pro-
viding assurances of non-repetition.24S However, since the Security Council may involve itself with 
the whole gambit of reparation forms, including such guarantees against repetition as changes of 
294 CHAPTER 5 
government, the conclusion that the use of force would not be necessary might still not be reached If 
the Security Council authorizes certain States or organizations to use force to enforce its decisions, 
any such force resorted to must be necessary to attain the goals set by the Security Council Security 
Council practice in this respect shows that those goals may be very general, and consequently a 
broad competence to use force has been delegated at times 
Proportionality 
So far the Commission has envisaged the lawful use of force only as a measure of self-defence taken 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations (article 34, Part One, of the ILC-draft). In rela-
tion to the use of force in self-defence the Court has acknowledged, in the Nicaragua Case, that the 
condition of proportionality applies14* In chapter four, subsection 4 4 3, it was argued that the ap-
plication of the condition of proportionality must involve a comparison between the internationally 
wrongful act committed and the response thereto It was further stressed that the proportionality of 
countermeasures was not to be judged in relation to the aim sought to be attained For if that were 
the case the response would remain proportional to the wrongful act for as long as the aim 
(reparation) was not in fact obtained However, it may be noted that then special rapporteur Ago 
claimed in relation to self-defenceI47 
"The requirement of proportionality of the action taken in self-defence, as we have said, con-
cerns the relationship between that action and its purpose, namely ( ) that of halting and re-
pelling the attack or even, in so far as preventive self-defence is recognized, of preventing it 
from occurring It would be mistaken, however, to think that there must be proportionality 
between the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct The action 
needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to 
those of the attack suffered " 
It is submitted that the criterion to determine the (dis)proportional character of acts of self-defence 
should not lie with the goal of the measures First of all it may be noted that Ago seems to be saying 
that self-defence may acquire disproportionate dimensions in relation to the original attack One may 
wonder, if that is so, how one could still argue that proportionality functions as a restriction to the 
use of force in self-defence Furthermore, as self-defence by definition involves the right to engage in 
cross-border use of force, that would appear to account for his opinion that there might be dispro-
portionate dimensions However, if an attack is still continuing any use of force to halt and/or repel 
the attack, including the use of force at different sites than where the actual hostilities are taking 
place, would not appear to be disproportionateI48 
In the end it seems preferable to remain within the framework of a comparison between the interna-
tionally wrongful act (an armed attack) and the reaction thereto (acts of self-defence) taking into ac-
count the elements discussed in chapter four, subsection 4 4 3 Those were the degree of gravity of 
the wrongful act, the degree of fault on the part of the author State, and the importance of the rules 
at stake The first element involves the scale of the acts, effects, damage or injury done As to the 
second element it was pointed out that this concerned questions of negligence, wilful intent, or pre-
meditation The third element involves the importance of rules as evidenced by widespread ratifica-
tion of multilateral treaties, elevation to the rank of peremptory norms, and recognition of particular 
conduct as an international crime The question of occupation of territory is especially relevant in re-
lation to self-defence As long as territory of the injured State remains occupied force can be used 
against the author State to regain such territory Similarly the use of force to forestall impending at-
tacks in circumstances where hostilities have not come to an end ought not to be viewed as dispro-
portionate 
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In regard to Security Council action the obvious conclusion must be that any armed action it 
authorizes ought to be seen in relation to the goals set by it. Thus the proportionality of action 
adopted pursuant to an authorization depends very much on an evaluation whether such action could 
be considered apt to achieve the goals laid down in the resolution. As a matter of fact the condition 
of proportionality would appear to operate more strongly before any authorization is granted. That 
is, it takes on importance at the moment in time at which the Security Council has to decide whether 
or not the use of armed force would be the appropriate means to remedy a certain situation. This 
does not amount to an evaluation as to whether or not certain action is necessary. As pointed out in 
the previous subsection, whether or not specific action is necessary depends on whether other, less 
far-reaching, means could still be resorted to. The situation of Libya may serve as an example once 
more. On the assumption that the Council would have expanded the measures of article 41 so as to 
amount to a complete embargo against Libya, it might be argued that after a period of time there 
would be sufficient grounds to conclude on their inadequacy. Other, armed, action might be consid­
ered necessary then. However, though the gravity of alleged Libyan involvement in acts of terrorism 
cannot be denied, it is hard to see how its continued refusal to hand over the individuals suspected of 
having caused the crash at Lockerbie could justify armed action against it.249 If one were to reject the 
proposition that armed action could be taken as against Libya, whether unilaterally or authorized by 
the Security Council, that would be, not because such action would not be necessary, but because 
the use of force would be disproportionate in view of the circumstances. Naturally the conduct alleg­
edly imputed to Libya could not be said to constitute an international crime. 
In relation to international crimes the use of force authorized by the Security Council could cer­
tainly not be considered disproportional to the acts concerned. 
Resort to armed force, peremptory norms, and human rights 
Enough has been said already regarding the peremptory norm on the use of force against the territo­
rial integrity and political independence of States. It may be repeated here that only the attempted 
genocide on a specific people could lead to a disruption of the territorial integrity of a State, and that 
no State could be put into a position of subordination towards other States for reasons unrelated to 
the performance of international obligations (whether those originate from primary or secondary 
rules of international law). 
The peremptory norm regarding self-determination of peoples obviously places a restriction on 
the use of force to the effect that it may not be used to prevent a people from deciding on its own 
future. As such it constitutes, partly, the counterpart of the peremptory norm on the use of force 
against the political independence of States. 
In regard to issues of self-determination the previous section made clear that a people living 
within the territory of an existing State cannot claim the right to secede from that State and form its 
own State. Also it could not claim any general right of armed opposition against the government of 
that State. Only when the denial of self-determination constitutes serious breaches of obligation by a 
State, involving widespread and systematic breaches of basic human rights obligations regarding in­
dividuals of the people, is there any right of armed opposition. Should a State resort to force, either 
as a lawful exercise of the right to self-defence, or as an unlawful humanitarian intervention, it must 
refrain from using force to suppress a people's legitimate aspirations to self-determination. 
With regard to the peremptory norm stipulating respect for basic human rights obligations similar 
observations apply. A State resorting to force must refrain from violating basic human rights. It is 
here that a link exists with international humanitarian law. Any cross-border use of force brings into 
operation the conventional and customary rules and principles regarding hostilities between States. It 
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is to be noted moreover that those rules and principles function as special rules which take prece­
dence over the general rules of human rights law (lex specialis derogat legi generalis) 
The basic tenet of humanitarian law, enunciated for the first time in article 22 of the Regulations Re­
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, is that 2 S* "The right of belligerents to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited " One of the most important among the rules formulated m 
pursuit ofthat principle is the fundamental distinction between combatants and non-combatants2S1 In 
general terms it is possible to say that the use of force should as least as possible affect the civilian 
population2 5 2 In furtherance of specifically that cause a treaty has been drafted, namely the 1949 
Geneva Convention IV 2 S 3 
With regard to combatants the situation is generally different The rule protecting the right to life un­
der human rights law essentially does not operate in relation to persons taking part in hostilities 
Thus it is lawful for individuals that are part of the armed forces (in a broad sense) of a party to the 
conflict to (attempt to) tall persons forming part of the armed forces of the other party (and vice 
versa) Restrictions have been placed on this right both from a general and specific point of view 
Generally speaking persons can no longer be killed if they no longer take part in hostilities Such is 
especially the case if they are no longer in any position to do any harm, or if they have surren­
dered ^ 4 Specific restrictions have been established with regard to the means and methods of killing 
individuals of the armed forces of the opposite party These concern mostly restrictions regarding 
prohibited weapons 
5.8. Summary 
The scope of the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force in international law, whether under the 
Charter or customary international law, is quite comprehensive States are under the obligations to 
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
other States, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or contrary to the 
peaceful settlement of disputes However, in contrast with the rule prohibiting the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of States, the rule prohibiting the use of 
force to settle disputes does not constitute a peremptory norm The Charter provisions allowing the 
use of force, basically articles 42 and 51, replaced the rules of customary international law in that re­
spect It is possible, though, that other derogations from the prohibition on the use of force have 
come, or will come, into existence under customary international law 
The considerations in section 4 2 1, chapter four, apply mutati ι mutandis to the function of resort 
to armed force However, m contrast to the function of countermeasures, the function of resort to 
armed force constitutes the forced settlement of reparation disputes between the injured State and 
the author State On the other hand resort to countermeasures constitutes a general option in re­
sponse to internationally wrongful acts Resort to armed force, in self-defence, constitutes an excep­
tional option for States In contrast armed force may be resorted to, generally, by the Security 
Council 
The basic precondition for the lawful resort to armed force lies, as with the lawful resort to 
countermeasures, with the prior commission of a wrongful act As an armed attack will necessarily 
constitute a breach of obligation, as a minimum, under article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, the re­
sort to force m self-defence is based, if only provisionally, on a determination of a wrongful act on 
the part of the author State Similarly the Security Council possesses the competence to determine 
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and as such does not 
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need to have recourse to the Court in order to establish the existence of an internationally wrongful 
act Due to the intentional, wilful and premeditated character of breaches of obligation constituting 
international crimes there is no need, for either injured States or the Security Council, to demand 
reparation or resort to dispute settlement procedures prior to the use of armed force against the 
author State As such resort to armed force should be considered typical in case of crimes Resort to 
armed force during arbitral or judicial proceedings is not prohibited just because of the existence of 
such proceedings 
As a matter of Charter interpretation resort to armed force by the Security Council must be pre-
ceded by a determination under article 39 of the Charter In deciding on the measures necessary to 
restore international peace and security the Council is not bound to resort to article 41 before taking 
action under article 42 Nor is it bound to refrain from taking action under article 42 until the meas-
ures adopted under article 41 would have proved to be inadequate In view of the lack of the agree-
ments envisaged in article 43, however, the Security Council cannot generally resort to action under 
article 42 
The interpretation of article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter, shows that the General Assembly pos-
sesses the competence to recommend the use of armed force if the Security Council is not exercising 
its functions under the Charter As the Assembly cannot decide on action, the lawfulness of armed 
force resorted to pursuant to a recommendation depends on the presence of a legal basis under the 
Charter or customary international law The same argument applies to Security Council recommen-
dations The practice of the Security Council shows that it can, analogous to the provision of article 
53, paragraph 1, on regional arrangements, authorize individual members of the United Nations to 
resort to armed force However, no obligation can be inferred to actually resort to force in pursuit of 
such an authorization 
In view of the Court's statements in the Nicaragua Case a right to resort to collective self-defence 
can be asserted only against an armed attack Where a use of armed force, whether earned out by the 
regular armed forces or by armed bands, is not of sufficient gravity, only a right of individual self-
defence can be exercised In the light of article 19, paragraph 3 (a), Part One, and article 5, para-
graph 3, Part Two, of the ILC-draft on State responsibility, only an armed attack should be consid-
ered a crime of aggression giving rise to injured State status for all States The object of self-defence 
must be to impose performance of the author State's obligations regarding cessation and restitution 
in kind To the extent that hostilities are continuing, force may be resorted to to fend off impending 
attacks A right of collective self-defence can be exercised only if the victim State declared itself un-
der attack (provided it had not been overrun) Such a State must also report to the Security Council, 
though failure to report will not invalidate any action taken in self-defence 
In contrast the Security Council's competence under article 39 extends to all kinds of uses of force, 
whether of minor importance or not, and to breaches of obligation which could lead to such uses of 
force The Security Council can authorize the use offeree to maintain or restore international peace 
and security In contrast to the object to be pursued by force in self-defence, resort to force under 
the authority of the Security Council may involve the forced implementation of all the author State's 
reparation obligations 
A denial of self-determination implies the denial of the political rights of the individuals of a peo-
ple on a discriminatory basis For that reason a serious breach of obligation for safeguarding the right 
to self-determination exists only if a State is violating, on a widespread scale and in a systematic 
fashion, the basic human rights of individuals of a specific people If such is the case the people con-
cerned has a right of armed assistance against the authorities of the author State Should the conduct 
of authorities of the author State allow for the conclusion that genocide is attempted or has been 
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committed, the targeted people may, subject to geographical and demographical factors, exercise its 
right to self-determination and opt for the establishment of a new State 
At present there does not exist any rule of international law, whether in the form of humanitarian in-
tervention or state of necessity, that would justify a cross-border use of force to stop the commission 
of human rights violations in another State A right of humanitarian intervention in response to wide-
spread breaches of basic human rights obligations ought to exist under international law However, in 
such a case one should not require the exhaustion of other means, nor that it should be undertaken 
for the shortest possible of times and with a minimum impact on the State organization In the long 
run all the reparation obligations of the author State of a crime, especially those on guarantees 
against repetition, must be implemented 
The Security Council has determined a threat to the peace regarding the crises m Somalia, Rwanda 
and Haiti Though the threats to "international" peace cannot be said to have been overly obvious 
regarding those situations, the competence of the Security Council must be recognized regarding 
these kinds of emergencies 
No restriction on the basis of the absence of specially affected States would apply to the right to 
resort to force, if such a right were to come into existence, m response to the crimes of denial of self-
determination and widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations Regarding the crime of 
aggression the presence of a directly injured State leads to the restriction that other States' resort to 
force must have been requested Furthermore, and also in relation to the crime of aggression, it may 
be said that the right of self-defence can be exercised only for as long as the Security Council has re-
frained from taking measures under articles 41 or 42 of the Charter 
The requirements of immediacy and necessity must be evaluated in the light of the objects of self-
defence, especially whether the use of force is still continuing, whether territory of the directly in-
jured State remains occupied, and whether a renewal of aggressive policies on the part of the author 
State is imminent Since the Security Council may involve itself with the whole gambit of reparation 
obligations, the argument that an authorization to use force is not necessary cannot easily be made 
The proportionality of the use of force must take into account the elements discussed in chapter four, 
namely the gravity of the wrongful act, the degree of fault on the part of the author State, and the 
importance of the rules at stake The evaluation of proportionality of action by the Security Council 
is relevant especially before any action is implemented Thus it would be hard to envisage, for in-
stance, that the Security Council would authorize the use of force against Libya notwithstanding the 
obvious inadequacy of measures under article 41 of the Charter 
The use of force may not lead to situations contrary to those desired under peremptory norms Re-
sort to the use of force must not, generally, lead to the disruption of the territorial integrity of the 
author State, to domination over it unrelated to the performance of obligations, to the suppression of 
legitimate aspirations of a people to self-determination, or to violations of the basic rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law 
Disputes or questions regarding the matters discussed m this chapter or those of the other chap-
ters may call for adjudication by the Court That brings us to the next chapter 
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meaning resulting from the application of article 31 It is not clear what should happen if the meaning flowing 
from the preparatory works contradicts the ordinary meaning of the terms employed in the treaty Judge Schwebel 
has addressed this issue See Dissenting Opimon Schwebel, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, ρ 6, 31-32 and 39 
Though he appears to grant precedence to the demonstrated lack of common intentions of the parties in the 
preparatory works, it may be submitted that in the particular case at hand, the interpretation(s) of the Doha 
Minutes, the disputed phrase did not cany with it any specific ordinary meaning Recourse to the preparatory 
works should have been based on the fact that the înterpretation(s) under article 31 left the meaning ambiguous 
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and obscure The purpose of such recourse would have had to be to determine the meaning rather than to confirm 
it Note Dissenting Opinion Shahabuddeen, ibid , 58 (more broadly 55-59) to this effect 
" Bowett, Self-Defence, 150-152, Brownlie, International Law, 265-268 
1 7
 С f Bowett, Self-Defence, 152, Virally, Article 2, Paragraphe 4, 117 and 125 Apparently contrary Brownlie, In­
ternational Law, 265-268, Verwey, W, Humanitarian Intervention under International Law, 32 NILR 1985, pp 
357^18, 379-380, 389, and 406 
" Ronzini, N , Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985, 8-9, Implicitly Schachter, О, The Lawful Use of Force by a State 
against Terrorists m Another Country, 19 IYHR 1989, pp 209-231, 213-214 and Schachter, О, Just War and 
Human Rights, 1 PUSL YIL 1989, pp 1-19, 5-6, Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), 117-118 Verwey, Humanitarian In­
tervention, 406, expresses the view that arguments supporting an extensive interpretation of the prohibition of ar­
ticle 2, paragraph 4, are more convincing 
" Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the Umted Nations, First Principle (States shall refrain in their international rela­
tions from the threat or use efforce against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations) Note also that the Definition of Aggression, 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), states "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, ( ) " 
м
 С f Nicaragua Case, Merits, 100 "The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood 
merely that of a 'reiteration or elucidation' of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter On the contrary, it 
may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rales declared by the resolution by them­
selves" 
1 1
 Goodrich, L, and Hambro, E , Charter of the Umted Nations, Commentary and Documents, Second and Revised 
Edition, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1949, 104-105 
2 2
 Especially Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
their Independence and Sovereignty, General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), and Bowett, Self-Defence, 42-50 
2 3
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 108 
2 4
 Observations Kellogg, Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Second Phase), Publications 
PCIJ, 1930, Senes A, No 24, ρ 4, 41, Goodrich and Hambro, Charter, 105, observe "Clearly the 'political inde­
pendence' of a state is in fact violated if a state is coerced through the threat or use of force by a more powerful 
state into taking action which it would not otherwise take " 
2 5
 Lotus Case, Judgment, 18 
2 6
 Brownlie, International Law, 268, Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 381 
2 7
 Though one might consider the situation, in relation to the Kurds, prevailing m Turkey and Iraq to come close to 
such an hypothesis Turkish action, however, appears not to involve the Iraqi Kurds, but only the Turkish Kurd 
armed opposition 
M C f Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 381-383 
"Eg Merrills, J, The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in Lowe, V, and Warbnck, С (Eds), The 
United Nations and the Principles of International Law, Essays in memory of Michael Akehurst, Routledge, Lon­
don, 1994, pp 49-65, and Tomuschat, С , Article 2(3), in Simma, The Charter, pp 97-106 The latter mentions 
that measures inconsistent with the ban of article 2, paragraph 4, are not peaceful 
3 0
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 145, Brownlie, International Law, 113, Charpentier, J, Article 2, Paragraphe 3, in Cot 
and Pellet, La Charte, pp 103-113, 103-105, and Virally, Article 2, Paragraphe 4, 116 See also Gray, С , The 
Principle of Non-Use of Force, in Lowe and Warbnck, The Umted Nations, pp 33-48 
3 1
 Arangio-Ruiz. G , Fourth Report on State Responsibility, 12 May 1992, A/CN 4/444, 40 pp , 25 Note also the ar­
guments recorded in Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 378-379 and 383 
3 2
 Note also especially Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, A/RES/37/10 
Charpentier, Article 2, Paragraphe 3, 106, observes "( ) il est relativement indifferent à la Charte que les Etats 
trouvent une solution à leur différends ce qui lui importe, c'est que ces différends ne s'enveniment pas au point de 
les conduire à les régler par la force " 
Note its place in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 2625 
(XXV), also Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 378-379 and 183 
" Goodnch and Hambro, Charter, 102, note "Interpreted in the light of paragraph 4, this principle would seem to 
prohibit any method of settlement involving the use offeree short of war The use of armed reprisals, for example, 
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is not to be regarded as a peaceful means, though technically it may not be war " See also Bowett, D , Reprisals in­
volving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AJIL 1972, pp 1-36 
3 6
 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, A/RES/37/10 
3 7
 Nationalities Decrees in Turns and Morocco, Publications PCD, Senes В, No 4, 23-26 
3 8
 Charpentier, Article 2, Paragraphe 3, 109 
3 9
 On situations and disputes see Kelsen, H, The Law of the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1951, 359-362 Charpentier, Article 2, Paragraphe 3, 108, observes 
"La notion de différend implique donc un objet suffisamment circonscrit Mais elle implique aussi des parties, en-
tre lesquelles a surgi une divergence de points de vue," 
40
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 92-97 
41
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 97-102 
42
 Operative paragraph 4 bears witness to this absence of differentiation, as it stated that the United States had "acted, 
against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force 
against another State," Nicaragua Case, Ments, 146-147 In the same vein it quoted indiscriminately from General 
Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) Ibid, 101-102 
43
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 106-111, 123-127, and 130-135 
44
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 123-124 and 130-135 The Court observed, moreover, that the goal of the Contras was the 
violent overthrow of the Nicaraguan government 
48
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 18-20 
46
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 145 
47
 Commentary Article 50, Law of Treaties, YBILC 1966, Volume II, pp 247-249, 247 Generally Dinstein, Y , War, 
Aggression and Self-Defence, Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge, 1988, 98-103 
48
 Nicaragua Case, Ments, 100 The Court referred to the apparently concurring views of the parties to the case in 
this respect Ibid, 100-101 С f Thirlway, H, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-
1989 (Part Two), 61 BYBIL 1990, pp 1-133, 108-110 
4
' Text and Commentary Article 33, Part One, YBILC 1980, Volume II, Part One, pp 34-52, 44 The Commission 
contemplated that there might be situations in which conduct infringing the territorial sovereignty of a State would 
not be necessarily considered acts of aggression It referred to (ibid and 43) "( ) incursions into foreign territory 
to forestall harmful operations by an armed group which was preparing to attack the territory of the State, or in 
pursuit of an armed band or gang of criminals who had crossed the frontier and perhaps had their base in that for­
eign territory, or to protect the lives of nationals or other persons attacked or detained by hostile forces or groups 
not under the authority and control of the state, or to eliminate or neutralize a source of troubles which threatened 
to occur or to spread across the frontier " Ibid ,43-44 In support Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 416-417, 
and Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force, 227-228 
5 0
 Charpentier, Article 2, Paragraphe 3, 105, and also 112 In his opimon this is because a proposal (related to the 
Declaration on Fnendly Relations), to the effect that the pnnciplc on the peaceful settlement of disputes constituted 
the expression of a universal conviction of the international community, was rejected Such denial of jus cogens 
status was due, in his opimon, because (ibid, 105) "( ) les Etats ont sans aucun doute voulu sauvegarder le large 
pouvoir discrétionnaire que leur laisse, comme nous le venons, le texte de l'article 2, paragraphe 3, sur le choix de 
moyens et sur l'appréciation des résultats " 
51
 Fischer, G, Article 42, in Cot and Pellet, La Charte, pp 705-716, 709 
52
 С f Certain expenses of the Umted Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Re­
ports 1962, ρ 151, 164, in which the Court noted that article 11, paragraph 2 "( ) in its first sentence empowers 
the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or to the Security Council, or to both, to organize 
peace-keeping operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concerned " Emphasis added 
5 3
 Definition of Aggression, General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), article 3 (e), Text and Commentary Article 
29, Part One, YBILC 1979, Volume II, Part Two, pp 109-115,113 
5 4
 Expenses Opimon, 168 
5 5
 Bowett, Self-Defence, 184-185 He added (185) "It is, therefore, fallacious to assume that members have only 
those rights which the Charter accords to them, on the contrary they have those nghls which general international 
law accords to them except in so far as they have surrendered them under the Charter " It may be noted that he 
otherwise takes a broad view on the circumstances which justify the exercise of the right of self-defence Ibid , 269-
275 Similar broad views are to be found in Bowett, D , The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in 
Cassese, A (Ed), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, 
pp 39-55 An analogous argument is made by Cassese, Article 51, 778, in regard to anticipatory self-defence "( ) 
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l'article 51 a de toute facon effacé tout le droit préexistant, sans laisser aucun espace à la legitime défense contem-
plée par le droit coutumier si ce n'est dans les limites où elle est explicitement autorisée par la Charte de l'ONU " 
Similarly Brownlie, International Law, 272-275 
54
 С f Malanczuk, Ρ, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, 
1993, 27 
5 7
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 108-111,126-127,130-135 
M
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 106, 110-111, 126-128 
5
' Nicaragua Case, Merits, 108 In the same line of reasoning article 53 of the Vienna Convention, while positing an 
almost absolute prohibition to derogate from peremptory norms, envisages the possibility that such norms can be 
modified by others having the same character 
M
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 109 The Court found that States had not, in actual fact, justified their conduct by refer­
ence to a nghl to intervene Ibid 
6 1
 Arangio-Ruiz' first observation, after discussing self-defence, concerned the question whether armed force could be 
used to obtain cessation of other cnmes than aggression Arangio-Ruiz, G, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, 24 
June 1993, A/CN 4/453/Add 3, 36 pp, 8 
° Arangio-Ruiz raised the issue in Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 9 and footnote 117 
° Ago, R, Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, YBILC 1980, Volume Π, Part One, 1-70, 53 
Relevant footnote omitted 
4 4
 Ago, Eighth Report, Addendum, 54 After the text quoted here Ago continues once more to argue the essentially 
punitive or repressive object of sanctions The Commission substantively took over Ago's remarks, but did not state 
that it would be wrong to view self-defence as a kind of sanction Text and Commentary Article 34, Part One, 
YBILC 1980, Volume II, Part Two, pp 52-61, 53-54 
4 5
 'Ordinarily' because a nght to use force in individual self-defence against uses efforce staying below the threshold 
of an armed attack exists under customary international law (see section 5 5) 
4 6
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May - 22 July 1994, General 
Assembly, Official Records, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No 10 (A/49/10), 366 
'
7
 Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 8 
" Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report, Addendum 3, 9 Underlining in the original Note these remarks by Rasy "S'il y a une 
chose incompatible avec le droit, c'est l'absence de force Car le faible, si faible au point de ne pouvoir se prévaloir 
de son propre droit, sera pour toujours l'étemel frustré " Rasy, D , Le droit et la force dans le monde contemporain, 
in Recueil d'études en hommage a Charles Eisenmann, Editions Cujas, Pans, 1975, pp 419-421, 421 And note 
the critical remarks by Scelle, G , Quelques réflexions sur l'abolition de la competence du guerre, 58 RGDLP 1954, 
pp 5-22, 12, and Fitzmaunce, G, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of En-
forcement, 19 MLR 1956, pp 1-13, 4-6 
" Commission Report 1994, 344-345, and 362 
70
 Arangio-Ruiz, G , Seventh Report on Slate Responsibility, 9 May 1995, A/CN 4/469, 49 pp, 20-21, and proposed 
article 17, paragraph 1, Part Two, in Seventh Report on State Responsibility, 24 May 1995, A/CN 4/469/Add 1, 4 
pp, 2 One may note that he has indicated that injured States could adopt urgent, interim measures aimed at 
(Seventh Report, 17) "( ) securing immediate access to the victims for purposes of rescue and/or aid or prevent-
ing the continuation of a genocide, measures concerning humanitarian convoys, anti-pollution action, passage fa-
cilities, etc " As noted earlier, in chapter four, subsection 4 3 1, it is not clear how injured States would secure 
immediate access to victims or prevent the continuation of genocide, etc , in view of the proposed prohibition of 
measures involving the threat or use of armed force 
71
 The Commission noted "Another element ( ) is that the use of force, even for strictly defensive purposes, is 
likewise admitted not as a general rule, but only as an exception to a rule under which a central authority has a 
monopoly on the use of force so as to guarantee respect by all for the integrity of others Only in specific situations 
where, by its very nature, the use of force by the agencies of the central authority cannot be resorted to promptly 
and efficiently enough to protect a subject against an attack by another does the use of means of defence involving 
force by the subject in question remain legitimate " Commentary Article 34, Part One, 52 С f Brownlie, Interna­
tional Law, 273, Bowett, Self-Defence, 195 (generally 195-197) Contrary Graefrath, В, Ausschluß der Völker-
rechiswidngkeit-Sclbstverteidigung-Sanktion, in Durchsetzungsprobleme des Völkerrechts, Wissenschaftliche 
Schriftenreihe der Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 1983, Ausschluß 13-26, 21, who notes that the nght to resort to 
self-defence and other sanctions are rights of the victim against the law-breaker for the enforcement of interna-
tional law, and for that reason should not simply be seen as exceptions to the rule 
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7 1
 Contrary Frowein, J, Article 42, in Simma, The Charter, pp 628-636, 631, who claims that the principle of pro­
portionality applies, since article 42 concerns such action "as may be necessary" 
7 1
 С f Goodrich and Hambro, Charter, 279 
7<
 С f Fischer, Article 42, 707-710 
7 5
 С f Brownlie, International Law, 265, 269-270, and 278-279, Cassese, Article 51,774-775 Contrary Bowett, Self-
Defence, 187-193 
7 4
 Generally Boweti, Self-Defence, 195-197, Franck, Τ, and Patel, F, UN Police Action in Lieu of War "The Old 
Order Changeth", 85 AJIL 1991, pp 63-74,63 
7 7
 Cassese, Article 51, 774-775, Roslow, E, Until What?, Enforcement Action or Self-Defense?, 85 AJIL 1991, pp 
506-516, 510-514, Greig, D , Self-Defence and the Security Council What Does Article 51 Require?, 40 ICLQ 
1991, pp 366-402,392-393 
7 8
 С f Greig, Self-Defence, 392 and 401 
7 9
 С f Ago, Eighth Report, Addendum, 70 
8 0
 Dallai, S , International Law and the United Nations' Role in the Gulf Crisis, 18 SJILC 1992, pp 111-140, 125 
Also ibid ,126 He claims the necessity of an advisory opinion on the basis that otherwise Iraq's claim on Kuwaiti 
territory remains unadjudicated If that claim were valid, so he seems to say, Iraq's use of force against Kuwait 
would not constitute an act of aggression In that connection he claims that Iraq's recognition of Kuwait in 1963 
was made by an unrepresentative government, was not ratified by a representative body, and not supported by a 
popular plebiscite Ibid ,127 To that one could counter that the present Iraqi government would also not appear to 
be a very representative government 
8 1
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 118-123 
" Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force, 221-222, correctly states in regard to the possible insufficiency of peaceful 
means "However, in some cases this does not make sense Not only does an ongoing attack require armed defence 
at the time but the relations between the parties may be so implacably hostile as to render futile any attempt at 
peaceful settlement " Footnote omitted He continues (222) however "These difficulties do not dispose of the basic 
idea that force should not be used if other means can be effective It should not be assumed, a prion, that measures 
of a non-military nature will fail to deter State support of terrorism ( ) " Footnote omitted 
8 3
 Giraud, E, Le droit international public et la politique, 110 RDC ADI 1963-Ш, pp 419-809, 664, observes 
"Quelle est la valeur de la guerre comme sanction du droit international? C'est sans doute une sanction beaucoup 
plus efficace que les mesures de rétorsion et de represailles, ( ) " Also ibid, 678 
Μ
 Dallai, International Law, 122-123 and footnotes 66 and 68, m a similar sense, Weston, Β, Security Council 
Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AJIL 1991, pp 516-535, 528-532, 
especially 530 
ю
 Note also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua ν Umted States of America), 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment ICJ Reports 1984, ρ 392, 434 
M
 Resolution 660 It may be asserted, a fortiori, that the Council would have been fully justified to determine the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait an act of aggression 
8 7
 Contrary Dallai, International Law, 123-124 and especially footnote 71, in which he claims "These differences 
stem from Iraq's claim that Kuwait is part of Iraqi territory ( ) They also stem from Iraq's claim that Kuwait was 
waging 'economic war against Iraq' " It is highly unlikely that such are the differences which the Security Council 
had in mind Would it have determined a breach of the peace if Kuwait should indeed be considered part of Iraq? 
The more plausible interpretation of paragraph 3 is that it relates to the differences on which negotiations were 
broken off in the days immediately preceding the Iraqi invasion See Rousseau, С , Chronique, 94 RGDIP 1990, 
1091-1093 
8 8
 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff m Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 1979, ρ 7, 20-
21 
8 9
 Umted States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, ρ 3, 17-18 
" Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 43 
" Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 43-44 The Court observed that the legality of the Umted States' actions, or any 
question of responsibility flowing (тот it, was not before it Ibid, 43 
" С f Frowein, Article 39, 612-613, and Frowein, Article 42,631 
ю
 Fischer, Article 42, 708-710 
M
 Fischer, Article 42, 709 
9 8
 С f Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 731 
* Fischer, Article 42, 709 
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" See A/46/825 (France), and A/46/827 (United Kingdom and United States) 
n
 С f Lapidoth, R., Some Reflections on the Law and Practice Concerning the Imposition of Sanctions by the Secu­
rity Council, 30 ADV 1992, pp 114-127,117 
" Nicaragua Case, Merits, 141 Also 116 
1 0 9
 Eisemann, Ρ , Article 41, in Cot and Pellet, La Charte, 691-704, 696 Emphasis in the original Fischer, Article 42, 
708, notes that the stance, that article 41 measures must be resorted to first, is not legally defensible 
1 9 1
 Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 528-532 Kaikobad claims that the Council should have clarified that the 
sanctions were, or had proved to be, inadequate Kaikobad, Κ, Self-Defence, Enforcement Action and the Gulf 
Wars, 1980-88 and 1990-91, 63 BYBIL 1992, pp 299-366, 353 
1 0 2
 Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 528-529 He observes (529) that critics noted that the United States had 
been extremely patient in regard to sanctions against South Africa, and that "( ), over time, the international 
crimes committed by Pretona matched - indeed exceeded - those committed by Baghdad " That comparison is 
completely lame The crimes committed by South Africa by far do not match the crimes of Iraq, especially not 
when considered over time 
1 0 3
 С f Boutros-Ghali, В , An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, 17 June 
1992, A/47/277, reprinted in 31 ILM 1992, pp 956-975, paragraphs 42 and 43 Generally on article 43 Goodrich 
and Hambro, Charter, 281-287, Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 756-768, Furet, M -F, Article 43, in Cot 
and Pellet, La Charte, pp 717-723 
I M
 Franck and Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War, 66 and 70 
, o s
 С f Fischer, Article 42, 707 and 714-716 Contrary Schachter, О, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 
AJIL 1991, pp 452-473, 462, who claims that resolution 678 constitutes an example of 'action' involving the use 
of military forces under article 42, and that such 'action' need not be under the control of the Security Council 
Also ibid, 469-460 In this sense also Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, 15 
, M
 Resolution 84, paragraphs 3 to 5 
1 0 7
 Apparently in agreement Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 936-940, Furet, Article 43, 721, Klem, E , Sanc­
tions by International Organizations and Economic Communities, 30 ADV 1992, pp 101-113, 105, and Frowein, 
Article 39, 614 
1 0 8
 С f Warbnck, С, The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 40 ICLQ 1991, pp 482^92, 486-487, Rostow, Until What?, 
508-509, Weston, Secuntv Council Resolution 678, 519, implicitly Dallai, International Law, 137-138 
ш
 Goodrich and Hambro, Charter, 281, Kelsen, The Law of the Umted Nations, 756, Franck and Patel, UN Police 
Action in Lieu of War, 66, Schachter, Umted Nations Law, 463-464 Contrary, though implicitly, Weston, Security 
Council Resolution 678, 519, who speaks of article 42 as a dead letter and of its dependent relationship to article 
43 
1 . 0
 Expenses Opinion, 166 and 177 The Court also quoted the following (170-171) from a Secretary-General plan 
"While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute 
units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country with­
out the consent of the Government of that country This does not exclude the possibility that the Security Council 
could use such a Force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII of the Umted Nations Charter " Em­
phasis in the original 
1 1 1
 Security Council resolutions 836, paragraph 9, and 871, paragraph 9 (UNPROFOR), 918, paragraph 4, and 925, 
paragraph 5 (UNAMTR) Also resolutions 459, 467, 488,498, and 501 (UNTFIL) 
1 . 1
 General Assembly resolution 377 (V), Uniting for Peace, paragraph 1 For general comment see Kelsen, The Law 
of the United Nations, 953-990, Giraud, Le droit international public et la politique, 678-681 
l u
 Expenses Opinion, 164-165 
1 , 4
 Expenses Opinion, 165 
, , s
 Security Council resolutions 119, 120, 129, 157, 303,462, 500, 571, 572, 573, 577, 580, and 612 
С f Frowein, J, Legal Consequences for International Law Enforcement in Case of Security Council Inaction, in 
Delbrück, J (Ed), The Future of International Law Enforcement, New Scenarios - New Law7, Duncker & Hum-
blot, Berlin, 1993, pp 111-124, 118-119, Klein, Sanctions by International Organizations, 106, and Lapidoth, 
Some Reflections, 125 Kelsen, H , Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations, 42 AJIL 1948, pp 783-796, 796, noted "The only organ competent to determine, m a way binding upon 
the members, the existence of an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51, is the Security Council, and not 
the General Assembly " 
1,7
 It may be noted that earlier on, in resolution 221, paragraph 5, the Security Council had called upon the 
Government of the Umted Kingdom to "( ) prevent, by the use offeree if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels 
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reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest 
and detain the tanker known as the Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is 
discharged there " In resolution 665, paragraph 1, the Security Council called upon "( ) those Member States co­
operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstance as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt 
all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to 
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990)," 
" ' S/PV 2963 (English version), 6 and 103 (USA), 19-20 (Kuwait), 41 (Colombia), 62-63 (China), 71 (Canada), 74 
and 76 (Malaysia), 81-82 (UK) Iraq disputed the validity of the authorization on the ground that it was not cov­
ered by any one of the three exceptions (articles 51, 42 or 106) m the Charter Ibid, 19-20 to 21 Yemen voted 
against the resolution because it was so broad and vague and was not limited to the enforcement of the 10 earlier 
resolutions It noted also that it was not related to any specific article under Chapter VII, that the Security Council 
would not control the forces, and this amounted to a classic example of "authority without accountability" Ibid , 
32-33 Cuba claimed that the text of the resolution violated the Charter by authorizing some States to use military 
force in total disregard of the procedures under the Charter Ibid , 58 Discussed by Lavalle, R., The Law of the 
United Nations and the Use of Force, under the Relevant Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and 1991, to Re­
solve the Persian Gulf Crisis, 23 NYIL 1992, pp 3-65, 31 -33 
" ' Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 525-528, admits that military action by the Coalition forces can be said 
to have been "technically" legal, but apparently he wishes to take some of that back in denying the legitimacy of 
such action 
1 2 0
 tg Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 518-519 
1 1 1
 Resolutions 816,836, 871, 908, 958, and 981 (former Yugoslavia), 794 (Somalia), 929 (Rwanda), and 940 (Haiti) 
ш
 Expenses Opinion, 167 
I M
 Glennon, M, The Constitution and Chapter П of the United Nations Charter, 85 AJTL 1991, pp 74-88, 77 and 
88, Schachter, United Nations Law, 464-465, implicitly Warbnck, The Invasion of Kuwait, 487 
114
 С f Schachler, Umled Nations Law, 463 
ш
 С f Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII, 75, 77-78, 81-82 and 88, Warbnck, The Invasion of Kuwait, 487, 
Schachter, United Nations Law, 463 and 464-465 
ш
 As does also, by now, the practice of the Security Council earlier mentioned resolutions 816, 836, 871, 908, 958, 
and 981 (former Yugoslavia), 794 (Somalia), 929 (Rwanda), and 940 (Haiti) 
1 1 7
 Implicitly Goodrich and Hambro, Charier, 316, Kodjo, E , Article 53, in Cot and Pellet, La Charte, pp 816-831, 
819 and 824 
'
M
 С f Freudenschuß, H, Between Unilateralism and Collective Security Authorizations of the Use of Force by the 
UN Security Council, 5 EJIL 1994, pp 492-531, 526 The Court recalled the practice of the Security Council to the 
effect that abstentions by permanent members do not prevent the adoption of resolutions, and noted as to this pro-
cedure that it "( ) has been generally accepted by Members of the United Nations and evidences a general prac-
tice of that Organization " Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1971, ρ 16, 22 See also articles 5 and 31, paragraph 3 (b) and (c), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and 
article 38, paragraph 1 (b), of the Statute of the Court The 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 39 
AJIL 1945, Supplement, pp 215-229 
"'Resolutions 221 (Rhodesia), 665 (Iraq-Kuwait), 787 (former Yugoslavia), 875 and 917 (Haiti) Resolution 770, 
paragraph 2, is similar in wording, but calls upon States to take all measures necessary to facilitate delivery of hu­
manitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia 
1 3 0
 Contrary Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 521, who states that the recommendations of article 39 relate 
to the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI Generally Cohen Jonathan, G, Article 39, in Cot and Pellet, 
La Charte, pp 644-666, 662-663, and Fischer, Article 42, 709-710 In resolution 83 the Security Council recom­
mended members to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as necessary to repel the armed attack The 
wording suggests that such assistance would amount to collective self-defence Resolution 84 authorizes forces un­
der a unified command to fly the United Nations flag 
1 3 1
 Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 521 
ш
 Goodrich and Hambro, Charter, 277, Eisemann, Article 41,695-696 
1 3 3
 С f Glennon, The Constitution, 82, in regard to resolution 665 
1 3 4
 С f Lavalle, The Law of the Umted Nations, 21 
1 3 5
 Commentary Article 34, Part One, 61 
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u
' Text and Commentaiy Article 30, Part One, YBILC 1979, Volume II, Part Two, pp 115-122, 121 
1 3 7
 The Commission, noting Ihe differences between self-defence and countermeasures, claimed "Armed reprisals 
cannot now be considered legitimate ( ) The prevailing view nowadays is that only the sanctions referred to in 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can entail a lawful use of force " Commentary Article 34, Part 
One, 54 
"* Proposed by Schwebel, YBILC 1980, Volume I, 192 "Hence, it might be necessary to include in the draft an arti­
cle which, m substance, provided that, where a State used force in a manner that would breach an international 
obligation were it not for the fact that the State was responding to a requirement or authorization of the Umted 
Nations or a regional organization acting pursuant to the Charter of the Umted Nations, that State did not incur 
international responsibility " Note also Commentary Article 34, Part One, 54 
u
' Definition of Aggression, General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), Annex 
1 4 0
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 101 Emphasis added 
1 4 1
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 101 
1 4 2
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 103 Generally on armed attack Gill, Τ, The Law of Armed Attack m the Context of the 
Nicaragua Case, 1 HYTL 1988, pp 30-58, Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force, 215-219. Sohn, L, The Interna­
tional Court of Justice and the Scope of the Right of Self-Defense and the Duty of Non-intervention, in Dinstein, 
Y (Ed), Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, International Law at a Time of Perplexity, Martinus Nijhoff Pub­
lishers, Dordrecht, 1989, pp 869-878, 871-875, Guillaume, G , Terrorisme et droit international, 215 RDC ADI 
1989-III, pp 287-416, 405-406, and Randelzhofer, A, Article 51, in Simma, The Charter, pp 661-678, 668-675 
143
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 103 
1 4 4
 Vigorously criticized by Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 331-352, and also by Jennings, 
Nicaragua Case, Merits, 542-544 Note Gill, The Law of Armed Attack, 38-44 and 50-52 
, 4 S
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 127 The Court earlier stated, in paragraph 211, that (ibid, 110) "Thus the lawfulness of 
the use offeree by a State in response to a wrongful act of which it is has not itself been the victim is not admitted 
when this wrongful act is not an armed attack In the view of the Court, under international law in force today — 
whether customary international law today or that of the Umted Nations system - States do not have a right of 
'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'aimed attack' " 
1 4 6
 Noted by Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 349-350 
1 4 7
 С f Gill, Τ, The Forcible Protection, Affirmation and Exercise of Rights by States under Contemporary Interna­
tional Law, 23 NYTL 1992, pp 105-173, 111-113, And note Gill, Τ, The Second Gulf Crisis and the Relation 
between Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense, 10 Grotiana 1989, pp 47-76, 63 (especially footnote 31), 
and 66 (especially footnote 38) 
1 4 8
 Especially Gill, The Second Gulf Crisis, 66, footnote 38 Apparently contrary Randelzhofer, Article 51, 667 
'
4
' In the Nicaragua Case there was only question of Nicaraguan incursions into the territory of Honduras and Costa 
Rica The Court did not investigate any allegation of Nicaraguan support for opposition forces in those countries 
Nicaragua Case, Merits, 86-87, and 119-121 
1 5 0
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 103-104 
1 5 1
 Nicaragua Case. Merits, especially 82-86, and 119 
, S I
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 103-104 Generally Lowe, V, The Principle of Non-intervention Use of Force, in Lowe 
and Warbnck, The United Nations, pp 66-84, Lauterpacht, Η , The Development of International Law bv the 
Court, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1958, 316-318, and Henkln, L , Use of Force Law and U S Policy, in 
Right ν Might International Law and the Use of Force, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1991, pp 
37-69, 47 
1 5 3
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 118-119 
1 5 4
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 119, 124-125, and 146, paragraph 3 Some acts of intervention have not been considered 
as they were claimed by the Court also to amount to a threat or use of force 
1 5 5
 Apparently in agreement Guillaume, Terrorisme et droit international, 401 Contrary Sohn, The International 
Court of Justice, 877-878 
1 5 4
 Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 299-300 
1 5 7
 In that sense earlier Hoogh, A de, Book Review Sachanew, К, Die Rechtstellung der betroffenen Staaten bei 
Verletzungen multilateraler Vertrage, Fragen der Aktivlegilimation und der völkerrechtlich zugelassenen Rechts-
folgen, 38 NILR 1991, pp 104-109, 107-108 
1
 С f Gill, The Forcible Protection, Affirmation and Exercise of Rights, 120 
С f Kaikobad who states that the objective of self-defence may be the "fending off and protection from further at­
tacks which constitute an integral part of the continuum of hostilities" He also mentions two other objectives of 
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self-defence fending off current attacks, and restoration of the territorial status quo Kaikobad, К, 'lus Ad Bel­
lum ' Legal Implications of the Iran-Iraq War, in Dekker, I, and Post, H (Eds), The Gulf War of 1980-1988, The 
Iran-Iraq War in International Legal Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992, pp 51-70, 63 
1 ( 0
 Rostow argued in connection to the goals of resolution 678 "But the Security Council resolutions also contemplate 
'measures to restore international peace and security in the area ' This phrase is not a rhetorical flourish It has al­
ways been an essential ingredient of the law of self-defense ( ) It means that the lawful goal of the war, viewed as 
a war of self-defense, was not simply to force Iraq out of Kuwait, so that it could wait, fully armed, until the United 
States and other coalition forces went home and it perfected its nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capabili­
ties The customary international law of self-defense, and therefore the law of Article S1 of the Charter, means that 
the coalition fighting Iraq could seek not simply to liberate Kuwait, but to make it impossible for Iraq to continue 
the extraordinary career of conquest it has pursued since 1979 " Rostow, Until What?, 514 
" ' Contrary Klein, E, Völkerrechtliche Aspekte des Golfkontlikts 1990/91, 29 ADV 1991, pp 421-435, 431-432, 
who claims that a march on Baghdad would have constituted a lawful measure of self-defence 
161
 On these latter issues see Cassese, A , International Law m a Divided World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 230, 
and Cassese, Article 51, 774-775 
ш
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 104 
"* Nicaragua Case, Merits, 105 On the reporting requirement see Greig, Self-Defence, 384-388 
' " Nicaragua Case, Merits, 105 Later on in the judgment the Court examined other evidence related to the (alleged) 
armed attack and (unreported) acts of self-defence, and found that neither had been claimed or indeed taken place 
Ibid, 119-122 
' " Respectively resolutions 836 (Bosnia) and 871 (Croatia) Similarly it has been recognized that UNAMIR may need 
to take action in self-defence against persons or groups that threaten protected sites or populations, Umted Nations 
or other humanitarian personnel, or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief Resolutions 918 
and 925 
1<T
 In an even broader sense one might say that similar resolutions on Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti also fall within this 
category, since they too concern responses to illegal uses of force As those all find their cause within one Slate 
they are excluded here 
ш
 Raie, D , The Gulf Crisis and the Umted Nations, 4 LJIL 1991, pp 119-134, 132 Contrary Lavalle, The Law of 
the Umted Nations, 48 
" ' That appears to be Graefrath and Mohr's interpretation of resolutions 686 and 687, though they claim that to pro­
vide for a right to use force to enforce compliance with Iraq's obligations has no basis in the Charter Graefrath, 
В , and Mohr, M, Legal Consequences of an Act of Aggression The Case of the Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of 
Kuwait, 43 AJPIL 1992, pp 109-138, 121-123 
1 7 8
 С f Graefrath and Mohr, Legal Consequences, 121 Note that the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal has been handling 
compensation claims since the early eighties on the basis of apparently less grave disputes between the Umted 
States and Iran 
171
 Thomberry, Ρ, The Principle of Self-Detenrunation, in Lowe and Warbnck, The Umted Nations, pp 175-203, 
187 
1 7 2
 Text and Commentary Article 19, Part One, YBILC 1976, Volume Π, Part Two, pp 95-122, 120 Note especially 
Palrmsano, G, Les causes d'aggravation de la responsabilité des états et la distinction entre «crimes» et «délits» 
internationaux, 98 RGD1P 1994, pp 629-673,647-652, in this respect 
173
 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 61 AJIL 1967, pp 870-887 Paragraph 3 of the 
same provision stipulates that "The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility 
for the administration of Non-Self-Goveming and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of 
self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
tions" 
174
 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples 
175
 Resolution 2131 concerns the prohibition of intervention m the internal or external affairs of States The prohibi-
tion encompasses the lending of all kinds of support for terrorist or armed activities, as well as interference in civil 
strife General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Sovereignty and Independence, paragraphs 1 and 2 Note also para-
graph 6 on self-determination Note further the remark of Pomerance, Μ , Self-Determination in Law and Practice, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982, 73 (more broadly 63-76), that "( ) self-determination claims will 
frequently conflict with other, no less sacred, rights and principles, such as sovereign equality, non-intervention, 
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the non-use of force, and the maintenance of territorial integrity and political independence," 
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
С f Thomberry, The Principle of Self-DeterminaUon, 181-183 
Commentary Article 19, Part One, 121 
Such a meaning would seem to accord also with the terms of article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which prohibits 
the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, e g inconsistent with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples Admittedly article 2, paragraph 4, applies equally to the threat of 
force Yet the question whether the mere threat to use force in denial of self-determination constitutes a serious 
breach of obligation depends on the answer to the question, to be discussed next, by what means a people may try 
to effect the exercise of its nght 
Resolutions (reaffirmations omitted) 312 (Portuguese colonies), 232 (Rhodesia), 269 (Namibia), 282 (South Af­
rica) 
Resolution 253 (reaffirmed in resolutions 277 and 411) With regard to the people of Namibia see resolution 269 
(reaffirmed in resolution 566) 
Schachtcr, Just War and Human Rights, 8, claims "The resolution recognizes, clearly enough, that people may use 
force to resist governments which deprive them of self-determination This can be read as recognizing the right to 
revolt, a nght that does not involve the use of force in 'international relations' and, therefore, is not within the 
terms of Article 2(4) " Emphasis in the original 
С f Doehnng, К , Self-Dctemunation, in Simma, The Charter, pp 56-72, 66 "( ) not every kind of discrimina­
tion can legitimize a secession As already pointed out, all citizens are in principle obliged to maintain loyalty to­
wards their State, and they must accept certain limitations of their freedom " Some provisions regarding the 
protection of the population in occupied territories contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the 
Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War, notably articles 64 to 68, envisage the continued application of le­
gal regulations within occupied territories, as well as the competence of the Occupying Power to prosecute indi­
viduals for violent acts against the occupying forces Text in Roberts, A, and Guelff, R (Eds), Documents on the 
Laws of War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp 272-326 Note also article 48 of the 1907 Regulations Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, in ibid , pp 48-57 
Note Doehnng, Self-Determination, 66 "( ) a nght to secession could, however, nevertheless be recognized if the 
minority discnminated against is exposed to actions by the sovereign state power which consist in an evident and 
brutal violation of fundamental human nghts, e g through lulling or unlimited impnsonment without legal pro­
tection, through destroying family relations, through expropnation without any regard for the necessities of life, 
through special prohibitions against following religious professions or using one's own language, and, lastly, 
through executing all these prohibitions with brutal methods and measures " See also 70 
С f Starace. V, La responsabilité résultant de la violation des obligations à l'égard de la communauté interna-
tionale, 153 RDC ADI 1976-V, pp 263-317, 299 Apparently contrary Cassese, A , Remarks on the Present Legal 
Regulation of Cnmes of States, in Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago, Le droit international à l'heure de sa codi-
fication, volume HI, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987, pp 49-64, 51-54, who claims (53) "«Forcible action» ( ) means the 
establishment of a repressive régime which does not allow the oppressed people to choose its lot by free means 
That expression does not necessanly entail that the State should continuously use military violence against the op-
pressed people the existence of institutionalized violence (such as that obtaining in South Africa) is sufficient to 
establish the nght of the people to resort to force " Note also articles 19, 21 and 25 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 
С f Adviescommissie Mensenrechten en Buitenlands Beleid (AMBB), and Commissie van Advies voor Volken­
rechtelijke Vraagstukken (CA W), Het gebruik van geweld voor humanitaire doeleinden, Dwangmaatregelen voor 
humanitaire doeleinden en humanitaire interventie, Advies nummer 15, Den Haag, 1992, 5 
Note for instance the discussion between Reisman and Schachter on the issue of pro-democratic invasions and on­
going self-determination Reisman, M, Coercion and Self-Determination Construing Charier Article 2(4), 78 
AJIL 1984, pp 642-645, and Schachter, О, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AJIL 1984, pp 645-650 
Article 2 of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, states that "The first use of 
force by a State m contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression ( ) " 
As the Charter does not provide for any first use of force other than that by the Secunty Council, the permanent 
members, or action against enemy States, humanitarian intervention would qualify as an act of aggression The 
Definition goes on to say, in article 5, paragraph 1, that "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, 
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression " 
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, и
 Cautiously m the latter sense, AMBB and CAW, Het gebruik van geweld, 7 The advice disputes that a rule of 
customary international law was ever developed, especially in the pre-Charter period, that could constitute the le­
gal basis for humanitarian intervention 
, M
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 106-110 
1 9 1
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 134 
191
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 134-135 
1 , 3
 С f Genügten, W van, Mensenrechten tussen staatssoevereiniteit en internationale jurisdictie, 21 NTRR 1992, pp 
204-223, 213-214 The AMBB and CAW have argued that presently international law does not know of any clear 
legal basis for the threat or use of force, outside Chapter VII of the Charter, to combat widespread violations of 
fundamental human rights At the same time they note that the obligation to protect and promote fundamental hu-
man rights provides a basis for the development of a legal justification in this respect Therefore, so they claim, a 
Slate may be justified, in extremely exceptional circumstances to resort to humanitarian intervention in another 
State, provided the following conditions are met that fundamental human rights are being violated on a large 
scale, that the intervening State has attempted in vain to activate all appropriate effective procedures to come to re-
sponses against the State which is violating human rights (including attempts to activate existing instruments, the 
Umted Nations, or a regional organization with authorization of the Umted Nations), and that the intervention 
does not amount to a larger threat to international peace and security than the violations of human rights which the 
intervention attempts to end AMBB and CAW, Het gebruik van geweld, 8 
"* Note Malanc7uk, Humanitarian Intervention, 27 
1,5
 С f Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), 123-124 Apparently contrary Henkln, Use of Force, 41-42, Beres, L , Genocide, 
State and Self, 18 DJILP 1989, pp 37-57,46 
"* Commission Report 1994, 344 (see also 347 and 361-362) In favour of the continued prohibition of armed meas­
ures Dominicé, С , Die internationalen Verbrechen und deren rechtliches Regime, in Völkerrecht und Rechtsphi-
losophie, Internationale Festschrift für Stephan Verosta zum 70 Geburstag, 1980, pp 227-248, 244 The stance 
that peoples struggling for self-determination can invoke the right to individual and collective self-defence must be 
discarded The argument fails basically because under the Charter the right accrues to member States only, and 
such a right of peoples does not seem to have been established under customary international law For discussion 
see Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 395-398 and 407-409 
"" Commentary Article 33, Part One, 44 (generally 43-45) 
"" Eg Raby, J, The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals, 26 CY1L 1988, pp 253-272, 265-
271 
l
" Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 413-418 
200
 Commentary Article 33, Part One, 45 
201
 Commentary Article 33, Part One, 49 
202
 Commentary Article 33, Part One, 49 
203
 In this sense Bowett, The Use of Force, 40-41, though he regards attacks against a State's nationals as an attack on 
the State regarding which a right of self-defence could be exercised, and Raby, The State of Necessity, 266 
104
 Contrary Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 414-416 
205
 Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 418 Duke, S , The State and Human Rights Sovereignty Versus Humanitar-
ian Intervention, 12 IR 1994, pp 25-48, 44-47, adheres to these conditions, but adds that humanitarian interven-
tion should be for the shortest possible period, that it should generally take place under Chapter VII procedures, 
and that it should involve, when possible, the consent of the target State Similar entena may be found with Lil-
hch, R_, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights. 53 IowaLR 1967-1968, pp 325-351, 347-351 
2M
 AMBB and CAW, Het gebruik van geweld, 8, 11 and 13-14 Duke, The State and Human Rights, 45, mentions 
that armed humanitarian intervention should be considered only after the measures of article 41 of the Charter 
have been exhausted 
207
 In resolution 912 the Security Council adjusted UNAMIR's mandate to the effect that it could act as an intermedi-
ary between the fighting parties in order to bring about a cease-fire, to assist in the resumption of humanitarian re-
lief operations, and to monitor events It also authorized an increase in the force level In resolution 918 it 
expanded UNAMIR's mandate again and authorized an increase of the force level up to 5,500 It recognized that 
UNAMIR could act in self-defence against persons or groups that threatened sites, the population, Umted Nations 
and other humanitarian personnel, and the delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief Finally, it decided on 
an embargo of arms and related material in respect of Rwanda Resolution 925 did not add anything substantial to 
the foregoing resolutions 
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2 n
 This condition is claimed to exist especially because intervening States tend to have ulterior motives for interven-
ing See Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention, 399-404 
2M
 Duke, The State and Human Rights, 45-46 He deduces from the above quoted part (ibid, 46) Thus, it follows 
that humanitarian forces should be as small as possible but sufficient to complete their tasks " In the same line of 
thought he claims (ibid ) that intervention must be for the shortest possible time and should not become long-term 
2 ,0
 In their advice to the Dutch government, in 1992, the AMBB and CAW indicated that a quick intervention and a 
fast withdrawal entails the nsk that the action only produces short-term effects and that an even more dangerous 
situation might ensue To prevent this from happening the intervention could also relate to the construction of 
administrative structures and the organization of elections AMBB and CAW, Het gebruik van geweld, 11-12 
Also Tomuschat, in Delbrück, The Future, 83-84 
211
 Respectively resolutions 794, 929 and 940 Note also resolution 688, paragraph 1, m which the Security Council 
condemned the "repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently m Kurd-
ish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region," It has been 
claimed by the States intervening m Northern Iraq for the protection of the Kurds that their action was not incon-
sistent with resolution 688 See generally Charpentier, С , La résolution 688 (1991) du Conseil de Sécurité quel 
devoir d'ingérence?, 23 El 1992, pp 279-317, 315, who demes that the resolution recognizes a right to intervene 
for humanitarian purposes In the same sense Scheffer, D , Use of Force After the Cold War Panama, Iraq and the 
New World Order, in Right ν Might, pp 109-172, 144-147 It is to be noted similarly that the "consequences" of 
the Iraqi repression threatened international peace and security in the region, not the repression itself 
2 1 2
 The 1993 Governors Island Agreement, reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General, A/47/975, 2-3, and the 1993 
New York Pact, reprinted in A/47/10O0, Annex See also the 1992 Protocol between President Jean-Bertrand Aris­
tide and the Parliamentary Negotiating Commission to find a Definitive Solution to the Haitian Crisis, reprinted in 
A/46/891, Annex I, and the 1992 Protocol between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Prime Minister-
Designate, Rene Theodore, under the Auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), reprinted in ibid, 
Annex II 
2 , 3
 Note Frowein's pertinent remark that "Serious violations of international law which could provoke armed counter-
measures may generally be seen as a threat to the peace even when the admissibility of the counter-measures may 
be doubtful " Frowein, Article 39,612 
2 1 4
 Resolutions 918, paragraph 1, and 925, paragraph 6 In resolution 929 the Security Council dropped the demand 
for an immediate cessation of hostilities (see paragraph 9) 
2 1 5
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 105 (see also 104) In the event the Court found (ibid , 120-121) that no such requests had 
been made by Honduras or Costa Rica, and that there was no evidence of requests by El Salvador earlier than the 
one contained in its Declaration of Intervention 
2 , 6
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 104 
2 1 7
 Dissenting Opinion Jennings, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 545 (also 546) Emphasis in the original Relevant footnote 
omitted See also the statements of a similar kind reported in Commission Report 1994, 346 
2
" Commentary Article 30, Part One, 119, which claims that the competent organs of the United Nations are "( ) 
empowered in certain circumstances not simply to authorize, but even to direct a Member Slate other than the one 
directly injured by a particular international offence, or a group of States, or at times all Member States, to apply 
certain sanctions, including measures involving the use of armed force, against a State which has committed an 
offence of a specified content and gravity " 
2
" С f Ago, Eighth Report, Addendum, 68 
2 2 0
 Though the Commission pointed out "This temporary exception applies to a Member State which is the victim of 
an armed attack, as well as other Members which consider themselves threatened by the acts of the aggressor or are 
merely associated by collective security agreements, ( ) " Commentary Article 19, Part One, 105 The Commen­
tary Article 34, Part One, does not shed any further light on this 
2 2 1
 С f Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 792 and 795-798, Brownlie, International Law, 329-331, Cassese, 
Article 51, 787, Schachter, United Nations Law, 457 Contrary Bowett, Self-Defence, 200-247 (especially 200-207 
and 215-218, Weston, Security Council Resolution 678, 520 
2 2 2
 С f Bowett, Self-Defence, 195 
2 2 3
 Argument found with Kaikobad, 'lus Ad Bellum', 68-70, implicitly Weiler, M, The Use of Force and Collective 
Security, in Dekker and Post, The Gulf War, pp 71-90, 87-90, note also Siekmann, R., Comments, m ibid, pp 91-
94, 93, and Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council, 389 
2 2 4
 Note Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait, 487^88 
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE 311 
С f Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council, 393-394, and more generally 393-399, and Cassese, Article 51, 
774-775 
Rostow, Until What?, 511, on the contrary claims 'To me, what Article 51 and resolution 661 seem to say is just 
the opposite - that the customary law of self-defense is not impaired m any way by the Charter but remains intact 
until the Council has successfully dealt with the controversy before iL" Emphasis in the original 
С f Schachter, United Nations Law, 458 Bowett, Self-Defence, 196, claims "Yet the decision of the Council 
without more cannot, one would suppose, terminate action in self-defence, for the phrase 'measures necessary' 
implies positive action Whether such positive action by the Council, or by member states pursuant to its decisions 
or recommendations, does in fact constitute the necessary measures must be decided on the facts of the individual 
situation It may well be that in some circumstances an order to the attacking state which is obeyed so as to end the 
attack will be sufficient, in other circumstances nothing less than the use of armed force will suffice " Relevant 
footnote omitted It may be suggested that the basis for concluding on the termination of the right of self-defence 
where the attacking State obeys an order of the Council lies with the accomplishment of the objectives of self-
defence rather than with the taking of necessary measures by the Security Council 
Notably article 2, paragraph 5 (preventive or enforcement action), article 5 (preventive or enforcement action), ar­
ticle 11, paragraph 2 (action), article 24 (action), article 42 (action), article 48, paragraph 1 (action), and finally 
article 54, paragraph 1 (enforcement action) Note also articles 53 and 107 which respectively mention "measures 
against any enemy state" and "action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an en­
emy", and article 106 which mentions "joint action on behalf of the Organization" 
Both Bowett and Kelsen, refer to articles 39, 41 and 42 Bowett, Self-Defence, 197, Kelsen, The Law of the United 
Nations, 801 The latter goes on to say however (ibid, 801-802, Bowett appears to take the same stance, ibid, 
196) "These measures need not necessarily be enforcement measures They may be 'recommendations' made un­
der Article 39 " This latter stance must be rejected Article 51 refers to 'measures', and article 39 distinguishes 
between the Security Council making recommendations, or deciding on measures under articles 41 or 42 Note 
also Stein, in Delbrück, The Future, 161-162 
Schachter, United Nations Law, 457-463, Warbnck, The Invasion of Kuwait, 486-488 In a similar sense, cate-
gorically, Frowein, in Delbrück, The Future, 183 
С f Dallai, International Law, 136-137 
Contrary Schachler, Umted Nations Law, 457-461 In an earlier published book review the present writer adhered 
to Schachter's stance See Hoogh, Book review Sachanew, 108 
Schachter, Umted Nations Law, 458 
Resolutions 664, paragraph 1, 667, paragraphs 2 to 4, and 674, paragraphs 1 and 5, basically demand of Iraq the 
release, freedom of action and departure of third-State nationals, Kuwaitis and diplomatic and consular agents, as 
well as to refrain from action that would jeopardize their safety and well-being 
Resolutions 665 (Iraq), 770, 787, 816, 836, 871, 908, 958, and 981 (former Yugoslavia), 794 and arguably 814 
(Somalia) (note Freudenschuß, Between Unilateralism, 515-516, in this respect), 837 (Somalia), 875 and 940 
(Haiti), 929 (Rwanda) Resolution 221 is somewhat odd in this respect as it called upon the Umted Kingdom to 
prevent, by the use offeree if necessary, vessels from carrying oil to Rhodesia Odd because the Council had not, to 
that date, imposed a mandatory oil embargo, under article 41 of the Charter, regarding Rhodesia 
Resolutions 665, 678, 794, 816, 836, 875, 929, 940, 958, and 981 
Resolutions 770 and 787 
As to necessity reference may be made here to the Caroline incident regarding which secretary of state Webster 
wrote "It will be for ( ) Her Majesty's Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities 
of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of The Umted 
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be 
limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the per-
son on board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing, it must be shown that day-light could 
not be waited for, that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the innocent and the guilty, that it 
would not have been enough to seise and detain the vessel, but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, 
for attacking her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on 
board, killing some and wounding others, and drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her on fire, 
and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead, 
committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with horror A necessity for all this, the Government of The 
Umted States cannot believe to have existed " Text in Hams, D , Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet 
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& Maxwell, London, 1983,656 Also Ago, Eighth Report, Addendum, 69 
" ' Ago, Eighth Report, Addendum, 70 
2 4 0
 The Court noted, at the end of the paragraph largely devoted to questions of necessity and proportionality, that 
"( ) the Court must also observe that the reaction of the United States m the context of what it regarded as self-
defence was continued long after the period in which any presumed armed attack by Nicaragua could reasonably be 
contemplated " Nicaragua Case, Merits, 122-123 
2 4 1
 It is to be noted again that the use of force by the injured State on its own territory does not need any separate jus­
tification under international law It can resort to force on its own territory on the basis of its territorial sover­
eignty Gill has argued this point convincingly Gill, The Forcible Protection, Affirmation and Exercise of Rights, 
127-131 
2 4 2
 In the Nicaragua Case the Court observed in regard to United States' action "First, these measures were only 
taken, and began to produce their effects, several months after the major offensive of the armed opposition against 
the Government of El Salvador had been completely repulsed ( ), and the actions of the opposition considerably 
reduced in consequence Thus it was possible to eliminate the mam danger to the Salvadonan Government without 
the Umted States embarking on activities in and against Nicaragua Accordingly, it cannot be said that these ac­
tivities were undertaken in the light of necessity " Nicaragua Case, Merits, 122 
1 4 3
 С f Rostow, Until What?, 513-514, with regard to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict 
2 4 4
 С f Malanczuk, Ρ , Countermeasures and Self-Defence as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the Interna­
tional Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 43 ZAORV 1983, pp 705-812, 767-768 
2 4 5
 The situation prevailing in Kuwait on 16 January 1991 could not have justified the revocation of the authorization 
to use all necessary means on the basis that armed action was no longer necessary 
1 4 6
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 103 and 122 The Court did not go into any detail It noted the concurrence of views of the 
parties regarding the applicability of the condition (103), and stated (122) "Whether or not the assistance to the 
contras might meet the criterion of proportionality, the Court cannot regard the United States activities ( ), ι e 
those relating to the mining of the Nicaraguan ports, oil installations, etc , as satisfying that criterion Whatever 
uncertainty may exist as to the exact scale of the aid received by the Salvadonan armed opposition from Nicaragua, 
it is clear that these latter Umted States activities in question could not have been proportionate to that aid " The 
Court further referred to the possibility of the acts of Nicaragua justifying proportionate countermeasures on the 
part of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, without indicating what would constitute such proportionate coun­
termeasures Ibid, 127 Note also Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, ibid, 299-300, on the overthrow of an aggressor 
government as a (disproportionate act of self-defence 
1 4 7
 Ago, Eighth Report, Addendum, 69 (see also 70) Emphasis in the original Ago's observations on the require­
ments of immediacy, necessity and proportionality were not inserted into the commentary on article 34, and conse­
quently there is no indication to what extent the Commission would have endorsed those See Commentary Article 
34, Part One, 60 Discussed by Malanczuk, Countermeasures and Self-Defence, 796-798 
24
" Ago noted (Eighth Report, Addendum, 70) that "Moreover, the limits inherent in the requirement of proportion­
ality are clearly meaningless where the armed attack and the likewise armed resistance to it lead to a state of war 
between the countries " He probably meant to refer to a state of hostilities between two States, since the existence 
of a state of war could not as such give rise to the right to act in self-defence Also it seems inappropriate to say 
that proportionality would no longer function as a limit in such circumstances 
M
' One may note that provisional measures were requested by Libya also because it considered that the Umted King­
dom (and the Umted States) had "refused to rule out the use of armed force against Libya " Questions of Interpre­
tation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aenal Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan 
Arab Jamalunya ν United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 1992, ρ 3, 7 
l s o
 The word 'enemy' in article 22 of the Regulations does not appear to be limited to military and paramilitary per­
sonnel, since it is prohibited in the following article, among others, to treacherously wound or kill individuals of 
the hostile nation or army, and to abolish, suspend, or declare inadmissible in a court of law, the rights and actions 
of nationals of the hostile party 
2 S I
 This distinction goes back to article 3 of the Regulations, which stated "The armed forces of the belligerent parties 
may consist of combatants and non-combatants In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated 
as prisoners of war " Apparently the category of non-combatants was not identical to the category of civilians It is 
noteworthy that articles 1 and 2 defined the word 'belligerents' which included armies, and, under certain condi­
tions, militia and volunteer corps, and inhabitants of unoccupied territory which spontaneously take up arms at the 
approach of the enemy Article 48 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 16 ILM 1977, pp 1391-1433, 
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states "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian ob­
jects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives " 
Note for instance article 13, paragraph 1, first sentence, of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven­
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II), 
16 ILM 1977, pp 1442-1449 "The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against the dangers arising from military operations " 
Complemented by articles 48 to 79 of Protocol I, and 13 to 18 of Protocol II To the extent that certain situations 
would anse not covered by these provisions the so-called Martens clause, contained in the preamble of the 1907 
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, in Roberts and Guelfi, Documents, 44-
47, stipulates "Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem 
it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the bel­
ligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the us­
ages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience " 
Reiterated in article 1, paragraph 2, Protocol I, and the preamble of Protocol Π 
Article 23 (c), Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Article 23 (d) forbids to issue a 
declaration that no quarter shall be given 
CHAPTER б 
THE RIGHT OF INJURED STATE(S) AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
6.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapters the substantive law regarding the international responsibility of States was 
discussed The first two chapters were devoted to exploring the legal interests of States and the 
United Nations The third chapter then examined what could be demanded, as reparation, of the 
author State of an international crime Chapters four and five finally investigated issues of enforce­
ment by way of countermeasures and the use of force Any dispute or question on these subjects, real 
or imagined, could be put before the Court for settlement or advice 
As a matter of fact Arangio-Ruiz has proposed, in his seventh report, to subject the exercise of 
rights to demand reparation and rights to resort to countermeasures to a prior determination by the 
Court that a crime has been or is being committed (articles 16 and 17, read together with article 19, 
paragraph 5) ' His choice for the Court is dictated mainly by the fact that the General Assembly and 
the Security Council are political organs, which tend to act neither necessarily or systematically re­
garding situations that call for the exercise of their competence, are not bound to use uniform crite­
ria, and need not motivate their choices2 Furthermore, the determination to be made would not 
result from the Court's exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, but would have to be the outcome of the 
Court's exercise of its contentious jurisdiction 3 States parties to a future convention on State re­
sponsibility would not, however, be entitled to seise the Court simply on their own initiative The 
construction of proposed article 19, Part Two, entails that any unilateral application to the Court 
would have to be based upon a prior decision of the Assembly or the Council, adopted by qualified 
majority, that the allegation of the existence of a crime is sufficiently substantiated to justify the 
grave concern of the international community.4 Arangio-Ruiz has further proposed, in view of the 
gravity of crimes, to establish the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in relation to any disputes over the 
implementation of the legal consequences of a crime s 
The purpose of this chapter will not be to discuss all of the substantive law in the light of the 
Court's jurisprudence and the substantive legal rules highlighted by it Nor will this chapter discuss, 
argue on, or dispute, Arangio-Ruiz' choice for the Court rather than the Security Council as the ap­
propriate organ to determine the existence of an international crime Rather the goal will be to focus 
on a number of substantive issues, correlated mostly to procedural obstacles, that may prevent the 
Court from settling a dispute or giving advice regarding international crimes 
It may be noted here that the Court's proceedings may be subdivided according to whether they 
relate to an exercise of its contentious or advisory jurisdiction Thus the Court performs two func­
tions According to article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute it is "to decide in accordance with interna­
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it",6 and according to article 65, paragraph 1, of the 
Statute it may give "an advisory opinion on any legal question" It flows from the provisions of the 
Statute that the former function can currently only be activated by States (article 34, paragraph 1, of 
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the Statute),7 whereas the latter function can be activated by "whatever body may be authorized by 
or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" (article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute)8 
According to article 96 of the Charter such bodies are the General Assembly and the Security 
Council (paragraph 1), or other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies when so 
authorized by the Assembly (paragraph 2 ) 9 At appropriate places issues related to advisory proceed-
ings will be discussed 
The obstacles regarding contentious proceedings before the Court relate mainly to the jurisdiction 
of the Court and the admissibility of the claim of the applicant State In this respect article 79, para-
graph 1, of the Rules of Court (established pursuant to article 30, paragraph 1, of the Statute) pro-
vides for the possibility of a State filing preliminary objections l0 If that occurs the proceedings on 
the merits will be suspended (paragraph 3), and the Court, in deciding upon any objection, nowadays 
has three options (paragraph 7) First, to uphold the objection, in which case the proceedings will be 
terminated, secondly, to reject the objection, in which case proceedings on the merits will be re-
sumed, and thirdly, to declare that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, 
an exclusively preliminary character, in which case proceedings on the merits will also be resumed 
The Court's decision on preliminary objections is to be laid down in the form of a judgment 
(paragraph 7) " 
In contrast the Rules do not envisage the filing of preliminary objections in respect of advisory pro-
ceedings Of course article 68 of the Statute (reproduced in article 102, paragraph 2, of the Rules) 
provides 
"In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of 
the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them 
to be applicable " 
But this has not so far led to separate phases and decisions on objections to jurisdiction and admis-
sibility regarding requests for advisory opinions l2 However, the Court has on occasion in its opin-
ions countered certain arguments directed against its competence and the admissibility of the 
requestl3 
Another topic relevant to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court concerns its relation to the Se-
curity Council This may relate to problems of concurrent jurisdiction and justiciability, as well as the 
possibility of a clash between their respective decisions The issue is all the more important as they 
are the only two organs of the United Nations regarding which, in general, member States have 
agreed to be legally bound by the decisions they may take (articles 25 and 94, paragraph 1, of the 
Charter, and articles 59 and 60 of the Statute) 
More substantively speaking the question is whether the Security Council can legitimately take deci-
sions requiring a member State to act in a certain way notwithstanding a member State's right, under 
international law, to act in another If the Security Council ought not to be considered competent to 
do this, the question would then be whether the Court could challenge the validity ofthat decision 
From the viewpoint of a State's responsibility for international crimes there is still another inter-
esting matter That concerns the indication of provisional measures in contentious proceedings Pro-
visional measures would not appear to play any role in advisory proceedings M Article 68 of the 
Statute might be invoked in that regard, but the advisory character of the Court's opinion and the ab-
sence of real parties militates against the analogous indication of provisional measures Certainly the 
Court has so far not developed any practice related to the indication of provisional measures other 
than in contentious proceedings IS 
One particular issue will not be discussed in this chapter, and that concerns the question of legal 
interest as a condition for the admissibility of the claim, or the possibility to claim, of an injured 
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State. Though of course the question of legal interest forms a central part of this thesis, no additional 
useful purpose would be served in going over all the aspects ofthat question again in the context of 
proceedings before the Court: the extensive discussion in chapters one and two should suffice in this 
regard. 
This chapter will therefore deal with the following sections. Section 2 will be devoted to the ju-
risdiction of the Court, and the possibility that its exercise will be hampered given the absence of af-
fected States. This is followed in section 3 by a discussion of the admissibility of claims, particularly 
in relation to disputes, negotiations and justiciability. Section 4 will explore the relation between the 
Court and the Security Council, especially the question of review. Finally aspects related to the indi-
cation of provisional measures and enforcement will be examined in section 5. 
6.2. The jurisdiction of the Court 
6.2.1. General observations 
It is undisputed that the Court only possesses the requisite jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case 
if the parties to that case have, in some manner, consented to such jurisdiction.16 Already the Perma-
nent Court had stated in one of its first cases:17 
"For this reason the Court, bearing in mind that its jurisdiction is limited, that it is invariably 
based on the consent of the respondent and only exists in so far as this consent has been 
given, cannot content itself with the provisional conclusion that the dispute falls or not within 
the terms of the Mandate." 
The Court cannot, of course, exercise its jurisdiction unless a party (or both parties) to a dispute 
bring(s) the case before the Court.18 This aspect concerns the so-called seisin of the Court,19 and is 
born out by article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute: 
"Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the spe-
cial agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the sub-
ject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated." 
It is important to note that the requisite consent concerns the jurisdiction of the Court and not the 
exercise of such jurisdiction. Thus no further show of consent is required once the Court determines 
that it has jurisdiction.20 That the Court is empowered to determine the scope of its jurisdiction flows 
from article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute, which records that:21 
"In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled 
by the decision of the Court." 
The use of the word "decision" could lead one to conclude that article 36, paragraph 6, must be read 
in conjunction to article 59 which stipulates the binding force of the decision of the Court. That con-
clusion is confirmed by reference to article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules, which states that the Court 
shall rule on objections through a decision in the form of a judgment. 
Article 36, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Statute, establishes three different ways by which States 
may consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. The first two ways both generally concern the treaty 
form and have been referred to, in article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, as follows:22 
"The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters 
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in 
force." 
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Cases which the parties refer to the Court are generally held to find their basis in a special agreement 
(compromis). The object of a special agreement is to found the jurisdiction of the Court regarding a 
predetermined dispute or controversy between the parties to the special agreement. With respect to 
matters specially provided for in treaties or conventions in force it may be said that these concern 
provisions which subject a certain generalized category of disputes, with or without conditions, to 
the jurisdiction of the Court. If such is the case the seisin of the Court takes place by way of applica-
tion. The categories included within the jurisdiction of the Court usually comprise disputes regarding 
the interpretation or application of the treaty, or disputes regarding breaches of obligations under the 
treaty.23 
The third way of constituting the jurisdiction of the Court concerns the making of a declaration by 
States parties to the Statute under article 36, paragraph 2, to the effect that they:24 
"(...) recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any 
other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an interna-
tional obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obliga-
tion." 
Cases brought before the Court under article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute are made by way of 
application, and may involve any legal dispute between States that have made declarations under that 
paragraph. 
A fourth way of establishing the jurisdiction of the Court concerns the so-called forum prorogatum. 
In such a case a State brings a case before the Court by way of application, without specifying any 
basis of jurisdiction, or a basis which even on aprima facie view simply does not confer any juris-
diction on the Court. Should the respondent State appear before the Court and fail to argue, in a 
timely fashion, the Court's lack of jurisdiction, such jurisdiction will have been established notwith-
standing the absence of any pre-existing basis to that effect.25 
Regarding these means of establishing the Court's jurisdiction it may be said that the first, the 
special agreement, and the latter, forum prorogatum, are unlikely to provide jurisdictional bases in 
case of international crimes. As to the first it is not to be expected that an author State of an interna-
tional crime will consent, by way of special agreement, to adjudication.26 The situation might be dif-
ferent of course if a change of government had occurred within the author State. As to the latter, 
forum prorogatum, it is not to be expected that any State accused of having committed an interna-
tional crime will appear before the Court without at the same time arguing its lack of jurisdiction.27 
Indeed, it is far more likely that an author State of an international crime will fail to show up. If that 
is the case the Court will have no other choice but to take note of the absence of any (arguable) basis 
of jurisdiction and remove the case from the General List. 
The second means of providing the Court with jurisdiction, provisions in treaties, may more 
fruitfully be resorted to by injured States. Since the requisite consent (to the treaty and hence to the 
Court's jurisdiction) will have been given, in advance, to the settlement of prospective disputes re-
garding the subject-matter of the treaty, the possibility of an author State of a crime being called be-
fore the Court is far from negligible. In this respect there is one basic condition, namely that the 
dispute and the injured State's claims, fall within the jurisdiction ratione materiae created through 
the jurisdictional clause.28 As an application of this condition may be mentioned the Court's refusal, 
318 CHAPTER 6 
twice in a row, to indicate the provisional measures requested by Bosnia and Herzegovina, because 
and to the extent that they were substantially unrelated to the subject-matter, and hence the jurisdic-
tion conferred by article IX, of the Genocide ConventionI9 
The subject-matter of the international crimes enumerated in article 19, Part One, of the ILC-draft, is 
to some extent covered by existing jurisdictional clauses in treaties 
The rules stipulating obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security are not, on 
the universal level, covered by any jurisdictional clause However, regionally the Pact of Bogotá, in 
article XXXI, vests the Court with jurisdiction regarding disputes of a juridical nature concerning the 
categories mentioned in article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute M The Pact is peculiar in this respect, 
since it does not restrict the Court's jurisdiction rottone matenae to the subject-matter of the treaty 
The Covenants, confirming the right to self-determination in their articles 1, similarly do not provide 
for jurisdiction of the Court On the regional level human rights treaties establish political rights 
which, when violated, may amount to a denial of self-determination However, while the intent to 
commit a denial of self-determination may be present, the jurisdiction extant in such treaties will be 
grafted upon the substantive human rights safeguarded under the treaty Such jurisdiction is moreo-
ver not conferred on the International Court of Justice, but on the institutions created by the treaty 
The foregoing considerations apply similarly to the crime of widespread breaches of basic human 
rights obligations Breaches of certain particular human rights obligations are covered by treaties in-
tended for the suppression of such breaches. In the context of the international crime of widespread 
breaches of basic human rights obligations, those relate to slavery, genocide and apartheid All three 
treaties contain jurisdictional clauses 31 So far there has only been one case in which the Court's ju-
risdiction has been invoked the pending case of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) 
In the context of this study it would go too far to examine all the jurisdictional obstacles related to 
that case It may be noted however that Maison claims, on the basis of the Court's orders on provi-
sional measures, that the Court holds that genocide cannot be committed by States, and that conse-
quently it does not possess jurisdiction under article IX of the Genocide Convention32 His assertion 
is based on the Court's rejection of the Bosnian request for the indication of a measure safeguarding 
Bosnia's right to self-defence и 
"Puisque l'Etat ne peut être l'auteur du génocide, la Bosnie n'est pas autorisée à l'utiliser, 
pour sanctionner ce crime, son droit de légitime défense, car celui-ci s'entend comme une 
mesure dirigée contre un Etat " 
The reason why a State cannot be the author of a genocide lies, according to Maison,34 in the fact 
that the Genocide Convention imposes but two obligations on States parties to prevent genocide 
and to punish those who commit genocide, and so States are not supposed to commit direct acts of 
genocide35 This view appears unduly restrictive and cannot be said to underlie the Court's orders If 
persons within a State commit genocide, that State will certainly have breached its obligation to pre-
vent acts of genocide But article 4 of the Genocide Convention stipulates 
"Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be pun-
ished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individu-
als" 
This provision clearly foresees the possibility that the organs of a State may engage in acts of geno-
cide That article 4 is directed towards the punishment of persons individually cannot contradict the 
obvious conclusion that the Convention envisages the possibility that a State may commit genocide 
The jurisdiction of the Court regarding disputes related to the responsibility of a State for genocide is 
not therefore restricted to situations in which a State fails to prevent the commission of genocide by 
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"prívate individuals" or isolated "public officials", but relates also to situations in which 
"constitutionally responsible rulers" directly engage in the acts punishable under the Convention. The 
Court's refusal to indicate measures safeguarding Bosnia's right of self-defence (and the concomitant 
refusal to declare that the arms embargo of resolution 713 does not apply to Bosnia and Herze-
govina) is based on the lack of jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention, since the Convention 
does not name the means by which States are to prevent genocide.3* 
The jurisdiction of the Court founded on declarations made pursuant to article 36, paragraph 2, of 
the Statute, allows most broadly the seisin of the Court by way of unilateral application. Contrary to 
the previously discussed means of conferring jurisdiction on the Court, the jurisdiction ratione ma-
teriae conferred on the Court by way of declarations under article 36, paragraph 2, appears virtually 
unlimited. Restrictions may nevertheless be imposed by a State by entering reservations to its decla-
ration, yet those may in tum be invoked by any respondent State. However, jurisdiction over dis-
putes regarding responsibility for an alleged international crime can, in principle, be based on 
declarations under article 36, paragraph 2. 
It may be noted in this respect that authors claiming the impossibility of an actio popularis in in-
ternational law generally argue such impossibility by reference to the absence of universal compul-
sory jurisdiction.37 However, as observed in chapter one, if one can establish a customary law 
obligation imposing respect for any particular human right, any State similarly bound by the same 
obligation would be in possession of a legal interest pursuant to the breach of such an obligation. 
Since the obligation exists under customary international law the only way of acting, on the judicial 
plane,38 upon such a legal interest would have to be based either on jurisdiction under a compromis, 
by virtue of forum prorogatum, or under the declarations based on article 36, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute.39 The crimes of aggression and denial of self-determination do indeed pose problems due to 
the absence of universal compulsory jurisdiction, but the problems on that count, to be discussed 
next, occur only if some States are not before the Court. 
6.2.2. Problems concerning States absent from proceedings before the Court 
States absent from contentious proceedings before the Court 
It is quite likely that the author State of an international crime, dragged before the Court against its 
(contemporary) will, will fail to show up at all. If that happens the Court will have three options. In 
the absence of any plausible jurisdictional basis it will, after a reasonable period of time, remove the 
case from the General List.4* However, should л prima facie arguable case exist in favour of juris­
diction, it will proceed to set dates for memorials by the applicant State and the respondent State. 
Clearly a respondent State that persists in its attitude not to appear will not be in a position to avail 
itself of the possibility of filing preliminary objections. Consequently proceedings on the merits will 
not be suspended, and oral hearings will take place after which the Court will withdraw to consider 
its judgment (article 54). In the light of the non-appearance of a respondent State, or its failure to 
defend its case, the applicant State may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim (article 
53, paragraph 1). In such circumstances the Court is bound to apply article 53, paragraph 2, which 
stipulates that it must satisfy itself that "it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37'. At 
this point the Court has two options. Either to find that it has jurisdiction, or that it has not. 
Another far more serious problem occurs when a State, though not a party to a certain case be­
fore the Court, may be affected by the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. The most famous example of 
this problem up till recently has been presented by the Monetary Gold Case.41 There the Court was 
asked to decide whether the United Kingdom or Italy could appropriate gold, in possession of the 
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United Kingdom, for compensation purposes The United Kingdom claimed the gold as compensa­
tion on the basis of the Court's judgment in the Corfu Channel Case; Italy claimed the gold as com­
pensation for wrongful acts by Albania, and Albania had owned the gold Both Italy and Albania 
were granted the right to apply to the Court, and Italy exercised that right In doing so it raised the 
question, the one and only preliminary objection ever to be filed by an applicant State, whether the 
Court could decide the priority of the Italian claim over the British claim in the absence of Albania 
from the proceedings In order to determine the issue it seemed to the Court that it would have to 
assess the validity of the Italian claim against Albania, and so it observed 4 2 
"To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run 
counter to a well-established principle of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, 
namely, that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent " 
The Court added to this in relation to the phrasing of article 62 of the Statute and Albania's non­
intervention β "In the present case, Albania's legal interests would not only be affected by a deci­
sion, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision." 
The argument has been made a number of times since that the Court could not decide a case, or 
not fully so, in the absence of certain States from the proceedings.44 There can be no question that 
the Court has been unwilling, in general,45 to let any such circumstance hamper the exercise of its ju­
risdiction From the perspective of international crimes two cases are of particular interest the Nica­
ragua Case and the East Timor Case 
In the Nicaragua Case the Court had to decide whether the United States could justify its conduct 
towards Nicaragua on the basis of a right of collective self-defence To do this the Court had to de­
termine whether acts allegedly committed by Nicaragua could be said to constitute an armed attack 
against either El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica The Court found against this contention of the 
United States In doing so it in fact determined that El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica had not 
been, in the relevant time span, the victims of an armed attack, and consequently could not have ex­
ercised any right of collective self-defence ** The United States' argument, that El Salvador, Hondu­
ras and Costa Rica were indispensable parties, and that the Court could not settle the dispute in their 
absence, had been previously rejected in the judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility In rejecting 
that plea the Court pointed to article 59 of the Statute and noted that the implicated States could 
institute separate proceedings or intervene under articles 62 or 63 of the Statute Also, so the Court 
claims, none of those States was in the same position as Albania, that is to say, their legal interests 
could not be considered to form the very subject-matter of the case before the Court47 
Another relevant case concerns that between Portugal and Australia In 1989 Australia concluded 
a treaty with Indonesia regarding the exploration and exploitation of the Timor Gap * This area 
constitutes part of the continental shelf of the territory of East Timor, which had been administered 
by Portugal unto 1975 In that year the Portuguese abandoned the territory, troubled as they were by 
civil disorder, after which Indonesia invaded49 Portugal claims that Australia, by negotiating, con­
cluding, and initiating performance of the Timor Gap treaty, is in breach of its obligation to respect 
the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor, its obligation to respect Portugal's rights 
as administering authority, and its obligation to conform to Security Council resolutions 384 and 389 
in accordance with article 25 of the Charter я 
Jurisdiction for this case was based upon Portugal's and Australia's declarations under article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute It seemed obvious that if the Court would investigate the Portuguese 
charges, it would first have to determine the legality of Indonesia's invasion into, and occupation of, 
East Timor For if that invasion had been lawful, or if the occupation had had the effect of providing 
Indonesia with a title to the territory valid under international law, such would constitute a compre-
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hensive defence against the breaches of obligation alleged by Portugal51 It is for those reasons that 
the Court observed that5 2 
"( ) Australia's behaviour cannot be assessed without first entering into the question why it 
is that Indonesia could not lawfully have concluded the 1989 treaty, while Portugal allegedly 
could have done so, the very subject-matter of the Court's decision would necessarily be a 
determination whether, having regard to the circumstances in which Indonesia entered and 
remained in East Timor, it could or could not have acquired the power to enter into treaties 
on behalf of East Timor relating to the resources of its continental shelf The Court could not 
make such a determination in the absence of the consent of Indonesia " 
And since Indonesia, in contrast with Australia, had never consented to the Court's jurisdiction, the 
Court quite rightly found that it could not exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the declara­
tions of the parties under article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute a 
The Nicaragua Case showed that a State which claims to exercise a right of collective self-
defence, but which is not itself attacked, may be brought before the Court as a respondent Appar­
ently a State arguably injured in the sense of article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two, of the ILC-draft, may 
be forced to account for its conduct notwithstanding that the directly injured State is not sued at the 
same time Question is whether the situation may be reversed, that is, whether a State injured in that 
way may sue the author State of an armed attack notwithstanding the absence of the directly injured 
State from the proceedings It would not have been too difficult to imagine the United States bring­
ing a case against Nicaragua, as an applicant, in respect of the latter's intervention in El Salvador ** 
Assuming for the sake of argument that El Salvador had not in the past accepted the Court's juris­
diction in relation to Nicaragua, and that the latter's action did amount to an armed attack, one might 
wonder whether the Court could have granted any claims brought before it by the United States 
That would mean accepting that Nicaragua could be forced to account for its action towards a third 
State (not before the Court), in relation to which it had not consented to the settlement of disputes, 
and in relation to which it could not make any counter-claims и It may not be too farfetched to con­
sider such to be an encroachment on the consensual and reciprocal character of the Court's jurisdic­
tion 
States implicated in advisory proceedings before the Court 
Similar problems as those discussed in the previous paragraphs may arise in the context of advisory 
proceedings Of course the jurisdiction of the Court to render an advisory opinion is triggered as 
soon as a request is made Though, as in contentious proceedings, the Court can only exercise such 
jurisdiction once the request is communicated to it In relation to the Court's advisory jurisdiction it 
has been claimed that judicial proceedings on legal questions pending between States could not take 
place without the consent of the relevant or affected States ** According to the Court this objection 
confuses the principles applicable to contentious proceedings and those applicable to advisory proce­
dure S7 
"The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in conten­
tious cases The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even where the Re­
quest for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between States The Court's 
reply is only of an advisory character as such, it has no binding force It follows that no 
State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory 
Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment 
as to the course of action it should take The Court's Opinion is given not to States, but to 
the organ which is entitled to request it " 
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By this token the Court appeared, to some extent, to back away from the opinion delivered by the 
Permanent Court regarding Eastern Cardia In that opinion the latter had stated.58 
"The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly the main point 
of the controversy between Finland and Russia, ( ) Answering the question would be sub­
stantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties " 
The Permanent Court's reason for denying that it could answer the question was only marginally 
based on the circumstance that this required the actual or real consent of the parties to the dispute 
Rather it depended on the circumstance that Russia was not a member of the League of Nations, and 
because, therefore, article 17 of the Covenant applied59 That provision stipulated that in case of a 
dispute between a member of the League and a State which is not a member, the latter would be in­
vited to accept the obligations of membership (under articles 12 to 16) of the League for purposes of 
such a dispute While the members of the League are bound by the obligations regarding the pacific 
settlement of disputes, non-members are not, and since Russia had declared its opposition to inter­
vention by the League it could not be said to have consented to such settlement60 
In the event it was the lack of competence of the League, not of the Court, which led the Permanent 
Court to decline to answer the question in the Eastern Carelia Opinion 
The Court has argued, on the other hand, that States by becoming members of the United Nations 
have agreed to the Court giving opinions on questions affecting their legal disputes with other mem­
bers 61 The operative condition as to the propriety of the Court's exercise of its advisory jurisdiction 
is that the question submitted lies within the competence of the organ requesting i t a 
The Court has indicated only one specific circumstance in which the rendering of an advisory opinion 
would be incompatible with its judicial character, namely when ° 
"( ) the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing 
the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settle­
ment without its consent " 
It has been claimed, by Akhavan, that in view of the inadequacy of international judicial remedies the 
advisory jurisdiction of the Court could be fruitfully used for purposes of enforcement under the 
Genocide Convention M In view of the object to induce compliance with the Genocide Convention, 
so he said, the question 6 S 
"( ) must not be at a level of abstraction where it would be ineffective for the practical pur­
poses of condemning states in international delinquency Nor should it be so factually specific 
that it would be tantamount to a clear contentious dispute and a manifest abuse of the advi­
sory opinion jurisdiction " 
He continues to state that the question could be framed in terms of applicability rather than in terms 
of consequences deriving from such applicability ** Yet one would think that this would constitute 
the exact point made by the Court, namely that the power to demand advisory opinions should not 
be used to circumvent the requirement of consent to judicial settlement Admittedly, it is hardly pos­
sible, in view of the Court's advisory practice, to deny that a thin line exists between answering a 
question, and settling a dispute between States. However, the Court has conceded that the same 
principles which apply to rendering advice in the presence of a dispute between States, apply also in 
regard to disputes between the United Nations and a (member) State67 The Court would therefore 
appear to rule out giving a reply to any question that would involve a determination of a State's re­
sponsibility 
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6.3. Admissibility of claims 
A preliminary question is when it is appropriate to speak of an objection against the jurisdiction of 
the Court and when of an objection against the admissibility of the claim of the applicant№ The dis­
tinguishing factor between the two lies with the phrasing of the jurisdictional basis Should the juris­
dictional basis make a reference to a condition to be fulfilled before the Court is seised, then any 
objection related to that condition is directed towards denying the existence of jurisdiction Should 
such a condition be absent from the jurisdictional basis, the same condition may be claimed to exist 
under a rule of treaty or customary international law Objections to the effect that a condition posed 
by a rule of treaty or customary international law is not fulfilled are directed against the admissibility 
of the claim Traditionally, for instance, there have been conditions attached to the exercise of the 
right of diplomatic protection the exhaustion of local remedies and the nationality of the claim *9 
Other conditions posed either in jurisdictional bases or under treaty or customary international law 
relate to the existence of a dispute or to negotiations leading up to it These will be discussed subse­
quently As a follow-up the legal or political character of disputes or questions will be discussed as 
an introduction to the final issue of justiciability. 
6 3 1 Disputes and negotiations 
The first and foremost condition applicable to the exercise of the right to claim lies with the necessity 
of there being a dispute between the applicant and respondent States70 Many jurisdictional clauses in 
treaties provide for the jurisdiction of the Court concerning disputes regarding the interpretation or 
application of the treaty, or regarding alleged breaches of obligation under the treaty However, even 
without any reference to disputes in such clauses, one would think that a claim could not be enter­
tained by the Court if there did not exist any dispute between the applicant and respondent States at 
the time of seisin Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute for instance envisages declarations accept­
ing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court regarding (legal) disputes only Article 36, paragraph 1, 
on the other hand merely mentions that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises cases referred to it by 
the parties, or matters provided for in treaties in force Notwithstanding the absence of any reference 
to disputes there, article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute states, in a somewhat haphazard manner, 
that the Court's function is to decide (in accordance with international law) such disputes as are 
submitted to it And article 40, paragraph 1 (chapter on procedure) provides that both in case of 
notification of the special agreement and of written application the subject of the dispute shall be in­
dicated 71 Question is of course what is to be considered a dispute for purposes of adjudication 
In this regard the often quoted dictum of the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis Case is still 
relevant7I 
"A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests 
between two persons " 
It is somewhat difficult to conceive of two States coming before the Court and asking it to decide on 
a disagreement on a point of fact or on a conflict of interests without at the same time arguing legal 
issues" That might perhaps be imagined regarding a conflict of interests should the parties authorize 
the Court to decide ex aequo et bono (article 38, paragraph 2, of the Statute)η* As this has never 
happened, the Court so far has always been obliged to decide disputes in accordance with interna­
tional law75 Yet how is one to decide that a dispute does indeed exist? That question was answered 
by the Court in 1962, when it held 7 e 
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"In other words it is not sufficient for one party to a contentious case to assert that a dispute 
exists with the other party. A mere assertion is not sufficient to prove the existence any more 
than a mere denial of the existence of a dispute proves its non-existence. Nor is it adequate to 
show that the interests of the two parties to such a case are in conflict. It must be shown that 
the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other." 
The idea that a dispute involves a claim by a State that is positively opposed by another State raises 
the questions what kind of opposition is required, and in which way it is to be ascertained. This poses 
the issue, relevant in relation to international crimes, whether negotiations ought to be conducted 
before bringing a case to the Court. 
The opposition required to show the existence of a dispute must concern a claim by one State 
which is contested by another State. Since the dispute must exist at the time the Court is seised, this 
seems to imply that an exchange of views must have occurred previously. Some writers contend, 
notably Cassese, that the purpose aimed at by subordinating proceedings before the Court to the ex-
istence of a dispute, is that:77 
"(...) the prestige and interests of States should not be harmed by a summons to appear before 
an international tribunal and the consequential opening of a long and costly trial when the 
State concerned could easily have acceded to the demands of the complainant State before 
being made answerable in court." 
The consequence is, so he claims, that there must be a clash between a demand to adopt a certain ju-
ridical attitude and another State's refusal to comply with the demand.78 The refusal can be explicit 
or implicit (through conclusive facts or omissive behaviour), and must expose an unwillingness to 
accede to the demand.79 
In the Mavrommatis Case the Permanent Court postulated that diplomatic negotiations were neces-
sary in order to define the subject-matter of a dispute.80 Although this appeared to be an absolute 
condition, both the Permanent Court and the Court have tended to be little formalistic on this score. 
In the Mavrommatis Case the Permanent Court went on to say that the criterion might be that a 
deadlock had been reached in the negotiations.81 The present Court similarly did not require exten-
sive negotiations between the parties, and likewise adopted the criterion of a deadlock.82 Whether 
the negotiations concern diplomatic exchanges defining the dispute, or negotiations intended to bring 
about a settlement of the dispute, the materialization of a deadlock regarding the perspective posi-
tions is decisive: it makes the dispute one that is not any longer capable of being settled through ne-
gotiations. 
Disputes regarding the commission of an international crime will concern legal and factual con-
troversies as to the international responsibility of the author State, inclusive its reparation obliga-
tions, or alternatively controversies related to enforcement, through countermeasures or the use of 
force, by injured States. In chapters four and five it was argued that, in case of crimes, neither injured 
States, nor the Security Council, would be under any obligation to resort to dispute settlement before 
resorting to countermeasures or the use of armed force. The most that could be required was that 
they indicate the specific demands made of the author State of an international crime at the time of 
their resort to countermeasures or force. This stance implies, negotiation being one of the means of 
dispute settlement, that substantively speaking one should not require an injured State to attempt to 
negotiate with the author State of an international crime. In the same vein an injured State's claim 
should not be found inadmissible by the Court on the ground that there had not been any negotia-
tions, or that they had not been sufficiently exhausted. Where the condition of negotiations is im-
posed by the terms of a jurisdictional clause of a particular treaty, one ought to proceed from the 
view that a mere offer, by the author State, to have resort to dispute settlement or to conduct direct 
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negotiations is insufficient to cut through a deadlock. The refusal by a State to negotiate could also 
render inoperative the condition to negotiate contained in a jurisdictional basis.0 Similarly the mere 
verbal assurance, unaccompanied by concrete action, that the demands of the injured State will be 
complied with, does not constitute evidence that there is room for negotiations. These arguments all 
tend to the conclusion that a provision conferring jurisdiction on the Court in a future convention on 
State responsibility ought to dispense with any condition to resort to dispute settlement generally, 
and negotiations in particular, in case of international crimes.84 
6.3.2. Political versus legal disputes and issues of justiciability 
Quite often the distinction between legal and political disputes is equated to the respective categories 
of justiciable and non-justiciable disputes.85 Some preliminary remarks are directed therefore to the 
question of determining the legal or political character of disputes, before entering into issues of jus-
ticiability. 
Political versus legal disputes 
The phrase "legal disputes" appears in article 36, paragraph 3, of the Charter, and article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute. Yet no indication is to be found as to what would make a dispute legal in 
character,86 or what would make it political in character.87 Now the Court, in the Armed Actions 
Case, claimed:88 
"(...) the Court is aware that political aspects may be present in any legal dispute brought be-
fore it. The Court, as a judicial organ, is however only concerned to establish, first, that the 
dispute before it is a legal dispute, in the sense of a dispute capable of being settled by the 
application of principles and rules of international law, (...)." 
It is similarly possible, with regard to determining the legal character of a dispute, to find numerous 
references to the idea of a dispute being apt to be settled by application of legal rules. Thus the 
phrase on the Court "whose function it is to decide disputes in accordance with international law", 
contained in article 38 of the Statute, does no more than to exclude political controversies, and indi-
cates that the Court can only take note of, and settle, disputes which are legal in character. 
The Court has dealt with objections, in both its contentious and advisory jurisprudence, to the ef-
fect that a dispute or question was political in character, or that the legal aspects could not be di-
vorced from their political context.89 The Court, in its Admission Opinion and Expenses Opinion, 
observed that a request for the interpretation of a treaty provision involved an essentially judicial 
task.90 And in the former opinion it stated that it was not concerned with the motives underlying the 
request, nor with the considerations advanced before the Security Council in relation to concrete 
cases.91 In the latter opinion it took note of an argument that it ought to decline to answer because 
the question was intertwined with political questions, but held that, in the nature of things, most in-
terpretations of the Charter had political significance.91 
The issue arose once more in the Diplomatic Staff Case. There the Court rejected an objection by 
Iran to the effect that the Court could not take cognizance of the American claims, because this 
would involve an examination of the issue:93 "(...) divorced from its proper context, namely the 
whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years." In 
its letter to the Court, Iran, remaining absent from the proceedings, had not made any attempt to 
explain or define the connection between the separate dispute and the overall problem, but according 
to the Court:94 
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"This was the more necessary because legal disputes between sovereign States by their very 
nature are likely to occur in political contexts, and often form only one element in a wider and 
long-standing political dispute between the States concerned Yet never has the view been put 
forward that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political 
dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue be­
tween them " 
Justiciability of disputes 
Another question concerns the meaning to be attached to the "(non-) justiciability" of disputes ** The 
more usual formulation is that a dispute may, or may not, be suitable for judicial decision ** The 
problem with that, of course, is that it does not specify why the dispute would, or would not, be suit­
able for adjudication Since, as noted in the previous paragraphs, a dispute which cannot be settled 
by way of the application of rules of international law is by definition a political dispute, it is also by 
definition a dispute which is not suitable for adjudication Yet the dispute's unsuitability for judicial 
decision lies with the impossibility of the Court to decide in accordance with international law, not 
because the dispute would be non-justiciable if legal rules could be found applicable to it " 
Another criterion sometimes put forward concerns the unwillingness of one of the parties to have 
the dispute settled by the Court Such arguments have not, however, gained any weight over the 
years It is widely accepted, in relation to issues of jurisdiction, that consent once given cannot be re­
voked at the moment a State invokes its own and another State's consent to have a particular dispute 
settled by the Court "* Indeed, the Statute envisages this type of situation by providing, in article 53, 
paragraph 1, that in cases of non-appearance of the respondent State, or failure to defend its posi­
tion, the applicant State may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim Paragraph 2 of the 
same article enjoins the Court to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, and that the claim of the appli­
cant State is well founded in fact and law The Court's case law furthermore testifies to the fact that 
the Court has tended to adjudicate disputes notwithstanding a respondent's failure to show up " 
Clearly unwillingness to appear or to defend, or generally to have the dispute adjudicated, cannot 
transform the dispute into a non-justiciable one 10° 
If the idea of justiciability is to have any place in the jurisprudence of the Court, it must mean that 
a dispute, though legal in character, ought not to be settled by the Court due to circumstances sub­
stantially extraneous to the substantive law1β1 
One such circumstance, particularly interesting from the viewpoint of international crimes, was ar­
gued by the United States l 0 2 
"The resort of force during ongoing armed conflict lacks the attributes necessary for the ap­
plication of the judicial process, namely that a pattern of legally relevant facts discernible by 
the means available to the adjudicating tribunal, establishable in conformity with applicable 
norms of evidence and proof, and not subject to further material evolution during the course 
of, or subsequent to, the judicial proceedings " 
The Court had no problem in refuting the primary argument that it would be unable to establish the 
facts, as well as the subsidiary argument that the judgment might not be capable of implementa­
tion Another argument was not really countered by the Court, namely that allegations of ongoing 
use of unlawful armed force were never intended by the draftsmen of the Charter to be covered by 
article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute I M In the light of the text of article 36, paragraph 2, such an 
argument appears somewhat odd, since its terms, establishing the jurisdiction of the Court regarding 
legal disputes,105 cover any question of international law, and any fact which may constitute the 
breach of an international obligation The fact however that a dispute can be settled by reference to 
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rules of international law would not be decisive in order to conclude on the non-justiciability of the 
dispute. As pointed out even legal disputes may be non-justiciable. However, the Court did not have 
to search for long to come up with precedents regarding the adjudication of disputes involving the 
use of force."6 
The connected argument that those precedents were all retrospective in character, and did not relate 
to a fluid situation, did not persuade the Court to refrain from deciding the issues. As judge Schwe-
bel aptly observed, in the merits phase of the Nicaragua Case, the provision on the Court's power to 
indicate provisional measures would not make sense if ongoing cases were excluded.1*7 In this con-
nection one may note that Nicaragua disputed that the Court's judicial function was "inherently ret-
rospective".1M In view of the accepted forms of reparation (supra chapter three) there appears no 
reason to deny the Court's power to settle disputes involving claims for cessation of wrongful con-
duct and restitution. These may involve putting a stop to (a) continuing wrongful act(s) or ending an 
illegal situation, and in that sense the Court's judgment would invariably be prospective. 
There is one aspect regarding the issue of (non-) justiciability that deserves closer scrutiny. It con-
cerns judge Schwebel's stance that the Court cannot, and could not, judge the necessity of United 
States' action in self-defence partly in view of the insufficiency of the evidence, and partly because of 
the difficulty of establishing the true motives and reasonableness of the policy of a party."9 The 
Court, in a very limited way, judged United States' action to be in conflict with the condition of ne-
cessity, mainly because it was initiated several months after a major offensive by the armed opposi-
tion in El Salvador had been repulsed.1" If it is recognized that the Court can assess whether a right 
of self-defence can be exercised in the circumstances of the case,111 fluid and ongoing as they may 
be, it would seem contradictory to claim that it could not assess, at the same time, whether other 
conditions for the lawful exercise ofthat right are fulfilled.111 
Two final issues, relevant from the viewpoint of international crimes, warrant discussion. First, 
can the Court uphold claims demanding, as guarantees against repetition, a change of government or 
the implementation of individual responsibility for crimes under international law? Secondly, can the 
Court issue a declaration affirming the right to take countermeasures or to use force by one party 
against another if the countermeasures or the use of force have not yet occurred? 
A serious problem of justiciability may exist regarding claims for guarantees against repetition, espe-
cially those relating to a change of government and the implementation of individual responsibility. It 
is not to be expected, generally, that an author State will implement such specific and far-reaching 
guarantees of its own free will.113 But that is not really the issue. The implementation of a change of 
government and the individual responsibility of public officials will usually involve not merely the 
dismissal of the government, but also a complete re-organization of the police, paramilitary and 
armed forces. It is also recognized that ultimate responsibility for the political reconstitution of a 
particular State lies with the people of that State. In the end then it is not merely a question of dis-
posing of those who bear the ultimate responsibility for the commission of an international crime, but 
of a complete turnabout including the organization of elections to enhance the legitimacy of the new 
government. It may be submitted that disputes regarding such complex issues, encompassing the 
making of choices regarding the future political and constitutional structures of a State, could not be 
settled by the Court. 
As to the second question, it is possible to claim that the Court cannot authorize resort to 
countermeasures or the use of force. It is generally accepted that the Court should not take into 
account, at any stage of its deliberations, the distinct possibility that a party would act in disregard of 
its obligation to comply with the judgment of the Court (article 94 Charter).114 Should a party 
nevertheless fail to honour its obligation, enforcement of the author State's responsibility may come 
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about on the basis of a Security Council decision under article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter, or by 
virtue of the injured State's exercise of its right to resort to countermeasures or to use force (should 
the latter be lawful under international law). It is to be assumed that the Court would have 
established the author State's responsibility and its obligation to provide reparation to the injured 
State. If the Court would issue a declaration that a State possesses, or would possess, the right to 
resort to countermeasures or to use force, this would amount to positing a party's future disregard 
of the judgment of the Court. At the same time this would implicate the Court in the injured State's 
decision to exercise its rights. Furthermore, as the parties will be free, subject to considerations of 
jus cogens, to opt for a settlement of their dispute on some other basis than the Court's judgment, 
such a declaration by the Court would prejudice the position of the author State in any negotiations 
following the judgment. 
6.4. Relations between the Court and the Security Council 
6.4.1. The concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the Court and the Security Council 
The non-justiciability of a dispute has been claimed to exist on the basis of the exercise by the Secu-
rity Council of its powers regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.ns Article 
24, paragraph 1, of the Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security. It has been argued that if and when the Security Council 
is exercising its functions in that field, the Court should refrain from exercising contentious jurisdic-
tion. With respect to these issues the Court had already stated in the Expenses Opinion that the Se-
curity Council's primary responsibility could not be considered to constitute an exclusive 
responsibility.116 Hence the General Assembly could take such action as did not come within the 
province of the Security Council.117 
In so far as the Council's relation to the Court is concerned the starting-point of the discussion 
must lie with article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter: 
"While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions 
assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommenda-
tion with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." 
As the Court has noted a few times already,118 there is no equivalent rule to be found anywhere in the 
Charter or the Statute limiting the freedom of the Court to exercise the functions assigned to it. It is 
to be observed that this limitation on the General Assembly's competence comes into operation al-
ready as soon as the Security Council is seised of a situation or dispute under Chapter VI (article 12, 
paragraph 2, read together with article 24, paragraph 2), and not merely if it exercises its powers un-
der Chapter VII (in which case article 11, paragraph 2, final sentence, may apply). For obvious rea-
sons no such limit could be imposed on the Court, since under Chapter VI it has a role to play 
regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes (articles 33 and 36, paragraph 3).119 Additionally it may 
be noted that the Security Council cannot adopt binding decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter, 
and that the concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the two organs will probably, but not necessarily, 
develop in parallel directions.12' 
Should the Court's position be any different if the Council is exercising its powers under Chapter 
VII of the Charter? The United States argued that Nicaragua's complaint about the use of force 
against its territorial integrity and national independence amounted to a charge of aggression and 
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armed conflict which could only be dealt with by the Security Council under Chapter VII, and not by 
the Court as part of the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI The Court retorted ш 
"But, if so, it has to be noted that, while the matter has been discussed in the Security Coun­
cil, no notification has been given to it in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, so that 
the issue could be tabled for full discussion before a decision were taken for the necessary 
enforcement measures to be authorized It is clear that the complaint by Nicaragua is not 
about an ongoing armed conflict between it and the United States, but one requiring, and in­
deed demanding, the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two States " 
It is not clear what kind of notification under Chapter VII is meant Yet what is clear is that the 
Court's construction of the dispute between the two parties is somewhat artificial Can it really be 
doubted that the mutual allegations of intervention and use of force concern situations appropriate 
for Security Council action under Chapter VIP The mere fact that the matter has not been tabled for 
discussion under Chapter VII, or that the Security Council has not adopted any resolution under that 
chapter, cannot mean that consequently there is no Chapter VII type of situation Even the fact that a 
draft resolution determining a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, fails to 
acquire the requisite votes does not mean that consequently there is no threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression It simply means that the Security Council has been prevented from 
exercising its powers on political grounds,112 and that it has not adopted any legally binding deci­
sions) The Court's argument did not address the issue whether it could adjudicate disputes that fall 
within the Security Council's province of Chapter VII Substantially the answer of the Court is that 
the Security Council had not exercised its responsibility under Chapter VII in regard to the dispute 
between Nicaragua and the United States And, again, this constitutes a reliance on the lack of any 
provision analogous to article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter 
Apparently the Court will not refrain from adjudicating a dispute on the sole ground that the 
Council is simultaneously exercising its responsibility under Chapter VI, nor when there is a Chapter 
VII type of situation regarding which the Council has failed to exercise its responsibility It remains 
to be seen whether the Court will exercise its contentious jurisdiction if the Council has made use of 
its powers under Chapter VII ш It may be noted that the Court has made use of its power to indi­
cate provisional measures in relation to the disputes between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugosla­
via (Serbia and Montenegro), and regarding which the Security Council has been, and is, exercising 
its powers under Chapter VII1 2 4 
6 4 2 Judicial review of Security Council resolutions 
The issue to be discussed in this subsection, review of decisions of the Security Council, is of the ut­
most importance in relation to international crimes As argued in the previous section questions re­
garding the prospective exercise of rights of enforcement are non-justiciable Not because they 
would not entail the interpretation or application of legal rules, but because the Court would, by af­
firming the existence of enforcement rights prior to their exercise, be implicated as to the political 
decision to exercise such rights It has been claimed by some that the Court could not settle certain 
disputes between States on the basis that such would encroach upon the powers of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter Of course, as noted in the previous subsection, there does 
not exist any danger of encroachment in cases in which the decisions of the two organs run in the 
same direction 
On the other hand, the Court's eventual decision could, hypothetically at least, be at variance with 
an existing Council decision The question then arises whether the Court could review the earlier 
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decision of the Council as to its conformity with the Charter or international law in general The 
Court can be confronted with the issue of review through the exercise of both its contentious and 
advisory jurisdiction However, since the Court's exercise of its advisory jurisdiction does not lead to 
any binding result for organs of the United Nations or member States, one could not consider such 
exercise a review of a decision properly speaking The Court's jurisprudence in the field of advisory 
opinions has, however, proved relevant to the issue, and will be discussed first. 
Review in advisory proceedings before the Court 
In its very first opinion, on the admission of States to the United Nations, the Court noted that1ÎS 
"The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provi-
sions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for 
its judgment " 
It would certainly not be too farfetched to claim that the phrase "threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression", featuring in article 39 of the Charter, presents criteria for the Council's 
judgment Indeed, the term "peace-loving" which formed the subject of this opinion of the Court 
could not be said to allow for any less wide appreciation of relevant circumstances than the phrase 
"threat to the peace" As argued before, especially in chapter two, the Council's determination of a 
threat to the peace under article 39, though undoubtedly constituting the exercise of a discretionary 
power and as such subject at the most to marginal scrutiny, involves not merely a factual, military, 
and political evaluation, but allows for the application of legally relevant criteria 
Subsequently, in its Expenses Opinion, the Court observed IM 
"But when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate 
for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that 
such action is not ultra vires the Organization " 
It is in the nature of a presumption that it can be rebutted, just as much as a doctrine of ultra vires 
acts constitutes a legal doctrine If there is a presumption that certain action is not ultra vires, then 
the rebuttal ofthat presumption must take place by reference to legal limitations on the powers con-
ferred Admittedly, the Court went on to point out that proposals to vest the ultimate authority to 
interpret the Charter in the Court were rejected, and that it was restricted to rendering an "advisory" 
opinion l27 At the same time one cannot but take note that it further observed thatl2e "( ) each or-
gan must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction " According to Watson the Court 
did assert a power of review in the Expenses Opinion, mainly because it stated that it could consider 
whether the expenses were "decided on in conformity with the provisions of the Charter" 129 
In the Namibia Opinion the Court, finally, pronounced itself more clearly on an argument against 
review (unless specifically so requested)13β 
"Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of 
the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned " 
Although the question submitted to the Court was what legal consequences ensued, for States, of the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276,u l 
the Court went on, in detail, to examine the legal justification for the General Assembly's action in 
terminating the mandate U 2 While thus affirming the non-existence of any power of review, it at the 
same time took a broad approach regarding the issues to be argued and in actual fact undertook ac­
tion that amounted to judicial review of Generally Assembly resolution 2145 ш 
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Review in contentious proceedings before the Court 
Gowlland-Debbas has argued that the Court could not review decisions of the Security Council un-
der article 39 of the Charter. Her position in this respect follows from her claim that determinations 
under that article involve a factual and political judgment, and not a legal one.134 This latter claim 
was discussed and rejected in chapter two. The Charter and the Statute do not really provide any 
guidance as to questions of review, and the preparatory works of the Charter may be interpreted to 
go either way.135 Although the question of review has not been the subject of any explicit statement 
by the Court, some of the Court's positions in contentious cases are relevant. The Court has had the 
opportunity to discuss its relation to the Security Council in four cases. 
In the Diplomatic Staff Case the Court observed that:13* 
"(...) it does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that there was or could 
be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions by the Court 
and the Security Council. Nor is there in this any cause for surprise. Whereas Article 12 of the 
Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any recommendation with regard to 
a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of that 
dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed upon the functioning of the Court by any 
provision of either the Charter or the Statute of the Court. The reasons are clear. It is for the 
Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that 
may be in issue between parties to a dispute;" 
This quotation indicates that the Court will not be hampered by the fact that the Security Council is 
exercising its functions under the Charter in respect of (partially) the same dispute. But that is of 
course not the same as saying that the Court has the power to review a determination of the Security 
Council under article 39. 
In the jurisdiction and admissibility phase of the Nicaragua Case the Court was faced with the 
claim advanced by the United States that the Court would be in need to determine that United 
States' activities complained of by Nicaragua constituted a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression. Nicaragua had earlier presented corresponding claims, as advanced to the 
Court, in a draft resolution to the Security Council which failed to acquire the requisite majority, and 
the United States, as part of a larger issue, argued that:137 
"(...) the Nicaraguan Application requires the Court to determine that the activities com-
plained of constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, (...). 
Since Nicaragua's Application in effect asks the Court for a judgment in all material respects 
identical to the decision which the Security Council did not take, it amounts to an appeal to 
the Court from an adverse consideration in the Security Council." 
The Court responded to this specific point:138 
"Nor can the Court accept that the present proceedings are objectionable as being in effect an 
appeal to the Court from an adverse decision of the Security Council. The Court is not asked 
to say that the Security Council was wrong in its decision, nor that there was anything incon-
sistent with law in the way in which the members of the Council employed their right to vote. 
The Court is asked to pass judgment on certain legal aspects of a situation which has also 
been considered by the Security Council, a procedure which is entirely consonant with its 
position as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." 
Again this does not amount to an unambiguous assertion that the Court possesses the power to 
review a decision of the Security Council under article 39. Here the Court merely proceeds to 
examine the legality of certain acts which beforehand had been presented to the Security Council 
with the claim that they constituted a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. It may be said 
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here, somewhat in the form of an obiter dictum, that the Court was certainly right to ignore the fact 
that the Security Council had not taken any decision under article 39 As is known the draft 
resolution was not adopted due to the United States voting againstl39 Apart from the obvious fact 
that no determination under article 39 took place, no other consequences attach to the so-called 
power of veto. The exercise of the right to vote in the Security Council concerns a political act and a 
vetoed resolution cannot prejudice, in any way, the legal position with respect to a certain 
140 
situation 
The third case in which acts of the Security Council have been implicated concerns the Lockerbie 
Case U l The United Kingdom and the United States demanded from Libya the surrender of two in-
dividuals, of Libyan nationality,MI and secured the support of the Security Council for its demands. 
Libya brought a case against the two States before the Court under the jurisdictional clause of the 
Montreal Convention, and asked the Court to issue provisional measures ordering the United King-
dom and the United States to refrain from putting any pressure on it, individually or through means 
of their position in the Security Council, to surrender the individuals concerned. Before the Court 
had completed its deliberation on the Libyan requests, the Security Council took a resolution under 
Chapter VII of the Charter ordering Libya to surrender the individuals The Court had to face a new 
situation, and reacted as follows 143 
"39 Whereas both Libya and the United Kingdom, as Members of the United Nations, are 
obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Ar-
ticle 25 of the Charter, whereas the Court, which is at the stage of proceedings on provisional 
measures, considers that prima facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in reso-
lution 748 (1992), and whereas, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations 
of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international 
agreement, including the Montreal Convention, 
40 Whereas the Court, while thus not at this stage called upon to determine definitively the 
legal effect of resolution 748 (1992), considers that, whatever the situation previous to the 
adoption ofthat resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention can-
not now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures, 
41 Whereas, furthermore, an indication of the measures requested by Libya would be likely 
to impair the rights which appear prima facie to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom by virtue 
of Security Council resolution 748 (1992)," 
While it is clear that the Court here refrains from reviewing the validity of Security Council resolu-
tion 748, that in itself is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the Court denies itself the power to 
review the resolution Indeed, there are a number of indications that the Court could possibly, 
probably in its deliberations on the merits of the case (if it reaches that stage), proceed to such re-
view Thus, first of all, the Court makes a reference to the fact that, at the stage of provisional meas-
ures, the obligation of article 25 prima facie extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 It 
seems to imply that, at a later phase of proceedings, it could examine whether resolution 748 really 
lays down any decision, or whether it should be considered to merely lay down a recommendation 
Furthermore, and more importantly, it appears to leave open the possibility of reviewing the validity 
of resolution 748 when it remarks that it is not called upon at the stage of provisional measures to 
"determine definitively the legal effect of resolution 748" I44 It may be submitted that part of the 
problem regarding this particular order lies with the incidental nature of provisional measures Could 
one expect the Court to proceed with a review of resolution 748, considering that it had not at such 
a stage determined its jurisdiction and is enjoined to refrain from prejudging the merits? Certainly 
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Finally the Genocide Convention Case presents some relevant indications as to the question of 
review. Bosnia and Herzegovina had requested the Court, inter alia, to indicate provisional meas-
ures to the effect that it could receive the supply of arms and assistance.146 In its first order the Court 
observed that such requests dealt with matters outside the jurisdiction of the Genocide Convention 
and could not be entertained.147 In its second order the Court added that the intention of the appli-
cant was not the indication of measures to be taken by the respondent, but a declaration of rights 
possessed by Bosnia and Herzegovina so as to clarify the legal situation to the entire international 
community; accordingly, so the Court noted, the request had to be regarded as outside the scope of 
article 41 of the Statute.148 Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in tum claimed that since the Se-
curity Council had been acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, and had taken decisions on the ba-
sis of article 25, the indication of provisional measures by the Court, of the type requested, would be 
premature.149 The Court understood that objection to be directed to those measures requested 
"which go beyond matters within the scope of the Genocide Convention", and it considered, for that 
reason alone, that it could not indicate those measures.150 However, it went on to quote the passage 
from the Nicaragua Case which noted the absence of any provision analogous to article 12, para-
graph 1, of the Charter.151 The inference to be drawn from the orders is that the Court's refusal to 
indicate measures affecting resolution 713 does not hinge on its inability or incompetence to assess 
its validity, but rather reflects the limited scope of jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention. 
It may be said, in conclusion, that the question of review of Security Council determinations un-
der article 39 of the Charter is still open. There are ample grounds for finding that determining the 
existence of a threat to the peace involves the application of legal criteria. A future decision by the 
Court in the Lockerbie Case could put the matter beyond doubt.152 
6.5. Indication of provisional measures under article 41 of the Statute 
Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Statute establishes that: 
"The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any 
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either 
party." 
A few aspects of this power of the Court stand out in the context of the present discussion on inter-
national crimes. These concern the preservation of rights, irreparable prejudice to rights, and argu-
ments on equality, neutrality and impartiality. Other aspects relate to the possible timeliness of any 
indication of provisional measures, and issues of (non-) compliance and enforcement of provisional 
measures. 
6.5.1. The preservation of rights, irreparable prejudice, and equality, neutrality and impartiality 
Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Statute contemplates the indication of such provisional measures 
which "ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." The Court, in its practice 
on article 41, has specified that this:153 
"(...) presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the sub-
ject of dispute injudicial proceedings;" 
From the perspective of international responsibility, and in particular the rules on reparation, there is 
but one possibility of irreparable prejudice to rights.154 Any internationally wrongful act gives rise to 
the obligation of the author State to provide reparation to the injured State. As argued in chapter 
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three, section 3 4, the obligation to provide restitution should be accorded preference if either the 
injured or the author State so prefers. In the nature of things compensation is always possible,155 
even if the determination of the amount of compensation may prove difficult. Restitution on the 
other hand may prove absolutely impossible in cases of destruction of property and the killing of 
people. In this respect the Court's observation made in its judgment on the merits of the Nicaragua 
Case is noteworthy. It referred to its provisional measure to refrain from action that might prejudice 
the rights of the other party related to the carrying out of its prospective decision, and it then 
stated:156 
"When the Court finds that the situation requires that measures of this kind should be taken, it 
is incumbent on each party to take the Court's indications seriously into account, and not to 
direct its conduct solely by reference to what it believes to be its rights. Particularly is this so 
in a situation of armed conflict where no reparation can efface the results of conduct which 
the Court may rule to have been contrary to international law." 
Conduct found to have been contrary to international law may still be compensated. Yet it may prove 
to be impossible to efface the results of such conduct. It may not be possible, to use the words of the 
Permanent Court, to:157 "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, (...), have existed if that act had not been committed." It is typically this impossibility 
which lies at the basis of any indication of provisional measures by the Court. Obviously irreparable 
prejudice will almost inevitably be caused when an international crime is committed. By referring to 
the impossibility of reparation in cases of armed conflict the Court already implied as much as to uses 
of force in general. In its second order on provisional measures in the Genocide Convention Case the 
Court repeated this formula.158 Obviously the same considerations apply regarding the international 
crimes of denial of self-determination and widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations. 
As a follow-up to this there is the consideration that the Court, by indicating provisional meas-
ures, might cause irreparable prejudice to the "rights" of the target State. That might be the case, for 
instance, if the Court would order measures that amount to restitution. Should the target State com-
ply with the order, and subsequently it were to be found either that the Court lacked jurisdiction or 
that the respondent party had acted lawfully, then it might no longer be possible (at least politically) 
to return to the situation before restitution. The Diplomatic Staff Case is illustrative in this respect. 
Should Iran have released the hostages and allowed their leaving the country, it is clear that no mat-
ter how the eventual judgment of the Court would tum out, they would not return to Iran. Surely 
this constituted the basis for the Iranian argument that the Court's indication of the measures re-
quested by the United States would amount to passing judgment on the substance of the case in 
breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction.159 The Court retorted that provisional measures must 
relate to the substance of the case, since they are designed to preserve the rights of either party 
(pending final decision).160 Logically the conclusion is that the indication of provisional measures 
may prejudge the outcome of the jurisdictional or the merits phase. 
In the past allegations have been made that indicated measures came close to constituting a prejudg-
ment on the merits.161 A big part of the criticism voiced in this respect was based on the perceived 
one-sidedness, or unbalanced character, of the Court's order.162 That measures have been directed at 
one party only raises questions regarding the equality of the parties, neutrality, and the impartiality of 
the Court. However, doubts in this regard are misguided. 
Merrills has claimed, regarding the issue of equality of treatment, that:163 
"Interim measures, however, exist to protect the rights of both parties. In deciding what ac-
tion is called for by the circumstances it is therefore essential for the Court to ensure that any 
impression of bias is avoided." 
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In a similar vein Iran argued that provisional measures could not be unilateral, meaning of course 
that they could not be directed against one party only. The Court countered this position by noting 
that provisional measures are designed to preserve the rights of either party, and that the concept of 
provisional measures (as recognized by article 73 of the Rules of Court) implies a request by one of 
the parties for measures to preserve its rights against conduct calculated to prejudice those rights.165 
The equality of parties before the Court relates basically to affording the parties equal opportunities 
to exercise procedural rights and to present and argue their case. Thus the issue of bias could arise 
only if the other party (usually the respondent) also requested the indication of provisional measures. 
But even if it could be said that a substantive obligation applies to both parties, this does not mean 
that provisional measures must be directed at both of them. For it is in the light of the facts of the 
case that the Court must appreciate the likelihood of action threatening irreparable prejudice. It is in 
this light that one has to see the Court's rejection of the request by Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) to indicate more specific measures, other than the general measure directed at both parties in 
the first order,166 to be directed at Bosnia and Herzegovina alone.'67 
The real reason for caution lies with the fact that the Court at the stage of provisional measures 
has not yet determined its jurisdiction,168 or heard sufficient argument on the law or the facts. It is for 
that reason that it cannot make definite findings on either the law or the facts, and that the rights of 
parties to contest such issues remains unaffected.169 Provisional measures must, as noted, be grafted 
upon the substantive law to be applied and the facts of the case.170 It would be a mistake to confuse 
the impartiality inherent in judicial proceedings with the apparent neutrality ascribed to the law. Es-
sentially law is designed to be applied and complied with. Once a situation evolves that could be de-
scribed as unlawful and involves breaches of obligation, the law's neutrality is dropped in favour of a 
very partisan attitude towards establishing the illegality, preventing repetition, and enforcement. 
Provisional measures clearly must favour the safeguarding of substantive rights and compliance with 
obligations for the period up to decisions on the jurisdiction or the merits.171 
6.5.2. Timeliness, (non-) compliance and the enforcement of provisional measures 
The Rules of Court provide that requests for the indication of provisional measures have priority 
over all other cases (article 74, paragraph 1), and that the Court shall proceed to a decision on the 
request as a measure of urgency (article 74, paragraph 2). The jurisprudence of the Court witnesses 
that the object of provisional measures, to preserve the respective rights of either party, presupposes 
that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial 
proceedings.171 It is clear that the threat of such irreparable prejudice accounts for the urgency with 
which the Court proceeds to consider and indicate provisional measures.173 One may wonder never-
theless whether the Court is sufficiently equipped, from the legal point of view, to prevent the occur-
rence of such harm. 
First of all it may be noted that even the priority accorded to the consideration of requests for in-
dication of provisional measures does not, in general,174 lead to the indication of provisional meas-
ures within two weeks of the date of the request. It may be surmised that within such a time span a 
substantial risk of irreparable harm could well have turned into actual fact. That argument is even 
stronger in respect of international crimes, since the acts complained of are being committed in a 
premeditated and intentional fashion. It may be noted, on the other hand, that irreparable harm may 
of course also take place after the indication of provisional measures, that is, if a State does not 
comply with the measures indicated. It may be speculated that whenever a State intentionally adopts 
a certain conduct, irrespective of whether the conduct would be characterized as lawful, a delict, or a 
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crime, that the more likely scenario is a defiant attitude towards indicated provisional measures. 
This brings us to issues of enforcement. 
Secondly, and this does not so much concern the Court as the structure of the international legal 
order, there are only limited possibilities to enforce provisional measures in case of non-compliance. 
The Security Council's power under article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter may be invoked only in 
case of non-compliance with a judgment of the Court.176 Whether or not the Court's orders indicat-
ing provisional measures would be covered by article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and whether or 
not one considers them binding on the parties, the choice of form, order instead of judgment, mili-
tates against the applicability of paragraph 2. The only form of organized collective enforcement left 
would lie with the Security Council determining non-compliance with provisional measures a threat 
to the peace under article 39 of the Charter.177 Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Statute runs: 
"Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the 
parties and to the Security Council." 
This paragraph probably was inserted to provide the Security Council with adequate information, so 
that it may take appropriate action, if the circumstances so require, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. 
Would an applicant or respondent State be entitled to resort to enforcement measures in case of 
non-compliance by the other State? It may be suggested that such is not the case. However, Sztucki 
has argued the contrary:178 
"Even if the indication of interim measures does not impose a formal obligation, and thus 
creates only a kind of lex imperfecta as between the parties, it still constitutes a formal rec-
ognition of the right to interim protection of the disputed rights. Consequently, order credi-
tors should be in a position lawfully to assert that right by all the means otherwise admissible 
in international law." 
The latter sentence reveals the crux of the matter: means admissible in international law. From the 
theoretical perspective any measure involving a breach of obligation is in need of justification, and in 
the absence of such justification will constitute an internationally wrongful act. 
If one considers an order indicating provisional measures to impose an obligation to comply with 
them, the possibility of enforcement in case of breach would be open to the injured (creditor) 
State.179 Yet one is hard pressed to find arguments in favour of their binding force other than numer-
ous allusions to the need for effectiveness.184 An order indicating provisional measures does not 
constitute a decision of the Court either under article 94, paragraph 1, of the Charter, or under article 
59 of the Statute. Even though the Rules of Court state that the Court decides on the indication of 
provisional measures, it is especially noteworthy that it does not enunciate them in a judgment. By 
doing exactly that it would place the matter beyond doubt. But generally speaking the only judg-
ments by the Court, other than those on the merits, concern decisions on objections and on requests 
for intervention under article 62. The Statute envisages decisions on disputes regarding jurisdiction 
(article 36, paragraph 6), and on certain other matters (articles 16, paragraph 2; 17, paragraph 2; 24, 
paragraph 3; 31, paragraph 5; 46; 48; 62, paragraph 2; and 64). Article 41, paragraph 1, proclaims 
the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures, but it does not stipulate that the Court de-
cides on provisional measures. Furthermore, most decisions of the Court are put down in the form of 
orders. Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court singularly stands out in that it provides that 
decisions on objections will be given in the form of a judgment. Nevertheless decisions under article 
62, paragraph 2, of the Statute have been laid down in judgments;181 in contrast decisions on provi-
sional measures have not. 
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Since the indication of provisional measures by the Court cannot be said to carry with it the force of 
legal obligation for the target States,182 this means that conduct inconsistent with such measures can­
not provide any justification for the State injured by such conduct to act in breach of its international 
obligations Simply put there are no admissible means to enforce provisional measures. 
Thirdly, the possibility of unilateral enforcement by the injured State, or applicant State, of its 
substantive rights runs counter to the tendency of the Court to indicate that the parties ought not to 
take any action, and ensure that no action is taken, which might aggravate the dispute, or render it 
more difficult of solution m It would seem obvious that all kinds of economic, and other, measures 
resorted to by an injured State against an author State may indeed aggravate the dispute and render it 
more difficult of solution During the hostages crisis, and after the indication of provisional meas­
ures, the United States resorted to economic and other kinds of measures against Iran 1S4 But the 
closest the Court came in relation to those was a remark to the effect that l 8 S 
"They were measures taken in response to what the United States believed to be grave and 
manifest violations of international law by Iran, ( ) " 
No other specific observations were made by the Court on this issue Ie* It may not be too farfetched 
to claim that the Court apparently did not consider resort to such measures to be inadmissible18T 
The situation is somewhat more complicated as regards military action The Court, in the Diplomatic 
Staff Case, took note of the United States' requests for a delay and later for an early judgment, and 
then, in relation to the American military incursion into Iran, felt bound to observe 1 8 8 
"( ) that an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind 
calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations, and to recall 
that ( ) the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by either party which might 
aggravate the tension between the two countries " 
Immediately after, in the following paragraph, it noted that the legality of the operation under the 
Charter or general international law, or any issue of responsibility, was not before the Court I 8 9 Ap­
parently the Court did not seem inclined to judge the American actions in the light of their discernible 
inconsistency with the indicated provisional measures As noted in relation to countermeasures and 
the use of force, prior recourse to dispute settlement procedures should not be considered a condi­
tion for lawful resort in case of international crimes Their lawfulness similarly should not be consid­
ered impaired on the basis of any inconsistency with provisional measures indicated by the Court 
The lawfulness of the use offeree should in fact be decided solely in relation to the substantive rules 
under the Charter or customary international law 1 Λ 
6.6. Summary 
One of the main obstacles that may induce the Court to refrain from settling a dispute lies in the 
absence of jurisdiction, generally, regarding the author State of an international crime It is very 
unlikely that an author State of an international crime will agree, by special agreement, or through 
application of forum prorogatum, to adjudication by the Court To the extent that the specific 
international crimes of article 19, paragraph 3, Part One, of the ILC-draft on State responsibility, are 
covered by existing jurisdictional clauses, recourse to the Court could be envisaged So far only one 
case, that between Bosnia and Herzegovina against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), has been 
brought before the Court The rejection by the Court of certain provisional measures requested by 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, twice in a row, was based on the fact that the measures requested were 
substantially unrelated to the subject-matter, and hence jurisdiction rattorte matertae, of the 
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Genocide Convention The jurisdiction conferred on the basis of declarations under article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute, allows for the settlement of disputes regarding international crimes That 
no universal compulsory jurisdiction exists under international law cannot hinder any State in 
possession of a legal interest from requesting the Court to settle any dispute related to human rights 
generally, or international crimes in particular, if a basis of a jurisdiction exists 
Serious problems may arise when the Court is confronted with a request to settle a dispute, and ac-
ceding to that request would implicate the rights or obligations of a State that is not a party to the 
proceedings The Court recognized in the Monetary Gold Case that it could not exercise jurisdiction 
over disputes in the absence of consent on the part of a third State if the legal interests ofthat third 
State would form the very subject-matter of the proceedings. The precedent has been slow to be re-
peated, though it found partial application in the Continental Shelf Case between Libya and Tunisia 
From the viewpoint of international crimes especially the Nicaragua Case and the East Timor Case 
are interesting In the former case the United States invoked a plea of collective self-defence, and 
claimed that the Court could not adjudicate in the absence of, particularly, El Salvador The Court 
refused to admit the existence of a rule of indispensable parties and asserted that the limits of its ju-
risdiction, as defined in the Monetary Gold Case, had not been reached In the East Timor Case, 
which involved basically the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor, the Court ex-
plicitly reverted to its precedent in the Monetary Gold Case, and ruled that it could not settle the le-
gal dispute(s) between Portugal and Australia in view of Indonesia's absence from the proceedings 
In the Eastern Carelia Opinion the Permanent Court decided to refrain from rendering advice to the 
League in view of the lack of consent by Russia required under article 17 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations As no similar condition has been inserted into the Charter, the Court has not re-
frained from rendering advice to the United Nations as long as the request came within the compe-
tence of the requesting organ The Court has recognized, however, that it would be incompatible 
with its judicial character to give a reply to a question if the circumstances disclose that the request 
constitutes an attempt to circumvent the principle that a State is not obliged to have its disputes 
submitted to judicial settlement without its consent This would seem to rule out any exercise of its 
advisory jurisdiction to the extent that giving a reply would involve establishing the responsibility of 
a State 
The primary condition regarding the existence and exercise of jurisdiction or the admissibility of a 
claim is constituted by the requirement of a dispute, which must be shown to exist by reference to a 
claim by one party that is positively opposed by the other party Generally the subject-matter of a 
dispute must have been defined through negotiations between the States concerned In chapters four 
and five it was argued that injured States should not be held bound to resort to dispute settlement in 
case of international crimes before having recourse to countermeasures or the use of force Similarly 
claims by an injured State before the Court should not be found inadmissible simply because there 
had not been any direct negotiations or because they, arguably, had not been sufficiently exhausted 
In relation to issues of justiciability the character of a dispute, whether legal or political, is deter-
mined according to the perception that it can be solved by application of legal rules and principles 
Consequently the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes is not equivalent to that 
between legal and political disputes By definition the latter kind of dispute is non-justiciable because 
it cannot be settled in accordance with international law. The jurisprudence of the Court also testifies 
to the fact that the unwillingness of a State to appear, to defend its case, or to have the dispute ad-
judicated, cannot transform the dispute into a non-justiciable one If the idea of non-justiciability of 
disputes is to have a place within the jurisprudence of the Court, it must mean that the Court ought 
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not to settle a dispute due to circumstances substantially unrelated to the substantive law to be ap-
plied. 
In the Nicaragua Case the Court rejected a number of arguments based on the alleged non-
justiciability of the dispute. It found that the ongoing nature of an armed conflict did not hinder it in 
such a way as to prevent it to verify the existence of a pattern of legally discernible facts. It also 
found, in accordance with established jurisprudence, that disputes involving the use of armed force 
were capable of adjudication. The argument that earlier precedents concerned inherently retrospec-
tive situations and did not concern a fluid situation of armed conflict similarly did not persuade the 
Court to refrain from settling the dispute. Having regard furthermore to the reparation forms of ces-
sation and restitution in kind, decisions of the Court on that score would necessarily be prospective 
in character. 
In relation to international crimes it may be argued that the guarantees against repetition concerning 
a change of government and implementation of the responsibility of individuals are non-justiciable. 
Linked as those are to other issues such as the re-organization of police, paramilitary and armed 
forces, the organization of elections, and constitutional changes, adjudication by the Court would in-
volve taking a stand on complex choices regarding the future organization of the State. Such choices 
are not necessarily and inevitably decided by way of application of legal rules and principles. 
Another question of non-justiciability may be identified in that the Court should not be considered 
competent to rule that one of the parties would be justified, prospectively, in resorting to counter-
measures or the use of force. The Court cannot assume that a party would act in disregard of its ob-
ligation to comply with the judgment of the Court. Such would also prejudice the position of the 
author State in future negotiations with the injured State. 
A particular claim of non-justiciability has been claimed to exist to the effect that the Court should 
refrain from exercising its contentious jurisdiction if the Security Council is exercising its primary re-
sponsibility regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. The Court has refuted that 
argument basically by relying on the absence of a provision analogous to that of article 12, paragraph 
1, of the Charter. That position of the Court cannot be challenged to the extent that the Security 
Council would exercise its primary responsibility under Chapter VI of the Charter. The Court has 
indicated provisional measures regarding the dispute between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro), regarding which the Security Council has exercised powers under 
Chapter VII. As this did not constitute an exercise of conferred jurisdiction under article 36 of the 
Statute, the issue has not been decided yet in regard to the Council's exercise of responsibility under 
Chapter VII. 
It cannot be said, on the basis of either the Court's advisory or contentious jurisprudence, that the 
Court has assumed any power of review regarding Security Council determinations under article 39 
of the Charter. Such jurisprudence does contain indications that it might assume a power of review 
under the appropriate circumstances. 
The indication of provisional measures by the Court presupposes that irreparable prejudice should 
not be caused to the rights in dispute. From the legal point of view only the destruction of property 
or the killing of persons amounts to irreparable prejudice, since this brings about the absolute 
impossibility to effect restitution in kind. As much was recognized by the Court in relation to the use 
of armed force generally, and may therefore be claimed to extend to the commission of international 
crimes generally. The indication of provisional measures itself may cause irreparable prejudice to the 
"rights" of the target State, since measures ordered, such as for instance the release of persons, may 
amount to restitution. If the targeted party complies with such measures, the release of such persons 
will most likely not be reversed, notwithstanding the possibility of a lack of jurisdiction or a 
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judgment on the merits in favour of the targeted party This shows that the indication of provisional 
measures is grafted upon the substance of the case, and may prejudice the decisions on jurisdiction 
and the merits In the same vein the Court has rightly not let itself be hindered by allegations that the 
measures indicated were one-sided Considerations of neutrality and impartiality must be taken into 
account only having regard to the fact that the Court has not yet, at the stage of provisional 
measures, determined its jurisdiction or ruled upon the admissibility of the claim 
Although requests for the indication of provisional measures are handled as a matter of urgency, or­
ders are rarely forthcoming within two weeks In such a time span irreparable prejudice may already 
have been caused Such may result also due to non-compliance with provisional measures, which is 
most likely to occur in cases of intentional conduct by a party Since the Court indicates provisional 
measures in the form of an order, article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter does not apply Conse­
quently the enforcement of provisional measures by the Security Council could only be effected 
through application of article 39 of the Charter The enforcement by one party of the measures tar­
geted at the other party cannot be admitted The Statute and the practice of the Court do not testify 
to the existence of any legal obligation on the part of the targeted party Consequently the basic pre­
condition for resort to countermeasures or armed force, the existence of an internationally wrongful 
act, will be lacking However, since provisional measures should not be considered binding on the 
parties, enforcement by a party may take place on the basis of those substantive rules establishing a 
right to resort to countermeasures, or to use armed force, in order to obtain reparation 
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equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by subsequent conduct of the State, there is a breach of the obliga-
tion only if the aliens concerned have exhausted the effective local remedies available to them without obtaining 
the treatment called for by the obligation or, where that is not possible, an equivalent treatment " Text and Com-
mentary Article 22, Part One, YBILC 1977, volume II, Part Two, pp 30-50 It may be deduced from the position 
adopted here that the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies does not belong to the rules of Part One, but to the 
rules of Part Two of the ILC-draft 
70
 The Court stated in Nuclear Tests (Australia ν France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, ρ 253, 270-271 "Thus the 
existence of a dispute is the primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function," See Bos, Les condi­
tions, 26-27, Aslaoui, О, Les conclusions et leurs modifications en procédure judiciaire internationale, Librarne 
Dro¿, Genève, 1963, 38-41, Mabrouk, Les exceptions de procédure, 134-135, Scandanus, N , Le jugement déclara-
toire entre états, La seperabilité du contentieux international. Éditions A Pedone, Pans, 1975, 181-186 and 249-
252, Donner, R, International Adjudication Using the International Court of Justice, with special reference to 
Finland, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, Helsinki, 1988, 90-91, Annacker, С, The Legal Régime oí Erga Omnes 
Obligations in International Law, 46 AJPIL 1994, pp 131-166, 162-163, Annacker, Die Durchsetzung, 100-101 
71
 С f Visscher, Aspects récents, 30-31 
71
 Mavrommatis Case, 11 For a critical comment see Cassese, A , The Concept of «Legal Dispute» in the Jurispru-
dence of the International Court, in II processo intemazionale, Studi in onore di Gaetano Morelli, Comunicazioni e 
Studi, volume 14, Giuffrè, Milano, 1975, pp 173-200, 179-182 
73
 Though the Permanent Court contemplated as much Case concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans is-
sued in France, Publications PCIJ, 1929, Senes A, No 20, ρ 5, 19 (and also 20) Abi-Saab, G, Les exceptions 
préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour internationale, Etude des notions fondamentales de procedure et des 
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moyens de leur mise en oeuvre, Editions A Pedone, Pans, 1967, 122, notes "En droit international, le désaccord 
sur les faits est moins commun qu'en droit interne En général, les différends portent sur des points de droit, c'est-
a-dire soit sur l'interprétation d'une règle par rapport à une situation de fait non contestée, soit sur la qualification 
juridique d'une telle situation, ce qui, logiquement, revient au même " Cassese, The -Concept, 179-180, claims 
"( ) it is wrong to extend the concept of dispute to include the conflict of interests as a separate issue ш respect of 
the conflict of legal views Were this so, every instance of opposing interests should give nse to a legal dispute " 
Emphasis in the original 
7 4
 See Dissenting Opinion Novacovitch, Serbian Loans Case, 80, on this issue 
7 5
 The Permanent Court has claimed that it could decide disputes on some other basis than international law It re­
ferred to the wide wording of article 36, paragraph 1, and to the possibility of it possessing jurisdiction to deter­
mine a fact under article 36 (c), of its Statute Serbian Loans Case, 19-20 Pessôa and Novacovitch disagreed 
Dissenting Opinion Pessôa, ibid , 62-64, and Dissenting Opinion Novacovitch, ibid, 79 Of course the phrase 
contained in article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute "whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it" did not feature in the Statute of the Permanent Court See Gordon, Ε, 
"Legal Disputes" Under Article 36(2) of the Statute, in Damrosch, The International Court, pp 183-222, 192-195 
On the other hand it may be noted that the Permanent Court disclaimed any power to prescribe a settlement on the 
basis of considerations of expediency only m the absence of any clear and explicit provision to that effect Case of 
the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Second Phase), Publications PCU, 1930, Senes A, No 24, 
ρ 4, 10 (also 11), also Observations Kellogg, ibid, 32-42, and Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
Distnct of Gex, Publications PCU, 1932, Senes А/В, No 46, ρ 96, 153 and 162 
7 6
 South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 328 Earlier on, in 1950, the Court had observed "Whether 
there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination The mere denial of the existence of a 
dispute does not prove its non-existence ( ) There has thus arisen a situation in which the two sides hold clearly 
opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain treaty obligations " Peace 
Treaties Opinion, 74 
7 7
 Cassese, The Concept, 176-177 The Permanent Court considered in relation to disputes "In so far as concerns the 
word 'dispute', the Court observes that according to the tenor of Article 60 of the Statute, the manifestation of the 
existence of the dipute in a specific manner, as for instance by diplomatic negotiations, is not required It would no 
doubt be desirable that a State should not proceed to take as senous a step as summoning another State before the 
Court without having previously, within reasonable limits, endeavoured to make it quite clear that a difference of 
views is in question which has not been capable of being overcome otherwise But in view of the wording of the 
article the Court considers that it cannot require that the dispute should have manifested itself m a formal way, ac­
cording to the Court's view, it should be sufficient if the two Governments have in fact shown themselves as hold­
ing opposite views in regard to the meaning and scope of a judgment of the Court " Interpretation of Judgments 
Nos 7 and 8 (The Chorzow Factory), Publications PCU, 1927, Senes A, No 13, ρ 4, 10-11 Also Joint Dissenting 
Opimon Spender/Fitzmaunce, South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 563 
7 1
 The Court observed in the East Timor Case "Portugal has, nghtly or wrongly, formulated complaints of fact and 
law against Australia which the latter has denied By virtue of this denial, there is a legal dispute " East Timor 
Case, paragraph 22 
" Cassese, The Concept, 173-178 (especially 176-178), and 186 Similarly Visscher, Aspects récents, 31-33 
" Mavrommatis Case, 15 "The Court realises to the full the importance of the rule laying down that only disputes 
which cannot be settled by negotiation should be brought before it It recognises, in fact, that before a dispute can 
be made the subject of an action at law, its subject matter should have been clearly defined by means of diplomatic 
negotiations " Cassese cnticizes these observations on the basis that the object of the rule on diplomatic negotia-
tions is to arrive at ал out of court settlement, and not to define the subject-matter of the dispute Cassese, The 
Concept, 181-182 and 184 See also Visscher, Aspects récents, 81-87, Abi-Saab, Les exceptions préliminaires, 
120-130, and Ghozali, N -E, La négociation diplomatique dans la jurisprudence internationale, Essai d'analyse, 
25 RBDI1992, pp 323-350 
81
 Mavrommatis Case, 13 See also Donner, International Adjudication, 92 In a later case, in relation to the question 
whether a difference of opimon existed, the Permanent Court noted that one exists as soon as a government con-
tends that an attitude adopted conflicts with its own views It further held that even if one were to require the exis-
tence of a definite dispute, such a condition could be fulfilled "( ) by means of the unilateral action on the part of 
the applicant Party " And it added "The Court cannot allow itself to be hampered by a mere defect of form, the 
removal of which depends solely on the Party concerned " Case concerning certain German Interests, Publications 
PCU, 1926, Senes A, No 6, ρ 4, 14 See also South West Afhca Cases, Preliminary Objections, 345 
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8 3
 South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 345-346, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Te­
hran, Judgment, 1С J Reports, ρ 3, 27 For comments on the latter case see Folz, Η -E, Bemerkungen zur völker-
rechtlichen Beurteilung der Vorgänge um die amerikanischen Geiseln im Iran, m Münch, I von (Ed), Staatsrecht-
Völkerrecht-Europarecht, Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer zum 75 Geburtstag am 28 März 1981, Walter 
de Gruyter, Berlin, 1981, pp 271-288, Röling, В , Aspects of the Case concerning United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff ш Tehran, 11 NYTL 1980, pp 125-153, Stein (Ted), Contempt, Crisis, and the Court the World 
Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76 AJTL 1982, pp 499-533 In the Nicaragua Case the Court held that al­
though Nicaragua had not in previously held negotiations referred to the 1956 treaty, it was not debarred from in­
voking its comproimssory clause Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 428-429 The arguments on ne­
gotiations m these cases all relate to jurisdictional clauses On negotiations required by a provision other than the 
jurisdictional clause itself see Armed Actions Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 92-99 
ю
 Note Declaration Oda, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamafunya ν Umted Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ 
Reports 1992, ρ 3, 18, Dissenting Opinion Bedjaoui, ibid, 35-37, inconclusive Dissenting Opinion Weeramantry, 
ibid, 51-52, Dissenting Opinion Ajibola, ibid, 82-84, and Dissenting Opimon El-Koshen, ibid, 108-109 
M
 Salvioh acknowledged that the Permanent Court did not impose any condition to negotiate, but considered never­
theless that it applied unless a treaty excluded the need for negotiations Salvioli, Problèmes de procédure, 565-
566 
85
 Note Acevcdo, D , Disputes Under Consideration by the U N Security Council or Regional Bodies, in Damrosch, 
The International Court, pp 242-263, 244-248 
84
 Discussed by Scandamis, Le jugement déclaratoire, 181-186, and Gordon, Legal Disputes, 183-222 
17
 In the Haya de la Torre Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, ρ 71, 79, the Court observed that the parties wanted it 
to "( ) make a choice amongst the various courses by which the asylum may be terminated But these courses are 
conditioned by the facts and by possibilities which, to a very large extent, the Parties are alone in a position to ap­
preciate A choice among them could not be based on legal considerations, but only on considerations of practica­
bility or of political expediency, it is not part of the Court's judicial function to make such a choice " Note also 
Kellogg "What is a political question? It is a question which is exclusively within the competence of a sovereign 
State ( ) In passing upon a political question there is no rale or principle of law, no norm of equity, justice, or 
even good conscience, which the Court can apply," Observations Kellogg, Free Zones Case, Second Phase, 41 
(more generally 32-42) 
n
 Armed Actions Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 91 It added (ibid , 106) "Nor should it be thought that the 
Court is unaware that the Application raises juridical questions which are only elements of a larger political situa­
tion Those wider issues are however outside the competence of the Court, which is obliged to confine itself to 
these juridical questions " 
" Admission Opimon, 61, Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 19-20, Armed Actions Case, Jurisdiction and Admis­
sibility, 91-92 
" Admission Opimon, 61, Expenses Opimon, 155 
" Admission Opimon, 61 In the Nicaragua Case the Court noted that if Nicaraguan support to the armed opposition 
in El Salvador constituted an armed attack, and if the other conditions for the exercise of a right of collective self-
defence were met, the United States could invoke that justification notwithstanding the existence of an additional, 
perhaps even more decisive, motive derived from the political orientation of the Nicaraguan government Nicara­
gua Case, Mente, 70-71 
Expenses Opinion, 155 
9 3
 Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 19 Immediately after Iran pointed to crimes committed by the Umted States in 
Iran (the 1953 coup d'état), its direct intervention in its internal affairs, and violations of other norms The Court 
later on in its judgment rejected these considerations as possible justification of Iran's conduct Ibid, 37-41 
94
 Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 20 
McWhinney, E , Judicial Settlement of Disputes, Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Judicial Law-Making on the Con-
temporary International Court, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, 44, has put the issue as follows "If it 
be accepted, then, that there is no objective, a priori basis for separating 'legal' from 'political' disputes, and the 
'legal' disputes today are, if not also inherently 'political' then at least mixed, 'political'-and-'legal', then the en-
tena for separating the justiciable from the non-justiciable, and the exercise of Court jurisdiction from its non-
exercise, become essentially pragmatic in character Such entena would involve judicial policy conclusions as to 
whether, and when, and in what degree, judicial lnterventionism on a particular tension-issue of contemporary in-
ternational relations will help or hinder actual community problem-solving " More generally 37-46 In a later 
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chapter he then goes on to identify basically three indices for guiding the Court as to justiciability timing, fact­
finding, and separation of powers Ibid, 134-147 
* Eg Gordon, Legal Disputes, 189-190 See also Anand, R, International Courts and Contemporary Conflicts, Asia 
Publishing House, London, 1974, 228-241, and Mosler, H, Political and Justiciable Legal Disputes Revival of an 
Old Controversy?, in Cheng, В, and Brown, E (Eds), Contemporary Problems Essays m Honour of Georg 
Schwarzenberger on his eightieth birthday, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1988, pp 216-229 
9 7
 Gordon, Legal Disputes, 191, observes "Accordingly, if a claim based on international law cannot be judged ob­
jectively on the basis of the sources enumerated in Article 38(1), it must fail In this event, however, it fails on its 
merits, not because it is unsuited for judgment " 
" In the Case concerning right of passage over Indian territory (Preliminary Objections), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1957, ρ 125, 142, the Court observed "It is a rule of law generally accepted, as well as one acted upon in the past 
by the Court, that, once the Court has been validly seised of a dispute, unilateral action by the respondent State in 
terminating its Declaration, in whole or m part, cannot divest the Court of jurisdiction " 
" Corfu Channel case. Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, ρ 244, 248, Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom ν Iceland), 
Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, ρ 3, 8-10, Nuclear Tests Case, Judgment, 257, Aegean Continental Shelf, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, ρ 3, 20, Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 9-10 In the Nicaragua Case, Merits, 23-
24, the Court observed "Furthermore the Court is bound to emphasize that the ηοη-parlicrpation of a party in the 
proceedings at any stage of the case cannot, in any circumstances, affect the validity of its judgment Nor does such 
validity depend upon the acceptance of that judgment by one party The fact that a party purports to 'reserve its 
rights' in respect of a future decision of the Court, after the Court has determined that it has jurisdiction, is clearly 
of no effect on the validity of that decision Under article 36, paragraph 6, of its Statute, the Court has jurisdiction 
to determine any dispute as to its own jurisdiction, and its judgment on that matter, as on the merits, is final and 
binding on the parties under Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute ( ) " 
1 0 0
 In agreement Schachter, О , Disputes involving the Use of Force, in Damrosch, The International Court, pp 223-
241, 238-239 
1 0 1
 An example may be found in the Northern Cameroons Case, in which the Court refused to adjudicate on the basis 
that "The function of the Court is to slate the law, but it may pronounce judgment only in connection with con­
crete cases where there exist at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal in­
terests between the parties The Court's judgment must have some practical consequence in the sense that it can 
affect existing legal rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations " Case 
concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon ν United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Re­
ports 1963, ρ 15, 33-34 More generally see 31-38 Another example might be seen to exist in the Nuclear Tests 
Case There the Court declined to adjudicate Australian and New Zealand claims on the basis of its assessment that 
by virtue of French unilateral statements those claims no longer had any object Nuclear Tests Case, Judgment, 
262-263 and 267-272 See also Annacker, Die Durchsetzung, 100-103 
1 0 1
 Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 436 
1 0 3
 Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 437-438 
1 M
 To the extent that the argument was based on the alleged exclusive competence of the Security Council the Court 
of course did address it See infra next section 
1 0 5
 Judge Oda claimed that the dispute did not constitute a 'legal' dispute under article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute 
Dissenting Opinion Oda, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 233-236 (generally 219-246) At page 245 judge Oda concluded 
"The present case is characterized by the fact that the dispute at issue, not being a legal dispute within the demon­
strable meaning of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, is one which the Respondent had never imagined as fal­
ling under the jurisdiction which it had voluntarily accepted " Emphasis in the original 
1 0 4
 The Court, discussing its relation to the Security Council, referred to the Corfu Channel Case and the Aerial Inci­
dent Cases Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 435 See generally Schachter, Disputes involving the 
Use of Force, 223-241 
1 0 7
 Dissenting Opimon Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 294 
, 0 §
 Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 437 
1 0 9
 Dissenting Opinion Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 293-296 His position presupposes that a right of self-
defence could be exercised in the circumstances of the case The Court majority took the opposite position Nicara­
gua Case, Merits, 122-123 and 146 
1 1 0
 Nicaragua Case, Merits, 122 The Court added (123) that Umted States action continued long after the penod in 
which any presumed armed attack could be contemplated 
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1 1 1
 Acevedo, Disputes under Consideration, 260, claims "( ) it is difficult to imagine how the existence of such a 
fundamental nght could be subject to adjudication by the IС J, particularly if one considers that the U N Charter 
itself prescribes that 'nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense,' but the Court is, however, competent to adjudicate a dispute resulting from allegations, made by one of 
the parues, of improper or unlawful exercise of the right of self-defense " Emphasis in the original The Court re­
jected the United States' justification of collective self-defence Nicaragua Case, Merits, 123 and 146 And it stated 
(ibid, 122) that the condition sine qua non (an armed attack) for the exercise of a right of collective self-defence 
was lacking Nicaragua observed that there is no generalized right of self-defense, but only a nght if an armed at­
tack occurs Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 433 See also generally Rostow, Ε, Disputes involv­
ing the Inherent Right of Self-Defense, in Damrosch, The International Court, pp 264-287 
1 , 1
 С f Schachter, Disputes involving the Use of Force, 229-231 
1 1 3
 Note for instance that Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 687 is being enforced 
by the continuance of the general embargo instituted by resolution 661 
1 1 4
 Eg Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 437-438 
1 1 5
 Generally Klein, E, Paralleles Tätigwerden von Sicherheitsrat und Internationalem Gerichtshof bei Fnedens-
bedrohenden Streitigkeiten, Zu Fragen der Zuständigkeit und Organtreue, in Bernhardt, R. (Ed), Völkerrecht als 
Rechtsordnung - Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit - Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, 1983, pp 468-
491 
114
 Expenses Opinion, 163, repeated in the Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 434 
117
 Expenses Opinion, 163-165 
118
 Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment 21-22, Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 434-435 
" ' Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 21-22 Contrary the United Kingdom on Libya's request for provisional meas-
ures Reported by Beveridge, F, The Lockerbie Affair, 41 ICLQ 1992, pp 907-920, 918 
"* Though it may be noted that resolution 731, adopted under Chapter VI, could have led to some conflict of opinion 
between the Court and the Security Council In the light of the non-binding character of recommendations under 
that Chapter it is unlikely that the Court would have given that resolution precedence over rights enjoyed by Libya 
Comment by Beveridge, The Lockerbie Affair, 909-912 and 917-918. and Gowlland-Debbas, V, The Relationship 
between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AJIL 
1994, pp 643-677,647 and footnote 26 
121
 Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 434 
122
 Judge Schwebel observed "Moreover, while the Security Council is invested by the Charter with the authority to 
determine the existence of an act of aggression, it does not act as a court ш making such a determination It may 
arrive at a determination of aggression - or, as more often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggres­
sion - for political rather than legal reasons However compelling the facts which could give nse to a determina­
tion of aggression, the Security Council acts within its rights when it decides that to make such a determination 
wilt set back the cause of peace rather than advance it In short, the Security Council is a political organ which acts 
for political reasons It may take legal considerations into account but, unlike a court, it is not bound to apply 
them " Dissenting Opimon Schwebel, Nicaragua Case, Merits, 290 Similar observations were made in Joint Dis­
senting Opinion Basdevant/Winiarski/McNair/Read, Admission Opimon, 85 
ш
 Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship, 656, claims that the Court has stated in the jurisdiction and admissibility 
phase of the Nicaragua Case, that "( ) even after a determination under Article 39, there is no necessary inconsis­
tency between Security Council action and adjudication by the Court " However, it must be pointed out that that 
phrase reflects the Court's summary of the Nicaraguan point of view and not the view of the Court itself Sec Nica­
ragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 432 
1 2 4
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993, 18-19 
1 2 5
 Admission Opimon, 64 
1 2 4
 Expenses Opimon, 168 
12
 Expenses Opinion, 168 
"* Expenses Opimon, 168 
u
' Watson, G, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HJLJ 1993, pp 1-45, 15 (generally 14-
17) The reference is to Expenses Opimon, 157 
1 M
 Namibia Opimon, 45 
ш
 Text of the question in Namibia Opimon, 17 
U 2
 Namibia Opimon, 45-50 
ш
 С f Watson, Constitutionalism, 17-22 
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ш
 Gowlland-Debbas, V, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts tn International Law, United Nations Action in (he 
Question of Southern Rhodesia, Martinus Nyhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, 451-452 Also Gowlland-Debbas, 
Security Council Enforcement, 72, 74, and 97-98 
1 3 5
 Watson, Constitutionalism, 4-14 
"* Diplomatic Staff Case, Judgment, 21-22 
ш
 Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 432-433 
ш
 Nicaragua Case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 436 
u
' See Paul, A, The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990, A Complete Record and Case Histories of the Security 
Council's Veto, Umfo Publishers, Sarasota, Fionda, 1992, 348-354 
" · See also Reisman, W, The Legal Effect of Vetoed Resolutions, 74 AJIL 1980, pp 904-907 Note also Graefrath, 
В , Oeser, E, and Steiniger, Ρ, Internationale Verbrechen - Internationale Delikte, 22 DA 1977, pp 90-101, 96, 
who observe that the existence of aggression is not dependent on a pnor determination to that effect by the Security 
Council 
141
 Comments by McGinley, G, The IС J 's Decision in the Lockerbie Cases, 22 GnCL 1992, pp 577-601, Kooy-
mans, Ρ, Zwijgt het recht als de Veiligheidsraad spreekt''. Uitspraak van hel Internationaal Gerechtshof m de 
Lockerbie-zaak van 14 apnl 1992, 67 НТВ 1992, pp 847-851, Beveridge, The Lockerbie Affair, 907-920, and 
Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship, 643-677 See also Osieke, Ε , The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of 
International Organizations, 77 AJIL 1983, pp 239-256, Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration, 37-54 and 
112-114, Franck, Τ , The "Powers of Appreciation" Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AJIL 
1992, pp 519-523, Bloed, A, 'Toetsing' van besluiten Veiligheidsraad, 67 NJB 1992, pp 661-663, Watson, 
Constitutionalism, 1-45, Bedjaoui, M , Du contrôle de légalité des actes du Conseil de Sécurité, m Nouveaux itiné-
raires en droit, Hommage à François Rigaux, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1993, pp 69-110 
141
 See A/46/827 
141
 Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 15 
144
 That phrase could be intended to convey merely the same meaning as the one spoken of earlier, namely that the 
Court, at the stage of provisional measures, considered that prima facie the obligation of article 25 extends to 
resolution 748 The separate and dissenting opinions indicate that at least some judges have m mind the possibility 
of review of resolution 748 See Declaration Oda, Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 17, Separate Opinion 
Lachs, ibid, 27, Separate Opimon Shahabuddeen, ibid, 28, 29 and 32, Dissenting Opinion Bedjaoui, ibid, 35 and 
41-46, Dissenting Opimon Weeramantry, ibid, 50 and 55-67, Dissenting Opinion Ajibola, ibid, 91-92, Dissenting 
Opimon El-Koshen, ibid, 101-107 
145
 С f Dissenting Opimon Bedjaoui, Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 41 and 46 
1 4 4
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993, 8, and ibid, Provisional Measures, 13 September 
1993, 332-333 
1 4 7
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993,18-20 
1 4 8
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 13 September 1993, 345 
1 4 9
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993, 18-19 
110
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993,19 
1 5 1
 Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 April 1993, 19 
ш
 Note the opinions indicating that the question of review may come up in the remainder of the proceedings of the 
case Declaration Oda, Lockerbie Case, Provisional Measures, 17, Separate Opimon Lachs, ibid , 26-27, Separate 
Opimon Shahabuddeen, ibid , 28-29, Dissenting Opimon Bedjaoui, ibid, 41-47, Dissenting Opimon Weeraman­
try, ibid, 50, Dissenting Opimon Ajibola, ibid, 91-92 See also Hoogh, A de, Comments, in Post, H (Ed), Inter­
national Economic Law and Armed Conflict, Martinus Nyhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994, pp 43-46, 45-46 
ш
 Umted States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 1979, ρ 7, 19, 
repeated, in somewhat changed form, m the Passage through the Great Belt, Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Re­
ports 1991, ρ 12, 17, Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 Apnl 1993, 19, Genocide Convention 
Case, Provisional Measures, 13 September 1993, 342 It is often indicated that provisional measures are to protect 
rights "pending final decision" Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Provisional Measures, Order, ICJ Reports 1990, ρ 
64. 69-70, Great Belt Case, Provisional Measures, 17-20, Genocide Convention Case, Provisional Measures, 8 
Apnl 1993, 19 The Permanent Court has observed that the provision on provisional measures applies in principle 
to the effect that "( ) the parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect 
m regard to the execution of the decision to be given ( ) " The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Publi­
cations PCIJ, Senes А/В, No 79, ρ 194,199 
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I M
 Generally see Sztucki, Intenm Measures, 106-112 The Permanent Court has observed that provisional measures 
were to preserve rights in so far as "( ) the damage threatening these rights would be irreparable in fact or in 
law," Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, Publications PCIJ, 1932, Senes А/В, No 48, ρ 
268, 284 
1 5 5
 Sztucki, Intenm Measures, 109, quite correctly notes "Indeed, there are no violations of rights which could not be 
made good in law by a reparation This is true not only of financial or other economic injury but also of all other 
injuries not measurable in pecuniary terms " It is odd to note that some writers discussing the issue of irreparable 
prejudice state that this involves the impossibility of compensating the requesting party Haver, Ρ, The Status of 
Intenm Measures of the International Court of Justice after the Iranian-Hostage Crisis, 11 CWHJ 1981, pp 515-
542, 517 and 534-535, and Memlls, Intenm Measures, 108-109 (generally 107-110) In this they can rely on the 
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FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
In the Introduction to this thesis it has been noted that the Commission envisaged the elaboration of 
more severe consequences applicable to those internationally wrongful acts defined as international 
crimes in article 19, paragraph 2, Part One, of the draft articles on State responsibility * It has further 
been indicated that the purpose of the research underlying this thesis has been to examine whether it 
is possible to envisage a régime of responsibility applicable to international crimes that would be 
substantially aggravated compared to the régime of responsibility applicable to international delicts 
To that end it was proposed to attempt to identify the aggravated consequences of the régime of re-
sponsibility applicable to crimes In consequence the first two chapters investigated questions of legal 
interest, and rights to invoke the responsibility of an author State, on the part of States and the inter-
national community personified in the United Nations The third chapter went on to discuss whether 
an extended scope of obligations under the specific forms of reparation could be envisaged in case of 
crimes Chapters four and five approached the issue of aggravated consequences from the viewpoint 
of enforcement by way of countermeasures or the use of armed force directed against the author 
State of a crime In chapter six the obstacles which could prevent the Court from settling a dispute, 
or giving advice, regarding international crimes were looked into The more salient conclusions on 
the aggravated consequences under a possible régime applicable to international crimes will now be 
put into a somewhat more broad perspective 
The investigation of the first chapter has shown that all States are in possession of a legal interest, 
and that they are entitled to invoke the responsibility of an author State, regarding international 
crimes That conclusion is reflected in article 5, paragraph 3, Part Two, of the ILC-draft, which de-
fines all States as injured in case of international crimes2 However, the injured State status conse-
quent upon the commission of a crime only constitutes an aggravated consequence in regard to the 
crime of aggression Obligations underlying the other crimes, regarding self-determination and basic 
human rights, are of such a nature that their breach, whether of minor or serious character, entails 
the right to invoke the responsibility on the part of all States bound by the rule As the rules on the 
right of self-determination and basic human rights exist also under universal customary international 
law, all States possess the right to invoke the responsibility of an author State for breaches of obliga-
tion not amounting to international crimes Article 5, paragraph 2 (e) (iii), Part Two, supports that 
conclusion 
For these reasons the dictum of the Court in the Barcelona Traction Case on obligations erga 
omnes does not really add anything to solving questions of legal interest3 That obligations erga om-
nes (or, as it was also put, to the international community as a whole) are the concern of all States 
and that they all have a legal interest regarding genocide and the protection of basic rights of the hu-
man person (including freedom from slavery and racial discrimination) flows from the nature of the 
rales for the protection of human rights generally As no State will be affected if another State vio-
lates the human rights of its nationals, all States bound by the particular rule in question must logi-
cally be deemed to possess the right to invoke the responsibility of the State breaching its human 
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rights obligations. Only the legal interest of all States pursuant to the commission of aggression can 
then be considered a true obligation erga omnes. 
The United Nations similarly are in possession of a legal interest pursuant to the commission of an 
international crime. However, the practice of the Security Council does not support the conclusion 
that a situation in which a crime is committed will necessarily be considered, as a minimum, a threat 
to the peace under article 39 of the Charter.4 For that reason claims by some that reactions to inter-
national crimes should exclusively take place through action of the Security Council under Chapter 
VII could not, and should not, form the basis for the régime applicable to crimes. In this respect 
Arangio-Ruiz has proposed to allow every State to bring allegations of the commission of a crime 
before the Court if the General Assembly or the Security Council had previously resolved that the 
allegations were substantial enough to warrant the grave concern of the international community. 
The Court's judicial determination of the existence of a crime would constitute a prerequisite for 
States to demand reparation or to resort to countermeasures.6 
His arguments to opt in favour of a determination by the Court rather than the Assembly or the 
Council fail to convince.7 As he observes, the Assembly is by far the more representative organ of 
the United Nations, but the absence of any decision-making power on its part makes it difficult to 
envisage a more substantial role for the Assembly within the organized international community. 
Arangio-Ruiz has further pointed to the Security Council's less democratic, and hence less represen-
tative, character. But the main reason brought forward by Arangio-Ruiz against letting the Council 
determine the existence of a crime is its political character. Yet the Council has been allotted the 
function of guardian of international peace and security, and in that capacity has been given the 
power to determine any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Far-reaching 
consequences, on the factual as well as the legal plane, may entail for States consequent upon such a 
determination by the Council: the imposition of measures against a targeted State, and the possibility 
of armed action against such a State. But all this has not prevented States from conferring those 
powers on the Security Council notwithstanding its political character. 
Turning now to substantive issues of reparation, the conclusion must be that the extended scope 
of guarantees against repetition forms an aggravated consequence of the régime of crimes. Two main 
categories may be identified. Guarantees related to the police, paramilitary and armed forces, which 
may include, inter alia, disarmament, destruction of weapons, and the reorganization of such forces. 
And guarantees related to the State organization, which may include, among others, the prosecution 
and punishment of responsible individuals, governmental and constitutional change, free elections, 
and respect for human rights. In the extreme case of an attempt at genocide, an affected people may, 
subject to geographical and demographical circumstances, exercise its right to self-determination. 
Considering the far-reaching character of such guarantees it would seem obvious that they cannot 
simply be demanded, imposed, or implemented, whether by way of countermeasures or the use of 
armed force, by States individually. Though this has been the practice related to the peace treaties 
after World Wars I and II, the more recent example of Security Council resolution 687, sometimes 
called the modern equivalent of a peace treaty, constitutes an improvement. However, while not de-
nying in any way the necessity of a large part of the measures imposed by means ofthat resolution, it 
cannot but be noted that there is no possibility whatsoever of dispute settlement on points regarding 
which Iraq might have legitimate grievances. Certainly one of these concerned the demarcation of its 
border with Kuwait, which turned out not just to be a case of demarcation but also, at least partly, 
one of delimitation.8 
Even more serious concerns may be voiced regarding the way in which the implementation and en-
forcement of Iraq's disarmament obligations have been taken on. For four years now Iraq and its 
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population have been subjected to a comprehensive trade embargo on the ground that Iraq has not m 
any satisfactory manner fulfilled its disarmament obligations It is an open secret however that the 
continued rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq constitutes the main reason for the United Kingdom and 
the United States to oppose, within the Security Council, the lifting of the sanctions ' While the 
plight of the Iraqi population is to a large extent due to Iraq's obstinate refusal to accept the offer to 
export oil for purposes of humanitarian relief, all this could have been prevented if the Coalition 
forces had marched on to Baghdad and taken it upon themselves to implement Iraq's obligations m 
the field of guarantees against repetition Admittedly, the implementation of guarantees regarding the 
Iraqi State organization probably would have posed serious problems The reasons for not taking on 
that task must have been the fear of chaos due to potential claims of self-determination by the Kurd-
ish people, the likelihood of Shiite rule analogous to that in Iran, and the resultant necessity for the 
prolonged occupation of Iraq as a whole Yet even so one might have expected a reconsideration of 
the available options when the Kurds and the Shntes rose against the government in Baghdad 
In this relation it may be noted that the Security Council later on established the Tribunals on the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,19 but that no tribunal was created to prosecute, convict and punish 
those individuals responsible for the commission of Iraq's crime of aggression or Somalia's crime of 
widespread breaches of basic human nghts obligations With regard to Iraq one explanation may be 
that since there was not going to be any occupation of Iraq, there would also not be any real possi-
bility of ever laying hands on the guilty persons Yet that does not seem to have stopped the Security 
Council in relation to the former Yugoslavia it remains to be seen whether Karadzic or Mladic will 
ever appear before the Tribunal notwithstanding their indictments of 25 July 1995 Mother explana-
tion may be that if a tribunal would have been set up to prosecute Iraqi crimes, there might have been 
a call to also prosecute those responsible for war crimes on the side of the Coalition forces From a 
public relations point of view no victorious army wants to be subjected to slurs on the record of its 
success story 
On a more general note it may be observed that the major obstacle regarding the prosecution of in-
dividuals lies with the impossibility of getting hold of them Even a transition from a military gov-
ernment to a civilian one, or from a dictature to a democracy, will not necessarily change that 
picture As expenence has shown, especially in Latin America, but also in relation to Cambodia and 
South Africa, the prosecution of former political and military leaders after a negotiated deal remains 
problematical This latter aspect also explains the difficulties encountered, with respect to the former 
Yugoslavia as well as Somalia, during negotiations or attempts at reconciliation, since the same 
people who could be accused of having committed senous crimes are the ones whose co-operation 
may be essential or necessary to bring the negotiations or attempts at reconciliation to a successful 
close 
It has also been argued by the present writer that all States can exercise their right to resort to 
countermeasures against the author State of a crime This constitutes a special or supplementary 
consequence regarding the crime of aggression, though a request by the directly injured State, if 
possible, must precede such exercises In view of the nature and gravity of international crimes nei-
ther injured States, nor the Security Council, are under any obligation to refrain from adopting 
countermeasures on the basis of a mere verbal admission of responsibility, or offer of dispute settle-
ment, on the part of the author State The latter's adequate performance of reparation obligations 
may terminate the right to adopt countermeasures In view of the potentially long time span neces-
sary to implement the appropriate guarantees, the right to resort to countermeasures may revive in 
cases of senous set-backs The adoption of countermeasures by injured States or the Security 
Council may not, however, infringe the basic human nghts of the nationals of the author State 
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The existence of any faculty of unilateral resort to countermeasures has been disputed especially by 
non-Western States. They aptly perceived that only Western States could muster the necessary, suf-
ficiently large scale, and hence relatively more effective, economic power to make a difference in re-
gard to issues of enforcement. In view of the large degree of cohesion within the Western block, they 
similarly descried that exercises of the right to resort to countermeasures would most likely be di-
rected against non-Western States. Such proved to be the case especially in relation to the Falklands, 
Hostages, Afghan and Polish crises, in response to which Western States adopted measures against 
Argentina, Iran and the Soviet Union respectively. While denying the legality as well as the legiti-
macy of recourse to unilateral, or concerted, economic countermeasures by Western States, non-
Western States insisted on such measures against the territory of Rhodesia and South Africa. The 
Security Council over time adopted comprehensive sanctions against the former,11 but in face of 
Western opposition came no further than a broad arms embargo regarding the latter.11 Due to the 
coming into power of Gorbachov and the resultant end of the Cold War, the Iraq-Kuwait and Yugo-
slav crises have led to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions by the Security Council." 
However, as noted some time ago by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, sanctions constitute a blunt 
instrument.14 Within a targeted State they will affect the least influential groups the first and the 
most. And, as observed also by the Secretary-General, the behaviour of the political leaders of a 
State is not likely to be affected by the plight of their people.15 The more pertinent examples in this 
respect are provided by Iraq, and, independently from any countermeasures issue, by Somalia. It 
follows from this that the instrument of countermeasures is most unlikely to be very effective in ob-
taining cessation and restitution in case of crimes, let alone the far-reaching guarantees against 
repetition necessary to prevent repetition of the crime. Though the arms destruction programme re-
garding Iraq, set out in resolution 687, seems almost to have been completed, the accomplishment of 
the more covert goal of disposing Saddam Hussein as political leader of Iraq may still take some 
more time. 
The right of collective self-defence, which may be exercised against armed attacks, bears witness 
to, and constitutes, the supplementary consequence in respect of the crime of aggression. Under 
contemporary international law the other international crimes, denial of self-determination and wide-
spread breaches of basic human rights obligations, cannot be countered by the use of armed force in 
the exercise of any right of humanitarian intervention or by invoking a state of necessity. The Secu-
rity Council possesses the power under article 39 of the Charter to determine a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and to decide on the measures of article 41, or take action 
under article 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. In view of the lack of the 
agreements anticipated in article 43 it has not been able to take direct action under article 42. Yet it 
has overcome that obstacle by authorizing States to resort to the use of armed force against particu-
lar States. Thus armed action could lawfully be taken by States against Iraq, and in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Haiti. These decisions by the Security Council to authorize the use of armed force fur-
thermore show that the use of armed force may be appropriate also in circumstances other than 
armed conflict between States. 
Be that as it may, practice has shown that States are not altogether eager to take part in armed en-
forcement action, or for that matter in peace-keeping operations.16 There can be little doubt that the 
experience in Somalia has contributed significantly to the unwillingness of States to engage in what 
they consider to be risky business. Perhaps this may provide the explanation for the tardy and in es-
sence ineffective response to the commission of genocide in Rwanda. The Somalian and Rwandan 
crises show however, at least in the mind of the present writer, that the use of armed force should 
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not be considered only in the last resort, but rather, and in fact predominantly, as the typical response 
to the international crime of widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations. 
Within the Commission there appears to be a body of opinion that wishes to reaffirm, express and 
establish the prohibition of countermeasures involving the threat or use of armed force also in regard 
to responses against international crimes. Arangio-Ruiz has proposed to allow the adoption of ur-
gent, interim measures to protect the right of the injured State or to limit the damage caused by the 
crime. Such measures could be aimed at securing immediate access to victims or preventing the con-
tinuation of genocide. Yet at the same time he has not challenged the applicability in case of crimes 
of the prohibition of armed countermeasures, and it is therefore difficult to see how urgent, interim 
measures could involve the use of armed force. While prohibiting armed action in response to crimes 
would conform to the present state of international law, it may be submitted that present-day realities 
allow for the progressive development of the law in this respect. Any future convention on State re-
sponsibility would be less than ideal if it failed to provide for resort to armed force in order to ensure 
the effective suppression of conduct constituting crimes. 
Of course, as indicated above, the far-reaching character of the guarantees necessary to prevent 
repetition should lead one to conclude that they should not be imposed by States unilaterally. If a 
unilateral right to resort to armed force were to be envisaged in response to the crime of widespread 
breaches of basic human rights obligations, it would have to be restricted to the goal of effecting ces-
sation of the crime, restitution, and disarmament. As the implementation of the other guarantees 
against repetition, especially guarantees regarding the State organization, may in themselves already 
necessitate a prolonged presence in the targeted State, the forces of any (group of) State(s) should 
be relieved by a United Nations force as soon as a secure and stable environment would have been 
created. It must be stressed that such a United Nations force could be a peace-keeping force based 
on the consent of the State involved, or a peace-enforcing unit based on the Council's exercise of 
powers under Chapter VII. The guarantees against repetition envisaged in case of crimes, whether 
related to the police, paramilitary or armed forces or to the State organization, may be demanded in 
law, and may be enforced or implemented by way of countermeasures or the use of armed force. 
Special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz has proven to be particularly progressive on issues of adjudica-
tion. As already noted he has proposed to have the Court determine the existence (and attribution) of 
a crime on the request of any State, subject to a prior decision of the General Assembly or the Se-
curity Council that the allegations warrant the grave concern of the international community. In view 
of the gravity of international crimes he has further proposed to confer jurisdiction on the Court to 
settle any dispute on the implementation of the legal consequences of crimes. 
Although the present writer has nothing but praise for the envisaged broad role to be played by the 
Court in relation to crimes, it may be submitted that the Court would not be right organ of the 
United Nations to concern itself with the subject of guarantees against repetition. First of all any dis-
pute on such issues would be likely to come before the Court only if there is still some sort of effec-
tive government capable of representing the targeted State. Yet the guarantees that may be 
demanded relate to the prosecution of responsible individuals, a change of government and the or-
ganization of free elections. It would be odd if the agents of the State before the Court would be the 
same whose prosecution is demanded. If there is no effective government, as in Somalia for instance, 
any dispute would not come before the Court until after the re-establishment of such a government. 
Yet that, as has also been noted earlier, might take quite some time. 
More importantly, the implementation of the specific guarantees against repetition would seem to re-
quire the making of choices which are not inherently decided by application of legal rules or princi-
ples. What kind of coercion, countermeasures or the use of armed force, will be necessary to prevent 
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repetition of the crime; if there is to be any resort to armed force, will it be necessary to occupy the 
territory and how many troops would that take; which kind of weapons are to be destroyed; which 
political groups or parties would have to be outlawed; which individuals would have to be prose-
cuted; what kind of political or constitutional structures would best prevent repetition; what long-
term arrangements would have to be put in place to monitor possible set-backs? All these questions, 
and more besides, would have to be decided on the basis of expediency and the circumstances pre-
vailing within the territory. It may be submitted that, if there is to be any role for the Court in this re-
spect, it must be fully retrospective. A way out of these difficulties would be the existence of any 
agreement between the parties within the State, or between the government or the parties within a 
State and the United Nations, formulating the necessary goals, measures and guarantees. The inter-
pretation and application of such an agreement would be a suitable subject for adjudication by the 
Court. 
In the light of the foregoing there can be no question that a substantially aggravated régime of re-
sponsibility applicable to international crimes may fruitfully be elaborated. The essential features of 
such a régime would relate to the reparation obligations of the author State and the possibility of re-
sort to armed force by injured States or the United Nations. The goal of resort to armed force would 
be to impose cessation of criminal conduct, restitution, and the implementation of far-reaching guar-
antees against repetition. 
It is submitted furthermore that the assumptions which formed the basis of the research have been 
proved correct. 
The first assumption was that the consequences applicable in case of delicts attach also to crimes. In 
this respect the prohibition of the threat or use of armed force does present some problems. How-
ever, from a purely theoretical point of view the use of armed force could be envisaged also against 
the author State of a delict. Under Chapter П the Security Council is not, moreover, restricted to 
reacting against crimes. 
The assumption that there are only two régimes of responsibility would appear to be sound. Though 
it may be difficult to draw a precise line between where a delict stops and a crime starts, it may be 
submitted that the application of the criteria to determine the existence of a crime, the essential im-
portance of the obligation, the seriousness of the breach, and premeditation on the part of the author 
State, could lead to substantially similar results. 
Finally the assumption that the régime of responsibility applicable to international crimes would apply 
in a uniform manner to all the crimes mentioned in article 19, paragraph 3, Part One, should be up-
held. Though from a de lege lata view the use of armed force cannot be resorted to in respect of the 
crime of widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations, that possibility should be envisaged 
as a matter of progressive development. 
As noted earlier Arangio-Ruiz has proposed to let the Court determine the existence of a crime at 
the request of any State, provided that the General Assembly or the Security Council decided previ-
ously that the allegations warrant the grave concern of the international community. 
A problematical aspect of the proposed construction is that the experience in the last fifty years re-
lated to cases before the Court on breaches of human rights obligations has not been exactly favour-
able. Even if the Assembly or the Council would have resolved that the allegations warrant the grave 
concern of the community, that is not to say that consequently any State will bring the matter before 
the Court. And even if any particular State would claim the existence of a crime, and the Court de-
termined its existence, this would not necessarily mean that other States, that is, all the injured 
States, would exercise their rights to invoke the author State's responsibility. 
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On the basis of their rights to invoke the responsibility of the author State, the crime having been 
determined by the Court, other States could demand reparation and resort to countermeasures. 
However, under Arangjo-Ruiz' proposals they would not be under any obligation to do so. In view 
of such freedom the author State might first of all be confronted by a variety of differing reparation 
demands and all kinds of divergent countermeasures. The proposed supplementary obligations for 
injured States (non-recognition, abstention regarding assistance, assist each other in these fields, not 
hinder the exercise of reparation and countermeasures rights, implement the prosecute or extradite 
principle, take part in lawful measures decided or recommended by an international organization, and 
facilitate the adoption of lawful measures to cope with emergency situations), will most likely not be 
sufficient to assure the effective suppression of the crime. 
Lastly, but not the least, the proposals as they stand suspend injured States' rights to demand repa-
ration and to resort to countermeasures till after the closure of, to use the words of Arangio-Ruiz, 
full-fledged contentious proceedings before the Court. If the proposal to have the Court determine 
the existence of a crime were to be accepted, it might be worthwhile to have the Court decide by 
way of summary procedure (article 29 of the Statute). As that procedure is ordinarily open only at 
the request of the parties, the future convention would have to provide in advance and expressly that 
the States parties to the convention accept summary procedure to determine the existence of a crime. 
As the ordinary kind of contentious proceedings generally takes a long period of time, the only reac-
tion immediately open to injured States would be to resort to urgent, interim countermeasures to 
protect the rights of an injured State or to limit the damaged caused by the crime. Though such 
measures may aim at securing access to victims or at preventing the continuation of genocide, the 
proposal would not appear to justify recourse to armed force to achieve such goals. 
In conclusion, serious misgivings may be expressed regarding the proposal to subject demands for 
reparation and resort to countermeasures to a prior decision of the Court to the effect that an inter-
national crime has been, or is being, committed. Indeed, already the formulation alone, that a crime 
has been committed, raises the issue whether the proposed construction could adequately lead to the 
suppression of the crime. Though Arangio-Ruiz has proposed an article 20, Part Two, stipulating 
that the provisions of Part Two of the draft articles are without prejudice to measures decided upon 
by the Security Council in the exercise of its functions under the Charter, or to the inherent right of 
self-defence as provided in article 51 of the Charter, this will most likely not bring about the effective 
suppression of crimes. The Council is the only standing organ of the United Nations empowered to 
initiate enforcement action within a matter of hours, days or weeks. For that reason the more appro-
priate course of action, considering the essential goal of suppressing conduct which simply cannot be 
tolerated, would appear to be to enlarge the competence of the Council by conferring it the power to 
determine the existence of an international crime, and the power to decide on any coercive measures, 
including the use of armed force, necessary to ensure the suppression of an international crime. 
There is one issue left for discussion and that concerns the question, posed in the Introduction to 
this thesis, whether the 'New World Order" would be grafted upon the old legal structures, or 
whether new legal structures would have to be created, necessitating, possibly, amendments to the 
Charter or the Statute. The Commission observed in relation to this issue:17 
"The Commission is in no way called upon to interpret or to supplement the Charter by the 
rules which it formulates, and still less to derogate from the Charter." 
And Arangio-Ruiz has opted, by proposing the determination of a crime by the Court based upon a 
prior decision of the Assembly or the Council that the grave concern of the international community 
is warranted, to stay within the existing contemporary legal structures. 
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To begin with the Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court will necessarily be based upon existing 
bases of jurisdiction,18 or upon the jurisdiction conferred through a future convention on State 
responsibility. Considering the far-reaching consequences attached to crimes it is not to be expected 
that it will be widely ratified. Nevertheless it might be worthwhile to propose amending article 34 of 
the Statute so as to allow international organizations to appear before the Court in contentious 
proceedings. Jurisdiction conferred by the future convention on State responsibility could then also 
cover disputes between the United Nations and any targeted author State. 
The position is far more difficult as the Charter is concerned. It has shown itself to be abundantly 
clear, to laymen and specialists alike, that international law is in need of something more than en-
forcement based on national policies and interests. Thus the aftermath of the (armed) conflict regard-
ing the Iraq-Kuwait crisis calls for reflections regarding the role of the United Nations in the future 
enforcement of international law. For it has been aptly perceived that the argument made by presi-
dent Bush concerning the creation of a New World Order hinged upon the good will, good faith and 
detente between the permanent members of the Security Council.19 Though the decision-making un-
der Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, and the armed conflict resulting 
therefrom, did not provoke too many dissents, it has been doubted whether such quasi-unanimity 
could be expected to continue even in the near future. Yet even if the Security Council will not again 
be paralyzed by any inappropriate use of the veto power, that does not necessarily mean that it will 
function effectively. Sensibilities between the permanent members, and States in general, may delay 
action by the Council to such an extent that the delay becomes unacceptable. The situation in 
Rwanda has been a case in point. Doing away with the veto power would solve some problems, but 
this will not likely take place if regard is had to articles 108 and 109, paragraph 2, of the Charter. 
Even so, proposals for the enlargement of the Security Council, including the number of (semi-) 
permanent seats, should not lead to an increase of the number of States holding the veto power. 
Another problem lies with the fact that the responsibility of the Security Council concerns the main-
tenance or restoration of "international" peace and security. The examination of the practice of the 
Security Council shows that it will not necessarily consider an international crime to constitute a 
threat to the peace. For that reason it would seem to be desirable that the competence of the Security 
Council would be established beyond any doubt also in relation to the crimes of denial of self-
determination and widespread breaches of basic human rights obligations. In view of the recent 
practice of the Security Council a proposed amendment of article 39 of the Charter to that effect 
would not in advance be chanceless. 
Far more important, at least at this moment, is the non-existence of any military forces at the disposal 
of the Security Council. In his Agenda for Peace Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended 
that negotiations begin to conclude the agreements envisaged in article 43 of the Charter.20 In his 
supplement to the Agenda he pointed to the desirability, in the long run, for a capacity of the United 
Nations to deploy, direct, command, and control forces to engage in enforcement action against 
those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, but he noted 
that:21 
"(...) it would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is re-
source-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peace-
keeping responsibilities entrusted to it." 
It seems obvious then that any enforcement action taken in response to international crimes will have 
to rely upon the good will of States, and particularly those accounted of major military power. One 
may doubt however whether the United States, the major military power in the world today, will be 
willing and capable of facing crises in every backward comer of the world.22 Apart from the fact that 
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only States with military power are able to carry out armed action in an effective manner, it would in 
effect be harsh to let only those States bear the burden of grief inevitably resulting from any military 
conflict. Clearly it would be desirable henceforth to institute the system of the Charter of the United 
Nations as it had been envisaged from the start. Yet it seems doubtful whether implementation of the 
scheme envisaged in the Charter will be held feasible any time in the near future. 
The effective suppression of conduct constituting international crimes necessitates recourse to 
armed force to impose cessation, restitution, and guarantees against repetition. Obviously this will 
not be feasible if there is a lack of financial and material resources. The effective functioning of the 
United Nations is impeded not merely because there is too much red tape involved, but because im-
portant and well-off member States fail to pay their assessed contributions.23 More importantly 
member States must have the will and determination to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, as well as to the suppression of international crimes. In the absence of centralized 
forces that may be put into action independently from the will of the contributing States, the goal of 
effective suppression of future international crimes will probably not be accomplished. An effective 
international order based on respect for international law will come into effect only if States are 
willing to contribute militarily to the elimination of such crises whose continued existence cannot be 
bome. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali observed in his Agenda for Peace:24 
"In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an oppor-
tunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations ca-
pable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and 
of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom'. This opportunity must not be squandered." 
In his supplement to the Agenda for Peace he further reiterated the need for hard decisions, and he 
stated:25 
"As understanding grows of the challenges to peace and security, hard decisions, if post-
poned, will appear in retrospect as having been relatively easy when measured against the 
magnitude of tomorrow's troubles." 
With another four years to go before the close of the United Nations Decade on International Law, 
and the completion of the Commission's draft on State responsibility coming up, member States of 
the United Nations will have to make up their minds on the issue of a "New World Order". The years 
to come will be critical. 
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SAMENVATTING 
In deze wereld van tegenstellingen en paradoxen hebben Staten het internationale recht geschapen, 
hebben ze het geschonden en als reactie daarop hebben andere Staten gehandeld als rechtshand-
havers. Zij hebben zich hierbij niet zozeer laten leiden door juridische beginselen, maar door politiek 
opportunisme en door de noden binnen de nationale gemeenschappen of de internationale gemeen-
schap. Wat betren de betrekkingen binnen de internationale gemeenschap hebben zij zich verzet te-
gen centralisatie, zowel op het gebied van de rechtsschepping als op het gebied van de rechts-
handhaving. 
Na Wereldoorlog I trad hier verandering in op. De lidstaten van de Volkenbond verbonden zich 
tot het verbreken van handels-, financiële en andere relaties met een Staat die een oorlog begon in 
strijd met het Covenant. Opmerkelijk genoeg kon de Raad van de Volkenbond alleen aanbevelingen 
doen wat betren de militaire bijdragen van lidstaten aan de strijdkrachten bedoeld voor de hand-
having van de verplichtingen onder het Covenant. 
Maar de Volkenbond faalde. Na Wereldoorlog Π werd met de oprichting van de Verenigde Naties 
een nieuwe poging ondernomen ter handhaving van de internationale vrede en veiligheid. Het ge­
bruik van geweld werd in het algemeen, met bepaalde kwalificaties, verboden in artikel 2, lid 4, van 
het Handvest van de Verenigde Naties. Daarnaast verbonden de lidstaten zich, in artikel 2, lid 3, hun 
geschillen te beslechten op een manier die de internationale vrede en veiligheid, en rechtvaardigheid, 
niet in gevaar zou brengen. Verder werd de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties bevoegd ver­
klaard bedreigingen van de vrede, verbrekingen van de vrede en daden van agressie vast te stellen en 
te beslissen of niet-militaire maatregelen of gewapende acties noodzakelijk zijn ter handhaving of 
herstel van de internationale vrede en veiligheid. Op dit feitelijk geweldsmonopolie van de Veilig­
heidsraad vormt het gebruik van geweld, individueel of collectief, als zelfverdediging tegen een 
gewapende aanval de enige uitzondering. 
Door het bestaan van de Koude Oorlog en het daaruit voortvloeiend veelvuldig gebruik van het 
vetorecht door de permanente leden heeft de Veiligheidsraad niet kunnen functioneren zoals bedoeld 
was ten tijde van de oprichting van de Verenigde Naties. Als gevolg hiervan heeft de Algemene Ver­
gadering van de Verenigde Naties gesteld, in resolutie 377 (V), dat zij ingeval van inactie van de 
Veiligheidsraad ontstaan door een gebrek aan consensus bij de permanente leden aanbevelingen zou 
doen naar de lidstaten toe omtrent passende maatregelen, inclusief het gebruik van militair geweld bij 
verbrekingen van de vrede en daden van agressie. Een andere reactie door regeringen en auteurs be­
trof een poging tot herinterpretatie van het verbod op het gebruik van geweld en de omstandigheden 
waaronder een gerechtvaardigd gebruik van geweld op grond van zelfverdediging mogelijk zou zijn. 
Op het juridische vlak vonden enige met elkaar in verband staande ontwikkelingen plaats die te 
maken hadden met het bestaan van een internationale gemeenschap. 
Zo bepaalt artikel 53 van het Verdrag van Wenen inzake het Verdragenrecht van 1969 dat een ver­
drag dat strijdig is met een dwingende norm van algemeen volkenrecht nietig is. Zo'n dwingende 
norm bestaat als een norm door de internationale gemeenschap van Staten in haar geheel wordt aan­
vaard en erkend als een norm waarvan geen afwijking is toegestaan. 
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Eenjaar later maakte het Internationaal Gerechtshof het onderscheid tussen verplichtingen naar Sta-
ten toe op het gebied van de diplomatieke bescherming en verplichtingen tegenover de internationale 
gemeenschap in haar geheel, dat wil zeggen verplichtingen erga omnes. Als voorbeelden van de 
laatste soort verplichtingen noemde het Hof de verboden op agressie en genocide en de beginselen 
en regels betreffende de fundamentele rechten van de menselijke persoon, inclusief bescherming te-
gen slavernij en rassendiscriminatie. 
In 1976 besloot de Commissie voor Internationaal Recht, in artikel 19, Deel 1, van haar ontwerp 
over Staatsaansprakelijkheid, een onderscheid te maken tussen internationale delicten en internatio-
nale misdaden. Lid 2 van die bepaling luidt [vertaling door de auteur]: "Een internationale onrecht-
matige daad die voortvloeit uit een schending van een verplichting die zo essentieel is voor de 
bescherming van de fundamentele belangen van de internationale gemeenschap dat de schending van 
die verplichting wordt erkend als een misdaad door die gemeenschap in haar geheel is een inter-
nationale misdaad." In het derde lid van artikel 19 formuleerde de Commissie een aantal categorieën 
van essentiële verplichtingen en specifieke voorbeelden binnen die categorieën. De categorieën be-
treffen de handhaving van de internationale vrede en veiligheid; het recht op zelfbeschikking van vol-
ken; de bescherming van de menselijke persoon; en de bescherming van het menselijk milieu. Als 
voorbeelden noemde de Commissie de verplichtingen inzake het verbod op agressie; het verbod op 
koloniale overheersing; het verbod op slavernij, genocide en apartheid; en het verbod op omvang-
rijke vervuiling van de atmosfeer of de zeeën. 
Gezien het gebrek aan bewijs, op dit moment, dat de internationale gemeenschap de verplichtin-
gen inzake de bescherming van het milieu essentieel acht voor de bescherming van haar fundamentele 
belangen; het feit dat zij de schending van zulke verplichtingen ook (nog) niet karakteriseert als een 
internationale misdaad; en de omstandigheid dat een internationale misdaad alleen opzettelijk en met 
voorbedachte rade kan worden gepleegd, worden schendingen van verplichtingen inzake het milieu 
niet apart besproken in dit boek. 
Enige vooronderstellingen lagen ten grondslag aan het onderzoek. Ten eerste dat alle gevolgen 
die voor een Staat intreden als gevolg van het plegen van internationaal delict ook intreden wanneer 
een Staat een internationale misdaad pleegt. Ten tweede dat er slechts twee regimes van aansprake-
lijkheid bestaan, namelijk één voor internationale delicten en één voor internationale misdaden. En 
ten derde dat die regimes substantieel gezien uniform van aard zijn, dat wil zeggen dat de gevolgen 
die toepasselijk zijn voor het betreffende regime in het algemeen intreden voor alle schendingen van 
verplichtingen binnen dat regime. Op basis van deze vooronderstellingen was het doel van het onder-
zoek na te gaan of het mogelijk is een regime van aansprakelijkheid voor misdaden te ontwerpen dat 
substantieel zwaardere gevolgen met zich meebrengt voor een Staat die een misdaad pleegt dan voor 
een Staat die een delict pleegt. 
Het idee van de Commissie achter het maken van het onderscheid was en is dan ook dat ernstigere of 
zwaardere gevolgen gaan gelden voor een Staat die een misdaad pleegt dan voor een Staat die een 
delict pleegt. Eén van die gevolgen zou kunnen zijn dat alle Staten of de internationale gemeenschap 
de aansprakelijkheid kan inroepen van een Staat die een misdaad pleegt. Dit aspect lijkt in overeen-
stemming met de uitspraak van het Hof over verplichtingen tegenover de internationale gemeenschap 
of verplichtingen erga omnes (hetgeen het beginpunt was van het onderzoek) en vormde het onder-
werp van hoofdstukken een en twee. Andere mogelijke gevolgen betreffen de remedies van 
internationale aansprakelijkheid, het recht om niet gewapende tegenmaatregelen (ook wel: represail-
les) te nemen en het recht om met militair geweld op te treden tegen een Staat die een misdaad 
pleegt. Deze onderwerpen werden besproken in hoofdstukken drie, vier en vijf. Geschillen omtrent 
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de gevolgen van misdaden kunnen voor het Hof komen voor advies of beslechting. Hoofdstuk zes 
bespreekt daarom een aantal problemen welke het Hof kunnen verhinderen bij het vervullen van 
diens taak. 
Alle Staten kunnen een juridisch belang geldend maken, dat wil zeggen dat zij de aansprakelijkheid 
kunnen inroepen, ten aanzien van Staten die een internationale misdaad plegen. Die conclusie is 
neergelegd in artikel 5, lid 3, Deel 2, van het ontwerp over Staatsaansprakelijkheid. De mogelijkheid 
van alle Staten om de aansprakelijkheid in te roepen van Staten die de misdaad plegen van misken-
ning van het recht van zelfbeschikking of ernstige schendingen van fundamentele mensenrechten is 
niet typisch voor het regime van misdaden. De aard van de regels inzake zelfbeschikking en mensen-
rechten brengt met zich mee dat alle Staten die gebonden zijn aan de betreffende regel, ingeval van 
regels van universeel gewoonterecht alle Staten, de aansprakelijkheid kunnen inroepen van een Staat 
die een verplichting schendt onder de regel. Hetzelfde geldt niet voor de regels inzake het verbod op 
het gebruik van geweld. Alleen wanneer dat verbod in ernstige mate wordt geschonden, in de zin van 
een gewapende aanval, zijn alle Staten gerechtigd de aansprakelijkheid in te roepen van de agressor 
Staat. Indien de schending van het verbod niet het niveau haalt van een gewapende aanval kan alleen 
de direct benadeelde Staat de aansprakelijkheid van de schendende Staat inroepen. 
De Verenigde Naties zijn ook in het bezit van een juridisch belang betreffende Staten die een mis-
daad plegen. De praktijk van de Veiligheidsraad bevestigt echter niet dat situaties waarin 
internationale misdaden worden gepleegd per definitie, als een minimum, een bedreiging van de vre-
de in de zin van artikel 39 van het Handvest opleveren. Speciaal rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz voor het 
onderwerp Staatsaansprakelijkheid heeft voorgesteld iedere Staat het recht te geven beschuldigingen 
inzake het plegen van een misdaad voor het Hof te brengen indien de Algemene Vergadering of de 
Veiligheidsraad vooraf zouden hebben beslist dat de beschuldigingen ernstig genoeg zijn om de be-
zorgdheid van de internationale gemeenschap te rechtvaardigen. De vaststelling van het bestaan van 
een misdaad door het Hof zou de noodzakelijke voorwaarde zijn voor de uitoefening door Staten 
van hun rechten remedies te eisen en tegenmaatregelen te nemen. 
De keus van speciaal rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz voor het Hof in plaats van de Veiligheidsraad is geïn-
spireerd door het politiek karakter van de samenstelling en besluitvorming van de Veiligheidsraad. 
Maar die keus overtuigt niet. De Veiligheidsraad is de taak van handhaving van de internationale 
vrede en veiligheid toebedeeld en kan deswege een bedreiging of verbreking van de vrede of daad 
van agressie vaststellen. Vergaande gevolgen, zowel op het feitelijke als op het juridische vlak, kun-
nen intreden op basis van zo'n vaststelling door de Raad: het opleggen van economische en andere 
maatregelen ten aanzien van een bepaalde Staat, of zelfs gewapende acties tegen zo'n Staat. Toch 
heeft het politiek karakter van de samenstelling en besluitvorming van de Veiligheidsraad de Staten 
niet tegengehouden deze bevoegdheden aan de Raad toe te kennen. 
Wat betreft de inhoud van aansprakelijkheid, dat wil zeggen de remedies, kan gesteld worden dat 
ver(der)gaande garanties tegen herhaling kunnen gelden als ernstiger of zwaarder gevolg van het re-
gime voor internationale misdaden. Twee hoofdcategorieën kunnen worden onderscheiden. Ga-
ranties betreffende het plegen van, of gedrag tijdens, de misdaad. Deze betreffen maatregelen inzake 
de politie, de paramilitaire en/of de strijdkrachten. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn ontwapening, vernieti-
ging van wapens en/of de reorganisatie van de voornoemde (strijd)krachten. Daarnaast kan men 
garanties eisen betreffende de organisatie van een Staat. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn de vervolging, 
veroordeling en bestraffing van verantwoordelijke personen, regerings- en grondwettelijke wijzigin-
gen, vrije verkiezingen en het respecteren van mensenrechten. Indien er sprake is van het extreme 
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geval van (een poging tot) genocide mag het betreffende volk, behoudens geografische en demogra-
fische omstandigheden, diens recht van zelfbeschikking uitoefenen. 
Gezien het vergaande karakter van zulke garanties kunnen zij niet eenvoudigweg geëist, opgelegd, 
of middels tegenmaatregelen of het gebruik van geweld doorgezet of geïmplementeerd worden door 
Staten individueel. Gezien de praktijk van de vredesverdragen na Wereldoorlogen I en II, kan Vei-
ligheidsraad resolutie 687 als een verbetering worden beschouwd. Niettemin moet het ontbreken van 
enige mogelijkheid tot geschillen beslechting, zoals bijvoorbeeld betreffende de afbakening (of de-
limitatie) van de grens tussen Irak en Koeweit, betreurd worden. 
Ook de precedenten van de oprichting door de Veiligheidsraad van de Tribunalen voor het voorma-
lige Joegoslavië en Rwanda kunnen voor verbeteringen doorgaan. Het probleem is hier meestal dat 
de verdachten niet te pakken zijn. Men moet bijvoorbeeld maar afwachten of Karadzic of Mladic 
ooit voor het Tribunaal zullen verschijnen niettegenstaande de aanklachten van 25 juli 1995. Dat 
probleem wordt vaak nog verergerd doordat dezelfde personen die verdacht worden van ernstige 
misdaden de personen zijn met wie onderhandeld moet worden over een vredesregeling. 
Alle Staten kunnen hun toevlucht nemen tot het uitoefenen van hun recht tot het nemen van te-
genmaatregelen ten aanzien van een Staat die een internationale misdaad pleegt. Alleen met 
betrekking tot de misdaad van agressie kan dit worden beschouwd als een ernstiger of zwaarder ge-
volg. Een verzoek van de direct benadeelde Staat moet, indien mogelijk, aan de uitoefening van die 
rechten voorafgaan. Gezien de aard en ernst van internationale misdaden zijn noch Staten, noch de 
Veiligheidsraad, gebonden afte zien van tegenmaatregelen op basis van een louter verbale erkenning 
van aansprakelijkheid of aanbod van geschillen beslechting. Alleen de adequate nakoming van ver-
plichtingen inzake de geëiste remedies kan het recht tot het nemen van tegenmaatregelen beëindigen. 
Dat recht kan echter herleven, gezien de lange periode die nodig kan zijn voor de implementatie van 
garanties tegen herhaling, indien ernstige terugvallen zich voordoen. 
Gezien het einde van de Koude Oorlog heeft de Veiligheidsraad weer veelomvattende sancties kun-
nen afkondigen met betrekking tot de Irak-Koeweit en de Joegoslavische crises. Zoals echter Secre-
taris-Generaal Boutros-Ghali opmerkte zijn sancties een bot middel. De minst invloedrijke groepen 
binnen een Staat worden er het eerst en het ergst door getroffen. En zoals de Secretaris-Generaal 
ook nog opmerkte wordt het gedrag van de politieke leiders van een Staat niet echt beïnvloed door 
de benarde toestand van de bevolking. Pertinente voorbeelden hiervan betreffen Irak en, onafhanke-
lijk van enig aspect van tegenmaatregelen, Somalië. Het instrument van sancties of tegenmaatregelen 
zal over het algemeen gesproken dan ook niet erg effectief zijn om het plegen van de misdaad te 
stoppen, of restitutie te bewerkstelligen, laat staan om de vergaande garanties tegen herhaling te ver-
krijgen. 
Het recht van collectieve zelfverdediging getuigt van en is een ernstiger of zwaarder gevolg in ge-
val van de misdaad van agressie. Het hedendaagse internationale recht kent geen recht van 
humanitaire interventie, noch kan de noodtoestand worden ingeroepen, om gewapenderhand op te 
treden tegen een Staat die het recht van zelfbeschikking van volken of op grote schaal fundamentele 
mensenrechten schendt. De Veiligheidsraad heeft de bevoegdheid, onder artikel 39 van het Handvest, 
bedreigingen of verbrekingen van de vrede of daden van agressie vast te stellen en vervolgens maat-
regelen onder artikel 41 of actie onder artikel 42 te nemen ter handhaving of herstel van de in-
ternationale vrede en veiligheid. De Veiligheidsraad heeft echter nog nooit directe actie kunnen on-
dernemen gezien de afwezigheid van de overeenkomsten voorzien in artikel 43 van het Handvest. De 
Raad heeft dit obstakel overwonnen door Staten te machtigen geweld te gebruiken naar andere Sta-
ten toe. Zo konden Staten gerechtvaardigd geweld gebruiken tegen Irak en in Somalië, Rwanda en 
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Haiti De besluiten van de Veiligheidsraad laten zien dat het gebruik van geweld ook geëigend kan 
zijn in omstandigheden anders dan een gewapend conflict tussen Staten. 
De praktijk laat echter zien, met name het geval van Rwanda, dat Staten niet bepaald staan te sprin-
gen om deel te nemen aan militaire dwangacties of vredesmachten. De voorbeelden van Somalië en 
Rwanda laten echter naar de mening van de huidige schrijver zien dat het gebruik van geweld niet 
slechts moet worden gezien als een laatste toevlucht, maar als de typische manier van reageren ten 
aanzien van Staten die op grote schaal fundamentele mensenrechten schenden. 
Binnen de Commissie bestaat een tendens om het verbod op het gebruik van geweld te bevestigen 
ingeval van internationale misdaden. Speciaal rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz heeft voorgesteld om urgen-
te, voorlopige maatregelen mogelijk te maken ter bescherming van de rechten van de benadeelde 
Staat of ter beperking van de schade veroorzaakt door de misdaad. Zulke maatregelen zouden dan 
gericht moeten zijn op het verzekeren van ogenblikkelijke toegang tot slachtoffers of op het verhin-
deren van een in gang zijnde (poging tot) genocide. Hij heeft echter de trend tot het herbevestigen 
van het verbod op gewapende tegenmaatregelen niet betwist. Hoewel deze positie overeenkomt met 
de huidige stand van het internationale recht is het mogelijk, gezien de hedendaagse realiteit, voor-
stellen te doen ter wijziging van het recht. Een toekomstig verdrag inzake Staatsaansprakelijkheid 
zou minder dan ideaal zijn als het niet het gebruik van geweld mogelijk maakt om te komen tot de 
effectieve onderdrukking van internationale misdaden. 
Speciaal rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz heeft zich bijzonder progressief getoond wat betreft de rol die 
het Hof kan spelen met betrekking tot het vaststellen van het bestaan van een misdaad. Verder heeft 
hij voorgesteld dat geschillen met betrekking tot de implementatie van de juridische gevolgen van 
internationale misdaden onder de jurisdictie van het Hof zouden komen te vallen. 
Hoewel men niets dan lof kan hebben wat betreft de brede rol die het Hof zou kunnen spelen inzake 
misdaden, kan men zich toch afvragen of het Hof wel het juiste orgaan van de Verenigde Naties is 
om zich bezig te houden met garanties tegen herhaling. Ten eerste is daar de complicatie dat een ge-
schil hieromtrent pas voor het Hof kan komen als er een regering is die de Staat kan vertegen-
woordigen. Als voorbeeld van zo'n complicatie kan men de situatie in Somalië noemen. Ten tweede 
kan men noemen dat garanties tegen herhaling onder andere kunnen inhouden dat de verant-
woordelijke individuen worden vervolgd, veroordeeld en gestraft. Het zou toch wel erg vreemd zijn 
als juist die vertegenwoordigers van een Staat die voor het Hof zouden verschijnen dezelfde zouden 
zijn wier vervolging, veroordeling en bestraffing wordt geëist. 
Nog belangrijker is de opmerking dat de implementatie van garanties tegen herhaling het maken van 
keuzen met zich meebrengt die niet inherent kunnen worden gemaakt met toepassing van juridische 
regels of beginselen. Zo kan men zich afvragen wat voor dwang, tegenmaatregelen of gebruik van 
geweld, moet worden uitgeoefend om herhaling te voorkomen; als er gebruik van geweld nodig 
wordt geacht, is het dan nodig om het grondgebied te bezetten en hoeveel troepen zou dat vereisen; 
wat voor wapens moeten worden vernietigd; welke politieke groeperingen of partijen moeten wor-
den verboden; welke individuen moeten worden vervolgd; wat voor politieke of constitutionele ver-
anderingen zouden herhaling kunnen voorkomen; en welke lange termijn programma's moeten wor-
den opgezet om terugvallen te observeren? Al deze vragen moeten worden beantwoord op basis van 
opportuniteit en de omstandigheden binnen het grondgebied. Men kan dan ook stellen dat de rol van 
het Hof volledig retrospectief zou moeten zijn. De interpretatie en toepassing van een verdrag of 
overeenkomst tussen de (strijdende) partijen of tussen de partijen en de Verenigde Naties zouden 
natuurlijk wel geschikt zijn voor geschillen beslechting door het Hof. 
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Gezien het bovenstaande kan er geen twijfel over bestaan dat een substantieel verzwaard regime 
van aansprakelijkheid ingeval van internationale misdaden kan worden ontworpen. De belangrijkste 
kenmerken van zo'η regime zouden zijn de te eisen remedies ten aanzien van een Staat die een inter­
nationale misdaad pleegt en de mogelijkheid van het gebruik van geweld tegen zo'n Staat door 
Staten of de Verenigde Naties. Het doel van het gebruik van geweld zou dan zijn het verhinderen van 
het plegen van de misdaad, het opleggen van restitutie en de implementatie van vergaande maatrege­
len tegen herhaling. 
Of alleen het instellen van een verzwaard regime van aansprakelijkheid voor misdaden voldoende is 
valt nog te bezien. Zo is het zeker dat amendementen van het Handvest of het Statuut van het Inter­
nationaal Gerechtshof kunnen bijdragen tot het creëren van een effectief regime van aansprakelijk-
heid voor misdaden. Wat het Statuut betren zou het goed zijn te overwegen artikel 34 te wijzigen in 
die zin dat ook internationale organisaties partij zouden kunnen zijn in contentieuse zaken voor het 
Hof. Wat betreft hetlHandvest lijkt het niet mogelijk, gezien de artikelen 108 en 109, lid 2, om te 
komen tot eliminatie van het vetorecht. Gezien de recente praktijk van de Veiligheidsraad lijkt een 
amendement van artikel 39, ter verruiming in die zin dat alle internationale misdaden onder de be-
voegdheid van de Raad zouden komen te vallen, niet bij voorbaat kansloos. 
Nog belangrijker, althans op dit moment, is de omstandigheid dat er nog steeds geen overeenkom-
sten in de zin van artikel 43 van het Handvest zijn gesloten. Het ontbreken van een militaire strijd-
kracht van de Veiligheidsraad die kan worden ingezet onafhankelijk van de wil van de individuele 
lidstaten betekent dat het doel van de onderdrukking van internationale misdaden niet snel zal wor-
den bereikt. 
Een effectieve internationale orde gebaseerd op respect voor het internationale recht kan alleen 
worden bereikt indien Staten bereid zijn militair bij te dragen aan de eliminatie van crises waarvan het 
voortduren niet kan worden getolereerd. Secretaris-Generaal Boutros-Ghali heeft in zijn supplement 
van zijn Agenda for Peace opgemerkt: 
"As understanding grows of the challenges to peace and security, hard decisions, if postpo-
ned, will appear in retrospect as having been relatively easy when measured against the 
magnitude of tomorrow's troubles." 
Met nog vier jaar te gaan voor het einde van het decennium voor internationaal recht van de Vere-
nigde Naties en gezien de naderende voltooiing van het Commissie ontwerp over Staatsaansprake-
lijkheid zullen met name de lidstaten van de Verenigde Naties zich moeten bezinnen op de "Nieuwe 
Wereldorde" aangekondigd door voormalig president Bush. De komende jaren zullen cruciaal zijn. 
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DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSD3DLITY 
Draft articles (provisionally) adopted by the Commission 
(Texts in YBILC 1980, Volume II, Part Two, pp 30-34, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of 
its forty-fifth sesstion, 3 May - 23 July 1993, General Assembly, Official Records, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement 
No 10, (A/48/10), pp 128-132, and Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth 
sesstion, 2 May - 22 July 1994, General Assembly, Official Records, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No 10, 
(A/49/10), pp 365-366, footnote 362) 
Fart 1. The origin of international responsibility 
Chapter I 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 1, Part One, Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts 
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility ofthat State 
Article 2, Part One, Possibility that every State may be held to have committed an internationally wrongful act 
Every State is subject to the possibility of being held to have committed an internationally wrongful act entailing its 
international responsibility 
Article 3, Part One, Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when 
(a) conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law, and 
(b) that conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State 
Article 4, Part One, Characterization of an act of a Slate as internationally wrongful 
An act of a State may only be characterized as internationally wrongful by international law Such characterization 
cannot be affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law 
Chapter II 
THE "ACT OF THE STATE" UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Article 5, Part One, Attribution of the State of the conduct of its organs 
For the purposes of the present articles, conduct of any State organ having that status under the internal law of that 
State shall be considered as an act of the State concerned under international law, provided that organ was acting m 
that capacity in the case ш question 
Article 6, Part One, Irrelevance of the position of the organ in the organization of the State 
The conduct of an organ of the State shall be considered as an act of that State under international law, whether that 
organ belongs to the constituent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether its functions are of an 
international or an internal character, and whether it holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organization of 
the State 
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Aiücle 7, Part One, Attribution to the State of the conduct of other entities empowered to exercise elements of the 
government authority 
1 The conduct of an organ of a territorial governmental entity within a State shall also be considered as an act of that 
State under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question 
2 The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal structure of the State or of a territorial 
governmental entity, but which is empowered by the internal law of that State to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State under international law, provided that organ 
was acting in that capacity in the case in question. 
Article 8, Part One, Attribution to the State of the conduct of persons acting in fact on behalf of the State 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of the State under international law if 
(a) it is established that such persons or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of that State, or 
(b) such person or group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence of the 
official authorities and in circumstances which justified the exercise of those elements of authority 
Article 9, Part One, Attribution to the State of the conduct of organs placed at its disposal by another State or by an 
international organization 
The conduct of an organ which has been placed at the disposal of a State by another State or by an international 
organization shall be considered as an act of the former State under international law, if that organ was acting in the 
exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it has been placed. 
Article 10, Part One, Attribution to the State of the conduct of organs acting outside their competence or contrary to 
instructions concerning their activity 
The conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial governmental entity or of an entity empowered to exercise elements 
of the governmental authority, such organ having acted in that capacity, shall be considered as an act of the State 
under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded its competence according to internal law or 
contravened instructions concerning its activity 
Article 11, Part One, Conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the State 
1 The conduct of a person or group of persons not acting on behalf of the Stale shall not be considered as an act of the 
State under international law 
2 Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution to the State of any other conduct which is related to that of the 
persons or group of persons referred to in that paragraph and which is to be considered as an act of the State by virtue 
of articles 5 to 10 
Article 12, Part One, Conduct of organs of another State 
1 The conduct of an organ of a State acting in that capacity which takes place m the territory of another State or in 
any other territory under its jurisdiction shall not be considered as an act of the latter State under international law 
2 Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any other conduct which is related to that referred to 
in that paragraph and which is to be considered as an act of that State by virtue of articles S to 10 
Article 13, Part One, Conduct of organs of an international organization 
The conduct of an organ of an international organization acting in that capacity shall not be considered as an act of a 
State under international law by reason only of the feet that such conduct has taken place in the territory of that State 
or ш any other territory under its jurisdiction 
Article 14, Part One, Conduct of organs of an insurrectional movement 
1 The conduct of an organ of an insurrectional movement which is established in the territory of a State or in any 
other territory under its administration shall not be considered as an act ofthat State under international law 
2 Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any other conduct which is related to that of the 
organ of the insurrectional movement and which is to be considered as an act ofthat State by virtue of articles 5 to 10 
3 Similarly, paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution of the conduct of the organ of the insurrectional 
movement to that movement in any case in which such attribution may be made under international law 
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Aibcle IS, Part One, Attribution to the State of the act of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new 
government of a State or which results in the formation of a new State 
1 The act of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be considered as an act 
of that State However, such attribution shall be without prejudice to the attribution to that State of conduct which 
would have been previously considered as an act of the State by virtue of articles 5 to 10 
2 The act of an insurrectional movement whose action results m the formation of a new State in part of the territory of 
a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered as an act of the new State 
Chapter Ш 
BREACH OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION 
Article 16, Part One, Existence of a breach of an international obligation 
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation 
Article 17, Part One, Irrelevance of the origin of the international obligation breached 
1 An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act 
regardless of the origin, whether customary, conventional or other, ofthat obligation 
2 The origin of the international obligation breached by a State does not affect the international responsibility arising 
from the internationally wrongful act ofthat State 
Article 18, Part One, Requirement that the international obligation be m force for the Slate 
1 An act of the State which is not in conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation constitutes a 
breach ofthat obligation only if the act was performed at the time when the obligation was in force for that State 
2 However, an act of the State which, at the time when it was performed, was not in conformity with what was 
required or it by an international obligation in force for that State, ceases to be considered an internationally wrongful 
act if, subsequently, such an act has become compulsory by virtue of a peremptory norm of general international law 
3 If an act of the State which is not in conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation has a 
continuing character, there is a breach ofthat obligation only m respect of the period during which the act continues 
while the obligation is in force for that State 
4 If an act of the State which is not in conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation is 
composed of a senes of actions or omissions in respect of separate cases, there is a breach of that obligation if such an 
act may be considered to be constituted by the actions or omissions occurring within the period during which the 
obligation is in force for that Stale 
5 If an of the State which is not in conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation is a complex 
act constituted by actions or omissions by the same or different organs of the Slate in respect of the same case, there is 
a breach of that obligation if the complex act not in conformity with it begins with an action or omission occurring 
within the period during which the obligation is in force for that State, even if that act is completed after that period 
Article 19, Part One, International crimes and international delicts 
1 An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act, 
regardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached 
2 An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential 
for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by 
that community as a whole constitutes an international crime 
3 Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime may result, 
inter alia, from 
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, such as that prohibiting aggression, 
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the right of self-
determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination, 
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the 
human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid. 
APPENDIX 371 
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the 
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or the seas 
4 Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in accordance with paragraph 2 constitutes an 
international debet 
Article 20, Part One, Breach of an international obligation requiring the adoption of a particular course of conduct 
There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to adopt a particular course of conduct when the 
conduct of that State is not in conformity with that required of it by that obligation. 
Article 21, Part One, Breach of an international obligation requiring the achievement of a specified result 
1 There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to achieve, by means of its own choice, a 
specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve the result required of it by that obligation 
2 When the conduct of the State has created a situation not in conformity with the result required of it by an 
international obligation, but the obligation allows that this or an equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by 
subsequent conduct of the State, there is a breach of the obligation only if the State also fails by its subsequent conduct 
to achieve the result required of it by that obligation. 
Article 22, Part One, Exhaustion of local remedies 
When the conduct of a State has created a situation not in conformity with the result required of it by an international 
obligation concerning the treatment to be accorded to aliens, whether natural or juridical persons, but the obligation 
allows that tbs or an equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by subsequent conduct of the State, there is a 
breach of the obligation only if the aliens concerned have exhausted the effective local remedies available to them 
without obtaining the treatment called for by the obligation or, where that is not possible, an equivalent treatment 
Article 23, Part One, Breach of an international obligation to prevent a given event 
When the result required of a State by an international obligation is the prevention, by means of its own choice, of the 
occurrence of a given event, there is a breach of that obligation only if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not 
achieve that result 
Article 24, Part One, Moment and duration of the breach of an international obligation by an act of the State not 
extending in time 
The breach of an international obligation by an act of the State not extending m time occurs at the moment when that 
act is performed The time of commission of the breach does not extend beyond that moment, even if the effects of the 
act of the Slate continue subsequently 
Article 25, Part One, Moment and duration of the breach of an international obligation by an act of the State 
extending in time 
1 The breach of an international obligation by an act of the State having a continuing character occurs at the moment 
when that act begins Nevertheless, the time of commission of the breach extends over the entire period during which 
the act continues and remains not in conformity with the international obligation 
2 The breach of an international obligation by an act of the State, composed of a senes of actions or omissions in 
respect of separate cases, occurs at the moment when that action or omission of the senes is accomplished which 
establishes the existence of the composite act Nevertheless, the tune of commission of the breach extends over the 
entire period from the first of the actions or omissions constituting the composite act not in conformity with the 
international obligation and so long as such actions or omissions are repeated 
3 The breach of an international obligation by a complex act of the State, consisting of a succession of actions or 
omissions by the same or different organs of the State in respect of the same case, occurs at the moment when the last 
constituent element of that complex act is accomplished Nevertheless, the time of commission of the breach extends 
over the entire period between the action or omission which initiated the breach and that which completed it 
Article 26, Part One, Moment and duration of the breach of an international obligation to prevent a given event 
The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event occurs when the event begins 
Nevertheless, the time of commission of the breach extends over the entire penod during which the event continues 
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Chapter IV 
IMPLICATION OF A STATE IN THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF ANOTHER STATE 
Article 27, Part One, Aid or assistance by a State to another State for the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act 
Aid or assistance by a Slate to another State, if it is established that it is rendered for the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act earned out by the latter, itself constitutes an internationally wrongful act, even if, taken 
alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute the breach of an international obligation. 
Article 28, Part One, Responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act of another State 
1 An internationally wrongful act of a State committed by a Slate in a field of activity in which that State is subject to 
the power of direction or control of another State entails the international responsibility ofthat other State 
2 An internationally wrongful act committed by a State as the result of coercion exerted by another Stale to secure the 
commission ofthat act entails the international responsibility ofthat other State 
3 Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to the international responsibility, under the other articles of the present 
draft, of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act 
Chapter V 
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS 
Article 29, Part One, Consent 
1 The consent validly given by a Slate to the commission by another State of a specified act not m conformity with an 
obligation of the latter State towards the former State precludes the wrongfulness of the act m relation to that State to 
the extent that the act remains within the limits ofthat consent 
2 Paragraph 1 does not apply if the obligation anses out of a peremptory norm of general international law For the 
purposes of the present draft articles, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character 
Article 30, Part One, Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an obligation of that State towards another State is 
precluded if the act constitutes a measure legitimate under international law against that other State, in consequence of 
an internationally wrongful act ofthat other State 
Article 31, Part One, Force majeure and fortuitous event 
1 The wrongfulness of an act of a Slate not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if 
the act was due to an irresistible force or to an unforeseen external event beyond its control which made it materially 
impossible for the State to act in conformity with that obligation or to know that its conduct was not m conformity 
with that obligation 
2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the situation of material 
impossibility 
Article 32, Part One, Distress 
1 The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation ofthat State is precluded if 
the author of the conduct which constitutes the act ofthat State had no other means, in a situation m extreme distress, 
of saving his life or that of persons entrusted to his care 
2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the situation of extreme 
distress or if the conduct in question was likely to create a comparable or greater peni 
Article 33, Part One, State of necessity 
1 A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that 
State not in conformity with an international obligation of the Slate unless 
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(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peni, 
and 
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation existed. 
2 In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness 
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity anses out of a peremptory norm 
of general international law, or 
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity is laid down by a treaty which, 
explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligation, or 
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity 
Article 34, Part One, Self-defence 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation ofthat State is precluded if the 
act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken m conformity with the Charter of the Umted Nations 
Article 35, Part One, Reservation as to compensation for damage 
Preclusion of the wrongfulness of an act of a State by virtue of the provisions of articles 29, 31, 32 or 33 does not 
prejudge any question that may anse in regard to compensation for damage caused by that act 
Part 2. The content, forms and degrees of international responsibility 
Article 1, Part Two 
1 The international responsibility of a State which, pursuant to the provisions of Part One, anses from an 
internationally wrongful act committed by that Slate, entails legal consequences as set out in the present part 
2 The legal consequences referred to m paragraph 1 are without prejudice to the continued duty of the State which has 
committed the internationally wrongful act to perform the obligation it has breached. 
Article 2, Part Two 
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 4 and [12], the provisions of this Part govern the legal consequences of 
any internationally wrongful act of a State, except where and to the extent that those legal consequences have been 
determined by other rules of international law relating specifically to the internationally wrongful act in question. 
Article 3, Part Two 
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 4 and [12], the rules of customary international law shall continue to 
govern the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a State not set out in the provisions of the present 
Part 
Article 4, Part Two 
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a State set out in the provisions of the present Part are 
subject, as appropriate, to the provisions and procedure of the Charter of the Umted Nations relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security 
Article 5, Part Two 
1 For the purposes of the present articles, "injured State" means any State a right of which is infringed by the act of 
another State, if that act constitutes, m accordance with Part One of the present articles an internationally wrongful act 
ofthat State 
2 In particular, "injured State" means 
(a) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a bilateral treaty, the other State party to the treaty, 
(b) if the right infringed by the act of a Slate anses from a judgment or other binding dispute-settlement decision of an 
international court or tribunal, the other State or States parties to the dispute and entitled to benefit ofthat right, 
(c) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a binding decision of an international organ other than ал 
international court or tribunal, the State or States which, in accordance with the constituent instrument of the 
international organization concerned, are entitled to the benefit ofthat right, 
(d) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a treaty provision for a third State, that third State, 
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(e) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a multilateral treaty or from a rule of customary international 
law, any other State party to the multilateral treaty or bound by the relevant rule of customary international law, if it is 
established that 
(i) the right has been created or is established ш its favour, 
(u) the infringement of the right by the act of a State necessarily affects the enjoyment of the rights or performance of 
the obligations of the other State parties to the multilateral treaty or bound by the rule of customary international law, 
or 
(in) the right has been created or is established for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
(f) if the right infringed by the act of a State anses from a multilateral treaty, any other State party to the multilateral 
treaty, if it is established that the right has been expressly stipulated in that treaty for the protection of the collective 
interests of the State parties thereto 
3 In addition, "injured State" means, if the internationally wrongful act constitutes an international crime [and in the 
context of the rights and obligations of States under articles 14 and IS], all other States 
Article 6, Part Two, Cessation of wrongful conduct 
A State whose conduct constituting an internationally wrongful act having a continuing character is under the 
obligation to cease that conduct, without prejudice to the responsibility it has already incurred 
Article 6 bis. Part Two, Reparation 
1 The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act full 
reparation in the form of restitution m kind, compensation, satisfaction and assurances and guarantees on non-
repetition, as provided in articles 7, 8,10 and 10 bis, either singly or in combination 
2 In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the negligence or the wilful act or omission of 
(a) the injured State, or 
(b) a national ofthat State on whose behalf the claim is brought, 
which contributed to the damage 
3 The State which has committed the internationally wrongful act may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for the failure to provide full reparation 
Article 7, Part Two, Restitution in land 
The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act restitution 
in kind, that is, the re-establishment of the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and 
to the extent that restitution in kind 
(a) is not materially impossible, 
(b) would not involve a breach of an obligation arising from a peremptory norm of general international law, 
(c) would not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit which the injured State would gam from obtaining 
restitution in kind instead of compensation, or 
(d) would not seriously jeopardize the political independence or economic stability of the State which has committed 
the internationally wrongful act, whereas the injured State would not be similarly affected if it did not obtain 
restitution in kind 
Article 8, Part Two, Compensation 
1 The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act 
compensation for the damage caused by that act, if and to the extent that the damage is not made good by restitution in 
kind 
2 For the purposes of the present article, compensation covers any economically assessable damage sustained by the 
injured State, and may include interest and, where appropriate, loss of profits 
Article 10, Part Two, Satisfaction 
1 The injured State is entitled to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act 
satisfaction for the damage, in particular moral damage, caused by that act, if and to the extent necessary to provide 
full reparation 
APPENDIX 375 
2 Satisfaction may take the form of one or more of the following 
(a) an apology, 
(b) nominal damages, 
(c) in cases of gross infringement of the rights of the injured State, damages reflecting the gravity of the infringement, 
(d) in cases where the internationally wrongful act arose from the serious misconduct of officials or from criminal 
conduct of officials or private parties, disciplinary action against, or punishment of, those responsible 
3 The right of the injured State to obtain satisfaction does not justify demands which would impair the dignity of the 
State which has committed the internationally wrongful act 
Article 10 bis, Part Two, Assurances and guarantees of non-repeübon 
The injured State is entitled, where appropriate, to obtain from the State which has committed an internationally 
wrongful act assurances or guarantees of non-repebüon of the wrongful act 
Article 11, Part Two, Countermeasures by an injured State 
1 As long as the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act has not complied with its obligations 
under Articles 6 to 10 bis, the injured State is entitled to take countermeasures, that is, subject to the conditions and 
restrictions set forth in articles 12, 13 and 14, not to comply with one or more of its obligations towards the State 
which has committed the internationally wrongful act as necessary in the light of the response to its demands by the 
State which has committed the internationally wrongful act in order to induce it to comply with its obligations under 
articles 6 to 10 bis 
2 Where a countermeasure against a State which has committed an internationally wrongful act involves a breach 
of an obligation towards a third State, such a breach cannot be justified as against the third State by reason of 
paragraph 1 
Article 13, Part Two, Proportionality 
Any countermeasure taken by an injured State shall not be out of proportion to the degree of gravity of the 
internationally wrongful act and the effects thereof on the injured State 
Article 14, Part Two, Prohibited countermeasures 
An injured State shall not resort, by way of countermeasure, to 
(a) the threat or use of force as prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations, 
(b) extreme economic or political coercion designed to endanger the territorial integrity or political independence of 
the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act 
(c) any conduct which infringes the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents, 
(d) any conduct which derogates from basic human rights, or 
(e) any other conduct in contravention of a peremptory norm of general international law 
Draft articles proposed by the Drafting Committee 
(Text in 5 EJH, 1994, pp 118-119) 
Article 12, Part Two, Conditions relating to resort to counter-measures 
1 An injured State may not take counter-measures unless 
(a) it has recourse to a [binding/third party] dispute settlement procedure which both the injured State and the State 
which has committed the internationally wrongful act are bound to use under any relevant treaty to which they are 
parties, or 
(b) in the absence of such a treaty, it offers a [binding/third party] dispute settlement procedure to the State which has 
committed the internationally wrongful act 
2 The right of the injured State to take counter-measures is suspended when and to the extent that an agreed [binding] 
dispute settlement procedure is being implemented in good faith by the State which has committed the internationally 
wrongful act, provided that the internationally wrongful act has ceased 
3 A failure by the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act to honour a request or order emanating 
from the dispute settlement procedure shall terminate the right of suspension of the right of the injured State to take 
counter-measures 
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Draft articles proposed by special rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz 
(Texts in Arangio-Ruiz, G , Seventh Report of State Responsibility, A/CN 4/469/Add 1, 4 p p , 2-4, and Arangio-Ruiz, 
G, Seventh Report of State Responsibility, A/CN 4/469/Add 2, 3 pp, 3) 
Article 15, Part Two 
Without prejudice [In addition] to the legal consequences entailed by an international debet under articles 6 to 14 of 
the present Part, an international crime as defined in article 19 of Part One entails the special or supplementary 
consequences set forth in articles 16 to 19 below 
Article 16, Part Two 
1 Where an internationally wrongful act of a State is an international crime, every State is entitled, subject to the 
condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below, to demand that the State which is committing or has committed 
the crime should cease its wrongful conduct and provide full reparation in conformity with articles 6 to 10 bis, as 
modified by paragraphs 2 and 3 below 
2 The right of every injured State to obtain restitution in kind as provided in article 7 shall not be subject to the 
limitations set forth in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 of the said article, except where restitution in kind 
would jeopardize the existence of the wrongdoing State as an independent member of the international community, its 
territorial integrity or the vital needs of its people 
3 Subject to the preservation of its existence as an independent member of the international community and to the 
safeguarding of its territorial integrity and the vital needs of its people, a State which has committed an international 
crime is not entitled to benefit from any limitations of its obligation to provide satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repention as envisaged m articles 10 and 10 bis, relating to the respect of its dignity, or from any rules or principles of 
international law relating to the protection of its sovereignty and liberty 
Article 17, Part Two 
1 Where the internationally wrongful act of a State is an international crune, every State whose demands under article 
16 have not met with an adequate response from the State which has committed or is committing the crime is entitled, 
subject to the condition set forth in paragraph 5 of article 19 below, to resort to countermeasures under the conditions 
and restrictions set forth ш articles 11, 13 and 14 as modified by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present article 
2 The condition set forth in paragraph S of article 19 below does not apply to such urgent, interim measures as are 
required to protect the rights of an injured State or to limit the damage caused by the international crime 
3 The requirement of proportionality set forth in article 13 shall apply to countermeasures taken by any State so that 
such measures shall not be out of proportion to the gravity of the international crime. 
Article 18, Part Two 
1 Where an internationally wrongful act is an international crime, all States shall, subject to the condition set forth m 
paragraph 5 of article 19 below 
(a) refrain from recognizing as legal or valid, under international or national law, the situation created by the 
international crime, 
(b) abstain from any act or omission which may assist the wrongdoing State in maintaining the said situation, 
(c) assist each other in carrying out their obligations under subparagraphs (a) and (b) and, in so far as possible, 
coordinate their respective reactions through available international bodies or ad hoc arrangements, 
(d) refrain from hindering in any way, by act or omission, the exercise of the rights or powers provided for in articles 
16 and 17, 
(e) fully implement the aut dedere aut ludicare principle, with respect to any individuals accused of crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind the commission of which has brought about the international crime of the State or 
contributed thereto, 
(f) lake part, jointly or individually, in any lawful measures decided or recommended by any international organization 
of which they are members against the State which has committed or is committing the international crime, 
(g) facilitate, by all possible means, the adoption or implementation of any lawful measures intended to remedy any 
emergency situations caused by the international crime 
2 Subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph S of article 19 below, the State which has committed or is 
committing an international crime shall not oppose fact-finding operations or observer missions in its territory for the 
verification of compliance with its obligations of cessation or reparation 
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Article 19, Part Two 
1 Any State Member of the United Nations Party to the present Convention claiming that an international crime has 
been or is being committed by one or more States shall bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly or 
the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter 
2 If the General Assembly or the Security Council resolves by a qualified majority of the Members present and voting 
that the allegation is sufficiently substantiated as to justify the grave concern of the international community, any 
Member State of the United Nations Party to the present Convention, including the State against which the claim is 
made, may bring the matter to the International Court of Justice by unilateral application for the Court to decide by a 
judgment whether the alleged international crime has been or is being committed by the accused State 
3 The qualified majority referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be, in the General Assembly, a two-thirds 
majority of the members present and voting, and in the Security Council, nine members present and voting including 
permanent members, provided that any members directly concerned shall abstain from voting 
4 In any case where the International Court of Justice is exercising its competence in a dispute between two or more 
Member States of the Umted Nations Parties to the present Convention, on the basis of a title of jurisdiction other than 
paragraph 2 of the present article, with regard to the existence of an international crime of State, any other Member 
State of the Umted Nations which is a party to the present Convention shall be entitled to join, by unilateral 
application, the proceedings of the Court for the purpose of paragraph 5 of the present article 
5 A decision of the International Court of Justice that an international crime has been or is being committed shall 
fulfil the condition for the implementation, by any Member State of the Umted Nations Party to the present 
Convention, of the special or supplementary legal consequences of international crimes of States as contemplated in 
articles 16,17 and 18 of the present Part 
Article 20, Part Two 
The provisions of the articles of the present Part are without prejudice to 
(ι) any measures decided upon by the Security Council of the Umted Nations in the exercise of its functions under the 
provisions of the Charter, 
(u) the inherent right of self-defence as provided in Article 51 of the Charter 
Article 7, Part Three 
1 Any dispute which may anse between any States with respect to the legal consequences of a crime under articles 6 
to 19 of Part Two shall be settled by arbitration on either parly's proposal 
2 Failing referral of the dispute to an arbitral tribunal within four months from either party's proposal, the dispute 
shall be referred unilaterally, by either party, to the International Court of Justice 
3 The competence of the Court shall extend to any issues of fact or law under the present articles other than the 
question of existence and attribution previously decided under article 19 of Part Two 
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